Интерпретации маскулинности в мужских молодежных сообществах Махачкалы тема диссертации и автореферата по ВАК РФ 00.00.00, кандидат наук Поляков Святослав Игоревич

• Поляков Святослав Игоревич
• кандидат наук
• 2022

Оглавление диссертации кандидат наук Поляков Святослав Игоревич

Постановка проблемы

Степень разработанности проблемы

Исследовательский вопрос

Цель и задачи исследования

Объект и предмет исследования

Ограничения исследования

Теоретические основания

Методы исследования

Научный вклад исследования в развитие предметного поля

Положения, выносимые на защиту

Заключение

Список использованных источников:

Приложение А Статья «Борцовская маскулинность в Дагестане как локальная гегемония»

Приложение Б Статья "Peers/strangers/others? The youth of Dagestan in search of group identities"

Приложение В Статья «Masculinity Constructing in Dagestani Male Youth Communities»

Приложение Г Статья «Masculinity constructing among street workout youth in post-Soviet Dagestan»

Работа выполнена в федеральном государственном автономном образовательном учреждении высшего образования «Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики».

Защита проводится по трём публикациям, представленным в приложениях А-Г:

Поляков С. И. Борцовская маскулинность в Дагестане как локальная гегемония //Социологические исследования. — 2021. — №. 10. — С

Omelchenko E. L., Poliakov S., Maiboroda A. Peers/strangers/others? The youth of Dagestan in search of group identities // Cultural Studies. 2019. — Vol. 33. — No. 5. — P. 841-865. Poliakov S. Masculinity Constructing in Dagestani Male Youth Communities // Europe-Asia Studies. — 2022 (в печати)

Poliakov, S. Masculinity constructing among street workout youth in post-Soviet Dagestan // Sport in Society. 2022. — Vol 25. — No. 2. — P

Другие публикации автора по теме диссертации:

Омельченко Е. Л., Поляков С. И. Концепт культурной сцены как теоретическая перспектива и инструмент анализа городских молодежных сообществ // Социологическое обозрение. — 2017. — Т. 16. — № 2. — С

Поляков С. И. Молодежная сцена уличного воркаута, Махачкала // В кн.: Молодежь в городе: культуры, сцены и солидарности / Сост.: Е. Л. Омельченко; науч. ред.: Е. Л. Омельченко. — М. : Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2020. — Гл. 14. — С

Poliakov S., Maiboroda A. Understanding the Gender Dimensions of Youth Cultural Scenes: A Youth Ethnography // Youth in Putin's Russia / Ed. by E. L. Omelchenko. Palgrave Macmillan,

Омельченко Е. Л., Поляков С. И. Концепт культурной сцены как теоретическая перспектива и инструмент анализа городских молодежных сообществ // В кн.: Молодежь в городе: культуры, сцены и солидарности / Сост.: Е. Л. Омельченко; науч. ред.: Е. Л. Омельченко. — М. : Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2020. — С

Поляков С. И., Епанова Ю. В. Радикализация и неравенство в нарративах второго городского поколения мусульманской северокавказской молодежи // Мониторинг общественного мнения: Экономические и социальные перемены. — 2020. — № 3. — С

Научные конференции, на которых были представлены результаты исследования:

Стать взрослым в современном обществе: исследования практик взросления и представлений о зрелости (Санкт-Петербург, 30 декабря 2019). Доклад: Стать взрослым в

современном обществе: исследования практик взросления и представлений о зрелости

XIX Апрельская международная научная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества (Москва, 10-13 апреля 2018). Доклад: Сопротивление социально-экономическому исключению в повседневных практиках воркаут-сцены Махачкалы»

XXI Апрельская международная научная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества (Москва, 12 апреля - 29 мая 2020). Доклад: Стили маскулинности дагестанской низкоресурсной молодежи: на примере сообщества уличного воркаута Махачкалы

Международная конференция «Городские молодежные культуры: солидарности, креативность, активизм» (Санкт-Петербург, 30 ноября — 1 декабря, 2017) Доклад: Resistance via practices: workout scene of Makhachkala in the social landscape of Dagestan (Сопротивление через практики: воркаут сцена Махачкалы в социальном ландшафте Дагестана)

Введение диссертации (часть автореферата) на тему «Интерпретации маскулинности в мужских молодежных сообществах Махачкалы»

Постановка проблемы

Настоящее диссертационное исследование вносит вклад в дебаты о способах и условиях конструирования актуальных мужских идентичностей в современном мире. В академической литературе отмечается, что масштабные изменения в экономике и обществе, с одной стороны, и прогресс социальных движений, выступающих за эмансипацию групп, дискриминируемых на основании гендерной и сексуальной идентичности, с другой подрывают структурные и культурные основания гегемонной маскулинности самых массовых мужских групп, создавая предпосылки для пересмотра традиционных мужских ролей и возникновение новых образцов и форм маскулинности [Anderson 2010, McCormack, M; Anderson 2011; Kimmel 2018; Ваньке, Тартаковская 2016]. В это же время эти изменения часто сопровождаются фрустрациями относительно девальвации мужского статуса, утраты социальных вознаграждений за исполнение гендерных ролей, несоответствия реального поведения культурному эталону, что ведет к росту дискуссий в академическом и публичном пространстве относительно кризиса маскулинности [Roberts 2014; Jordan, Chandler 2019; McDowell 2003].

Вместе с тем, исследователи признают, что концепция гегемонной маскулинности, которая является центральной теоретико-методологической парадигмой в изучении мужских идентичностей, опирается на академическую традицию и эмпирический материал стран «первого мира», что в значительной степени снижает ее эпистемологическую ценность. В связи с этим формулируется задача расширения дебатов за счет нюансированого изучения и описания гегемонных и негегемоных форм маскулинности в периферийных странах и регионах с привлечением теорий концепций и данных, отражающих страновую и региональную специфику [Connell 2012; Messerschmidt 2012). Исследования, которые фокусируются на мусульманских странах и регионах, комбинируют перспективу гендерных исследований с постколониальной и интерсекциональной оптикой [Aslam 2014, Ghoussoub 2000; Conway-Long 2003, Khan 2018, Metcalf 2000, Monterescu 2006]. В них в частности, отмечается, что социальные изменения, затрагивающие позиции мужчин в обществе и семье, часто рассматриваются и оцениваются самими мужчинами как последствия западного доминирования [Aslam 2014; Conway-Long 2003]. Такое восприятие также отражает позицию социальных групп, меньше всего выигрывающих от глобализации и вестернизации [Conway-Long 2003]. Поскольку многие регионы бывшей колониальной периферии, являются аренами длительных вооруженных конфликтов, опыт насилия, наряду с социально-экономическими изменениями, может рассматриваться как один из ключевых источников кризисных интерпретаций маскулинности [Sa'ar, Yahia-Younis 2008].

В рамках настоящего исследования мы применяем эту оптику к трансформирующемуся периферийному обществу со сложной этнической и религиозной композицией, каковым является Дагестан. Мы заостряем внимание на следующих структурных и культурных трансформациях постсоветского периода: деиндустриализации, вызванной политическим крахом Советского Союза и переходом от плановой к рыночной экономике, переходом от традиционного к современному обществу, урбанизации, реисламизации и раскручивании спирали вооруженного насилия в контексте «войны с терроризмом» [Стародубровская и др 2011; Стародубровская, Казенин 2014]. Описанные черты формируют контекст, значимый для понимания актуальной конфигурации гендерного порядка и формирования мужских идентичностей в республике Дагестан. Фокус на молодежной маскулинности позволяет еще больше радикализовать исследовательскую оптику, так как социальное значение молодости связано с ожиданиями относительно активного «делания гендера» через освоение соответствующих практик и образцов мужественности, а также утверждения и отстаивания собственного варианта мужской идентичности в условиях проблематичности других маркеров социального статуса.

Степень разработанности проблемы

Эмпирические исследования маскулинности в различных сферах общественной жизни, [Anderson 2010, McDowell 2003, Messner et al. 1995, Messerschmidt 2012] показывают, что культурная глобализация, рост транснационального капитализма, институциональные изменения в сфере занятости, образования, государственного управления и семьи создают предпосылки для изменения традиционного гендерного порядка и формирования новых нормативных образцов маскулинности. В частности, развитие так называемых «новых видов спорта» сигнализирует о сдвиге к более инклюзивным по отношению к женщинам и другим мужчинам, менее соревновательным и не сфокусированным на физическом доминировании маскулинным идентичностям [Atkinson 2011, Pringle & Phillips 2013, Wheaton 2004]. В то же время исследования мужских идентичностей в периферийных, в частности, мусульманских обществах Ближнего Востока [Aslam 2014, Ghoussoub 2000; Conway-Long 2006; Rizk, Makarem, 2015; Khan 2018] показывают, что характер и направление изменений во многом зависят от локальной культурной динамики. Характерной чертой отечественной дискуссии о маскулинности можно считать фокус на взаимосвязи конкретных сценариев мужской идентичности с социальными и экономическими трансформациями поздне- и постсоветского периодов. В рамках этого направления изучаются возникновение и функционирование символических и

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дискурсивных конструкций мужественности [Кон 2010а; 2010б, Рябов 2012; Здравомыслова и Темкина 2002; Мещеркина 2002; Чернова 2007], стратегии поведения и самопозиционирования, актуальные для наиболее массовых групп мужчин на рынке труда [Ashwin & Lytkina 2004; Ваньке; Тартаковская 2016; Kiblitskaya 2000], диверсификация культурных моделей и сценариев маскулинности в контексте родительства, брака, сексуальной жизни и т.д. [Кон 2006; 2010, Рождественская 2020, Роткрих 2011]. Молодые мужчины часто оказывают в центре дискуссии о маскулинности постольку, поскольку молодежь (и подростки) традиционно рассматривается как главный индикатор социальных изменений и одновременно главный объект моральных паник, связанных с гендером, сексуальностью и телесностью. Ключевыми для этого направления являются такие исследовательские сюжеты, как мужская социализация в контексте образовательных институтов [Haywood & Mac an Ghaill, 2012; Connolly 2006[, связь мужских идентичностей с другими социальными категориями (класс, раса, этничность) (McDowell 2011; Nayak 2006; Nayak, Kehily 2013; Skeggs, 1997; Roberts, 2001; Archer, 2001; O'Donnell, Sharpe 2002), молодежная и подростковая деликвентность [Messerschmidt 1997], досуг и потребление [Griffin 1997], выход на рынок труда и трудовые карьеры (Nayak 2006), сексуальность, гетеросексуальность и гомофобия [Kimmel 2008].

Как отмечают специалисты [Pilkington et al 2001], в современном обществе роль ключевых социальных арен, на которых происходит конструирование и артикуляция новых гендерных укладов, постепенно перенимают на себя сообщества, связанные с жизненными стилями, компаниями и солидарностями. В связи с этим особый интерес представляет этнография конкретных молодежных сообществ, вскрывающая связь между конкретными культурными практиками, стратегиями и аффилиациями молодых людей и их маскулинными идентичностями В России этнографические исследования подобного рода находятся в процессе становления. В этих работах на отечественном эмпирическом материале прослеживается конструирование мужских идентичностей в контексте выбора культурных стратегий и солидарностей [Pilkington 1996; Pilkington et al 2001; Pilkington, Omelchenko 2013; Громов 2013], жизненных стилей [Костерина 2011], а также конкретных жизненных планов различных групп российской молодежи [Исупова 2020]. Несмотря на существование корпуса работ, в котором раскрывается специфика гендерных отношений в республиках Северного Кавказа, в частности, в Дагестане [Лыткина 2013; Сиражудинова 2013; 2015], молодежная дагестанская маскулиность до сих пор специально не изучалась. Вместе с тем, прояснение этого вопроса не только вносит вклад в развитие гендерной теории, но и, как показывают аналогичные исследования, проведенные в других регионах, открывают путь к более глубокому пониманию региональных особенностей

функционирования социальных и политических институтов, также проблем неравенства, насилия и политического радикализма. Данное диссертационное исследование призвано закрыть этот пробел.

Исследовательский вопрос

Исследовательский вопрос можно сформулировать следующим образом: Как конструируются и воспроизводятся групповые интерпретации маскулинность в мужских молодежных сообществах Махачкалы. Акцент делается на групповом, интерсубъектном измерении молодежной маскулинности, что отражает теоретические предпосылки о взаимосвязи маскулинности с гомосоциальностью и возрастающем значении групп сверстников в процессе перехода от детства к взрослости в условиях урбанизации и разложения традиционной семьи. Выбор Махачкалы как локации проведения исследования обусловлен тем, что этот город является основным пространством урбанизационных и модернизационных процессов в республике Дагестан.

Цель и задачи исследования

Цель исследования заключается в том, чтобы выявить специфику функционирования групповых интерпретаций маскулинности в мужских молодежных сообществах Махачкалы. Поставленная цель определяет круг задач исследования:

Опираясь на существующую академическую литературу, выявить характеристики социально-экономической и политической ситуации в республике Дагестан, значимо влияющие на конфигурацию гендерного порядка и конструирование маскулинностей махачкалинской мужской молодежи.

Реконструировать содержание гегемонного идеала мужественности, выделив смысловые конструкты и символические оппозиции, структурирующие дискурсивное пространство дагестанской молодежной маскулинности;

Определить репертуары гендерных практик, одобряемых жизненных карьер и культурных стратегий, обеспечивающих интерпретативную контекстуализацию гегемонных принципов в рамках рассматриваемых сообществ;

Описать структурные условия и механизмы поддержания групповых конструктов молодежной маскулинности;

Выявить интерсекциональные пересечения групповых интерпретаций маскулинности с актуальными групповыми идентичностями, выделяемыми на основе культурного и социального бэкграунда информантов,

Проанализировать влияние характера гомосоциальных связей в сообществах на

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формирование мужских идентичностей.

Объект и предмет исследования

Объектом исследования являются групповые конструкты маскулинности в мужских молодежных сообществах, а предметом исследования — смыслы, составляющие содержание этих конструктов. Эмпирическим объектами исследования являются участники мужских молодежных сообществ Махачкалы, образованные вокруг занятий вольной борьбой и дворового спорта (уличного воркаута). Участники обоих сообществ представляют самую массовую прослойку дагестанской молодежи, консервативное «моральное большинство», в котором существует консенсус относительно гендерной сегрегации и доминирования мужчин над женщинами. Фокус на молодежных маскулинностях важен, поскольку период хронологической молодости связан с активным конструированием мужских идентичностей при еще не сформированных диспозициях, которые обеспечивают осознанное согласие с гендерной судьбой. В этот период возможна рефлексия насчет содержания гендерных конструктов и ролей. Диссертационное исследование базируется на следующих предположениях: В условиях социально-экономической прекрасности основной массы городской молодежи актуализируется стратегии конструирования маскулинности, в которых высокой символической ценностью обладает неотчуждаемая форма мужского капитала — мужское тело, а основной социальной средой, в которой воспроизводятся и репрезентируются мужике идентичности, является спорт. Высокий потенциал конфликтности и насилия обусловливает социальный спрос на те версии маскулинности, которые опираются на силовое доминирование. При этом молодежные маскулинности конструируются с исламской религиозности как основной общественной идеологии и центральной символической оси региональной (дагестанской, северокавказской) идентичности. Вариативность индивидуальных вариантов маскулинности и степень их соответствия групповому идеалу зависит от характера гомосоциальных связей в конкретном молодежном сообществе.

