Цифровая трансформация бизнеса и её влияние на механизмы корпоративного управления тема диссертации и автореферата по ВАК РФ 00.00.00, кандидат наук Иванинский Илья Олегович

• Иванинский Илья Олегович
• кандидат наук
• 2023

Оглавление диссертации кандидат наук Иванинский Илья Олегович

Contents

Introduction

Motivation

Key Concepts

Brief Literature Review

Objectives of the Research

Research Structure and Methodology

Main Findings

Contribution

Scientific and Practical Significance

Research limitations

Approbation of Research Results

Publications

References

Appendix A. Variables used in the research

Appendix B. Paper "The Impact of the Digital Transformation of Business on Corporate Governance. An Overview of Recent Studies"

Appendix C. Paper "Does digitalization mitigate or intensify the principal-agent

conflict in a firm?"

Appendix D. Paper "Are blockchain-based digital transformation and ecosystem-based business models mutually reinforcing? The principal-agent conflict perspective"

Введение диссертации (часть автореферата) на тему «Цифровая трансформация бизнеса и её влияние на механизмы корпоративного управления»

Introduction Motivation

For more than 40 years since the publication of the seminal paper [Jensen and Meckling, 1976], agency conflict between shareholders and management has been at the center of corporate governance research. Currently certain trends appear to be exacerbating this conflict indicating a "lack of balance" in the application of corporate governance mechanisms. Firstly, we are observing the growth of shareholder activism [Foldsey et al., 2015; Cohn et al., 2018]. Secondly, researchers have demonstrated that the growth of index investment funds encourages a more passive behavior among retail investors [Fich et al., 2015], and this behavior is at the core of the conflict [Roe, 1991]. Shareholders, therefore, are either becoming exceedingly passive or tend to proceed towards activism.

At the same time, digital transformation of business (or simply digitalization) which became a feature sine qua non for firms and their governing bodies [Grove, Clouse, Schaffner, 2018] has a potentially mitigating impact upon the conflict. Technologies as blockchain and artificial intelligence create efficiency gains for adopters, enhancing their competitive advantages [Westerman et al., 2012]. However, two important questions remain unanswered with regards to impact of digitalization for corporate governance. Firstly, while theoretical / conceptual literature suggests that digitalization has an improving impact on corporate governance [e.g. Yermack, 2017; Bystrom, 2019], there are indications that the opposite may be true [Kaal, 2019]. Furthermore, direct empirical evidence is scarce. Thus management, lacking evidence may refrain from digitalization as a way to generate shareholder value.

Secondly, while there is a discussion on the technical aspects of digitalization, there is no evidence on how business models should change to maximize the impact on corporate governance. Globally business models are evolving towards the adoption of platform/ecosystem models relying on digital technologies. Researchers interpret this as "the end of corporate governance, hello platform governance" [Fenwick et al., 2019]. At the time of this research, the most highly valued firms (by market capitalization) were operating as ecosystems (e.g. Apple, Amazon, etc.). Several authors have argued that digitalization and platform/ecosystem models are mutually reinforcing [Yrjola, 2020; Chong et al., 2019]. Hence, the firms leveraging both opportunities would reap the most benefits for governance. However, some features of ecosystems may make the existing governance mechanisms unapplicable. As with overall impact of digitalization, there is yet scarce direct empirical evidence on the topic.

The motivation of the research is three-fold. First, to obtain empirical evidence on the digitalization - agency conflict relationship. Second, to explore whether certain business models are especially beneficial for corporate governance when applied together with digitalization. Third, to provide practitioners as boards of directors with evidence on implications of leveraging digital transformation and business model innovation: a) whether they should expect an increased conflict with shareholders resulting from digitalization which is considered risky decision; b) whether digital transformation and new business models should be applied in parallel for maximum effects for corporate governance.

