Stability in a Multipolar International System тема диссертации и автореферата по ВАК РФ 00.00.00, кандидат наук Храбина Йозеф

• Храбина Йозеф
• кандидат наук
• 2023

Оглавление диссертации кандидат наук Храбина Йозеф

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

INTRODUCTION

I. STABILITY OF MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURES AND GREAT POWER POLITICS IN THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1.1 Concept of Polarity as the Distribution of Power

1.2 Instability of Structure of the International System

1.3 Great Power Politics in a Multipolar World

II. FROM THE NAPOLEONIC WARS TO THE LONG PEACE: HAVE THE STRATEGIES OF GREAT POWERS CHANGED WITH THE TIMES?

2.1 Post-Revolution France

2.2 European Concert

2.3 World War

2.4 World War II

2.5 Long Peace

III. UNCHANGED OPERATIONAL GOALS IN THE CHANGED ENVIRONMENT: WILL THE LONG PEACE PROTRACT IN THE MULTIPOLAR WORLD OF THE 21st CENTURY?

3.1 The Problem of Stability in Multipolar Power Configurations

3.2 The Problem of Stability in Emerging Multipolarity in the 21st Century

3.3 Coming of the Global Concert?

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Populations of the Great Powers In

Industrialisation During the Napoleonic Wars

Map 1 Kevin Gilchrist: Napoleonic Wars

Composite Index of National Capabilities During The Concert Of Europe

Changes In GDP of Major Actors Between

Map 2 R.L. Ransom: German Unification

Table 2 Populations of the Great Powers in

Major Powers GDP Per Capita in 1900 Source Correlates Of War

1900 Populations of Major Powers

Industrialisation Levels as % Per Capita in

GDP of Major Powers in

Populations of The Great Powers in 1900, 1914 and 1920 in Millions

Industrialisation Levels in % as of

GDP of Major Powers in

CINC of Major Actors

CINC of Major Actors

Map 3 Bloomberg: Central Europe After the Munich Conference

1928-1942 Military Spending of Major Powers

Map 4 Paul Kennedy: Europe in

Cinc of Major Actors

Map 5 Vdiplomacy.Com: Cold War Spheres Of Influence

CINC of Major Actors

CINC of Major Actors

CINC of Major Actors

1950-2020 Trends in Military Spending of Major Actors

1989-1999 Comparison of the U.S. and Soviet/Russian GDP

CINC of Major Actors

GDP (PPP) of U.S., China And Russia

Figure 1 Shifts in Status Quo in 21st Century

Table 6 21st Century Composite Index of GDPS of Major Actors as a % Share in

Constant Dollars

Figure 2 Gallup Poll: Rate of the U.S. Public Satisfaction

Figure 4 Gallup Poll: American Preferences for the U.S. Role in World Affairs

Map 6 OBOR: One Belt One Road Initiative

Gross Domestic Spending on R&D as % of GDP

Map 7 World Defence Review: Territorial Disputes of the PRC

Global Balance of Power in 21st Century

Введение диссертации (часть автореферата) на тему «Stability in a Multipolar International System»

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is devoted to the study of multipolar power configurations and their stability. The researchers explore why multipolar systems can become unstable and how great power politics influences the stability of such configurations. The object of this study signals returning importance to one of the general questions of the realist school of political thought. Hence, is a system with multiple centres of power a stable one? How can the great powers' strategies affect stability in multipolar structures?

With progressing redistribution of power, international system stability is often debated in expert communities and in public. Therefore, on the one hand the topic's relevance undoubtedly touches upon the current shifts in the status quo and the multiple centres of power that form a global system of the 21st century. On the other hand, most multipolarity scholars are centred around the structural properties of such configurations, while the unit level impact is shadowed by structural determinism.

Nevertheless, the analysis of five case studies, within the scope of roughly 200 years, in conditions of multi, bi, uni, and non-polar configurations, proves that systemic stability can be impacted by unit-level strategies and even by autonomous decisions of single actors.

This study examines how causality between particular strategies potentially threatens systemic stability and vice-versa. The working hypothesis tested in the cases is whether the pair of strategies can destabilize the multipolar configurations and to what extent a domestic factor and free will are present during the designing of strategies that impact the system's stability.

The degree to which the problem has been researched in scientific literature demonstrates the war-prone nature of multipolar configurations. Multipolarity gave rise to the balance of power concept, as the great powers

balanced ambitions of each other in an uncertain environment.1 Harvard's Belfcenter study of the so-called Thucydides trap, the interaction between rising and established powers, points to 12 armed conflicts between great powers throughout the multipolar distribution of power during 1500-1945. Furthermore, Barry Posen refers to 4 major wars from 1752 to 1945; the Seven Years War, the Napoleonic Wars, and World Wars I and II. Nonetheless, there are at least two more wars for hegemony in the five hundred years of modern IR history; the Thirty Years War and the War for Spanish Succession. All these conflicts started under the multipolar distribution of power. The discussion of whether the distribution of power or human nature is the leading cause of war preoccupies scholarly literature.2 Alas, the war remains a persistent feature of statecraft. According to available data from the Correlates of War project, from 1816 to 2020, the only year humankind was spared the burning and ripping of human flesh and bones - as the pacifist definition of war goes - was 1889.