Ограничения исследования

Основные ограничения исследования задаются качественной методологической

парадигмой, предполагающей участие исследователя в изучаемых процессах и влияние его

аксиологических и эпистемологических установок на результаты исследования, активную

субъектность объекта исследования в определении и объяснении социальной реальности,

субъект-субъектный характер отношений между исследователями и информантами. Цель

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качественного исследования заключается не в производстве истины как некоего соответствия объективному положению дел, а в исследовательской рефлексии жизненного мира изучаемых. Феминистская и постколониальная оптика гендерных исследований, обязывает исследователя рефлексировать собственную позицию в изучаемом поле, постулируя встроенность властных отношений в процессы производства и репрезентации знания. Применительно к моему исследованию это означает, что представленные репрезентации групповых конструктов маскулинности дагестанской молодежи не являются ни исчерпывающими, ни монопольными.

Теоретические основания

Концепт гегемонной маскулинности [Соппе11 2005] остается самой влиятельной теоретической рамкой в дискуссии о маскулинности, несмотря на критику. Согласно Коннелл, гегемонная маскулинность определяется как «конфигурация гендерной практики, которая воплощает в себе принятый в настоящее время ответ на проблему легитимности патриархата, который гарантирует (или принимается в качестве гарантии) доминирующее положение мужчин и подчинение женщин» [Соппе11 2005, Р. 77]. Гегемония возникает в том случае, если имеется соотношение между культурным идеалом и институциональной властью (индивидуальной, или коллективной). Это соотношение не является раз и навсегда заданным, оно постоянно проблематизируется как изменениями социальных институтов, так и противоречиями, возникающими внутри самого гендерного порядка. Понятие гегемонной маскулинности существует лишь в отношении к другим типам маскулинности: подчиненной, сообщнической и маргинализованной [Соппе11 2005]. Подчиненная маскулинность характеризует группы мужчин, находящихся в самом низу гендерной иерархии (например, гомосексуалов). Сообщническая маскулинность является формой проявления маскулинности, присущей большинству мужчин. Она выражается в конформном отношении к господствующему идеалу маскулинности, что позволяет получать патриархатный дивиденд в категориях «чести, престижа и права командовать» [Соппе11 2005, Р. 82]. Маргинализованная маскулинность возникает на пересечении гендера с классом, расой, возрастом, этничностью как маскулинность социально депривированных и стигматизированных групп мужчин (андеркласс, мигранты, этнические и расовые меньшинства). Все указанные типы маскулинности формируются в более широком институциональном контексте гендерного порядка, который реализуется в отношениях власти, производства и катексиса [Соппе11 2005, Р. 74]. При этом властные отношения являются основным элементом структуры гендера.

Последовательное развитие концепта гегемонной маскулинности привело к признанию

значимости географического контекста. Гегемония конструируется на локальном уровне, охватывающем взаимодействия лицом-к-лицу внутри семей, организаций и первичных коллективов, на региональном уровне, в контексте нации-государства, и на глобальном уровне, в контексте международной международной политики, бизнеса и медиа [Connell, Messerschmidt 2005].

В эмпирических исследованиях мужских идентичностей концепция гегемонной маскулинности синтезируется с бурдьевистскими идеями «культурного капитала», «габитуса» и «поля», которые применяются для концептуализации ресурсов, определяющих позицию индивидов в гендерной иерархии и описания взаимной обусловленности индивидуального опыта и структурных условий конструирования и воспроизводства маскулинности [Huppatz, Goodwin 2012; Anderson 2010; Waсqant 1995; Coles 2009].

Важным вкладом в адаптацию теории культурного капитала к гендерным исследованиям является концепция маскулинного габитуса [Behnke, Meuser 2001; Мещеркина 2022; Meuser 2003] как совокупности телесных и ментальных диспозиций, выступающих «естественным» основанием различения мужского и не-мужского и следовательно, социального воспроизводства гендерных различий. Жизнь в соответствии с мужским хабитусом порождает чувство габитуальной безопасности [Behnke & Meuser 2001], которое лежит в основе осознанного принятия гендерного порядка и своей позиции в нем [Janning 1991, цит. по Behnke & Meuser 2001].

Исследования мужчин и маскулинности [Bird 1996, Flood 2007; Hammaren, Johansson 2004[ подтверждают тезис, что жизни мужчин в значительной степени организованы вокруг отношений с другими мужчинами, что выражается в стремлении к созданию эксклюзивных гомосоциальных сообществ. Гомосоциальность, как отмечает Мещеркина, «глубоко функциональна с точки зрения потребности в социальном пространстве, "свободном" от женщин, в рамках которого коллективно разделяемые смыслы мужской жизни типизируются и приобретают межличностную значимость» [Мещеркина 2002, C. 274]. Таким образом, гомосоциальность характеризует групповое измерение маскулинности. Она играет ключевую роль в воспроизводстве гегемонной модели, функционируя как социальный механизм приведения к норме и отклонения ненормативного поведения. Другие авторы [Thurnell-Read 2012; Hammaren, Johansson 2004] также отмечают, что привлекательность мужских сообществ обеспечивается не столько соревновательностью и

исключением (вертикальная гомосоциальность), сколько позитивным опытом дружбы, доверия, солидарности (горизонтальная гомосоциальность).

Этнографические исследования российских молодежных сообществ и сцен [Pilkington 1996; Pilkington et al 2001; Pilkington and Omelchenko 2013, Омельченко 2013] показывают значимость культурных стратегий и глобально-локального позиционирования для конструирования молодежных гендерных идентичностей. Значимой осью культурной поляризации в российском контексте выступает оппозиция продвинутой (иногда -прогрессивной, альтернативной) и нормальной (обычной) молодежи. Выстраивание культурных иерархий внутри молодежных социальностей происходит на основе взаимного позиционирования своих мини-групп по отношению к «Другим», которые определялись через особенности культурных пристрастий (музыка, кино, медиа), отношение к Западу, характер потребления, творческую и коммерческую деятельность [Омельченко 2013].

Методы исследования

Работа выполнена в качественной методологической парадигме с использованием исследовательской стратегии сравнения двух случаев. Первый кейс, рассматривающий практики и представления участников махачкалинского сообщества уличного воркаута, был реализован автором данного исследования в 2017-2020 гг. в ходе исследовательских экспедиций в Махачкалу в рамках проекта «Созидательные поля межэтнического взаимодействия и молодежные культурные сцены российских городов», реализованного Центром молодежных исследований Высшей школы экономики (грант Российского научного фонда № 15-18-00078) под руководством Е.Л. Омельченко. Весь эмпирический материал в рамках исследовательского кейса уличного воркаута собран автором данной работы при поддержке сотрудников ЦМИ Д.А. Омельченко, А.В. Майборода, Е.Онегиной. Результаты данного этапа представлены в публикациях:

Poliakov, S. Masculinity constructing among street workout youth in post-Soviet Dagestan // Sport in Society. — 2022. — Vol 25. — No. 2. — P. 353-368.

Омельченко Е. Л., Поляков С. И. Концепт культурной сцены как теоретическая перспектива и инструмент анализа городских молодежных сообществ // Социологическое обозрение. — 2017. — Т. 16. — № 2. — С.111-132.

Поляков С. И. Молодежная сцена уличного воркаута, Махачкала // В кн.: Молодежь в городе: культуры, сцены и солидарности / Сост.: Е. Л. Омельченко; науч. ред.: Е. Л. Омельченко. — М. : Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2020. — Гл. 14. — С. 400-420.

Poliakov S., Maiboroda A. Understanding the Gender Dimensions of Youth Cultural Scenes: A Youth Ethnography// Youth in Putin's Russia / Ed. by E. L. Omelchenko. — Palgrave

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МастШап, 2021. — Р. 91-136.

Омельченко Е. Л., Поляков С. И. Концепт культурной сцены как теоретическая перспектива и инструмент анализа городских молодежных сообществ // В кн.: Молодежь в городе: культуры, сцены и солидарности / Сост.: Е. Л. Омельченко; науч. ред.: Е. Л. Омельченко. М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2020. — Гл. 2. — С.92-109.

Второй кейс, эмпирическим объектом которого стали участники секций вольной борьбы в г. Махачкала, реализован в рамках индивидуального аспирантского проекта «Маскулинности молодежи Дагестана» (грант Российского фонда фундаментальных исследований № 19-311-90056). Автор этой работы совершил две экспедиции — в марте 2020 и июне 2021 года — для сбора эмпирического материала. Результаты этого этапа нашли отражение в статье Поляков С. И. Борцовская маскулинность в Дагестане как локальная гегемония //Социологические исследования. — 2021. — №. 10. — С. 116-124.

В рамках обоих кейсов комбинировался метод полуструктурированного глубинного биографического интервью с невключенными наблюдениями и неструктурированными беседами. Гайд интервью включал в себя вопросы, которые позволяют реконструировать социальный бэкграунд и жизненную траекторию информантов, а также их представления об идеальной и нормативной маскулинности. Метод наблюдения использовался как для верификации тех сведений, которые были получены в коммуникации с информантами, так и для схватывания слабо рефлексируемых и невербализованных аспектов социальной реальности. Общая эмпирическая база диссертационного исследования составила:

— 30 глубинных полуструктурированных биографических интервью с воспитанниками секций вольной борьбы, действующими и бывшими борцами вольного стиля в возрасте от 14 до 35 лет, а также тренерами по вольной борьбе в г. Махачкала.

— 29 глубинных полуструктурированных биографических интервью с подростками и молодыми мужчинами в возрасте от 14 до 25 лет — участниками сообщества уличного воркаута в г. Махачкала и его спутнике г. Каспийске.

— 68 часов наблюдений и неструктурированных бесед с действующими и бывшими уличными воркаутерами и борцами вольного стиля, их друзьями, родителями и родственниками.

Рекрутинг проводился в спортивных организациях (детско-юношеские спортивные школы, официальные и неофициальные секции борьбы) и местах групповых тренировок (стадионы, пляжи, школьные спортивные площадки), тематических сообществах в социальных сетях. Также использовались личные сети исследователя, сформированные в ходе многократных исследовательских экспедиций в Дагестан в 2015-2017 гг., и рекрутирование методом «снежного кома».

Для обработки и осмысления собранных данных использовалась комбинированная стратегия, совмещающего для производства теоретических суждений (теорий низкого уровня) о разделяемых участниками социальных интеракций смыслах. Анализ проводился в программе NVivo. Результаты сравнительного исследования обеих кейсов представлены в статье Poliakov S. Masculinity Constructing in Dagestani Male Youth Communities // Europe-Asia Studies. — 2022 (в печати)

Научный вклад исследования в развитие предметного поля

Диссертационное исследование вносит вклад в дискуссию о трансформации маскулинности в контексте масштабных социальных, экономических и политических сдвигов, которые ведут к реконфигурации гендерного порядка и проблематизации традиционных культурных моделей мужской идентичности. Опираясь на эмпирический материал Дагестана, данная работа призвана восполнить недопредставленность конкретного локального (регионального) контекста в академически исследованиях маскулинности, и способствует уточнению и ревизии доминирующих в академическом дискурсе концептуализации маскулинности, сформулированных преимущественно на материале западных обществ, находящихся в «центре» глобальной мир-системы. С этой точки зрения, диссертация отвечает актуальной задаче нюансированого изучения и описания гегемонных и негегемоных форм маскулинности в периферийных странах и регионах с привлечением теорий концепций и данных, отражающих страновую и региональную специфику [Connell 2012, Messerschmidt 2012]. В рамках исследования автором была собрана и проанализирована эмпирическая база, включающая 59 глубинных полуструктурированных биографических интервью с участниками махачкалинских молодежных сообществ и их социальным окружением и 68 часов наблюдений и неструктурированных бесед. По результатам исследования написано и опубликовано 5 статей в журналах, индексируемых в Q1 и Q2 библиометрических систем Scopus и WoS. Разработана теоретико-методологическая рамка для нюансированного описания процессов конструирования маскулинности с учетом комплексной этнической композиции и религиозной ситуации, колониального исторического бэкграунда, высокого конфликтного потенциала, характеризующих выбранный регион. Впервые предпринята попытка реконструкции маскулинности как системы смыслов и практик, организующей отношения власти и неравенства в Дагестане в конкретной региональной социально-экономической и этноконфессиональной ситуации, а также дано детальное описание коллективных конструктов маскулинности двух групп молодых мужчин — борцов вольного стиля и уличных спортсменов. Впервые дано описание и проведена социологическая

Список литературы диссертационного исследования кандидат наук Поляков Святослав Игоревич, 2022 год

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Статья поступила: 08.06.21. Принята к публикации: 17.08.21.

WRESTLER'S MASCULINITY IN DAGESTAN AS A LOCAL HEGEMONY POLIAKOV S.I.

National Research University Higher School of Economics (St. Petersburg), Russia

Sviatoslav I. POLIAKOV, Research Fellow, Centre for Youth Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics, St.-Petersburg, Russia ([e-mail]).

Acknowledgements. The reported study was funded by RFBR, project No. 19-311-90056.

Abstract. The article analyzes the reproduction of hegemonic masculinity in the local context, using the example of masculinity of freestyle wrestlers in the Republic of Dagestan, a multinational subject of the Russian Federation dominated by the Muslim population. Based on 20 semi-structured in-depth biographical interviews with current and former wrestlers, as well as interviews with 15 young Dagestani men not involved in wrestling practices, I discover four key mechanisms of support for hegemonic masculinity. The functioning of wrestling as a mass sport in Dagestan, due to the sport specialization of the republic, leads to the generalization of the ideal of masculinity and related practices. Regular recruitment of wrestlers into the political elite thus solving the issue of its own legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, supports the associations of this variant of male subjectivity with social prestige, power and success. The wrestlers' alliance with religious (Islamic) elites provides their masculinity with ideological legitimation. The transition from traditional to modern society due to late urbanization generates mass frustration regarding men's loss of control over the domestic sphere and the upbringing of their sons fraught with a crisis of reproduction of proper masculinity. In this context, freestyle wrestling sections function as an institution for maintaining the power of older men over younger ones.

Keywords: hegemonic masculinity, Dagestan, freestyle wrestling, mass sports, power of Elders.

REFERENCES

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Elites]. No. 5: 387-417. DOI: 10.31119/pe.2018.5.14. (In Russ.) Lytkina T. (2010) Transforming the Gender Regime: An Ethnosociological Analysis of Modernization in the North Caucasus. Laboratorium:

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Lytkina T.S. (2013) Transformation of Traditional Masculinity in the Modern North Caucasus. In: Tartakovskaya I.N. (ed.) Ways to Be a Man: Transformations of Masculinity in the 21st Century. Moscow: Zven'ya: 235-249. (In Russ.)