Key Concepts

This research draws on several key concepts. Principal-agent or agency conflict. [Jensen and Meckling, 1976] define agency relationship "as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent". The authors show that "if both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal". In the case of management and shareholders, diverging objectives result in managerial decisions suboptimal for shareholders. Moreover, there is evidence that managers may make decisions suboptimal for themselves, e.g., invest less in innovation [Aghion et. al., 2013]. The conflict can be directly observed in proxy fights [Ertimur et al., 2010] and other forms of activism [Brav et al., 2008]. We appreciate that the conflict is not limited to shareholders and management, it also involves majority - relationship with minority shareholder's e.g., [La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 2002], bondholders, etc. However, we limit the definition to this one as the most well researched.

Corporate governance. According to OECD, corporate governance "involves a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined" [OECD, 2015]. Better governance creates value even in emerging markets and non-listed firms (see e.g. [Spenger, Lazareva, 2022]). Most authors agree that one of its key goals is principal-agent conflict mitigation [see e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Khan, 2011; Yermack, 2017; Brav et. al., 2008]. Hence, when discussing impact of digitalization on the corporate governance mechanisms and the extent that it "reinforces" or "improves" them, we will be referring to the effect on the ability to mitigate the conflict.

Digital transformation or digitalization. We define digitalization as the implementation of transformative digital technologies for transformation of internal processes of a firm. There are multiple technologies with significant impact on the business and corporate governance. Examples of technologies commonly surveyed in literature include artificial intelligence, big data, 3D printing, and blockchain [Zhu, 2019; Grove, Clouse, Schaffner, 2018].

Platform and ecosystem business models. There is no universally accepted definition for platform and ecosystem models yet and certain authors use the terms interchangeably [Tsujimoto et al., 2018] or use the term "platform ecosystems" [Karminsky and Voytov, 2022]. [Fenwik et al., 2019] define platform businesses as the ones that "leverage networked technologies to facilitate economic exchange, transfer information and connect people". [Kamargianni and Matyas, 2017] define business ecosystems as "the wider network of firms that influences how a focal firm... creates and captures value". Both platforms and ecosystems rely on the network of 3rd parties to generate value for direct customers as well as the overall network of partners. In this research we do not differentiate between the two terms.

Brief Literature Review

This section contains the review of existing literature on implications of digital transformation for corporate governance and its connection to business model innovation. As mentioned earlier, digitalization is an application of a digital technology for business transformation. While there are many transformative digital technologies, research shows that artificial intelligence (AI) and blockchain have a particularly strong impact on corporate governance [Zhu, 2018; Fenwick and Vermeulen; 2018; Grove, Clouse, Schaffner, 2018]. According to [Swan, 2015] the "blockchain concept... is a new organizing paradigm for the discovery, valuation, and transfer of all quanta (discrete units) of anything, and potentially for the coordination of all human activity.". AI is defined as "a technology that applies systems to machines so that machines can think like humans" [Go et al., 2020]

Of the two technologies, we selected blockchain for this research. Firstly, several authors maintain that blockchain offers the highest transformative potential [Yermack, 2017; Cong and He, 2019]. Blockchain creates systems where users interact without the need for a central authority [Hawlitschek et. al., 2018]. This reduces costs and increases speed and accuracy of transactions - both within a firm and with external stakeholders. Therefore, blockchain changes the ways how industries and corporate functions work. Secondly, this technology is mature enough to be acknowledged and applied even by governments. It was said at the 2021 World Economic Forum that "86% of central banks are exploring the benefits and drawbacks of central bank digital currency"1. Prominent investors as Warren Buffet acknowledge the importance of blockchain2. Thirdly, there are multiple applications of blockchain designed for corporate governance improvement and already in the process of testing [Lafarre and Van der Elst, 2018]. Examples of such applications are using blockchain for corporate voting [Mainelli, Milne, 2016], using blockchain to register transactions with securities on exchanges [Caytas, 2016], etc. Applications of blockchain for corporate governance

With regards to corporate governance, there are multiple propositions of potential blockchain impact. However, it must be noted that most propositions are conceptual and not yet empirically tested. Firstly, it makes the governance mechanisms more effective. The key lever to achieve this is increases in transparency and restriction of information asymmetry abuse by management. Examples include blockchain applications to optimize voting procedures at shareholder meetings [Van der Elst and Laffare, 2017] or to create greater clarity in the ownership structure of firms, preventing such strategies as "empty voting" [Yermack, 2017]. Authors argue that higher ownership transparency would create more trust towards processes among shareholders and hence, make them more involved in governance. However, while using blockchain for voting and annual meetings is a promising opportunity, there are sceptics.