The perspectives on the conflict proneness of multipolarity vary in the literature. Proponents of stability in multipolar structures come from the school of classical realism. Hans Morgenthau believes that increased uncertainty about the intentions of others is forcing states to be more cautious in their actions. Hence, he prefers multipolarity over bipolarity.3 Morton Kaplan also adds to this argument, and sees multipolarity as the most stable framework because balancing coalitions form naturally. David Singer and Karl Deutsch challenge the claim of

1 At the same time, we understand the international political system as a complex adaptative system that is not solely shaped by units operating within it. Quite the contrary, systemic constraints force the actors to adapt to the extent of their own will, and their behavior is also driven by systemic events that the units cannot influence. With that said, one can observe a state's behavior on the system-wide level, where actors often adapt to the new realities, or at the unit-level where actors interact with each other and possibly influence the structure within the system. However, our work focuses on the latter, even though it stresses its relevance to the unit's complex adaptative system. For more see Scartozzi, C.M. A New Taxonomy for International Relations: Rethinking the International System as a Complex Adaptive System [Electronic resource] / C.M. Scartozzi. — URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/95496/2/MPRA_paper_95496.pdf (retrieved on 30.09.2020).; Harrison, N. (2006). Complexity in world politics: Concepts and methods of a new paradigm. State University of New York Press.; or Kavalski, E. (2016). World politics at the edge of chaos: Reflections on complexity and global life. State University of New York Press.

2 Waltz, K. N. (2018). Man, the state and war: A theoretical analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. P.32.

3 Morgenthau, H.J. Politics among nations; the struggle for power and peace / H.J. Morgenthau. — New York : Knopf, 1968. P.362

classical realists by their popular notion assuming that even multipolar systems operating under the rules of balance-of-power policies are shown to be self-destroyingg4 as multipolarity appears to be an unstable configuration in terms of conflict frequency. With multiple centres of power, a variety of interests also come.

Richard Rosencrance attempts to bridge the classical realist's claims with the conflicting view of structural realists as he compares the virtues of bipolar and multipolar systems. His summarisation depicts multipolarity as more conflict-prone than bipolarity due to the greater diversity of interests and demands5. Less conflict intensity belongs to the properties of multipolar power configurations simultaneously. Posen, in contrast, claims that the multipolar conflicts are of greater magnitude. Furthermore, Rosencrance argues that states are less obsessed with each other due to greater interaction opportunities, and thereby arms races occur less.

These notions bring us to the idea of structural balance in multipolarity. The states can overstretch their power, form powerful alliances for conquest, or simply buck-pass the threats of potential aggressors. Here, John Mearsheimer observes the structural configuration from the point of a balanced distribution of power. He develops the term balanced (multi)polarity- the configuration being inherently stable as it lacks any potential hegemon but still creates power asymmetries. The lack of an aspiring hegemon generates less fear, according to Mearsheimer. The systems, he maintains, which are unstable are the unbalanced ones since these configurations give rise to a potential hegemon that is feared by others due to his superior capabilities.

In contrast, the school of hegemonic stability argues about hierarchic instead of anarchic order of international relations. William Wohlforth defines

4 Deutsch, K.W. Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability / K.W. Deutsch, J.D. Singer // World Politics. — 1964. — 16(3). — P. 390-406. — D01:10.2307/2009578

5 Rosecrance, R. Bipolarity, multipolarity, and the future / R. Rosecrance // Journal of Conflict Resolution. — 1966. — 10(3). — P. 314-327. — DOI: 10.1177/002200276601000304

multipolarity as the flat hierarchy, in which no state is unambiguously number one. He argues that multipolarity is unstable as all three conditions for war -uncertainty, free-riding, and fear of allied defection - are at play there. Therefore, Wohlforth assumes that uni and bipolar configurations are more stable than the multipolar ones as they have far fewer incentives for direct positional competition over status.6

Similarly, structural realists argue that bipolar structures are more stable than multipolar ones due to the rigid balance of power between two blocks. They point out the perils of buck-passing proneness in the multipolar configuration that might lead to the potential threat of unchecked revisionist powers. Stephen Walt develops the argument of Kenneth Waltz and applies it to the alliance formation. At the same time, he argues the twin dangers of "abandonment" (being left in the lurch in a crisis or war as a result of buck-passing) and "entrapment" (being dragged into misguided wars by one's alliance commitments as a result of chain-ganging). States that fear abandonment are less able to restrain adventurous allies and more likely to be entrapped. In contrast, states resisting entrapment must worry that their key allies will lose confidence and seek more reliable partners. Kenneth Waltz's idea of entrapment by alliance commitments is further developed in the article of Christensen and Snyder, and it's called chain ganging.7

Glenn Snyder and Kenneth Waltz argue that these twin dangers8 are more worrisome in multipolar systems than in bipolar systems, and Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder suggest that these problems are even more pronounced when conquest is easy and the need for prompt and reliable allies is especially great.

6 Wohlforth, W.C. The Stability of a Unipolar World / W.C. Wohlforth // International Security. — 1999. — Vol. 21. — No. 1. — P. 5-41.

7 Walt, S.M. The Origins of Alliance [Electronic resource] / S.M. Walt. — Cornell University Press, 1987. — URL: www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt32b5fc (retrieved on 30.09.2020).

8 Christensen, T. J. Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity / T.J. Christensen, J. Snyder // International Organization. — 1990. — 44(02). — P. 137. — URL: https://sci-hub.tw/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300035232.