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Solonenko M. (2012) Wrestlers for Power: Sports Communities and their Role in the Political Life of Dagestan. In: Karpov Y. (ed.) Society as the Subject and the Agent of Power: Essays on the Political Anthropology of the Caucasus. St. Petersburg: Peterburgskoe vostokovedenie: 91-110. (In Russ.)

Starodubrovskaya I.V., Kazenin K.I. (2014) North Caucasian City: Territory of Conflicts. Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennost' [Social Sciences and Contemporary World]. No. 6: 70-82. (In Russ.)

Starodubrovskaya I.V., Zubarevich N.V., Sokolov D.V., Intigrinova T.P., Mironova N.I., Magomedov G.Kh. (2011) The Northern Caucasus: A Modernization Challenge. Moscow: Delo. (In Russ.)

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Received: 08.06.21. Accepted: 17.08.21.

Приложение Б Статья "Peers/strangers/others? The youth of Dagestan in search of group identities"

Omelchenko E. L., Poliakov S., Maiboroda A. Peers/strangers/others? The youth of Dagestan in search of group identities // Cultural Studies. 2019. — Vol. 33. — No. 5. P. 841-865. DOI: 10.1080/09502386.2018.1544650

The article discusses the map of youth cultural scenes in Makhachkala, the capital of the Republic of Dagestan, and the third largest city in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. The uniqueness of Makhachkala's youth space is associated with the specific geopolitical and cultural circumstances of the history of the republic. This is set against the context of post-Soviet transformation: rising unemployment and severe inequality; the revival of Islam; radical changes in the gender regime, the ethnic and religious composition of Dagestanis; and a complicated political agenda involving the struggle with radicalization, and the growth of a terrorist threat. Thus, we consider it important and timely to study the local youth socialities, which exist in such a contradictory context. The research that underpins the article is focused on two opposing youth scenes in Makhachkala: street workout (inscribed in the context of the local patriarchal regime), and the anime community (symbolically resisting the pressure of social 'normativity'). Using the theoretical concept of cultural scenes and a case-study approach (indepth interviews, participant observation, community mapping), the potential to categorize youth that are not centred (that is, who are outside the 'core' of the capitalist world-system) is critically considered through the opposition between subcultural and mainstream groups. The key aim of the article is to demonstrate the importance of using the construct of the 'other' (that which is alien or dangerous) as the main way to define the more subtle (often latent) structure of group identity and cultural capital of a community. This also describes the intra- and inter-group solidarities and the value conflicts of youth in a complex and contradictory local urban environment. In this case, the process of growing up and the socialization of youth involve the selection of different strategies of acceptance and resistance to the social order, the structure of normativity and images of success.

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To cite this article: Elena Omelchenko, Sviatoslav Poliakov & Alina Mayboroda (2019) Peers/ strangers/others? The youth of Dagestan in search of group identities, Cultural Studies, 33:5, 841-865, DOI: 10.1080/09502386.2018.1544650

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Peers/strangers/others? The youth of Dagestan in search of group identities

Elena Omelchenkoa, Sviatoslav Poliakovb and Alina Mayborodab

aDepartment of Sociology, National Research University - Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg, Russia; bResearcher at

the Center for Youth Studies, National Research

University - Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg, Russia

ABSTRACT

The article discusses the map of youth cultural scenes in Makhachkala, the capital of the Republic of Dagestan, and the third largest city in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. The uniqueness of Makhachkala's youth space is associated with the specific geopolitical and cultural circumstances of the history of the republic. This is set against the context of post-Soviet transformation: rising unemployment and severe inequality; the revival of Islam; radical changes in the gender regime, the ethnic and religious composition of Dagestanis; and a complicated political agenda involving the struggle with radicalization, and the growth of a terrorist threat. Thus, we consider it important and timely to study the local youth socialities, which exist in such a contradictory context. The research that underpins the article is focused on two opposing youth scenes in Makhachkala: street workout (inscribed in the context of the local patriarchal regime), and the anime community (symbolically resisting the pressure of social 'normativity'). Using the theoretical concept of cultural scenes and a case-study approach (indepth interviews, participant observation, community mapping), the potential to categorize youth that are not centred (that is, who are outside the 'core' of the capitalist world-system) is critically considered through the opposition between subcultural and mainstream groups. The key aim of the article is to demonstrate the importance of using the construct of the 'other' (that which is alien or dangerous) as the main way to define the more subtle (often latent) structure of group identity and cultural capital of a community. This also describes the intra- and inter-group solidarities and the value conflicts of youth in a complex and contradictory local urban environment. In this case, the process of growing up and the socialization of youth involve the selection of different strategies of acceptance and resistance to the social order, the structure of normativity and images of success.

KEYWORDS Youth; cultural scene; group identity; Caucasus

Introduction

The issues discussed in this article are at the intersection of two problematic areas of contemporary social science. Firstly, the well-documented

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subculture/post-subculture debate (Bennett 1999, Hodkinson 2002, Bennett and Kahn-Harris 2004, Hesmondhalgh 2005), particularly the discussion of the possibility of using subcultural or post-subcultural concepts to study the cultural practices of youth that are outside the 'core' of the capitalist worldsystem (Pilkington et al. 2002, Omelchenko 2013, Omelchenko and Sabirova 2016, Nayak 2016). Secondly, we are engaging with 'transition studies', which problematize a linear scheme of young people's transitions from a state of dependent childhood to an independent adult identity within the framework of developmental stage models such as school-to-work transition, housing transition and domestic transition (Morrow and Richards 1996, Coles 1997). In particular, it is noted that growing up in the post-modern world is individualized, and is becoming less attached to such sites of identity formation as the home, work and the church, which generates multiple, contradictory and fragmentary transition experiences for young people (Chisholm and Bois-Reymond 1993, Hollands 2002, Skelton 2002, Valentine and Skelton 2003, du Bois-Reymond and Chisholm 2006).

Analysis of empirical data and involvement in the ongoing transformations taking place in Russian society allow us to discuss significant and sometimes cardinal regroupings both within particular (specific, exclusive) youth communities and sub/cultural groups, and between them and the mainstream. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, polarization occurred between the groups of the so-called 'advanced' and 'normal' youth on the basis of their attitude to the West as a cultural, symbolic and geographical 'Other' (Pilkington et al. 2002). However, recent research, in particular, a survey among students of universities and colleges in Kazan, Makhachkala, St. Petersburg and Ulyanovsk indicate that, firstly, there is an increasing number of new vectors of solidarity and polarization, and secondly, that the space of youth cultures is becoming increasingly fragmented, and the trajectories of group identity formation are becoming increasingly complex. This is facilitated by such factors as the ongoing development of

information technologies and the virtualization of everyday life, the reinforcing of discursive and practical pressures from the authorities on youth, the conservative turn in domestic and foreign policy rhetoric, and a new round of geopolitical and ideological confrontation with the West (Omelchenko and Sabirova 2016). The empirical focus of this article is youth cultural life in Makhachkala, the capital of the Republic of Dagestan, which is one of the republics of the Russian Federation. Taking two 'polar', in many ways, urban scenes (street workout and anime), we will show how actual youth identities and socialities are designed and reproduced, both in discourse and in everyday life on the very periphery of a globalized world.

Methodologically, a fruitful step in this context is to combine the concept of solidarity, referring to the communicative nature of contemporary youth socialities and the concept of scene (Straw 1991, 2004, Shank 2011, Stahl 2004, Woo et al. 2015), linking the formation of solidarity with the specific social conditions of 'place'.

The context of growing up: Dagestan

Makhachkala is the capital of the Republic of Dagestan. It is the third largest city in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation and is located on the western coast of the Caspian Sea. It was founded as a military fortification in 1844 at the height of the Caucasus War, which ended with the suppression of the national liberation uprising of the peoples of the North Caucasus (Babich 2007). The settlement received the status of a city in 1857, and was named Petrovsk (later Port-Petrovsk) (Kazhlaev 1967, Tahnaeva 2007). In 1921 the city was renamed in honour of the Dagestani revolutionary Makhach Dakhadayev. The rapid development of Makhachkala occurred during the Soviet period. From the 1930s to the 1980s, the population of the city increased more than tenfold, and the creation of an urban infrastructure, an education system, and a basic industrial infrastructure occurred (Gadzhiev 2013).

In the early 1990s, Makhachkala, like other Russian cities, experienced deindustrialization caused by the political collapse of the Soviet Union, and the transition from a planned to a market economy. The city is no longer an industrial centre, and reoriented itself to serve the needs of agrarian economy. It has become a site of agriculture trade and a place of investment of agrarian capital (Starodubrovskaja 2014). The collapse of enterprises, economic turmoil and a difficult criminal situation led to the out-migration of some urban groups, primarily workers, employees and intellectuals. This migratory wave coincided with the counter-flow of migrants arriving from the rural (mountainous) areas of the republic (Kapustina 2014). The formation of the Makhachkala agglomeration over the period 2002-2010, which was accompanied by the partial inclusion of suburbs inhabited by the arriving rural migrants, caused an abrupt population growth. The share of 'old urbanites' is now only one-seventh of the population of present-day Makhachkala (Starodubrovskaja 2014).

The growth of unemployment and social polarization, which are largely stimulated by the total dependence of Dagestan on federal subsidies, are further important consequences of post-Soviet transformation. According to Enver Kisriev (2012), the property differentiation of the republic's population is one of the highest in Russia. One thousand families (about 6500 people or 0.3% of the population of Dagestan)

possess enormous resources and influence political relations in the Republic. 5- 7% of the population, having considerably improved their financial position, represent a higher-level property elite. Twenty to Twenty-five percent of the population make great efforts to keep at 2-5 times above the subsistence level. However, the majority of the population (about 70%) live in poverty.1

This scenario of transition is typical for most Russian cities, however, the regional specifics should be noted. Today, Dagestan is ethnically the most diverse region of the Russian Federation. Over 30 ethnic groups were recorded in the census (Goskomstat Rossii 2002, 2011), 14 of which are recognized as nationalities and registered in all official documents. These are Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins, Laks, Russians, Tabasarans, Azerbaijanis, Chechens, Nogais, Rutulians, Agulis, Tsakhurs and Tatas. The out-migration of the Russian population has been a distinctive feature of the post-Soviet period. The majority of this population lived in urban areas and was associated with industry. The share of the overall Russian population over the period from the early 1990s to 2010 has decreased from 10% to 3.6% (Ibragimov 2011).

A further important factor in the daily and political life of Dagestan is religion. The republic in the post-Soviet period became the epicentre of re-Islamization, manifested in the rapid growth of religious Islamic institutions, and the spontaneous desecularization of everyday life. As communist ideology lost its dominant position, religion 'regained its status as an officially approved faith, and is seen as an indispensable component of a "normal" way of life' (Kisriev 2000). The religious situation is characterized by a struggle between so-called traditional Sufi Islam, represented by the Muslim Spiritual Board of Dagestan and supporters of 'new' or 'pure' Islam, 'Salafis' (Wahhabis). After the armed conflict of 19992 and the official ban of so-called Wahhabism, this confrontation (in which not only religious actors but also federal and regional officials are involved) went into a latent phase, but did not cease (Makarov 2000, Souleimanov 2005, Walker 2005, Yarlykapov 2006, Kisriev 2007, Dzutsev 2011, Bobrovnikov

2017). In recent years, in connection with the situation in the Middle East and the creation of 'Islamic State', the rhetoric of the 'Salafis threat' has played out in Dagestan. New overtones, reinforced by extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances and tortures of civilians, have resulted in counter-terrorist operations against the radical underground, and persecution of communities that are in opposition to 'official' Islam (Campana and Ratelle 2014, Souleimanov and Petrtylova 2015).

The ethnic and religious 'otherness' of the republic, which is overlaid with real religious and near-religious conflicts, is often exploited beyond its borders to construct the image of an aggressive, dangerous 'Alien'. This portrayal is consistently reproduced, both on the everyday level and in political rhetoric, thus portraying the population of this subject of the Russian Federation as beyond all-Russian civil consensus (Barash 2012, Bedrik 2015). Outside the region itself, young Dagestanis, as 'persons of Caucasian nationality', (a cliche-stigma circulating in Russian public discourse) constantly face discrimination in the spheres of employment, housing, and in relationships with the police and authorities (Karpenko 2002, Skripkina 2010, Shnirelman 2014). The rhetoric of a 'struggle against extremism' justifies the federal authorities special attitude towards Dagestan, which in practice often results in the granting of special powers to law enforcement agencies, as well as the arbitrary restriction of civil rights and freedoms within the republic (Ibragimov and Matsuzato 2014, Starodubrovskaja 2014).

These factors create a 'controversial' space for young people growing up and experiencing socialization, in which different social logics and 'transition' scenarios co-exist and clash. The collapse of industry led to the dismantling of the Soviet 'from school to work' transition model, in which young people were led carefully through institutional steps that provided more or less equal access to public resources (education, culture, mobility) and positions in the labour market. The dominant pattern today can be called 'from high school to unemployment/bullshit job'. On the one hand, the prestige of higher education, which was formed through Soviet ideology still exists - practically all young people aim to go to university (Tagirbekova 2012). On the other hand, after graduating from an educational institution, a young Dagestani, as a rule, is long-term unemployed, or gets a low paid job that does not equate to the university diploma which has been received (and quite often bought) (Varshaver 2014). Unemployment in Dagestan has a young face: almost half of unemployed in Dagestan are young people from 15 to 30 years old. Also, 70% of the population of this group has no full-time job (Oficial'nyj sajt 2018). At the same time, both in the sphere of education and in the labour market, 'there are particular job placement rules, i.e. the main guarantee for quickly finding a good job is the presence of patrons or access to needed networks of social relations' (Trotsuk 2007). Through the media and via the Internet, young people become acquainted with another, and more westernized version of consumer society is practised. Being one of the key recipients of re-Islamization, young people actively join in both the competition of religious and secular projects, and in the confrontation between 'traditional' and 'new' Islam. Although in both camps there are representatives of all ages, the conflict between them is often represented by authorities as an intergenerational one and the Wahhabi problem - as a 'youth problem'. The religious life of young people is constantly the focus of close attention by the authorities and law enforcement agencies. In addition, most young Makhachkala residents live in a liminal situation between the city and the village. The process of young residents growing up takes place in the context of a prolonged transition from a labour society to a consumer society that is also accompanied by rapid changes in the identity of the place itself. The city is not revealed to them in the form of a ready-made landscape that ensures a consistency in terms of reading and experiencing the city space. Thus, before they become urbanites, they still have to rethink, or rather, to invent their own urbanism as a way of life.

In conditions of uncertainty related to the fragmentation of society and the crisis of social institutions in the transition from a labour to a consumer society, when none of the logics 'work as they should', informal sites for socialization and growing up - that we will designate as 'scenes' - increase in importance.

Scene as an informal site of socialization

Scene is a local social world, acting as an environment for city identities and solidarities, based on self-expression values, mutual lifestyle and shared cultural sensibility (Straw 1991, Stahl 2004, Shank 2011, Omelchenko and Poliakov 2017).