1 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/02/key-takeaways-on-digital-currency-from-the-davos-agenda/

2 2 De N. Warren Buffet: Bitcoin Is a 'Delusion' But Blockchain Is 'Ingenious. Coindesk. 2019. Available at

https://www.coindesk.com/warren-buffet-bitcoin-is-a-delusion-but-blockchain-is-ingenious., accessed on 28.02.2021. Full interview to CNBC is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2hdDE7XYr30 accessed on 11.10.2021

E.g., [De Falco et al., 2019] show that industry practitioners are skeptical about it. [Magnier and Barban, 2018] argue that blockchain increases transparency of ownership, which may not be desirable.

Secondly, there are applications automating certain functions of management and governance bodies. Blockchain enables automation of certain Board of Directors functions as internal audit [Peters and Panayi, 2016; Bystrom, 2019]. It can even enable the creation of companies without management known as "decentralized autonomous organizations" (DAOs) [DuPont, 2017; Kristof, 2017]. Automation, even partial, may reduce information asymmetry and hence improve the governance efficiency. This application could prevent corporate scandals when management commits fraud against shareholders, like a relatively recent Wirecard13. However, the opposite may also be true. There are a lot of risks associated with blockchain implementation. [Ruckeshauser, 2017] and [Kaal, 2019] argue that blockchain may be manipulated fraudulently by management. [Kristof, 2017] describes a failed DAO investment fund undermining the idea of DAOs.

Thirdly, blockchain may have implications of shareholder activism which is an extreme form of shareholder involvement. On the one hand, it could make it less frequent. A) increased ownership transparency would make activism more difficult [Yermack, 2017]. B) Blockchain-associated hype generates abnormal returns. There are examples of share prices' extreme growth following the change of a firm's name or a statement that it is focusing on blockchain [Pollock, 2018]. C) Investment banks as J.P. Morgan suggest that firms would benefit from blockchain, creating confidence for the investors [Rooney, 2018]. D) Blockchain may serve as take-over defense. In contrast to traditional tools as poison pills that have negative entrenchment effects [Holmen, Nivorozhkin, Rana, 2014], blockchain would not have these issues. On the other hand, there is a lack of legal clarity of blockchain [Kajtazi and Moro, 2018; Fry, 2018]. This may result in shareholders opposing management efforts in implementing it.

Fourthly, even if not applied to corporate governance, digitalization (not necessarily via blockchain) may improve the governance mechanisms. [Westerman et al., 2012] show that firms committed to digital transformation are, on average, "by 9% to 26% more profitable than their average industry competitors on a basket of measures, including EBIT margin and net profit margin". [Dranev et. al., 2019] show that share prices experience short-term abnormal returns after M&A with a fintech. Therefore, digitalization may create performance improvement expectations. Hence, firms will generate more value to be shared, which may lead to more active shareholder participation in decision making to capture the value hence, and to a weaker principal-agent conflict [Parrino et. al., 2003].

As we see, there is no consensus on the impact of digitalization for governance. Still, we believe that firms active in digitalization should have overall better functioning governance mechanisms and shareholders more actively involved in governance. It is important to underline that most papers in this

3 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-wirecard-inquiry-timeline-idUSKBN2B811J

field are conceptual in nature. Hence, by establishing a direct empirical link between digitalization and corporate governance this research provides an important contribution. Blockchain and business model innovation

There are multiple papers discussing technical aspects of blockchain implementation such as the size of a block on the blockchain, configuration of blockchain (open vs closed), etc. There is also discussion on what capabilities organizations should possess to successfully implement a blockchain. [Beck and Muller-Bloch, 2017] argue that an organization needs to possess a skillset for radical innovations. However, to the best of our knowledge there is no evidence or suggestions for the selection of business model of a firm to maximize efficiency of blockchain implementation for governance improvement.