The novelty of this dissertation lies in the revision of the twin dangers in multipolarity by expanding the structural approach to unit-level influence. By doing so, one can observe the impact of actors on structural stability. We argue that, besides systemic events that actors cannot influence, the instability in multipolar systems is directly linked to structural conditions and unit level sources. Both phenomena are intertwined in the strategic preferences of the great powers, i.e. their strategies. Great powers, our argument goes, through their strategic choices, can impact the structure's stability and even influence the distribution of power to their advantage. As we demonstrate, the pairs of strategies simultaneously determine future instabilities and their scope and magnitude. Therefore, throughout this study, we show that combinations of particular strategies are likely to destabilize the multipolar structures. We call this phenomenon a Strategic Twinning.

Observing strategic choices of actors, one finds out that contemporary literature is primarily aimed at the status quo and upward-downward dynamics of the state - a set of strategies addressing the redistribution of power and its effects, as it draws on the rise/decline of the major actors, i.e. vertical dynamics. Under this category falls the argument of preventive war theorists9, based on the power transition theory argument10 articulated by the like-named theoretical school. However, both schools vary about which state initiates conflict. Whereas the preventive war theorists claim that the established power is prone to launch a war on the challenging power,11the power transition theory, on the contrary, asserts12 the opinion that its mostly a challenger dissatisfied with the status quo who is likely to initiate the conflict. Moreover, the argument of John Mearsheimer on

9 See Allison, G. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? / G. Allison. — New York : Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017; Gilpin, R. War and Change in World Politics / R. Gilpin. — New York : Cambridge University Press, 1981; Anderson; A.J.P. Taylor

10 See Organski, A.F.K. The war ledger / A.F.K. Organski, J. Kugler. — Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1980.

11 For more, see Allison, G. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? / G. Allison. — New York : Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017; Gilpin, R. War and Change in World Politics / R. Gilpin. — New York : Cambridge University Press, 1981

12 Organski A.F.K. (1958). World Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1958. 461 p.

unbalanced multipolarity with the presence of a challenger adds to this dynamic a notion that the redistribution of power is a destabilizing element and can influence the strategic choices of actors. Therefore, arguments on rising and declining actors and their strategies form the first category of vertical dynamics.

The latter category describes the balancing strategies of states, i.e. checking the status quo. For instance, Van Evera13, Lebow14 and Snyder15 observe the windows of vulnerability regardless of the rising or declining trend in the state's relative power. Another balance of power motivated behavior is summed up by Stephen Walt in his book on alliances formation.16 Walt compares balancing and bandwagoning and assumes that states are likely to balance against threats via ad-hoc alliances. Bandwagoning is a widely considered implausible strategy when balancing threats or aiming to increase power.17 Contrary to bandwagoning against aggressors, Schweller offers his notion of bandwagoning for profit18 that portrays free-riding in hierarchical orders. Randal Schweller. in his book Deadly Imbalances, also points out the importance of effective balancing. He stresses the structural conditions for the rise of Germany as a revisionist power and adds the crucial role of domestic elites in the causes of World War II. At the same time, his conclusions depict a failed strategy towards Germany as well. The second category is framed by the latest work of T.V.Paul on soft-balancing, who asserts

13 Evera, S.V. The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War / S.V. Evera // International Security. — 1984. — 9(1). — P. 58. — DOI:10.2307/2538636

14 Lebow, R.N. Between peace and war: The nature of international crisis / R.N. Lebow. — Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

15 Snyder, J. Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914 / J. Snyder. — Baltimore : John Hopkins University Press, 1985. - P.123.

16 Walt, S.M. The Origins of Alliance [Electronic resource] / S.M. Walt. — Cornell University Press, 1987. — URL: www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt32b5fc (retrieved on 30.09.2020).

17 See Jervis, R. Dominoes and bandwagons strategic beliefs and great power competition in the Eurasian rimland / R. Jervis, J.L. Snyder. — New York : Oxford University Press, 1991, or Mearsheimer, J.J. Tragedy of Great Power Politics / J.J. Mearsheimer. — New York : W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.

18 Schweller, R. Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back / R. Schweller // International Security. — 1994. — 19(1). — P. 72-107. — DOI:10.2307/2539149

that hard-balancing is often causing instabilities and in the MAD19 age, the instabilities might cause a major conflict amongst the nuclear powers. 20

Stability or peace are phenomena insufficiently researched in IR. As Jack Levy points out, there is one page dedicated to peace for every hundred pages of war studies.21 Yet, we live in the Long Peace period as we witness paradigm shifts in great power relations that have been relatively peaceful for 76 years since World War II. Therefore, the study of stability requires the study of destabilizing and stabilizing behaviors of the major actors.

The comparative method will allow us to determine strategies that foster peaceful or sanguine relations amongst the major actors, i.e., reflect the system's stability. When it comes to upholding peace, contemporary scholars offer a combination of deterrence and restraint as the most plausible combination of strategies.22 As Myerson argues, a successful deterrent strategy requires a balance between resolve and restraint, and this balance must be recognized and understood by our adversaries.23 The problem of absent transparency in deterrent building is also pointed out by Robert Jervis, who maintains that military buildups produce uncertainty and misperceptions.24 Friedman, in his latest work, offers a solution to the security dilemma problem: "Deterrence works best with unambiguous red lines, established over time, linked with vital interests, and backed by clear and credible messages, reinforced by known capabilities, about what will happen if they are crossed. It will work less well as more uncertainties

19 Mutual assured destruction

20 Paul, T.V. Restraining great powers: Soft balancing from empires to the global era / T.V. Paul. — New Haven : Yale University Press, 2018.