This world is supported by a network of people whose cooperative activity, organized by their common knowledge of the conventional means of doing something, produces 'the very thing ... '. In the production and maintenance of the 'scene', informal ties and knowledge are the priority, and are acquired during the movement of participants from the periphery to the centre of the 'scene' (Straw 2004, 2015). As a key category of cultural studies, the 'scene' allows us to consider emerging identities and solidarities, on the one hand, as fragmented, diffuse and freely selectable, and on the other hand, as tied to specific places and/or spaces in which, according to Will Straw, local tendencies interact with global trends (Straw 1991).

'Scene' is 'at the crossroads' of ethics and aesthetics. On the one hand, it functions as a site for the representation of cultural identities - a space in which everyone has the opportunity to see and to be seen (Straw 2004, Kahn-Harris 2006, Silver et al. 2010; Silver and Clark 2015). On the other hand, it is a separate 'ethical world' (Straw 2015), in the context of which a certain moral regime is cultivated (tolerance - homophobia, patriarchy - gender equality, consumerism - asceticism, etc.). Such a regime helps to establish the rules and means by which each participant's

behaviour is legitimized in the 'scene'. Through the acceptance (and rejection) of the values cultivated within the 'scene' reference to the imagined community occurs (Omelchenko and Sabirova 2016).

In western academic debate, the scene is discussed in the context of the transition from an economic model based on formal rationality, to 'postFordist economic activity ... as embedded within informal connections and an ongoing attentiveness to rumor and opportunity' (Straw 2002, p. 252; see also Grimes 2015). From this point of view, the scenes presented here cannot be seen as typical, since Dagestani society is the 'periphery of the periphery'. Our argument is that the scene emerges as a 'response' to the existential uncertainty that accompanies a period of transition, whether from industrial to post-industrial society or - as in the case of Dagestan - from socialism to capitalism. The scene functions as an alternative to the socializing institutions of the family, education and work, which in a new context lose their totalizing character, and are unable to answer the question of how to live (and grow up) in these new conditions.

We have found that combining a 'scenic' conceptual framework with a youth solidarities approach, which has been developed to study the cultural practices of young people outside the capitalist core, is beneficial. As empirical studies show, the material basis, the substance of late socialist and post-socialist youth cultures is communication (Pilkington 1994, Pilkington et al. 2002, Omelchenko 2013). This communication is not rigidly attached to certain styles or obligations of the group norm, but develops around cultural innovations and practices and can embrace stylistically, symbolically or ideologically different youth groups through a commitment to certain common orientations and values (Omelchenko 2013).

By solidarity we mean a special form of sociality that is formed around value-ideological vectors, which are fundamental for a social group. This solidarity allows opposition to antipode groups, where there is a symbolic (or real) struggle for cultural, political and value domination. Today, the main lines of value confrontation around which solidarity is formed are consumerism and anti-capitalism, antifascism and nationalism, collectivism and individualism, pacifism and militarism, patriarchy and gender equality and loyalty to state power and anarchy (Omelchenko 2011).

Furthermore, the scene can be interpreted as a locus of solidarity, area or space where solidarity is being produced/realized through everyday communication and cultural practices. The constellation of regimes of solidarities creates an 'ethical world' of the scene, that legitimizes the cultural activity of its participants. The analysis of youth identities, carried out in the late 1990s, made it possible to identify a significant axis of polarization of youth cultural scenes in the post-Soviet space outside of the metropolis, with a developed club culture and Western-type consumption. The most important marker by which young people themselves defined their cultural orientation was by the distinction of advanced (sometimes progressive, alternative) and normal (conventional) youth. The building of cultural hierarchies within each scene was based on the mutual positioning of our mini-groups in relation to other ones, which were determined through the characteristics of cultural tastes (music, cinema, the media), attitudes to the West, the type of consumption, and forms of creative and commercial activities. The advanced young people were oriented to the outside world and strived for new opportunities. The West served as a source of information and an orienting mark on the global horizon, but advanced youth were also the most critical of it. The horizons of normal youth were confined to the immediate environment, their cultural strategy was to maintain local ties, but in their own way, they were included in 'global' consumption (Pilkington et al. 2002). We take this distinction as the starting point for the discussion of the two scenes focused upon in this article, which to a certain degree represent the two extreme poles of the 'normal - advanced' axis we have described. At the same time, we proceed from the fact that with the development and widening of access to information about various cultures around the world, and the expansion of the number of Internet sites promoting various political and stylistic trends, new types of networks and connections of those who share these trends are being formed. Youth cultural scenes, both on-line and off-line, are becoming increasingly diversified (Omelchenko and Sabirova 2016, Omelchenko and Poliakov 2017).

Empirical basis and methodology of the research

This article is based on data gathered as part of the project 'Fields of positive interethnic interactions and youth cultural scenes in the Russian cities'.3 The research was carried out in four Russian cities: St. Petersburg, Ulyanovsk, Kazan and Makhachkala. In each city, quantitative and qualitative methods were used. A quantitative survey was conducted among students of secondary special education institutions and universities (800 questionnaires in each city, the total number of respondents 3200). Then qualitative in-depth interviews were carried out with representatives of various youth communities in each city (total 169), as well as eight case-studies.4 In Makhachkala, two youth communities - workout and anime scenes - were investigated. These communities, in our opinion, employ different (and sometimes opposing) cultural strategies and life styles and create specific spaces for growing up and socialization.

The case-study of the Dagestani street workout scene was carried out in Makhachkala in September 2016 and April 2017. The researcher5 carried out participant observation of street training and interviewed participants involved in the scene and those who surrounded it. A total of 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted with adolescents and young men between the ages of 14 and 25. During the course of the observation, a field diary was kept, which

was also included in the final data analysis.

The case-study of the anime scene was carried out in March and April 2017.6 Twenty-four in-depth interviews were conducted with young people aged 17-25 - key participants in the anime scene, cosplayers, festival spectators, venue organizers and other non-formals in the city. The researcher observed the life of the anime scene for a month, participating in subcultural 'gatherings' and friendly meetings.

Anime and workout in the context of youth cultural scenes in Makhachkala

According to the results of the survey carried out amongst students of higher and secondary special education institutions in Makhachkala (n = 800), the most popular youth groups in the city include: football fans (25.9% of respondents), participants of street workout (20.1%), 'active Muslims' (18.5%), fans of board games (18.3%), cyclists (15.7%) and participants of the low-riders (fans of lowered vehicles) movement (7.2%). Thus workout is the second most popular youth scene in Makhachkala, whereas the anime scene is encountered less in the survey - only 6.6% of respondents identified themselves with anime culture. However, communicative involvement in the scene is much higher - 28.9% of the students surveyed noted that their friends are anime fans and 35.7% know about the existence of such a scene, but do not engage with it themselves. This data show therefore that both the workout and the anime fans are visible youth groups in the urban space. We will now focus on the analysis of the life styles of the participants in these two significant city youth scenes in the context of growing up and socialization, and will consider the anime and workout scenes through the notion of 'significant others'.

Urban spaces and composition of the scenes

Street workout is a 'lifestyle sport', which 'is less institutionalized than more traditional 'modern' sports; has fewer formal rules and regulations and less formal restrictions and exclusion; and tends to be opposed to traditional forms of competition, also promoting a participatory ethos' (Wheaton 2000, p. 436). As a practice, workout includes performing various exercises on street sports grounds, on horizontal bars, parallel bars, wall bars ('Swedish walls') and monkey bars. The main emphasis is on working with your own weight and developing strength and stamina. In the post-Soviet space, workout has acquired a number of features from the social movement for a healthy way of life [e.g. a life without drugs and alcohol], which combines free training with educational activities. In Dagestan, the 'core' of the scene makes regular trips to remote villages (auls) and gives lectures and master classes in schools, colleges and universities.

The Makhachkala workout scene has existed for more than five years and brings together teenagers and young people (exclusively men) aged between 14 and 25. The number of participants can vary from 20 to 100 people. Periodically, attempts have been made to institutionalize the 'scene', for example, there are plans to create a formal organization with membership rules and regulations. However, to date workout remains open to new participants and access to it and departure from it is relatively flexible.

Graduates of Makhachkala universities (between 21 and 25 years old), who met through the social network VKontakte, make-up the core of the 'scene'. The mobile (but numerically predominant) periphery consists of school and college pupils. Training spaces in Makhachkala include a typical sports ground on Askerkhanova street, a space for workout at the 'Trud' stadium, and a horizontal bar located on the city beach, where complex acrobatic exercises are carried out.

Recruitment to the scene mainly occurs via social networks (VKontakte and Instagram). School and university administrative structures, where exhibition performances take place, as well as friendly sports communities (for example, the community of street parkour) are also included in the network. The Makhachkala 'scene' occupies a central position in relation to workout 'scenes' in other cities in Dagestan (Izberbash, Kaspiisk, Derbent) and furthermore, the Dagestani 'scene' is part of the wider Russian workout 'scene'.

In socio-demographic terms, the average Dagestani workouter is an unmarried young man from a low-income family. Often these are singleparent families where the mother is the sole wage earner. The parent or parents are typically employed in low skilled positions in the public or service sector, in market trading or are engaged in unskilled physical labour. These young men have rarely travelled outside of Dagestan and never abroad. The exception to this is short-term visits with relatives to carry out 'shabashka' (semi-official seasonal construction work) in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Those who have already finished their education are normally unemployed. Anime has also existed for more than five years and brings together anime fans, cosplayers, venue organizers and other non-formals in the city. It should be noted that in Makhachkala, interest in anime began to emerge over the period 2000-2005 when Japanese animation productions (for example, 'Shaman King7, 'Sailor Moon', 'Naruto', 'Pokemon') were broadcast on central Russian TV channels and became very popular among schoolchildren. Many Dagestanis became familiar with anime culture later, thanks to friends, relatives and acquaintances, who 'infected' them with the new trend. Anime was discussed with friends or on websites, and on Internet forums. However, the starting point for the development of the local scene was the Festival of Japanese and Korean culture, held for the first time in Makhachkala in 2012. This festival united anime fans and other 'advanced' youth of the city. The 'core' of the modern anime scene includes participants and spectators of the initial festivals (10-15 people). They hold the power within the community, produce the scene and define its boundaries. Most of the 'senior'

participants in the anime scene can be referred to as middle class. They are graduates or senior students of the city's secondary and higher educational institutions (19-25 years of age), those who are involved professionally in the creative industries and also those who started their 'subcultural careers' by organizing events, creating DIY attributes and performing at the annual festival.

A further group of non-formal7 youth of the city is on the periphery of the scene - the 'new generation' of anime fans (12-18 years old): members of the festival audience, volunteers and simply fans of Japanese and Korean culture. It should be noted that unlike the workout community, the anime scene is heterogeneous in terms of gender. However, girls are the more active participants of the scene and are at its core - they organize the festivals, carry out crafts or experiment with their appearance, for example, hair colour, style of clothes and make-up. This is connected, above all, with the narrow normative frameworks of male socialization, which exist in Dagestan. The 'normal' majority (adults and other young people) regards such experiments with appearance and performance at festivals as deviant practices that require immediate regulation.

Unlike the workout scene, which is sustained through weekly training sessions at sports grounds, on an everyday level the anime community is concentrated in virtual space - it is reproduced through daily communication taking place in social networks. In the real world, the scene is embodied in rare (e.g. every two months) subcultural 'gatherings' ('skhodki'), but the key event is the annual Festival of Japanese and Korean culture, composed of a concert programme and cosplay defile.

In terms of their biographical path, informants see anime as a logical continuation of their subcultural career and as part of the 'style supermarket' (most young people during their school years identified themselves with gothic and emo cultures). That is why the community members' style is comprised of a combination of 'standard' informal elements (e.g. backpacks, nonconventional shoes, unisex style and in some cases brightly coloured hair) and subcultural attributes. The latter includes badges with anime characters on them, popular among the participants of the scene. One of key vectors of solidarities of anime scene is built on the denial of 'standard', 'common', 'mass' clothes consumption, for example clothes that are sold in the city's markets and shops (with rare exceptions). That is why a 'usual' youth, in a sense, becomes an opposite group for anime solidarity concerning clothes and lifestyle consumption.

Shared meanings and boundaries of the youth scenes

Discursively workout is constructed as a disciplinary practice, which is focussed on adolescents and young men, and ensures their correct gender socialization during the transition to adulthood. Informants define their participation in the scene in terms of what 'normal' young male (Dagestanis, Muslims, 'guys from the street') should do. On the one hand, workout is a popular global practice, a fashionable trend, on the other hand it is similar to practices of 'yard socialization', common in Dagestani society, where boys and teenagers acquire a strong body and learn to behave like men, under the supervision of older brothers and male members of the neighbourhood. Powerful and bodily enhanced masculinity is a key vector of solidarity that links scene participants with one another as well as scene itself with 'whole' Dagestani society.

The main activity is 'training', which lasts for one hour and includes components of training, meeting for companionship and filming. At the beginning of the 'training', a 15-minute warm-up is held under the guidance of senior workouters, after which everyone carries out their exercise 'programme'. For beginners, pull-ups on the horizontal bar, push-ups on the parallel bars and push-ups from the floor are mandatory elements of the programme. Many participants of the scene begin their training by watching videos on social networks and on YouTube. Following the example of successful workouters in other Russian regions and other countries, they spend a lot of time taking photos and videos to maintain their own profiles on social networks.

Now I'm planning to shoot a training video. And so we video all the time. Performance - video. We have our operators, with pictures. Constantly we shoot a video. We are very active on social networks, on Instagram, we have a profile on Instagram. The channel and this Vkontakte group. We are doing this PR constantly. (Workout_2_M).

The posting of visual content serves several purposes: it supports the individual status of a workouter, it serves as a showcase for his skill, it promotes the popularization of workout in Dagestan and it provides a virtual presence of Dagestan on the global workout scene. Usually training and presentation videos are shot during training sessions on the cameras of cheap smartphones. However, there are also 'professionals' who specialize in the shooting of staged videos within the scene.

Training sessions and video shoots do not interfere with the close communication, which takes place during and between exercises, sometimes even taking their place. Many regular participants in the scene prefer to train individually, and use the collective 'trainings' to 'have a chat'. The topics covered include: the internal routine of the scene; study and admission to higher educational institutions; and the latest fights in MMA [Mixed Martial Arts], computer games and movies or series.

Training sessions are held four times a week in the evenings. For the majority of regular participants of the scene, workout is their main leisure activity and the primary source of company outside of the family circle. On Sundays, conversations that have begun on the training ground often continue in nearby cafes or pizzerias, where they also

play board games, such as Monopoly.

The religiosity (Islam) is also a key vector of solidarity for the workout scene. The domination of Islam in the space of the scene is fixed visually (the presence of the prayer rug), performatively (regular individual and collective Namaz) and with the help of special norms of behaviour. In the context of repressive activity on the side of the authorities in relation to the so-called Salafis, the workout scene acquires another important function - that is of a safe space in which religious youth can freely discuss, among other things, the problems of religious life and where they can find like-minded people with whom information can be exchanged.

If workout is a socially approved practice, then anime, on the contrary, is problematic and has become the focus of attention for 'normal youth' in Makhachkala, as well as amongst parents and relatives of informants. For example, dying hair bright colours (informants or their friends), wearing non-formal clothes, making bodily modifications (tattoos, piercings, etc.) often lead to 'moral panics' among 'adults'. As S. Cohen suggests, certain groups and their practices can be represented in the media or everyday discourses as a threat to social values and interests (Cohen 1972).