Within the business model innovation research, topic of ecosystem models is receiving a growing attention. Research shows that ecosystems generate a tangible business opportunity, while ignoring them creates a tangible threat. A recent BCG survey shows that a quarter of executives believe that within three years digital ecosystems will account for over 60% of sales in their industries. According to the survey, executives expect ecosystems in such industries as telecommunications, media and technology, finance, consumer goods and healthcare to be particularly urgent and relevant, while industrials and energy are seen to be less urgent and relevant [Bhatnagar et al., 2021]. However, certain authors (e.g., [Fenwick and Vermulen, 2018]) argue that no one is immune from this threat: "The rule is straightforward: 'You either become a platform, or you will be killed by one'."

There are two major ways in which ecosystems may influence governance mechanisms. Firstly, the key difference between ecosystems and traditional business models is the value generation process. Traditional companies generate value by building a closed, centralized structure with "a clear boundary between the firm and the 'outside world'" [Fenwik et al., 2019]. Platforms generate value by sharing information rather than hiding it. An important feature of ecosystems is trust among stakeholders, which is key for a large firm [La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1996] Hence, it is reasonable to expect ecosystems to generate transparency and trust and better functioning governance mechanisms.

Secondly, certain authors (e.g., [Bainbridge, 2003; European Commission, 2018]) argue that ecosystems may on average have a stronger agency conflict due to the fact that traditional governance mechanisms are not well-suited to ecosystem-based businesses. Furthermore, recent legal scrutiny faced by platform companies (see e.g. [Avdasheva and Korneeva, 2019]) may also increase the conflict.

There is strong interaction between ecosystem models and blockchain. Both create greater trust among stakeholders (incl. suppliers, clients, etc.). Blockchain reduces the reliance on human decisions while ecosystem models create an environment where value is created by exchange of information among the stakeholders. Blockchain shifts the "center of trust" from the ecosystem founder towards the underlying technology [Xia et al., 2017]. Since trust and transparency are key sources of value for

ecosystem-based businesses, researchers argue that digitalization and business model innovation are mutually reinforcing [Yrjola, 2020; Schweiger et al., 2016; Fehrer et al., 2018; Schweiger et al., 2016]. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect the impact of digitalization on corporate governance to be more significant for companies which leverage ecosystem business models. Given that we expect digitalization, as mentioned above, to have an improving impact on governance, it is reasonable to expect companies which leverage both trends to experience even better functioning mechanisms. However, as in the case of digitalization, empirical evidence regarding the implications of ecosystem-based business models for corporate governance is limited. This research is an attempt to fill this gap.

Summing up, we see several gaps in existing research. Firstly, there is no empirical evidence on the implications of digitalization overall and in the form of blockchain in particular for the effectiveness of governance mechanisms. Moreover, evidence is available neither for the level of shareholder involvement in governance, nor for the level of shareholder hostility towards management. Secondly, the literature review shows the absence of empirical evidence on the combined effect of blockchain application and business model innovation upon the effectiveness of governance mechanisms. Objectives of the Research

The goal of the research is to identify the impact of digitalization on the corporate governance mechanisms. To fulfill it, we attain several objectives:

1. Analyze the existing research on the role of digital transformation of business in a form of blockchain implementation and its implications for the corporate governance to identify the gaps.

2. Select the most relevant corporate governance mechanism and its determinants to measure the impact of digitalization and propose a way to measure the impact of blockchain implementation.

3. Determine the impact of digitalization on the level of shareholder involvement in corporate governance using the selected corporate governance mechanisms

4. Determine the impact of digitalization on the level of shareholders' hostility toward management

5. Determine the implications of business model innovation for the impact of digitalization on corporate governance mechanisms.

Заключение диссертации по теме «Другие cпециальности», Иванинский Илья Олегович

6 Conclusions

In this paper we explored two ways in which digital technologies are changing the business environment: digital transformation driven by technologies as blockchain, AL, etc. and transformation of business model through adoption of ecosystem-based models. Previous empirical research and conceptual papers suggested that digitalization has a mitigating impact on the principal-agent conflict and this impact is the strongest when digitalization and business model transformation occur together. In order to lest this hypotheses, we analyzed the dynamics of annual share holder meetings. We looked at the number of shareholder-sponsored proposals received for voting as a proxy for shareholder activity and the percentage of management-sponsored proposals tliat pass voting as a measure of shareholder hostility towards the management.

Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that digital transformation has a mitigating impact on tlie principal-agent conflict in the organization. Shareholders are more active yet not more hostile towards the management. Tlie results are most significant in sectors where ecosystem-based business models are widespread, indicating that the two trends reinforce each other. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is among the first providing the direct empirical evidence on the two trends explored with regards to corporate governance and the agency conflict mitigation.

We believe that the results have important practical implications. Overall, they indicate that leveraging the emerging transformative digital technologies and ecosystem-bascd business models is an opportunity for shareholder value creation and should not be missed out. First, we see that active digitalization creates corporate environment less prone for information asymmetry abuse which results in a weaker agency conflict. Second, the results indicate tliat shareholders appreciate tlie performance improvement potential from applying ecosystem-based business models in parallel with digitalization which also results in agency conflict mitigation.

We acknowledge a number of important limitations of our study. First of all, we use a very general proxy for digital transformation, i.e. any application of blockchain technology. Our analysis would have been more accurate if we had considered only applications specific to corporate governance, Secondly, we understand that blockchain is just one example of a digital technology and tliat the analysis would bene lit from a robustness check with other digital technologies. Thirdly, since we do not have an explicit proxy at corporate level for the adoption of an ecosystem-based business model, we remained at the sector level in our analysis. We understand tliat even in sectors unaffected on the whole by business model innovation, certain individual companies are adopting the platform business model. At the same time, it is possible that certain sector characteristics make the impact of the digital transformation stronger. Fourthly, we acknowledge that there may be other unobserved corporate characteristics that result in higher numbers of shareholder-sponsored proposals, not currently captured by our analysis. Fifthly, we understand that the cause-effect relationship needs further exploration, Investments in digital technologies are typically long-term and our analysis is currently limited to tlie short-term. Sixthly, due to data availability our analysis is based on a sample of US -traded firms. We understand that expanding the analysis to other

geographies and other research methods (e.g.. case studies) may provide additional important insights.

Nevertheless, we believe that our study is a valuable contribution to the literature on both corporate governance and digitalization, We intend to overcome the identified limitations in subsequent research.

Список литературы диссертационного исследования кандидат наук Иванинский Илья Олегович, 2023 год

References

Bhatnagar A.. Modi S., Powers В.. Szczepanski, K. & von Tung. T. (2021). BCG's (Jig¡Lai ecosystem accelerator kick-starts plaUbrm strategies. BCG. Jan. 29. https://www.bcg.com/capabiliLies/digit ittechnology-djla/digital-ecoaystтя/arceleutor Acccsscd 3 June 2022.

Bystnom. H. (2019)' Blockchains. real-time- accounting. and ihc future of credit list modeling. Ledger. htLps://de>[ -org/i0.5 ]95/tedger.20] 9.100.

Chesbrough. H. W_ (2006). Open business models: How to thrive in the new innovation landscape. Harvard Business School Press.

Chong, A. Y.. Lim, E. Т.. Hua. X.. Zheng. S.. & Tan. C.-W. (2019). Kusincss on chain: A comparative case study of five blockchain-inspired business models. Journal of the Association fur Information Systems, 20(9), 9. https://doi.org/l0.IT705/ljais.00568.

Colin. J. В.. lowner. M.. Si VirajiL, A. (20IB). Quasi-insider shareholder activism: Corporate governance at ihc pcripheiy of control. SSRN Ehctrrmic Journal. https://doi.oig/l0.2J3'9/ssm.29456J3.

Cong, L., & He.Z. (2019). Blockehain disruption and smart contracts. The Review of Financial Studies, 32(5), №54-1797. https://doi.or3/10.1093/rr5/hhz007.

Dignam. A. (3020). Artificial intelligence, tech corporate governance and the public interest regulatoiy response. Cambridge Journal of Rcyitms, Economy and Society, iJJii j. 37-54. https://doi.org/IO. I093/cjre5/rsaij002.

DuPont. Q. (2017). Experiments in algorithmic governance: A history and ethnography of'The DAO", a failed decentralized autonomous organization. In M. Campbell-Verduyn (Ed.), Hitcoin and beyond: Crypiocurrencies. blockchains and global governance (pp. 157-177). Rou [ledge.