21 Levy, J. S. The causes of war and the conditions of peace [Electronic resource] / J.S. Levy. — Annual Review of Political Science. — 1998. — Vol. 1. — P. 139-165. — URL: https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.L1.139 (retrieved on 30.09.2020).

22 Posen, B. Restraint: a New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy / B. Posen. — Cornell University Press, 2015 -P. 256; Mearsheimer, J.J. Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities / J.J. Mearsheimer. — Yale University Press, 2018 - P. 328.

23 Myerson, R. Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: a Game-Theorist's Perspective / R. Myerson. Carlisle : Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2007. 31 p. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11401 (retrieved on 06.09.2021).

24 Jervis, R. War and Misperception / R. Jervis. — The Journal of Interdisciplinary History. — 1988. — 18(4). — P. 675-700. — DOI: 10.2307/204820.

are introduced - about where the lines actually are, how much any transgressions will matter, whether there will be much of a response if they are crossed and what difference they will actually make."25

Friedman describes what we label as structural or order-restraint. The international orders are helping to mitigate misperceptions via socialization, uncertainty via agreed norms, and provide a set of reassurances to act as a vehicle to check the aggressors. In contrast, the major stakeholders are responsible for the stability of the international regime.

In discussions, restraint being the best remedy for the flawed foreign policy of the US after the Cold War is advocated by those who label restraint as an isolationist foreign policy. However, Stephen Walt and other realists argue otherwise and depict restraint as a form of offshore balancing. Self-restraint, in contrast, portrays a picture of a state that does not seek confrontation unless its vital interests are at stake.26 With that said, restraint is not the type of strategy that would directly imply a non-interventionist approach. It is more of a selective engagement approach that enables the state to reserve the right not to intervene on all occasions.

Finally, we analyze détente as the stabilizing foreign policy strategy. The literature mainly depicts the US-Soviet détente. Litwak describes the US retreat from containment and re-evaluation of American strategic commitments as the primary goals of détente.27 However, one might find patterns of détente in history, such as Franco-German détente in the early 20th century. Keiger describes this period of French aims to accommodate the growing threat of Wilhelmine Germany as a success.28 In this context, détente appears as a strategy for decliners.

25 Friedman, L. Introduction-The Evolution of Deterrence Strategy and Research / L. Friedman // In: Osinga F., Sweijs T. (eds) NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020. The Hague : T.M.C. Asser Press, 2021. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_1 (retrieved on 06.09.2021).

26 Posen, B. Restraint: a New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy / B. Posen. — Cornell University Press, 2015. P.324.

27 Litwak, R.S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Security, 1969-1976 / R.S. Litwak. New York : Cambridge University Press, 1986. 244 p.

28 Keiger, J. Jules Cambon and Franco-German Détente, 1907-1914 / J. Keiger // The Historical Journal. — 1983. — 26(3). — P. 641-659. — URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639084 (retrieved on 24.08.2021).

Nicholas Kitchen also recognizes this correlation, linking Obama's doctrine to either détente or decline.29 MacDonald and Parent offer an answer to Kitchen's question, as they assume that great powers usually retrench in relative decline. Hence Kitchen's notion about the difference between détente and decline in Obama's strategy were both correct as Obama was the first in the line of American presidents to pursue retrenchment30. Travis Robinson recognizes the direct link between the response to the relative decline, retrenchment, and détente. Given Robinson's findings, the retrenchment portrays fundamental structural realignment, while détente mainly focuses on bilateral relationships.

Last, but not least, is order building as a stability-oriented strategy. With the historical experience of 19th-century proto-order, an international group of scholars has noted the shifting distribution of power that established the 21st Century Concert Study Group (CCSG) project"51. A subsequent publication aiming to mitigate the destabilising effects of the forming multipolar structure followed in 2014.32 More recent pieces on Global Concert have been added by Miller and Rauch33, Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan34, and critics of the recent Haass and Kupchan article such as Nico Popescu and Alan S. Alexandroff with Colin I. Bradford35. All the pieces mentioned above share a common concern in the

29 Kitchen, N. The Obama Doctrine — Détente or decline? / N. Kitchen // European Political Science. — 2010. — 10(1). — P. 27-35. — URL: https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2010.71

30 The US retrenchment seems to be a new bipartisan consensus as Obama, Trump, and Biden have pursued this strategy

31 Members of the group are Mélanie Albaret, Bertrand Badie, Kanti Bajpai, Oleg Demidov, Nicola Horsburgh, Adam Humphreys, Andrew Hurrell, Konstanze Jüngling, Charles Kupchan, Delphine Lagrange, Kyle Lascurettes, Siddharth Mallavarapu, Sara Bjerg Moller, Daniel Müller, Harald Müller, Alexander Nikitin, Weizhun Mao, Zhongying Pang, Carsten Rauch, Matthias Schulz and Iris Wurm

32 The Twenty-First Century Concert Study Group. A twenty-first century concert of powers — promoting great ... [Electronic resource]. — URL: https://www.hsik.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsik_downloads/PolicyPaper_ATwentyFirstCenturyConcertofPowers.pdf (retrieved on 30.09.2020).