In the case of anime fans, 'right-thinking' relatives ('tukhum') and other adults build moral barricades, and often assess anime fans' participation in the 'gathering' ('tusovka') as deviant behaviour that must be controlled and suppressed. Firstly, anime and informal gatherings (tusovki) are often associated with 'bad company', the members of which consume alcohol and drugs, and reject traditional values, religious prescriptions and violate established norms.

'Oh, it's her fault' (she quotes her friend's mom). 'You look at her and change because of her, she dyes her hair, that is all, the problem is in her'. There were attempts to get rid of me, but I went and and met her mother. She (the mother) thought that if I was in that company, if I look that way, then I would drink or whatever else, I would connect her daughter with bad company (anime_№5_F).

Secondly, watching anime and reading manga along with adopting the styles shown are seen as a legitimate childhood practice. However, when a person is a student, or an adult, it is then seen as deviant. In particular, parents' logic of normalization for girls is associated with the need to 'get married'; subcultural style, according to relatives, lowers the chances of finding a partner.

Participants in the anime scene thus experience constant pressure from the normalizing discourses of parents, teachers and other young people. Nonformal style invariably draws the attention of the 'tukhum' (relatives) and becomes the main focus. Due to this, many informants, who in everyday life openly display their own style, will on occasion 'play' the part of 'the right Dagestani', for example, during visits to relatives (in the village), they will wear clothes that are unusual for them but conventional for wider Dagestani society:

Yes, a separate wardrobe, I even have separate clothes for events, but these are dresses of different lengths, I do not know why my mother always buys them and even swears that I do not wear them. Of course, I will not wear them. This, well, when you go somewhere to visit, although already all the guests are used to what I wear, I usually have for a 22-year-old adult lady ... They are used to that I am (creative profession): 'She's sick, leave her alone!' That is, something like that. And so you have to wear it from time to time [?], but even if you go to some funeral, you will not go there in jeans. I have to wear dresses. (anime_ №2_F)

The image of the 'right Dagestani' includes not only having a certain style, but also, as already noted, holding certain religious views. In particular, a 'normal' young man should practice Islam and observe its rules. It should be noted that among the members of the anime community, there are both atheists and religious young people. However, with parents' and grandparents, at university or in wider social circles, young people will try not to emphasize their atheism and some are forced to constantly play the 'game of religiosity'.

I said that I am an agnostic. And in general, everyone reacts very negatively and tries to impose their own beliefs.. I do not know what will happen later. Maybe, I will believe, maybe, I have such a period in my life now, I do not deny this . All, the whole family [is religious], not only my mother. Grandmother, uncle, aunt, sisters, all are religious and I generally do not like to talk about it, well, discuss this topic with them, even when we come to the cemetery, they read prayers there, I [covers his face with his palm]: one, two, three, four, five. (anime_ №11_M.)

Social pressures from others have shaped certain views about what is right within the community. In fact, the scene acts as a space where normative expectations are weakened, where young people can 'be themselves' and not play the part of 'normal Dagestanis'. Anime fans described, that their company accepts people with different views and values (for example, with different beliefs, faiths, ethnicity, age). Hence, the cosmopolitism and tolerance toward one another are the key vectors of solidarity in the group. Anyway, one thing that is unacceptable in their community is to impose your ideas, values and views on others.

It is important to note that young people on the anime scene do not define themselves in terms of local and ethnic identity: they do not use the terms 'Dagestani', 'Avari' or 'Lezgin'. On the contrary, the scene participants' daily practices are aimed at constructing a cosmopolitan ('advanced') identity through consumption (using AliExpress (a global on-line retail service), or buying second-hand), social networks (many friends outside Dagestan), values and

in some cases the complete exclusion of themselves from the social space of Makhachkala:

I almost never go out of the house and even now I can hardly force myself out of the house ... . I'm so used to the fact that every guy might say something, maybe even hit me, but that rarely happens. You stand there, they begin to pester you, pester you, pester you, you are silent. (anime_№ 4, F.)

The anime and workout scenes present different scenarios for socialization and growing up. Participants in the workout community are focused on local (territorial) life styles. They represent themselves as 'normal youth' and support such regimes as moderate patriarchy, heterosexual masculinity, religiosity and homophobia. The participants in the anime community are oriented 'outwards'. The key vectors of solidarity in the anime scene can be defined through such regimes as tolerance, gender equality, not patriarchy, pacifism, cosmopolitanism and the rejection of homophobia. However, along with the visible differences which exist between these two youth communities, both scenes can be considered as 'alternative socialities' which are ideologically opposed to the significant 'Other' personified in the image of the 'gopnik'8 ('rednecks', 'vagabonds', 'scumbags').

Significant 'others': 'gopniks'/'vagabonds'/'hachis'/'tigers'

A healthy lifestyle, cultivated in the context of the workout scene, resembles a box with a false bottom where, under the layer of anti-drug and anti-alcohol rhetoric, there is also a layer that competes with another project of 'street' masculinity in the image of the 'gopnik', 'rednecks', 'scumbags'. As a discursive 'Other,' rednecks have two essential attributes: a tendency to spontaneous illegitimate violence and a marginal social status; these are exactly the problems that are solved at the micro-level of the workout scene. Informants said that their 'parents' culture requires them to be strong and 'not afraid' of violence:

Since youth, it's like, from childhood, we were inspired to do it there. For example, my father, if he is there [said:] do not be afraid of anyone there, fight there if something happens. We were brought up like this, in short, you are made a muzhik immediately here. (workout_№1_M)

However, at the same time, this requirement is associated with a lack of access to socially approved 'markets of violence', e.g. situations where the use or demonstration of force (brutality, bodily strength, the ability to fight and win) is 'exchanged' for higher social status. There are two key markets of violence in Dagestan. The first one is combat sports, in particular, freestyle wrestling, which is extremely popular among young men in Dagestan. Many of the workouters had also attended combat sports clubs and some continue to attend them. However, it is widely believed that there is a 'glass ceiling' in combat sports, beyond which further development is possible only if financial resources are available.

The money issue is particularly acute in the case of another, less prestigious, but in demand 'market of violence' in Dagestan, that is serving in the 'organs' (OMON (Special Purpose Police Unit) FSB (Federal Security Service), MChS (The Ministry of Emergency Situations)). To get a real 'male' job, which is also well-paid, you must pay a bribe, some estimates put the amount of this as equal to the annual budget of a Dagestani family:

Well, for example, I went from the army and came to work for the police, I was there, they (police) said I should pay 120150 thousand (Rubles) [to get this job] What? I have passed through the army, I got a military identity card, Exams [in police] physical tests are not a problem for me < ... > I laughed, said: Thank you, It is not for me, I have the right [to work here] by law, he also laughed 'you know what laws we have', I say; 'I will not pay' and I left. (workout_№1_M)

There remains a street where violence can be 'exchanged' only for a lower, marginal - in relation to educational terms - social status. In terms of informants, involvement in street violence means to be a 'redneck'; an uneducated, unsuccessful young man with a tendency for spontaneous violent behaviour.

The participants of the workout scene resolve this contradiction by constructing an alternative space for presenting themselves to others, where the demonstration of one's own force is not connected with violence. However, overcoming marginality can also be seen as a separate problem that does not relate to violence, but is closely connected to the structure of opportunities offered or excluded by the family, the school/university and the labour market. The following excerpt from a research diary shows the contexts of social exclusion that are very real for informants: the devaluation of higher education; unemployment or the precarious 'bullshit' job; and a permanent semi-dependency on parents that does not cease, but is only prolonged by marriage.

A [workouter] mentioned that his uncle graduated without attending the university/ My father, he said, simply paid money for him. B [workouter] picked up that none of those present, having received higher education, will work in their specialty, since there are no such jobs. B said: 'Say, C. [one of the trainers] graduated from economics [faculty of economics], but nobody needs economists.' I asked why he was studying then. B. answered: 'It's so fashionable when you marry your son to say that he's graduated from the law or medical faculty.' C. Supported him: 'And he really can not heal'. I asked: 'What if they leave?' B. responded: 'Those who leave, yes, they learn really and find work.' I: 'Why do they not leave then?' B.: 'Do you know what the system is here? You are found a girl when you are 20, parents marry you off and you vagabond

("bichuesh") with her here.' (field notes, 7.03.2017) The identification of a life style as vagabonding (from the vagabond Cbich') - a fallen, drunk man, a pariah) connects socio-economic downward mobility with the problem of a lack of (self) respect and recognition from others. Social isolation and stigmatization become a payment for the enforced failure to comply with the normative obligations of traditional masculinity, that is, to have a career and a meaningful job that provides for the family. The scene provides the workouters with the resolution of this problem at the micro-level. It functions as a central life interest (Stebbins 1992), a space for the application of efforts based on special training and skills, in which it becomes possible, as Stebbins (1992, 47) states, 'to make a career, experience important moments, achieve goals and participate in life'

Workouters see scene participation as a job that allows them to branch out. Thanks to the educational work, the individual and group social capitals acquired within the scene are converted into recognition outside of it - in the 'whole' society.

According to the narratives of representatives of the anime scene, 'gopniks', 'rednecks' and 'bulls' are those who are on the other side of the barricades in terms of values. They are the main antipode for anime fans because they demonstrate opposite values and behaviour, for instance, they have conservative views on gender and lifestyle, and actively impose their views on what they see as 'proper' through force:

And khachi believe that non-formals ['nephors'] are, sorry for the expression, fags. Even if with girls, they are kind of tolerant, they do not really show it, but when they see a non-formal guy, everything explodes inside them, they consider themselves absolutely [right], they think that they are absolutely allowed, in that case, to do something with this person and somehow correct this world for the better, in their opinion, but this is not correct. (anime_№2_F.)

In terms of the key everyday practices of 'bulls', informants talk about joint get-togethers ('tusovki') and walks through the city streets, accompanied by 'conversations', 'incursions' and 'accosting' of non-conventional-looking youth.

The clashes with the 'gopniks' were described in narratives in the context of the entire subcultural experience of the young people who participated in the study. In the diachronic perspective, during their school years (2008-2014), the city streets, parks and the embankment were represented as extremely dangerous spaces for non-formals, in which there were constant fights, 'incursions' and 'raids'. 'It was difficult when all of us were beaten and so on, so, you imagine that in addition to ... having the strategy of retreat, we were still moving like ninjas around the city, no one saw us' (anime_№14_M.).

However, now Makhachkala is described as a more liberal space in which to live, where the tension between 'yard' and 'informal' youth is gradually in decline. Nevertheless, although the city centre is represented as a relatively safe space, where 'gopniks' 'behave more modestly', then the suburbs and outskirts of the city are described by many respondents as emotionally unpleasant places for walks and 'get-togethers' and sometimes as unsafe.

I have a friend, even acquaintance, he had an orange briefcase, hachi just abused him because of a very bright briefcase and beat him ... another friend who had shaved temples and a fringe, he was also beaten up because of his hair. (anime_ №13_M.)

Aggressive and violent models of 'yard youth' behaviour, aimed at the social exclusion of non-formals from the urban space, contributed to the development of specific practices of non-formal behaviour in the city, which can be conditionally divided into tactics of 'mimicry' in the urban space and 'withdrawal' from meetings with 'gopniks'.

We do not all risk it here, it's the hair color that causes very bad reactions, especially with the guys, for them it's some kind of object for mockery, it's impossible to pass by them, it's better to plug your ears, it's immediate: 'What's the matter with you? Were you dipped into paint? Did you fall into the sewer? You could be used to paint a fence!' (anime_№4_F.)

Such experiences of clashes in the urban space, described in the narratives, often led to disguising particular clothing, with, for example, caps, shawls, bandanas and hats.

Since 'gopnikness' was defined in terms of its mass character, one of the main tactics of moving around the city, which was repeatedly cited by informants, is the practice of avoiding meetings with large companies of lads who share a common style and behave 'loudly' on the street. 'To get around, go to the other side, do not come into contact with', 'walk by that company'.

I walk along the street, I always look around and I always expect danger, I always expect, especially when I'm with a guy, I'm afraid that someone will say something to me, word for word and he can be beaten, just I have already had it with another guy, there were such situations. (anime_№17_F)

However, it was not always possible to avoid such meetings. That is why many informants talked about their own individual 'interactions' with gopniks. The most common tactics were: 'do not pay attention', 'do not answer', and 'do not react'. However, the practice of 'incursion' ('naezd') (Looking West, p. 144) could be accompanied not only by words, but also by violence, which then required non-standard tactics of behaviour. For example, a young man

talks about his experience of using other tactics of interaction. In a conversation with a 'gopnik' it was important to find common lifestyle points - 'to find a common language' or to use relevant categories:

That is, when the conversation starts: 'Do you know that I'm an Avarian?' Another asks me 'Why?' [with regard to his participation in the community] - 'to meet Girls!' (I say) and so on. I'm just bored!' - 'So I go to the gym', 'And when I've already gone' they say: 'Come on, normal boy'. (anime_№14_M.)

Conclusion

The main aim of the article was to analyse the local specifics of youth cultural scenes in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, through a study of two youth communities: street workout and anime. The selection of these two group identities was not accidental. It was connected both with the overall design of the research project, within which the study was carried out, and with the characteristics that were revealed of the participants from the selected cases in terms of their attitudes to other youth communities in this Russian city. The analysis of the overall geopolitical situation in the republic helps us to understand the uniqueness of Dagestani youth's trajectories of growing up and socialization. This uniqueness is a result of the history of the republic within the Soviet Union and the severity of experience during the post-Soviet period. The most important factors which characterize the post-Soviet period include: the rapid growth in inequality, property polarization, unemployment, changes in the ethnic composition of the population, the out-migration of the Russian population, the transformation of Dagestanis' way of life along with changes in the rural and urban composition of the republic.