Ere I I., Stern, L. H., Tan, C.. & Weisbach M. S. (2018). Selecting directors using machine Learning. NBER Working Paper, i.24435). https:tfwww.n bcr.org/papcrs/w24435.pdf.

Fiima. E. F., ifc Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of law and Economies, 26(2), 301-325.

Fehrer. J. A.. W'oratschek. H.. & Brodie. R. J. (2018). A ^stemic logic lor platlorm business models. Journal of Service Management, 29(4), 546-568. https://doi.org/IO.] 108/J OS M -02-2017-0036.

Fen wick, M.. McCahciy. J. A.. & Vermc uteri, E. P. (2019}. The end of 'corporate' governance: Hello 'platform* governance. European Business Organisation Law Rei'iew, 20(1), 171-199. httpsitfdoi. org/10,. 1007/s40804-019-00137-z.

Fen wick, M.t & Vcrmeulcn, E. P. (2019). Technology and eorporale governance: Blockehain. erypto. and artilicial intelligence. TttXili Journal of Business Iaiw. 48( 1), I-15.

Fich. E. M.. Harlord. J.. &Tran, A. L. (3015). Motivated monitors: The importance oi institutional investors' portfolio weights. Journal of Financial Economics, IIS[ I), 21-48. htLps://doi.org/JO.lOI6/j. jlitKco.2015.06.014.

Foldscy. J.. Hanscll. G.. Friedman. D.. Janda. J., Kolzen. J., & Hammoud. T. (2015). Winning moves in the Aagc of shareholder activism. BCG. Aug 11. https:tfwww.bcg.corn/pubLieations/20J5/corpo rate-strategy- port folio-manageme tit- value-ere ation-strategy-winning-mo ves-agc- shareholder- activ ism.aspx. Accessed t5 June 2020.

Fry. J. (2018k Booms, busts and heavy-tails:The stoiy ofbitcoin and ctyplocurrency markets?£conomic Letters, ¡71,225-229. hllps:tfdoi.org/LO. 10l&j.econlet.2018.08.008.

Gawer, A.. & Cusumano, M. A. (2014). Industry platlorms and ecosystem innovation. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 3i{3\ 417-433. https://doi.org/IO. 1 11 l/jpim. 12105.

Grove, H.. С louse. M.. & Schaffner, L. G. (2018). Digital Nation impacts on eorporale governance. Journal of Governance and Regulation. 7(4). 51-63. https://doi.orE/ L0.22495/igr_v7_i4_p6.

Hawash. R.. & Lang. G. (2020). Docs the digital gap matter? Estimating the impact of 1СГ on productivity in developing countries. Eurasian Economic Review, IU(2). 189-309. https:tfdoi.org/l0.JQ07/ s40S22-OI9-OOI33-L

llicv. P.. KaLodimos. J.. & Lowry. M. (2021). Investors' attention to eorporale governance. 77»Review uf Financial Studies, 2). 5581-5628.

Issa, H., Sun. Т.. &. Vasarhelyi. M. A. (2016). Research ideas for artificial intelligence in auditing: The formalization oi audit and wort force supplementation. Journat of Emerging Technologies in Accounting. J3(2), 1-20. https:tfdoi.org/l0.2308/jcta-J05IL

Ivaninskiy. J. (2019). The impact oi the digital transformation of business on corporate governance. An overview of recent studies. Korparathmye Fhums у Journal of Corf>orate Finance Research, ;ii(3). 35^7. httpstfdoi .org/10.17 323/j.jcfr.2073-043S. 13.3.2019.3 5-47.

Ivaninskiy. 1, & Ivashkovskaya, I. (.2020"). What impact does artificial intelligence have or corporate governance? Korporatii'nye Finanty JOurtlal of Corporate Finance Research, I4(4), 90-10]. https:// (3oi.org/10.17323/j ,jefr.20 73-0438.14,4-2020.19-30.

Ivaninskiy. I.. Ivashkovskaya, I., & McCahery, J. (3021). Docs di gitalization mitigate or intensify the principal-agent conflict in a linn? Journal ofManagemeid and Governance. httpsitfdoi.orE/LO. J007/ s 10997-021-095S4-8.