33 Great Power Multilateralism and the Prevention of War: Debating a 21st Century Concert of Powers / ed. by H. Müller, C. Rauch. 1st ed. London : Routledge, 2017. 284 p. URL: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315206790 (retrieved on 30.09.2020).

34 Haass, R. The new concert of powers [Electronic resource] / R. Haass, C.A. Kupchan // Foreign Affairs. — 2021, April 29. — URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-03-23/new-concert-powers. (retrieved on 30.09.2021).

35 Popescu, N. The case against a new concert of powers [Electronic resource] / N. Popescu, A.S. Alexandroff, C.I. Bradford at all // Foreign Affairs. — 2021. — URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-05-11/case-against-new-concert-powers (retrieved on 30.09.2022).

instability of multipolar structures. They aim to stimulate discussion about the prevention of major wars in the 21st century. However, these publications lack the unit-structure approach we introduce in our line of research.

The above-introduced subject embodied in strategies of great powers influences this dissertation' object represented in the stability of multipolar systems.

The dissertation seeks to answer the question of how great power strategies can influence the structural stability of multipolar systems.

The chronological framework entails the period from the 19th century to the beginning of the 21st century encompassing the cases studies of great power dyads resulting in protracted stability or instability of the system.

The goal of the research is to illuminate the interconnection between the stability of multipolar structures and the strategies of great powers. The research goal of the dissertation is attained through the following objectives:

• Conceptualization of multipolarity properties to fully comprehend the problem of its stability regarding changes in relative ranks of major actors (structure level influences) and their strategies (unit level influences).

• Analysis of the great power politics role in the stability of multipolar structures as the core determinant of unit-level impact on the structure.

• Determination of which strategies were at play prior to and during dyads to distinguish stability-oriented and instability-causing strategies.

• Confirm the impact of particular strategies on the stability of the structure via a study of cases when major actors employed strategies of predation, buck-passing, hard-balancing, appeasement, accommodation, restraint, deterrence or détente.

• Revisit the twin dangers via adding unit-structure dynamics which result in strategic twinning.

• Justify the findings of case studies and their relevance to contemporary political science and define the strategic patterns that cause instabilities in the contemporary international arena

• Formulate recommendations for maintaining stability in the 21st-century multipolar system based on a.) order-restraint via norms b.) socialization mechanisms as crisis management tools, and c.) distribution of benefits via cooperation patterns.

Заключение диссертации по теме «Другие cпециальности», Храбина Йозеф

CONCLUSION

This study has dealt with the interconnection between the stability of multipolar structures and strategic patterns of great powers. Acknowledging the notion that actors often adapt their behaviors to the systemic events, origins of which they cannot influence, the structure-unit and unit-structure dynamics were the bedrock of research. Via thorough analysis of theory and case study, we depict the behavioral models that foster stability and spur instability in multipolar structural configurations. Illuminating the problem of multipolar system stability thus required six objectives in order to verify six inferences:

1. Conceptualizing multipolarity properties in order to fully comprehend the problem of its stability regarding changes in relative ranks of major actors (structure level influences) and their strategies (unit level influences).

We found out that multipolar structures offer greater manoeuvrability that a.) can more often result in conflicts, but b.) with more balancing options the odds for managing potential conflicts grow. Both assumptions revolve around a flat hierarchy that involves three or more centres of power.

Observing sources of instabilities in multipolar power configurations, some scholars depict the instabilities in multipolar structures as of greater in frequency but lesser in scope. In contrast, we found out that in the past 150 years, the most robust conflicts broke out in multipolar configurations. And as our main argument goes, it is not only systemic events and structural configurations that determine the scope and magnitude of instabilities, but also the strategic behavior that plays a great role in structural stability.

It is our submission that it is not only the structure curtailing the strategies of the units but also the same units that directly impact the structure's stability via behaviors opposing the balance of power logic.

2. Analysis of the great power politics role in the stability of multipolar structures as the core determinant of unit-level impact on the structure

brought us to the notion of structural realists about twin dangers in multipolarity. However, proponents of the twin dangers offer explanations only for one side of the problem, i.e. the perils of multipolarity that invite states to buck pass or chain drag the alliances into the whole-systemic conflicts. Therefore, we aimed to revisit the twin dangers and offer a deeper explanation of the instabilities in multipolar configurations on both structure and unit levels. That said, great powers' strategies are embedded at the domestic level as the economic surpluses and skilled leadership open the way to pursue more ambitious foreign policy, or the need for domestic reforms can stimulate the anxious reactions to the structural events. In contrast, structural sources of foreign strategies are mostly based on power calculus and windows of opportunity. These calculations, taken together, reflect into strategic behavior of great powers.

3. Therefore, we aspired to revisit the twin dangers via adding unit-structure dynamics which result in strategic twinning.

Our explanation of instabilities in multipolar structures points out that the resulting instabilities are not always stemming from buck-passing and chain ganging, but the pairs of strategies, or as we call it, strategic twinning, implied by great powers prior and during conflicts. Strategic twinning, our argument goes, points out the predation and hard-balancing as a primary source of instabilities in international affairs, while the reactions such as buck-passing, accommodation and appeasement are the variables that determine the scope and magnitude of the coming instabilities. Having said that, the systemic reaction to the aggression helps us to understand the resulting instability, while domestic and structural sources of behavior offer explanations for the roots of such behavior.