Furthermore, in recent years, the rapid revival of Islam and its growing influence and the accompanying cardinal redefinitions of the construct of the 'correct' Dagestani identity, including its gender dimensions, have become increasingly salient. The study showed that the socialization of the current generation of young Dagestanis is connected, to a large extent, with the complicated political agenda of the (officials say) 'struggle against radicalization and the growth of the terrorist threat The survey data, gathered as part of the study, demonstrates that all respondents define themselves in relation to Islam. Further, Islam has become extremely important, not only for the formation of a regional identity, but also for self-positioning in the context of their company, that is the community which is chosen for leisure and for participation in collective cultural practices. This article did not encompass all the differences between youth cultural scenes or all aspects of the choices and inclusion and solidarity of young people around important values, practices and urban spaces. Instead, two, in a certain sense opposing, cases of youth community in Makhachkala were chosen: street workout (inscribed in the context of the local patriarchy regime) and an anime community (symbolically resisting the pressure of social 'normativity'). It was important to understand the significance of the contradiction between these group identities, which was rhetorically emphasized both by the workouters and by the anime participants. This led us to pose the question, can we continue to use the theoretical framework of an 'advanced' (subcultural youth minority-oriented toward 'Western' values, open to difference) and 'normal' (conventional youth, focused on the values of locality, neighbourhood and patriarchy)? Alternatively, is the contemporary (in our case the local) situation of the youth space in Makhachkala more complicated? Are the constructs of 'ours' and 'others' formed by more complex scenarios? Analysis of the data obtained during the ethnographic research showed that the use of the construct of 'scene' helps not only to study the specific creative clusters of contemporary cities with a developed infrastructure of leisure and subcultural spaces, but also to understand the specifics of socialization of peripheral youth in a situation of uncertainty. Here the scene becomes a kind of alternative space to such institutions of socialization (family, education, work), a kind of social niche that helps to gain status and to interpret the meaning and direction of life outside the framework defined by the available milieu. The combination of a framework using the construct of 'scene' with a solidarity approach enabled us to examine the specifics of the key (core) values and norms that cement the communication of the scene participants. The most important marker for defining the cultural orientation of young people of the late 1990s was the distinction of advanced (sometimes progressive, alternative) and normal (conventional), when selfreferral and the definition of 'ours' and 'others' occurred through the characteristics of cultural tastes (music, cinema, media), attitudes towards the West, the type of consumption, the view 'inward' (protection of norms and values of locality and neighbourhood) or 'outward' (focus on the centre, openness to the new), as well the type of gender regime (patriarchal or liberal). Yet, in the case of our research, this framework 'advanced - normal' was not sufficient for understanding the substance of group identities. The use of ethnography helped us to understand the latent values complementing our vision of subcultural choice, as well as the practices of public presentation and demonstration of group identities in the urban context. The selection of the workout scene and the anime community was determined by the visibility and prominence of these groups in Makhachkala, as well as by the apparent contradiction between the values that form the basis of their solidarity. For young men involved in the workout scene, it is important to position oneself as ordinary Dagestani guys, Muslims, or lads from the street. For these young men, it is the open space, which is accessible for observation, which becomes a significant factor in demonstrating the right masculinity and 'Dagestanness', where Islamic religiosity, along with the cult of a strong body, acts as an indispensable element of mainstream normality. For the participants in the anime community, on the contrary, the street, especially the non-central city spaces, becomes a

security threat that pushes them to develop special tactics of resistance and mimicry, to maintain a 'game in religiosity', and to employ practices of concealing the parts of their identity that are not approved of by the 'normal' majority.

How informants differently constructed the image of a significant 'Other' or 'Alien' was found to be more subtle and important for the subsequent analysis. This led to the conclusion that despite the visible differences between the workout and the anime communities, they can both be considered as 'alternative socialities', ideologically opposed to the significant 'Other', personified in the image of 'gopnik' ('redneck', 'vagabond', 'scumbag7). Despite the differences in how the informants from these two scenes defined 'the other and the alien', the right to open street violence demonstrated by the gopnik is the most important in their description. For all the informants, this feature is a marker of marginality, a lack of education and social disadvantage. Both workouters and anime participants find it unacceptable to defend their identity and prove their worthiness and 'normality' through aggression, physical violence and humiliation of human dignity. At the same time, despite the similarity of the symbolic 'Other', for both the workouters and the anime scene, this image in each case is associated with its own discursive ontology and suggests various interaction strategies. For workouters 'gopnik' is 'our Other', whose marginality stems from the immanent contradiction inherent in current scenarios of correct masculinity. Thus, the main task of the workout scene is to correct such a 'spoiled' identity. In the context of the anime scene, 'gopnik' is a representative of another youth scene, an 'Alien' scene. It represents a real source of danger and determines their attitude towards the 'streets' and other public spaces of Makhachkala. That is why the main task for participants of the anime scene is not to defend the legitimate values of street life, to create a space for style performance and communication, which is safe from the presence of 'Others'.

Notes

1. The Dagestani War began when the Chechnya-based Islamist group, led by warlords Shamil Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab, invaded Dagestan on 7th August 1999, in support of Salafi rebels. The war ended with a major victory for the Russian Federation and the Republic of Dagestan, and the retreat of the Islamists (Souleimanov 2005).

2. This stratification is especially deep in Makhachkala, where the majority of budget transfers allocated to the republic remains. This money, through corruption schemes, fall into the pockets of bureaucracy and related businessmen.

3. Supported by a Russian Science Foundation Grantno. 15-18-00078. Within the research project, the following city case-'scenes' were selected: in Makhachkala, workout and anime; in Ulyanovsk, a female Instagram site - a 'scene' for caring for oneself (which became an off-line 'scene' of 'normal club get-togethers') and eco-volunteers; in Kazan, a rap-'scene' (Tatar rap) and participants of search expeditions ('poiskoviki') [Those who seek and re-bury the remains of soldiers

of the Second World War]; and in St. Petersburg, a post-Gothic 'scene' and vegans.

4. Anonymized.

5. In Russian 'look like Papuan' is a rude phrase, which means look ridiculous, not civilized, dressing too brightly.

6. 'Non-formal' is a common name in Russian for members of different subcultures. It has appeared in USSR, when subcultures (punks, hippie, style hunters) were contraposed to 'formal' and approved by authorities youth organizations (pioneers, comsomol). Today the notion is being used to describe youth that participates in different youth scenes (especially, creative), that has particular style and values. For anime scene participants, such a name in Russian ('neformal', 'nifer') is self-descriptive.

7. 'Gopniks' is a collective image of a certain masculine identity, represented through special practices and occupied spaces. 'Gopniks', in academic literature, are defined as a 'collective community', which has a narrow spectrum of interests and 'unconsciously' repeats group behaviour patterns (see Gavriluk 2010, Kosterina 2006). In Makhachkala the terms 'vagabonds', 'khachi', 'bulls', and 'tigers' are used as synonyms of 'gopniks'.

8. In Makhachkala 91.4% of respondents consider themselves believers and about 20% define themselves as 'active Muslims'.

Acknowledgements

The results of the project 'Fields of positive interethnic interactions and youth cultural scenes in the Russian cities' realized in 2015-2017 by the team of the Centre for Youth Studies (National Research University 'Higher School of Economics' in Saint-Petersburg).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Funding

The results of the project 'Fields of positive interethnic interactions and youth cultural scenes in the Russian cities' supported by Russian Science Foundation [grant number 15-18-00078].

Notes on contributors

Elena Omelchenko is Professor of the sociological department and Head of Centre for

Youth Studies National Research University Higher School of Economics St. Petersburg, Russia. Her research is located in the area of youth studies. She is an author and coauthor of 17 monographs on globalization of youth cultures, ethnic and religious identities of youth, drug (ab)use cultures, the body and sexuality, xenophobia and migrant youth. Currently, she is working on developing the concepts of 'solidarity' and 'cultural youth scene' for the study of cultural practices of contemporary Russian youth.

Sviatoslav Poliakov is a Researcher and PhD-Student at the Centre for Youth Studies of the National Research University Higher School of Economics. The focus of his research interests is youth in post-Soviet Russia. He is currently working on such issues as youth cultures and solidarities of modern Russia, Islamic radicalization among young people in the North Caucasus, youth policy in the Russian and global context.

Alina Mayboroda is a PhD student, researcher at Center for Youth Studies at the National Research University High School of Economics St. Petersburg. Her main research interests are youth cultures, participatory cultures, fan studies, anime and cosplay cultures.

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Приложение В Статья «Masculinity Constructing in Dagestani Male Youth Communities»

Poliakov S. Masculinity Constructing in Dagestani Male Youth Communities // Europe-Asia Studies. — 2022 (в печати) DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2022.2115462

Drawing on 60 in-depth interviews with adolescents and young men in Dagestan, I examine the construction of masculinity in the context of a postcolonial and peripheral society undergoing a transformation associated with deindustrialisation, urbanisation and globalisation. I focus on three male communities: freestyle wrestlers, street workout athletes and devout Muslim youth. Members of these communities develop their variants of male identity, differing in their attitudes towards violence, their view of the power of elders and their form of moral sovereignty. These versions of masculinity are supported and stabilised both by configurations of power relations and mechanisms of intragroup homosociality.

Разрешение на копирование: Согласно https://www.elsevier.com/about/policies/sharing, автор статьи может использовать полную журнальную версию статьи в своей диссертации при условии указания DOI статьи.

Europe-Asia Studies

Masculinity Constructing in Dagestani Male Youth

Communities

Journal: Europe-Asia Studies

Manuscript ID CEAS-2020-0191.R1

Manuscript Type: Article

Keywords: Dagestan, youth, masculinity crisis, homosociality

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Masculinity Constructing in Dagestani Male Youth Communities Poliakov Sviatoslav

PhD-student, Researcher at the Center for Youth Studies, National Research University — Higher

School of Economics, St. Petersburg (Russia)

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Funding

The reported study was funded by RFBR, project number 19-311-90056

Sviatoslav Poliakov is a Researcher and PhD-Student at the Centre for Youth Studies of the National Research University Higher School of Economics. The focus of his research interests is youth in post-Soviet Russia. He is currently working on such issues as youth cultures and solidarities of modern Russia, Islamic radicalization among young people in the North Caucasus, youth policy in the Russian and global context. Word number: 11564

The Construction of Masculinity in Dagestani Male Youth Communities

SVIATOSLAV POLIAKOV

Abstract

Drawing on 60 in-depth interviews with adolescents and young men in Dagestan, I examine the construction of masculinity in the context of a postcolonial and peripheral society undergoing a transformation associated with deindustrialisation, urbanisation and globalisation. I focus on three male communities: freestyle wrestlers, street workout athletes and devout Muslim youth. Members of these communities develop their variants of male identity, differing in their attitudes towards violence, their view of the power of elders and their form of moral sovereignty. These versions of masculinity are supported and stabilised both by configurations of power relations and mechanisms of intragroup homosociality.

This study was funded by RFBR, project number 19-311-90056.

This article examines the construction and negotiation of masculinities amongst young men from Dagestan, focusing on the intertwining of gender, religion, ethnicity and sport. It contributes to the discussion on peripheral and postcolonial masculinities, especially in Islamic countries and regions (Conway-Long 2003, Kimmel 2003; Gerami 2005; Rizk & Makarem 2012; Aslam 2014).

Dagestan is one of the Muslim republics of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus and home to over 30 ethnic groups. The territory of Dagestan became part of Russia during the protracted and bloody Caucasian War in the nineteenth century. Today, Dagestan is going through a complex structural transformation associated with the processes of deindustrialisation, urbanisation and globalisation and the destruction of traditional society. The region's peripheral position in relation to both to the 'core' of global capitalism and the federal centre in Moscow, along with a high level of social and political conflict in Dagestani society, gives a special dramatic character to these changes, revealing in radical form the contradictions of the patriarchal gender order. In this article, I argue that multiple tension lines—between city and countryside, centre and periphery, secularism and Islamic fundamentalism, tradition and modernity, older and younger generations—create uncertainty and cultural disturbance that frame social reflection amongst different groups of men about what social qualities, practices and behaviours construct socially successful or acceptable male identities.

I explore this thesis through the case of adolescents and young men involved in freestyle wrestling, yard sports (street workout) and devout Muslin youth communities. Each community, while remaining within the conservative consensus that defines the basic parameters of the gender order (gender segregation and male domination over women), constructs its own versions of masculinity, relying on its available economic and cultural resources. These variants of masculinity are supported and stabilised both 'from above'—that is, by configurations of power relations in the context of the whole society—and from below by mechanisms of intragroup homosociality.

Hegemonic masculinity and homosociality

The concept of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 2005) remains the most influential theoretical framework in academic debates on masculinity, despite criticism. According to Connell, hegemonic masculinity is defined as 'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women' (Connell 2005, p. 77).

Researchers have repeatedly attempted to formulate the key features of hegemonic masculinities. The four principles of traditional masculinity according to David and Brannon (1976) are widely known: 'no sissy stuff' (avoidance of everything feminine); 'the big wheel' (men succeed by dominating other men); 'the sturdy oak' (be strong and do not show weakness); and 'give 'em hell' (take physical risks and do not be afraid of violence). Joseph

Pleck (1976) complements this repertoire of attributes with the expectation that 'a man' wins status and respect from others. For Michael Kimmel (1994), hegemonic masculinity is based on misogyny (avoiding everything feminine), homosociality (prioritising male communities) and heteronormativity, which necessarily excludes homosexual interpretations of masculinity.

However, as Connell (2005) explains, hegemonic masculinity cannot be reduced to a set of timeless attributes. Hegemony arises when there is a relationship between a cultural ideal and institutional power (individual or collective). This relationship is not cast in stone yet constantly problematic, as changes in social institutions and contradictions arise within the gender order itself. The concept of hegemonic masculinity exists only in relation to other types of masculinity: subordinate, complicit and marginalised (Connell 2005). Subordinate masculinity characterises groups of men at the bottom of the gender hierarchy, such as homosexuals. Complicit masculinity is a form of masculinity inherent in most men. It is reflected in conformity with the dominant ideal of masculinity, which allows for a patriarchal dividends in terms of ' honour, prestige and the right to command' ( Connel 2005, p. 82), while marginalised masculinity typical arises at the intersection of gender with class, race, age and ethnicity (Connell 2005).

All these types of masculinity are shaped within the broader institutional context of the gender order, which is realised in power, production and cathexis3 relations (Connell 2005, p. 74). At the same time, power relations are particularly important. Demetriou suggests two dimensions to hegemony: internal and external (Demetriou 2001, p. 341). The first type refers to hierarchies that line up between groups of men who differ in status and power, while the second describes men's domination over women.

Studies of men and masculinity (Bird 1996; Meshcherkina 2002; Flood 2007) confirm the thesis that men's lives are largely organised around relationships with other men, hence reflecting the desire to create exclusive homosocial communities. Homosociality, as Meshcherkina notes, 'is deeply functional in terms of the need for a social space "free" of women, in which collectively shared meanings of male life are typified and acquired interpersonal significance' (Meshcherkina 2002, p. 274). Thus, homosociality pervasively characterises the group dimension of masculinity. Indeed, it plays a key role in the reproduction of the hegemonic model, functioning as a social mechanism to bring normality and to reject abnormal (non-normative) behaviour.

Global and local /regional masculinities

The development of the concept of hegemonic masculinity has led to a recognition of the significance of geographical context. While at a local level hegemony is produced through face-to-face interactions within families, organisations and communities, it is produced at a regional level in the context of nation-state, and at the global level in the context

3 According Connell (2005), emotional attraction (both positive and negative) to the subject.

of international politics, business and media (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). For example, today's global level is dominated by a transnational business masculinity that is institutionally based on multinational corporations and global financial markets (Connell 1998, p. 3). Three levels are linked: 'Global hegemonic masculinities pressure regional and local hegemonic masculinities, and regional hegemonic masculinities provide cultural materials adopted or reworked in global arenas and utilised in local gender dynamics' (Messerschmidt 2012, p. 59).