Jensen. M. C., & McckLing, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financ ial Economics, J(4). 305-360. https://doi.ori/IO. JO 16/0304-405X(76)90026-X.

Kaaf. W, A. <2020). Blockchain solutions lor agency problems in corporate governance. In K. R. Bal-achandran l.Ed j_ information fur efficient did sum mating: Rig data, blockchain and relevance (pp. 3I3-329J. Worid Scientific Publishing Co. tiLtpsitfdai.org/10.1I42/9789S11220470_0012.

Kajtazi. A,., & Moro. A. t20L9). The role of bitcoin in well diversified portlblios: A comparative global study. I m erna rional Re view of Financial Analysis, 61, 143- 257. https ://doi .org/10.1016/j. irla.2018. 10.003.

Kamargianni. M.. & Matyas, M. (2017). The business ecosystem of mobiLity-as-a-scrvicc. In: 96th Transportation Research Board ri"RB) Annual Meeting (Washington. I3C. Jan. 8-12). https://discovciy. ucl .ac. uk/i d/e print/ 10037890/ l/a2135d_445259l7fl4474l0 fBL16ccb625bdl7fii .pdf. Accessed 3 June 2022.

Karpolf. J. M.. Malatesta, P. H.. & Walk ling. R. A. (1996). Corporate govern anoc and sharehotder initiatives: Empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economies, 42(3), 365-395. https://doi.org/LQ.JQL6/ 0304-40 5X (96)00883-5.

Kristof, A. (20 J7).. Autonomous finance. In D. L. KuoChucn & R. Deng (Eds.). Handbo<jk of blockchain, digital finance, and inclusion. Volume 2: CflinuTech, mobile security, and distributed ledger (.pp. 471^179). Academic Press.

Lalarre. A.. & Van der Efst. C. (20 LSf BLockehain tcehnoiogy for corporate governance and shareholder activism. SSIW Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/l0.2139/ssm.3135209.

Libert. B.. Beck. M.. & Bonchck. M. (2017). AI in the boardroom: The next realm of corporate governance. MIT Sloan Management Review. Oct. 19. httpsitfstaLic I. square space .com/static/ 57 6007632b 8ddcc314t02a2f/t/5c67b50c4c I7b62745153034/1550300434251/MTTSMR-^+AI +in+thc-l-board room ^2C+the+nc\L-t-realm+of+corporatc-t-govcmanoc.pdf. Aeccssed 3 June 2022.

Manita, R.. Elommal. N.. Baudier. P., & Hikkerova, L. t202Q). The digital transformation of external audit and its impact on corporate governance. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 150, L19751. https://doi.oj3/JO. 1016/j.techlbrc.30 J 9.119751.

Miklosik, A., Kuchta, M.. Evans, N.. & Zak, S. (20I9J. Towards the adoption of machine Lcaming-based analytical tools in digital marketing. I FEE Access, 7. S5705-857I8. hLlpsitfdoi.org/LG.] LOOT ACCESS.20 19.2924425.

Moffitl. K. C.. Rozario, A. M.. & Vasarhclyi. M. A. (201 Si. Robotic process automation for auditing. Journal of Emerging Technologies in Accounting., J5(l}, J-10. https://doi.org/l0.230li/jcta-L05S9.

Moore. J. F. (1993 J. Predators and prey: A new ecology of competition. Hurwrd Business Review, 7/t3). 75-56.

Mosco.G. D. (2020). AI and boards of directors: Preliminary notes from the perspective of Italian corporate Law. SSRN Elect mac Journal, htlpsitfdoi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3531924.

Parrino. R.. Si as. R. W.. & Starks, L. T. i. 2003). Voting with their feet: Institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, <Mi(L). 3-46. htlpsitfdoi.org/L0.1016/ S0304-405X (02)00 247-7.

Peters. G. W.. ¡fe Panayi. E. (2016). Understanding modern banking ledgers through blockchain technologies: Future of transaction processing and smart contracts on the internet of money. In P. Tasca, T. Aste, L. Pclizzon. & N. Pcrony (Eds.1. Ranking beyond bunks and money: New economic windows (pp. 239-278). Cham: Springer.