The second proposed inference had made a case for pairs of strategies that mutually impact the structure of international relations. Therefore, in order to investigate the second main inference, we aspired to case study a phenomenon of

multipolar structures that can be destabilized via pairs of contradictive strategies, i.e. strategic twinning. Meanwhile, we demonstrate that status quo-oriented strategies such as restraint or deterrence are likely to promote stability in the structure.

4. Determine which strategies are at play prior to and during dyads, to

distinguish stability-oriented and instability-causing strategies.

The case study proved that the predation, or its signs, at least, is omnipresent in every case we observed. States pursuing predatory strategies aspire to rise in their relative rank or prey on the other declining states in the structure, such as when France and Russia preyed on the declining Ottoman Empire prior to the Crimean War. Predation is assertive in its core and thereby often met with hard balancing, bandwagoning or buck-passing, depending on the aspirations of reacting side.

Moreover, the public favours predatory policies if those projects benefit public welfare, as in the cases of Nazi Germany, Wilhelmine Germany and Napoleonic France demonstrated. On the contrary, structural reactions differ based on the relative power of the predatory state. If the state reaches near power preponderance, others are likely to balance it, and whole-systemic instabilities might occur. The primary difference between predation and primacy is that the state with the lower rank and in relative decline can also pursue predatory policies, while primacy is, to a large extent, stimulated by beliefs of the national elite, often connected with messianism, i.e. belief in one's own destiny to lead. In other words, predatory strategies are to, a large extent, determined by beliefs of the national elite that their state is superior to the others or it is rightful to spread their values and ideas by force. Systemic reaction to predatory states often reflects in

buck-passing as the predatory state can pose little or no threat to the status quo. In contrast, the strategy of primacy often meets structural barriers in the form of hard balancing coalitions. If the state poses no threat to the whole-structural distribution of power, others are likely to calculate with buck-passing as the ones who pass the buck aim to weaken other peer competitors in the structure.

Buck-passing strategy comprises power calculus of major actors aiming either on the bloodletting of their peer competitors or preserving themselves from indirect threats. Power calculations of the buck-passer often create the danger of unchecked growth of the predatory state that might become power preponderant and aim to achieve hegemony. British appeasement of Nazi Germany also included features of buck-passing as Chamberlain hoped for the mutual confrontation between Germany and the Soviet Union in which they would bleed each other white. Appeasement and accommodation are mostly a reflection on the structural dynamics in which the appeaser perceives its own relative decline, while there is a rising state signalling no threat to balance of power - as illustrated in the case of Germany under Bismarck. However, the accommodating approach appears to be short-sighted as the accommodated state's elite can potentially shift towards a hawkish stance, which is the primary conclusion of British-German relations prior to World War I. A shift towards a hawkish approach by national elites is likely to cause instabilities in the structure.

In order to prove that state elites manipulate with a certain degree of free will (agency) in strategy composition, we investigated the domestic and structural causes of instabilities, the dissertation recurring debate on agency vs structural determinism. As we found out, the agency phenomenon can manifest in multipolar structures quite frequently as these structures offer greater manoeuvrability for units. When it comes to instabilities, free will reflects in structural nonconformism that often involves opportunistic behavioral patterns such as predation, revisionism, or buck-passing. The field, however, requires further research on the connection between free will and structural stability. In

addition, we lack a comparison of agency levels in different structural configurations.

The 20th century gave birth to nuclear arsenals of great powers that, as it appears, limited warfare as the most destabilising feature of great power politics. However, we have witnessed the bound bipolar and unipolar structures since the last great power war. Therefore, as many contemporary scholars suggest, we cannot claim that the major wars have been eradicated entirely. At the same time, great powers continue to compete in all possible ways, and coercive politics mirrors in specific areas such as economic wars, cyberwarfare, propaganda and informational warfare, diplomatic standoffs and proxy wars. All these features fit into the definition of political warfare, which we address as the replacement of the major instabilities we witnessed throughout the study of historical cases.

5. Implementing the findings of our study to contemporary international relations, we found three significant patterns that draw on the instabilities.

As we found out, the state's motivations have not changed to date. Great powers still compete for scarce resources and control, while their behavior is driven by fear, uncertainty and a lust for power. At the same time, the great powers use the same strategic patterns such as predation, hard-balancing, buck-passing and accommodation.

If we are to sum up the discussion about the nature of international affairs today, it would be a debate on who is revisionist today and who is the most significant source of instabilities the world has encountered over the past decade. Scrutinising these events via lenses of strategic twinning, one sees the hard-line strategy at the bottom of each recent dyad.

The US revision of post-Cold War order, Chinese regional revisionism predation and Russian resurgence as a great power are the primary sources of instabilities today. In the case of US predation, the primacist administrations in

the US caused bipartisan foreign policy that resulted in local conflicts, regime change policies and alienation of periphery powers.