One of the promising directions of this research is to examine how globalisation affects the construction of masculinities in peripheral regions such as Asia, Africa, and Central and Latin America (Messerschmidt 2012). Combining a gender and feminist lens with a postcolonial approach, this research has been sensitive to the relations of hegemony, subordination and resistance that shape the global 'north-south' and 'centre-periphery' axis. In particular, studies of male subjectivity in Asian, African and Middle Eastern Muslim societies (Conway-Long 2003; Kimmel 2003; Gerami 2005; Rizk & Makarem 2012; Aslam 2014;) have often centred their attention on the problematic and 'crisis masculinities' that emerge as a response to Western domination and interference in socioeconomic and political domains. These studies have sought to bring into focus the position of those groups of men who benefit least from globalisation.

Thus, a significant body of research focuses on the disturbance that men in traditional gender relations feel about their loss of power in the family and society due to women's economic and political empowerment (Ghoussoub & Sinclair-Webb 2000; Ghoussoub 2000; Conway-Long 2003; Kimmel 2003; Rizk & Makarem 2012). This sentiment is evident on all levels, from individual frustrations (Conway-Long 2003), media and popular culture discourses (Ghoussoub 2000) to the 'men-under-threat' political rhetoric produced by masculinist nationalist regimes (Rizk & Makarem 2012). Other authors (Harris 2012; Aslam 2014) emphasise how global neoliberal order contributes to the precarisation and marginalisation of large parts of the male population in Muslim regions, evoking protest, including violent masculinity scripts. The peripheral and postcolonial situation in Muslim societies creates, as Ghoussoub states, a 'chaotic quest for a definition of modern masculinity' (Ghoussoub 2000: p. 234). Monterescu uses the category 'strangeness' to write about the situational masculinity of Jaffa's Arab men, who exists between 'the "real" world of inferior socio-economic and political status and the "ideal" world of proud Arabness and patriarchal manhood' (Monterescu 2006, p. 128). He describes it as an identity game that manoeuvres between Muslim and liberal-secular masculinity. Nilan (2009) writes of two conflicting modalities of Indonesian Muslim male identity: the Western, sexualised 'playboy' ideal of masculinity and the Islamist discourse about Western sexuality as the major threat to male Muslim piety. Sa'ar and Yahia-Younis (2008), in turn, describe the situation of a perceived crisis of masculinity amongst Israeli Palestinians, whose political-economic location does not permit a hegemonic position in the region, while alternative scripts of less violent masculinities are difficult to achieve.

One of the most debated topics in this field is the nexus between Muslim male identities and violence (Ahmed

51

2006; Baobaid 2006; Ferber & Kimmel 2008; Abu-Odeh 2011; Aslam 2012; Emig 2019), which can be seen either as a 'vestige' of the archaic patriarchal ideology or as a reaction to its crisis. Interest in this topic has been invigorated by regular outbreaks of jihadist terrorism and the retaliatory 'war on terror' that have marked the past 20 years. However, this academic agenda has been criticised for contributing to the marginalisation and stigmatisation of men with Muslim backgrounds as well as masking the visibility of other masculine discourses and social practices (Lutz 2010; Charsley, & Liversage 2015). In this regard, there are a number of works that examine 'soft', nonviolent versions of masculinity amongst followers of conservative Islam (Metcalf 2000; Samuel 2011; Gokariksela & Anna 2017; Khan 2018).

Data and methodology

The empirical basis of the article consists of semi-structured in-depth interviews with teenagers and young men, as well as field notes and observation diaries of male youth communities collected during individual and collective projects in the Republic of Dagestan in 2015-2019.4 The projects explored the relationship between cultural practices and the ethnic and religious identities of Dagestan's urban youth. The geography of the project included the cities of Makhachkala, Kaspiysk, Derbent and Izberbash. The total number of respondents was 61, of whom 56 were interviewed individually, and six participated in two group discussions. The respondents' ages ranged from 12 to 42. Most of them (48) were members of at least one of the following three homosocial communities.

The first, freestyle wrestling, is the most popular male sport in Dagestan. A total of 19 respondents were part of wrestling communities. Of these, 14 were trainees at children's and youth sports schools, one was a member of the Olympic team, and four worked as freestyle wrestling coaches.

The second, the street workout community, has its roots in a youth sports culture that emerged in the early 2000s in the ghettos of American metropolises and spread thanks to videos distributed on YouTube. A total of 21 respondents were members of this community. In post-Soviet spaces, street workout has become a social movement with regular free training sessions for all comers, demonstrations in educational institutions and active work with young people. Practices include work with one's own weight on horizontal bars, wall barsand handholds. In addition to interviews, I also used field notes from participant observation of the street workout communities in Makhachkala,

4 This article is based on data collected through the following projects:

1. 'Masculinity of young people in Dagestan' (hereafter 'Masculinity'), funded by RFBR, project number 19311-90056.

2. 'Creative fields of interethnic interaction and youth cultural scenes of Russian cities', implemented in 20152017 by the Center for Youth Research of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, with the support of the Russian Science Foundation (grant number 15-18-00078).

3. DARE [Dialogue about Radicalisation and Equality] project in 2018-2019

Kaspiysk, Derbent and Izberbash.

The third community is that of devout young Muslims. Members of this group share a common interest in the study of Islam and the implementation of Islamic moral norms in everyday life. A total of nine respondents were participants of this group. Such communities frequently arise from religious educational institutions. In modern Dagestan, boys from 5-6 years old attend religious schools at mosques, where read the Arabic text of the Quran and learn about the basics of the faith. There are also higher education institutions in which Islamic subjects are taught. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dagestani youth obtained the opportunity to receive a higher education at religious institutions abroad. With the spread of the internet, an increasing number study religion independently using Islamic resources available online. Such young people often become agents of Islamisation in the local communities and companies of which they are members. Following Gokariksel and Secor (2017), I will call this group 'devout Muslim youth' to distinguish them, on the one hand, from young people with an Islamic identity and, on the other, from observant Muslims who are not part of active communities.

As supplementary material, I used interviews with young people who were not participants in any of the communities listed (13 respondents). However, their narratives contain an external perspective on the positions held by these communities in Dagestan society and how they are perceived by other groups of Dagestani youth.

Each community was treated as a separate case. Although the empirical base consisted of interviews from different research projects, they were conducted according to guides that included common blocks of questions, which made it possible to compare them later. First, respondents were asked a series of questions that allowed them to reconstruct the norms and ideals of masculinity that were relevant to them and their social circle; for example, who is a 'real man'? What qualities he should have? Who is an example of a real man? What is needed to achieve real man status? What behaviour is acceptable/unacceptable for a man? The second block of questions concerned how these versions of masculinity related to holders' understanding of the normative gender order, such as the ideal relationship between men and women, what social roles and positions are 'male' or 'female', and how power and responsibility should be distributed between the genders in society, family and labour market. An additional biographical block made it possible to place these ideal perceptions in the context of the respondents' individual life histories and everyday lives.

My task was to highlight the meanings and practices that capture the essential features of the version of masculinity designed and constructed at the group level. Individual scripts of masculinity in any of the social groups under consideration can deviate significantly from this 'ideal-typical' nucleus as well as from each other. Moreover, young people may belong to several communities and adhere to more than one masculinity script. However, in this article, I have put these nuances in brackets.

The local context: Dagestan and Makhachkala

Let us consider some features of Dagestani society that are important for understanding the dynamics of gender and intergenerational relations in the Republic of Dagestan. First, modern Dagestan is a society in transformation. At the beginning of the 1990s, the republic, like other Russian regions, experienced widespread deindustrialisation caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition from its planned economy to the market economy. Specific to the North Caucasus, however, is that this decay of the Soviet state happened in sync with another transformation: the transition from a traditional to a modern society. Attempts to modernise Dagestan during the Soviet era mainly affected the cities. The rural periphery preserved many elements of the traditional way of life based on customary law (adats) (Bobrovnikov 2001). In the post-Soviet period, the collapse of state-owned enterprises and a complex crime wave provoked an outflow of the urban population from the republic and an 'incoming' mass resettlement of the rural inhabitants. The most obvious consequence of this urbanisation was a period of social anarchy/unrest between the collapse of the rural customary regulations in a new setting and the development of new urban ones. On the one hand, the city no longer 'digested' the village, as deindustrialisation destroyed the economic foundation of the model that turned villagers into urban dwellers; on the other hand, the city still made traditional rural customary rules irrelevant (Starodubrovskaya & Kazenin 2014, p. 71). Starodubrovskaya (2019) speaks about the crisis of the traditional North Caucasian family, as reflected in the separation of the nuclear family from its extended family and the local community. Secondly, and as a consequence perhaps, intergenerational tension is growing within the family itself, with the younger generation more actively challenging the power of the older. It is worth noting that the crisis is not linear and does not lead to one-step changes in perceptions and behavioural patterns. In cases where family and kinship ties are the only institutions, vestiges of traditionalism remain, such as parental agreements on marriage and intraurban marriages (Sirazhudinova 2013). Often, young people are not ready to take responsibility for establishing a family, somewhat forcing parents to intervene in this process (Starodubrovskaya 2019).

The second feature is the exceptional role of religion (Islam) in the daily life of most Dagestanis. In the postSoviet years, Islam filled the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of communist ideology and became the central vector of regional identity (Drambyan 2009; Kisriev 2009). Religion became the ideological foundation of the so-called conservative turn that led to the formation of a broad public consensus on gender segregation and male dominance over women (Starodubrovskaya 2019). The dominance of Islam affects the construction of youth masculinities, asserting as a norm the principle of gender separation in the public sphere and marginalising masculine scenarios related to sexuality and alcohol and drug use.

At the same time, there is evidence that the structural foundations of male dominance are eroding because of economic transformation. An important result of deindustrialisation has been that the position of breadwinner has become linked not to employment in agriculture and industry, but to work in trade and services, a development for

which many Dagestani men were not prepared, due to a specific code of honour (Lytkina 2010; Sirazhudinova 2013; Starodubrovskaya 2019). Therefore, in many families, the breadwinner position is taken by women, calling into question the gender contract and encouraging men to seek other social mechanisms to preserve their hegemony.

Third, Dagestan, like the other republics of the North Caucasus, belongs to the so-called namus societies (King 2008), in which the concept of honour plays a key role in regulating social relations. The namus paradigm places a special obligation on men: they are responsible for maintaining not only individual honour but also the collective honour of the family or clan (Ratelle & Souleimanov 2017).

Finally, a key attribute of life in the republic is the high level of conflict and violence (Zurcher 2007; Ibragimov & Matsuzato 2014). Dagestan is part of a region that has historically served as an arena of long-term political instability and armed conflict. Russia's colonial expansion in the nineteenth century triggered the Caucasian War, which played a key role in shaping the overall Caucasian 'mountain' identity (Gammer 1994). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dagestan was drawn into a full-scale conflict that started as a war between separatists and federal forces in Chechnya but, later, transformed into a confrontation between federal authorities and a jihadist movement throughout the North Caucasus (Dobaev 2009; Markedonov 2010). This confrontation was overlaid with local conflicts between local elites vying for control over economic and political resources, as well as between Sufi tariqats and the so-called Wahhabis. Despite the organisational defeat of the Islamist underground, the situation in the republic remains tense to this day. This is largely because Moscow manages the republic based on a special regime. The law enforcement agencies have been given exclusive powers and de facto immunity as part of the 'fight against terror'. With this protection, they use extra-judicial persecution, torture and murder to maintain the conflict in a smouldering state. The situation is exacerbated by corruption and the 'occupation' of state institutions by informal networks and clans, which block meritocratic social mobility, thus fuelling social tensions. This contributes to the preservation of forms of male dominance over other men and women that are based on aggressive expressions of force and violence.

Hegemonic and other masculinities The masculinity of wrestlers

For many Dagestanis, freestyle wrestling acts as an ideal institution for steering the transition from childhood to adulthood while responding to the basic demands of patriarchy. Wrestling reinforces and naturalises gender inequality, constructing and essentialising differences between sexes and linking them to the distribution of violence:

My uncle once told his wife a phrase that I liked very much. She was outraged that the men there [at wrestling events] constantly hurt women and do not allow them to participate. He said: 'Let's fight, and you'll understand the difference between a man and a woman.' It was sarcasm. But the difference between a man and a woman

is inherent in nature, so it is wrong to talk about equality. 5

In addition, wrestling, like other contact sports, remains an important arena in which violence is a legitimate mechanism for establishing hierarchical relationships between men. The most successful men receive recognition and authority, while the less talented are weeded out through competition.

Since there are no accurate figures on how many people participate in freestyle wrestling in Dagestan, we can only indirectly estimate. In 2010, the number of freestyle wrestlers in the children's and youth sports school systems, including the children's and youth sports schools of the Olympic reserve6, was given as 29,769 people (Briusov 2012). This estimate did not consider older participants, or those who trained in clubs organised at schools, universities and colleges or privately.7 According to the Ministry of Sports and Physical Culture of the Republic of Dagestan, the number of people involved in physical culture and sports increased more than sixfold from 2010 to 2019, with growth observed in almost all ages and types of mass sports.8 Since Soviet times, freestyle wrestling has been a priority area for support and financing. Consequently, it does not seem an exaggeration to say that the overwhelming majority of boys and teenagers participate in wrestling (Solonenko 2012).

To a large extent, the unabated popularity of wrestling is due to the fact that it functions as a social elevator for those who aspire to positions in the political elite of the republic (Solonenko 2012; Kolesnik 2018, p. 394). Former athletes often become deputies and state officials or join the police force and the Federal Security Service. This situation is a result of the long-term strategy of the wrestling communities, which in the post-Soviet period has successfully converted symbolic resources into political representation (Solonenko 2012). Sports clubs have been and continue to be important venues for the emergence of informal alliances that subsequently play a key role in the functioning of power institutions in this region (Kolesnik 2018). In the eyes of many Dagestanis, famous athletes who have converted recognition on the mat into power and influence are examples of meritocratic mobility:

5 Respondent 1, Abdula, 23 years old, wrestlingAll citations illustrate opinions and interpretations about which there is consensus in that community. For respondents who illustrate external view, only age is given.

6 Specialized sports school for training gifted children in Russia

7 This estimate also does not consider the 'overflow' of athletes who start their careers in freestyle wrestling and then move on to other types of wrestling (for example, grappling, judo, jiu-jitsu, sambo), as well as to mixed martial arts (MMA), which has recently become very popular in the North Caucasus.

8 'Fizicheskaya kul'tura i sport (Dannye Ministerstva po fizicheskoj kul'ture i sportu Respubliki Dagestan)' [Data from the Ministry of Physical Culture and Sports of the Republic of Dagestan] May, 2020, available at: https://dagstat.gks.ru/storage/mediabank/Z7PGoOwU/QH3HqecKag%20KyflbTvpa%20H%20cnopT.docx.htm, accessed: 29 July 2022

The athletes are now the elite youth in Dagestan. If you're an athlete, you have many opportunities. We now have young deputies in power, and so on., They are all athletes; it may still be somehow interconnected. For Olympic champions, any door is open. You can be anything you want to be. 9

In the early 2000s, wrestling communities in the republic began to converge with religious elites representing leading Islamic organisations, such as Dukhovnoe upravlenie musul'man Dagestana [the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Dagestan]. The resulting alliances were mutually beneficial: the religious elites had political ambitions and sought the support of influential actors, while the latter were interested in the Islamic legitimisation of their 'right to command' as Islam became the main public ideology. From this period onward, Islamic religiosity has been seen as an integral part of the lifestyle and image of a Dagestani wrestler: 'Amongst athletes, they are all spiritual guys because sport and religion are now very much connected. However, in other directions, there are fewer religious people; there are more secular people' (21). Thus, wrestling masculinity can be seen as a local variant of hegemonic masculinity. This hegemony relies, on the one hand, on the institution of mass sports and, on the other hand, on the bloc of former wrestlers within the political and spiritual elites.