Renneboog, L., & S/ilagyi, P. G. (2011). The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance. Journal of Corporate Finance, /7(1), 167-188. httpsiffdoi.or^/JO. 10 ]6/j.jcorplin.2010.10.002.

Roc. M. J. (1991). A political theory of American corporate finance. Columbia Eaw Review, 9/(1), 10-67. https://doi.o^/10.2307/l]22S56.

Ruckcshauscr, N. t20L7). Do we really want blockchain-based accounting? Decentralized consensus as cnablcr of management override of internal controls. In: Leimeister J.M.. Brenner W.. cds. Pruc. der 13. Internalionalen Tic%uttg Wirlschajhinformalik fW'i 2017) (pp. 16-30). St. Gallcn. httpsiC/ wi20 L7.cti/imagcs/wi20 J 7-0112.pdf.

Schwab. K. (3017). The fourih industrial ntivLaiAn. Currency Books.

Schwcigcr. A., Nagcl, J.. Bohm. M.. & Kncmar, H. (20161. Platform business models. Iл A. Fabcr. F. Matthcs. & F. Michel (Eds.), Digiiut motility platforms and ecosystems: State of the art report (pp. 66-77). Technischc Unite rsitit.

Thomas. R. 5.. & Colter. J. F. (2007k Shareholder proposals in Ltie new millennium: Shareholder support, board response, and market rcaclion. Journal of С or portae Finance., iit(2-3), 368-391. httpsi/doi. org/ L0.101 Щ .jeorpl in .2007.02.002Ge t.

Tsujimoto, M._ Kajikawa. Y.,Tomita_ J.. & Malsumoto, ¥. (301A review ol'the ecosystem concept: Toward* coherent ecosystem design. Technological Forecasting and Social Change., ¡36, 49-58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcch tore.2017.06.032.

Van derElst. C.. & Lafarre. A. (2017). Bringing the AGM to the 21st ocntury: Blockchain and smart contracting tech lor shareholder involvement. SSRW Electronic Journal. http5:tfdoi.org/J0.2139/ssm. 2992804.

Wang. R., Asghari, V., Ilsu. S.-C., Loc. C.-J., & Chen. J.-H. (2020). Detecting corporate misconduct through random forest in China's construction industiy. Journal of Cleaner Production., 266, 122266. https:tfdoi.org/10.1016/j.jclcpio.2020.122266.

Wciblcn, T. (2014). The open business model: Understanding an emerging concept. Journal of M и hi Business Model Innovation and Technology, /(1), 35—66. https:tfdoi.ore/L0.13G52/jmbmit2245-456X.212.

Wcstcrman.G.. Tannou. M.. Bonnet. D.. Ferraris, P.. & MeAtbc. A. (2012). The digital advantage: How digilat leaders outperform their peers in every industry. Capgemini Consulting, https:tfwww.capgc

mini.com/wp-contcnl/uploads/20l7/07/Thc_Digital_Advantagc_llow_Digital_Leadcrs_Outpc

rform_ the ir_ FfccrsJ n_E veryj ndustiy. pd f.

Xia. Q. 1., Sifah, E. В.. Asanioah, K. 0.. Gao, J.. Du, X., & Guizani. M (2017k MeDShare: Trust-less medical data sharing among cloud service providers via blockchain. liSiE Access, 5, 14757-14767. https://doi.org/IO. 1 L09/ACCE S S. 2017. Z730S43.

Ycrmack. D. (2017). Corporate governance and blockchains. ffevittv of Fi/tcence, 21(1), 7-31. https://doi. org/10.1093/rol/riw074.

Yrjbla. S. (2020). How could Blockchain translorm 6G towards open ecosystemic business models? In: 2020 IEEE Int. conf. on communications workshops (ICC Workshops) (pp. 1-6). IEEE.

Zhu. C. (2019). Big data as a governance mechanism. i7it* Review of Financial Studies, J 2(5), 20212061. https://doi.org/IO. J093/rfs/hhy081.

Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps

and institutional arliliatLons.