The initial problem in Russia-West relations is the nature of the system as Russia has sought a recognition of an independent great power status. In contrast, the US expanded liberal order to the proximity of Russia that has directly contradicted Russia's vital interests. Without taking Russian warnings into account, the US sought NATO eastward expansion and supported liberal movements across Eurasia, which resulted in an anxious response from Russia and adoption of hard-line strategies in the Russian near abroad. While scholars labelling Russia as a revisionist power depict its hard-line responses to soft-power tools and defiance towards the so-called liberal order, the other side of this argument points to the US unilateral and often coercive spread of liberal values being revisionist. The current aim of the US in containing Russia is to restrain it from using its full potential. The recent case is a recurrence of the British policy of Russian containment in the 19th century and during the Crimean War. A skilful use of dichotomic reactions makes Russia resilient to Western pressure today. Contrary to the Cold War, this dyad is likely to largely remain a regional significance, even though Russia and NATO are both nuclear capable actors/alliance, thus an open military confrontation would have whole-systemic impact.

In contrast, current US-China tensions could become of whole-systemic magnitude as China is active globally, and most of the US allies so far decided to pass the buck on Chinese predation, which may or may not change in the future. Regional hegemony is the best description of Chinese foreign policy goals, while Chinese internal debates point out the division into proponents of becoming more assertive and restraint voices calling for a low key approach of quiet rise. Notwithstanding these debates, the current foreign policy of the US is defined by bipartisan consensus about containment of China. Scholars however, agree about an unprecedented growth of continent-size China. This dynamic is the major

challenge to the Western dominance in global affairs since the fall of the Chinese Empire. Therefore, China might either become the leader of the possible multipolar configuration or engage in system-destabilising severe competition with the US over the world leadership position.

The current US grand strategy appears as a combination of revisionism and retrenchment. Although not usually researched as a plausible pair of strategies, revisionism and retrenchment are not mutually exclusive. Quite contrary, the United States aims to revise the international order to cement it in their advantage, while they are reorientating to Asia. It is not clear, however, whether the US will aspire to contain Russia and China at the same time. Such a course would likely result in overstretch and internal shocks in the US. The early 2022 talks between the US and Russia about new security architecture in Europe manifested the US reluctance to rely on European allies in containment of Russia. Therefore, the retrenchment in Europe is unlikely to succeed as there is no one to take up on the task.

In contrast, the US might want to drag Russia into a proxy war in Ukraine that would destabilise Russia internally and drain its resources. Destabilising Russia would allow the US to focus on China solely without paying much attention to Eastern Europe. However, the result of the US-Russia dyad over European security architecture will offer us a lot of answers to the future of the system. Such as, a.) if the US is truly reorientating to Asia it should understand that being active in two theatres at the same time might become the bedrock of its collapse, therefore, the US are likely to seek a common ground with Russia over Eastern Europe b.) if Russia and China aim to keep the US overstretched then Russia is likely to pursue confrontational policies in Eastern Europe and China likewise in Asia-Pacific c.) stressing the importance of shared misperceptions about the decline of the West, Russia and the Chinese economy slow-down might result in a more ambitious foreign policy in the backyard of peer competitors with resulting instabilities,

and d.) results of these dyads will likely influence the distribution of power in the forthcoming decade.

However, the scope and magnitude of the instabilities accompanying the decline of Pax Americana and shifts in the structure will likely be determined by the stance of future domestic elites. If the hard-liners prevail, the competition will likely result in whole-systemic instabilities. On the contrary, if the retrenchers and moderates remain in power, the competition will probably not overreach the current state of political warfare in respective regions.

With that said, we demonstrated that current great power dyads are a product of varying perceptions of the existing structural setting, while these conflicting views are mutually perceived as a threat in the 21st century dyads. The resulting dynamic is that all actors perceive their counterpart as revisionist, as they claim that the international system is posited in different configuration. In admitting otherwise, all actors would undermine their positions and thereby their vital interests. Russia and China accepting the US hegemony would imperil their national elites' perceptions of security and sovereignty. The US accepting a multipolar structure would equal accepting their own decline from hegemony. In this environment, the world is facing a series of escalations in the near abroad of China and Russia and on the periphery of the US led liberal order. As all actors consider their counterpart as predatory, or revisionist, they feel threatened and commit themselves to coercive actions and hard balancing. With that said, we are witnessing strategic twinning at play. In a contemporary case of strategic twinning, we are likely to witness heightening tensions and possible military escalation in the above mentioned regions.

6. Formulate recommendations for maintaining stability in the 21st-

century multipolar system

Regardless of the debate about current power distribution, there is an undisputedly ongoing struggle for power amongst the three centres of power that

can be labelled as the most decisive ones in the system at this moment. Thus, even if one admits that the dust from the collapsing Pax Americana has not settled yet, and the upcoming distribution of power is yet to be determined, the participants of the current dyads are the ones who will determine whether the system remains stable. Stabilising the current situation requires; accepting the shifting balance of power by acknowledging great power status and spheres of influence of other peer competitors; choosing non-violent strategies to achieve one's interests; and finally to stabilise great power relations by cementing the current status quo via forming international norms ideally based on balance of power logic and respecting the sovereignty of other great powers.

As for the final inference, we assumed that major powers will try to avoid a direct confrontation. Thus, we argued that in order to manage current great power dyads, all relevant actors must admit the vital interests of their counterparts and thereby accept the multipolar configuration. Managing multipolar structure will require an order-building.

In order to find out the stabilising behavioral patterns in multipolar configurations, we analysed the theoretical approaches in contemporary literature, which primarily use deterrence, restraint, détente and bandwagoning as the role models for stability-oriented strategies of great powers. As the case study of two Long Peace periods points out, patterns of behavior that mitigate uncertainty and a certain degree of cooperation are the most plausible for strategies that foster stability in the structure.