Street workout masculinity

Hegemony remains out of reach for the vast majority of men, who adhere to more pragmatic versions of masculinity that allow them to enjoy the benefits of patriarchy without being on its 'front lines' (Connell 2005). I met an example of such complicit masculinity in the street workout community. In Makhachkala, the community has existed since 2013. Athletes work out three or four times a week, and sessions last for an hour and a half. After a 15-minute warm-up, beginners practice the so-called 'base', which include pull-ups, push-ups on bars and push-ups on the floor, while experienced athletes practise complex acrobatic and strength skills. Underprivileged youth dominate in this community: sons of the urban subproletariat with a rural background along with the non-elite intelligentsia plunged into poverty by the shock reforms of the 1990s. amongst those who have already graduated from school, the norm amongst participants is unemployment or part-time employment.

The street workout community exists in the shadow of mass sports. Martial arts continue to set the tone but the community is geared to those groups of male youth who are unwilling or unable to meet the rigid criteria of wrestling masculinity. In particular, my participant observation revealed that many participants had previously been forced to leave martial arts due to injuries or were not accepted into wrestling sections for health reasons.

The street workout community replicates the main features of prestigious sporting communities, which are

9 Respondent 2, Khabib, 25 years old, ordinary youth, Makhachkala, 17 June 2016

considered the benchmark for reproducing masculinity. The community is organised around practices designed to build a strong male body. The community maintains a strict homosociality: women are not allowed to train with men, although it is stipulated that they can train individually:

Our mentality doesn't allow us to train with girls. In Islam it is also forbidden. But if a girl wants to practise, [we tell her] please practise at home, or in the morning when no one is on the court. Not with us. 10

The priority of Islam is respected in the training space. It is visible by the presence of prayer mats, regular individual and collective prayer, and by special norms of behaviour.

Unlike wrestling, street workout can be attributed to so-called post-sports practices, typical features of which are 'grassroots' participation and an ideology that combines individualism, hedonism, self-realisation, freedom, broad inclusiveness, andlack of competitiveness and aggressiveness (Wheaton 2004). It is important for community members to keep in touch with the global street workout scene as both a source of new interpretations of masculinity and a promising venue to perform the male self. The video camera built into a smartphone, broadband mobile internet, video hosting sites and social networks combine to form a virtual infrastructure that allows athletes to track current cultural trends, represent themselves and gain recognition without leaving their city and neighbourhood:

Now I'm planning to shoot a training video. We make videos all the time. We have an active social network on Instagram; we have a profile on Instagram. We have a channel and community on Vkontakte. All the time we make these kinds of PR moves.11

This example shows how elements of traditional patriarchy are combined with neoliberal hegemonic masculinity, which is based on the 'association of bodies with entrepreneurial culture' (Nash 2018, p. 6). One interviewee's definition of a workout as 'fitness for street kids', explores the logic of the individual work of self-production (Maguire, 2008). Inclusion in these practices enables young people from the city's underclass to overcome—at least on a symbolic level—the structural limitations associated with their low socio-economic status.

Devout masculinity

Communities of devout Muslim youth are common in Dagestan, which reflects the position of this group of men in the system of power relations. They construct their own version of masculinity, which is revealed through faithfulness (man), scrupulous adherence to the norms of Islamic morality and the performance of daily ritual duties, and the study

10 Respondent 3, Mustapha, 19 years old, street workout, Makhachkala, 10 September 2016

11 Respondent 4, Ali, 23 years old, street workout, Makhachkala, 01 September 2016

of Islamic dogma and law. Given the consensus on the centrality of Islam in public life, this group has the potential to claim a hegemonic position: 'Everything within Dagestan is [built] upon them [devout Muslims]. They study, work, know the basics of Islam, and live by these norms'12

However, urban youth—which over the past 20 years has become the largest stratum of young Dagestanis— prefer to practice religion outside the traditional structures (tariqats) and religious organisations affiliated with the state (Yarlykapov 2010; Starodubrovskaya 2015, 2019). They reject traditional religious leaders and prefer an independent search for 'truth' by independently seeking information and discussing religious issues of interest with the most competent 'brothers'.

Regional and federal authorities labelled such uncontrolled religiosity as 'dangerous' and associated it with extremism and terrorism (Sokiryanskaya 2019). Since 1999, Dagestan has had a law prohibiting Wahhabi activity on its territory. This law creates a legal basis for the persecution of any non-traditional forms of Islam. Young people who visually resemble Wahhabi followers (that is, a beard without a moustache and rolled-up pants), as well as visitors to Salafist mosques, are regularly arrested, tortured and sometimes framed on charges of aiding and abetting terrorism. Law enforcement agencies apply preventive registration as potential extremists against them, which involves regular checks at checkpoints and administrative borders, police reporting, and de facto bans on work in the state and municipal sectors (Sokiryanskaya 2019). Many young Dagestanis perceive these measures as an injustice, a humiliation of their human dignity and a violation of their basic rights:

The only problem with preventive registration is that the police stop me at every roadblock. I get nervous like I'm a criminal, that's how it feels, although I've never broken any Russian law in my life. It's just that I've never even broken people as I know it's a sin in the Quran. Nobody here ever cheats anyone. Being the subject of preventive registration feels as if you are an extremist. They even ask you if you have any relatives in Syria13).

Thus, devout masculinity is celebrated in terms of religion as a form of male subjectivity but is marginalised politically as an undesirable and dangerous configuration of social practices. This tension creates a paradoxical experience of identity for members, combining a keen sense of vulnerability with a feeling of being chosen. This complex of feelings is the affective core of this version of masculinity.

Homosociality

Wrestling masculinity, which has transcended the sporting world and become a social ideal, sets a rather high bar for

12 Respondent 5, Rasul, 20 years old, devout youth, Makhachkala, 15 May 2019

13 Respondent 6, Said, 26 years old, devout youth, Makchachkala, 3 June 2017

physical characteristics and individual involvement. At the same time, the overproduction of athletes competing for limited resources—whether for places on the national team or parliamentary mandates—has led to a steady rise in this bar for both aspiring and established wrestlers and thus has intensified competition.

Competitiveness is a norm of wrestling homosociality, which is supported both 'from above'—by the power of coaches—and 'from below', at the peer-group level. Thus, it is common practice to test newcomers in team games preceding training. They are treated roughly on purpose to filter out, even at this initial stage, those who are not oriented towards competition and victory. This competitive spirit is accompanied by a regime of social isolation from peers who do not wrestle. Wrestling involves a daily routine that leaves no time for leisure, expansion of social connections, and inclusion in interest groups:

I went to college for finance. I study there and work out in the evening. There's nothing else. I jog in the morning, come home, eat breakfast, take a shower and go to school. After studying, I have about two or one and a half hours left before training. I sleep. I come to training at six o'clock and that's basically my regime. At 11 o'clock I go to bed.14

In this way, the community that forms in the gym becomes for children and adolescents the main, if not the only, peer group that supports their age-related socialisation. This contributes to the production of an exclusive male 'brotherhood', which is cemented by discipline, lifestyle and loyalty to each other and the coaches (Solonenko 2012). During training sessions and competitions, wrestlers acquire bodily attributes that naturalise their differences from other groups of men: 'When I first started wrestling, we treated a broken ear as something miraculous, almost sacred. If we saw someone's ear broken at competitions, we were already afraid of them'.15 For most Dagestani wrestlers— who train on average five to six hours a day—the gym is also an important space of collective religious experience. Every wrestling club is equipped with a prayer room and a space for ablutions. Joint prayers with 'brothers in wrestling' provide sporting solidarity with the features of a religious community.

Belonging to a 'brotherhood' provides a subjective feeling of inner community cohesion and a group sense of superiority, which is functional in terms of endorsing claims of dominance over other groups of men. In contrast, the focus on inclusion in the street workout community results in a more relaxed mode of homosociality. Ordinary participants have no obligation to attend regularly or to meet training criteria. Each individual trains at his own pace and practices the elements he prefers. Participants often discuss non-workout topics during training. Although there are elements of competition in this community as well, they do not play a defining role: 'We also have competitions,

14 Respondent 7, Mokhammad, 17 years old, freestyle wrestling, Makchachkala, 13 March 2020

15 Respondent 17, Musa, 34 years old, freestyle wrestling, Makchachkala, 10 June 2019

but not like in martial arts. It's more like gymnastics, you know?' (20, street workout).16 More important is collaboration, the need for which arises from the practice itself:

When you practice new elements, you always have to be backed up, helped ... When we were training on the beach, when I was working on the glove [the name of an acrobatic move that consists of lifting one's torso above the bar of the horizontal bar with arms extended], my friends helped me. They would stand next to me and hold me. There was one kid who was doing somersaults, they also spotted him. M. and R. [coaches — Author's note] spotted me, held me, helped me.17

Furthermore, street workout training does not interfere with other recreational activities and involvement in other communities of interest. For example, many of my respondents concurrently engage in parkour, photography and videography, play group computer games, and participate in volunteer activities at their place of study. Such homosociality is comfortable for men who agree to a supporting role in the gender order in return for their share of the patriarchal dividend. In this way the street workout community supports a complicit masculinity.

The boundaries of homosocial communities that support the devout masculinity are set by norms of religious homogeneity:

According to Islam, a Muslim cannot be friends with a non-Muslim, but he can maintain a good relationship with him. I adhere to this rule. I have non-Muslim acquaintances. I have been many places. I did an internship in Oriental Studies in Istanbul; I had many acquaintances amongst Russians. It's just different for them. They

have different goals in life, a different ideology. If you're a religious person, you are not on the way with them

18

The closed nature of this community is also affected by the marginalisation of devout youth. As a target of systematic persecution, they are extremely careful about who they let into their inner circle, as they fear infiltration by security service and police provocateurs.

In many cases, professional and business ties further cement ideological closeness. As already noted, young Muslims are de facto denied access to work in business structures affiliated with the state. The result is that devout Muslims are in general concentrated in the same sectors of small and medium enterprises, which are independent from

16 Respondent 12, Ibragim, 20 years old, street workout, Makhachkala, 20 March 2017

17 Respondent 8, Abu, 17 years old, street workout, Makchachkala, 14 March 2017

18 Respondent 6, Said, 26 years old, devout youth, Makchachkala, 3 June 2017

the state. These are the so-called halal businesses (Kapustina 2016; Kaliszewska 2020), as well as business initiatives in the field of social media and internet marketing.

Attitudes towards violence

The key difference between three types of masculinity lies in their attitudes towards man-to-man violence. For the community of wrestlers, violence is a crucial feature of this group's experience. The gender regime links the acquisition of masculinity to the successful utilisation of violence, which transforms the human body into 'a weapon to be used against other bodies' (Messner 1992, p. 203). Coaches teach beginners to initiate and not fear violence, using violence as their main pedagogical method. Slaps and minor injuries, including stabbing of the buttocks, masterfully administered by a trainer, are all normal training practices. To my question as to whether training was possible without physical punishment, all coaches without exception reacted: 'How else will you make men out of them?'19

In the context of the wrestling room, certain types of violence are sanctioned as approved gender performances, and deviations from them is stigmatised as non-male behaviour:

They punish us if we enter the mat and just don't wrestle like a man, just give up the fight. My father and my coach always scolded me for that. They could scold me and hit me and tell me why. I just wanted to tell everyone, too, that by just stepping on the mat, you have to be worthy and fight like a man and go all the way. And you can't just give up the fight like that. 20

This pedagogy aims to develop adolescents' habitual dispositions (Bourdieu 1977) to allow them to take physical risks, to not give up and be afraid of violence, not only on the wrestling mat but in other life situations. The interviewees mention individual fights with peers in school and on the street, group confrontations between schools, school bullying, friendly 'who's stronger than who' competitions after school, petty crime and self-defence. The lives of male adolescents outside the family and home are portrayed as a 'battlefield' in which they must always be prepared to confront violence with violence:

I moved from Kizilyurt to Makhachkala. I was hurt a lot. In those days nobody fought one-on-one. You were attacked by gangs. And in the settlement where I lived, there was such a group consisting of boys and young men. They were always chasing me, hurting me, bullying me. I even tried to go around the village on my way home. And one day my father says to me, they have the same fingers, the same hands, as you, they are the

19 Respondent 9, Seif, 42 years old, wrestling, Makchachkala, 23 March 2020

20 Respondent 10, Artur, 30 years old, wrestling, Makchachkala, 11 March 2020

same kids as you, what are you afraid of? Hit him in the face, he'll change. 21

The script of 'give 'em hell' masculinity is especially important at the stage of transition from childhood to adulthood, when wrestlers are still becoming rather than being men and are—in the view of informants—not yet able to fully control the desire for confrontation, which is determined by age-related psychology and physiology. This is the period when claims to male status are maximally challenged by other contenders and even a single withdrawal from violence or capitulation is regarded as a diminution of honour and entails reputational risks that remain into adulthood.

On the other hand, wrestlers are aware of the representation of Dagestani young men as physically developed, but short-tempered and aggressive athletes. This representation is an important part of the post-imperial imagination of Dagestan in Russian mass consciousness, popular culture and media discourse (Kapustina 2016; Khalidova et al. 2014). To overcome this stereotype, wrestlers emphasise the value of education in constructing correct masculinity. However, there is a serious gap between this rhetoric and practice. The gruelling, twice-daily workouts and a strict regimen actually lead to the exclusion of wrestlers from the educational process. At the same time, the high status of the sport in the republic allows them to manipulate the formal indicators of education; namely, academic performance. Successful wrestlers can count on special treatment by teachers at school and an 'automatic' evaluation at university (Solonenko 2012). Therefore, the normative attitude of 'studying well' in wrestlers' narratives is reduced to getting good grades.

Street workout practitioners share an understanding of a strong body as the main asset of a man. At the same time, these participants seek to distance themselves from direct physical violence and aggression in favour of more peaceful forms of articulation of a strong-bodied masculinity:

In martial arts, for example, a goal is to defeat like-minded people by fighting. Some kind of aggression is present. And in a street workout, the guys are, how can I say ... They are sanguine people, melancholics, calm cheerful people [laughs].22

In this discourse, a 'strong body' is equal to a healthy body, as reflected in their commitment to a so-called 'healthy lifestyle'. A body constructed through active violence is problematised as unhealthy, as it is attributed to social disadvantage: 'In my childhood there were such clashes, but they were rare. Well, the only conflicts were with those guys, bydlo [cattle, uneducated, rude people], who are looking for a reason to pick on me'.23

21 Respondent 11, Arsen, 28 years old, wrestling, Makchachkala, 10 March 2020