With that said, deterrence, restraint and détente appear to be the most effective stability-producing strategies. At the same time, bandwagoning proved to be sufficient only in the short-run so long as the preponderant actor holds the significant advantage over the bandwagoning state - as demonstrated in the post-Cold War US-Russia relations. Case studies in our research portray restraint as key to stability in all kinds of structures. If the US acts as a benevolent hegemon

in the post-Cold War world, its position would be a lot more advantageous with far fewer instabilities contrary to the contemporary world. Also, at the beginning of the Cold War détente period was a demonstration of restraint behavior in the Caribbean Crisis. And finally, the Nineteenth Century Vienna System is well known for the self-restraint of great powers and structural restraint embodied in proto-norms and ad-hoc balancing manoeuvres.

International regimes appear to be helpful when used as stabilisation vehicles. Major stakeholders consciously build orders and, thus, should be considered as products of unit behavior. Some may even say a strategic one. As the European Concert, Yalta Order and Liberal Order demonstrate, the international orders offer significant capabilities in crisis mitigation as the major actors agreed to the order principles. The norms and most of the orders also contain mechanisms of socialisation, such as ad-hoc conferences or international organisations after World War II. With that said, international regimes provide stability for the part of actors who agreed (members) to establish such a vehicle. Nonetheless, international regime-building subsequently offers the order-restraint imposed on actors. Consequently, orders produce a.) order-restraint via norms b.) socialisation mechanisms as crisis management tools, and c.) distribution of benefits via cooperation patterns.

Understanding the advantages of order-building, some authors looked into the history and proposed establishing the Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers. This idea is fuelled by increasing a fear of great power dyads and even wars as the shifts in the distribution of power cause chaos and uncertainty-driven behavior. Indeed, the multipolar configurations, to a certain extent, can be managed via regimes that would respect domestic sovereignty and international spheres of influence of their members. The perils of such ventures lie in the changing perception of domestic elites and power distribution that persistently changes.

However, the formation of a Global Concert seems inevitable as the power redistributes towards multipolar configuration. Sooner or later, the current great power dyads and competition will manifest in the necessity to socialise and establish formal or informal rules. If not, then global issues such as climate change, pandemics, poverty, or international security will force major stakeholders to debate the future of our planet.

Establishing a Global Concert would, nonetheless, encounter two significant issues. First is the order building problem. Selected orders were meant to conserve the favourable distribution of power for major stakeholders during all periods of the Long Peace researched in this study. In contrast, today's potential stakeholders would have to admit the decline of the Western powers and the rise of the Global ones, which seems inevitable, but requires a lot of self-consciousness of the elites in the countries that ruled the World for the past several centuries. Observing the practices of retrenchment or accommodation, these behavioral patterns are viable options for the actors who admitted their decline and accepted the new distribution of power, a stage of which contemporary international affairs are still somewhat distant.

The latter, and perhaps the most troubling issue, is the coercive tool behind structural restraint. Nuclear deterrence of two relatively satisfied superpowers is different from the multipolar structure with revisionist, predatory and declining nuclear powers. The nineteenth-century Concert portrays a constant threat of military intervention against misbehaving empires trying to increase their share on the distribution of power. In contrast, 21st century great powers are well aware that there is a limited likelihood of actors risking a nuclear cataclysm over islands in the South China Sea, Libya, or Syria. Therefore, agreed norms would be exclusively informal, where some coercion tools as the tools of contemporary coercion such as economic sanctions might be punitive but unlikely to change the behavior of the targeted country.

Nevertheless, predicting instabilities or offering recipes for stability is impossible. It is unlikely that states will cease to compete for scarce resources, relative rank, or prestige, as it is doubtful that the constant interaction of states will not result in dyads and conflict. This study did not aspire to offering a universal pattern on how to make multipolarity stable. However, history and contemporary international relations offer priceless lessons of inter-state behavior which impact the stability of the structure. Avoiding instabilities will require great powers to refrain from buck-passing on potential aggressors, or even trying to appease them with an illusion of short-term stability in exchange for whole-systemic conflicts in the future. Great powers of the day need to retreat to self-restraint and dedicate tremendous efforts to diplomatic solutions of global issues. The good news is that establishing an international regime providing stability and benefits for all its members would likely help uphold the period of Long Peace for several decades to come. Newly established order would provide mechanisms of structural restraint; norms, either formal or informal, to tackle the uncertainties; a platform for socialisation and off-record diplomatic meetings to mitigate misperceptions, and; an ad-hoc diplomatic forum in times of crises. The bad news is that the great powers must recognize structural changes that led us towards an unprecedented era of genuinely Global Affairs and the need for building international order that would reflect on this new reality. Recognition of one's decline and willingness to cooperate on the establishment of the new regime in order to maintain international stability should become an area of further research as the functioning order could be essential in the future. At the same time, some should dedicate their research to the hard-balancing problem in the era of nuclear deterrence, as the new form of order restraint is desirable in the period of international law erosion and institutional decay. These phenomena could be just as temporary as the high degree of competitiveness in the international arena or even the current downturn of the Pax Americana. However, the odds for reverting the current global trends are becoming more distant by the day.

Список литературы диссертационного исследования кандидат наук Храбина Йозеф, 2023 год

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