Реструктуризация задолженности как мера предупреждения банкротства по российскому и европейскому праву тема диссертации и автореферата по ВАК РФ 12.00.03, кандидат наук Мастилович Лариса

• Мастилович Лариса
• кандидат наук
• 2021

Оглавление диссертации кандидат наук Мастилович Лариса

ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ

Введение

Глава 1. Общая характеристика процедур реструктуризации задолженности и превентивной реструктуризации в контексте предупреждения банкротства и их значение

1.1. Понятие реструктуризации долгов и предупреждения банкротства по российскому и европейскому праву

1.2. Правовое регулирование превентивной реструктуризации - Директива о превентивной реструктуризации 1023/2019. Общая характеристика

1.3. Предупреждение банкротства: общегражданская или банкротная правовая природа. Директива о превентивной реструктуризации 1023/2019

1.4. Правовое регулирование предупреждения банкротства по российскому законодательству

1.5. Правовая природа предупреждения банкротства по российскому законодательству

1.6. Риски при оценке перспектив превентивной реструктуризации в соответствии с Директивой 1023/2019 и ответственность за неправильные решения

1.7. Экономические основания принятия Директивы о превентивной

реструктуризации 1023/2019 и экономические последствия ее введения

Глава 2. Последствия введения предупреждения банкротства по российскому и европейскому законодательству. Сравнительно-правовой анализ регулирования предупреждения банкротства и судебных производств по банкротству

2.1. Аналитическое соотношение предупреждения банкротства по российскому законодательству и превентивной реструктуризации по европейскому

2.2. Аналитическое соотношение предупреждения банкротства и традиционных судебных производств по банкротству (конкурсного производства и реабилитационных процедур) по российскому и европейскому законодательству

2.3. Практический аспект развития законодательства по предупреждению банкротства (поиск баланса)

2.4. Эволюционный аспект развития законодательства по предупреждению

банкротства. Трансмежотраслевое правовое регулирование превентивной реструктуризации - Директива о превентивной реструктуризации 1023/2019....105 2.5. Лица, имеющие право инициировать введение процедуры предупреждения

банкротства и судебной реабилитационной процедуры, по российскому и

европейскому законодательству

Глава 3. Закрепление новых институтов. Предложение нового правового регулирования предупреждения банкротства

3.1.Причины необходимости закрепления принципа «социальности» в российском законодательстве о банкротстве. Сравнительный взгляд с европейским законодательством

3.2. Причины необходимости закрепления принципа «добросовестности» должника и кредиторов, как критерий для применения предупреждения банкротства в российском законодательстве о банкротстве. Сравнительный взгляд с европейским регулированием

3.3. Причины необходимости нового регулирования легальных оснований для возбуждения процедуры банкротства в их взаимосвязи с предупреждением банкротства

3.4. Причины необходимости рецепции института продажи должника по банкротству как юридического лица

3.5. Причины необходимости закрепления нового института - внесудебного

превентивного реабилитационного соглашения

Заключение

Список использованных источников и литературы

«Акцент будет делаться не на ликвидацию предприятий, а на реабилитацию»,10 февраля 2021 г., Доктор экономических наук, Первый заместитель Председателя Правительства Российской Федерации, Андрей Рэмович Белоусов

Введение диссертации (часть автореферата) на тему «Реструктуризация задолженности как мера предупреждения банкротства по российскому и европейскому праву»

Введение

Актуальность темы исследования определяется, прежде всего тем, что в российском законодательстве о банкротстве не предусмотрен, известный европейскому праву, институт внесудебной реструктуризации долгов юридических лиц, в целях предупреждения банкротства, на стадии отсутствия внешних признаков банкротства. Это относится как к главе 2 Федерального закона от 26 октября 2002 г. № 127-ФЗ «О несостоятельности (банкротстве),1 специально посвященной вопросам внесудебного предупреждения банкротства (ст. 30, 31 Закона о банкротстве), так и к остальной части Закона о банкротстве, кроме некоторых его норм, регулирующих внесудебные процедуры предупреждения банкротства финансовых организаций (§ 4 главы IX Закона о банкротстве). О реструктуризации долгов юридических лиц упоминается только в законопроекте №239932-7 «О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон «О несостоятельности (банкротстве)» и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части процедуры реструктуризации долгов в делах о банкротстве юридических лиц»,2 который был принят в 2017 году в первом чтении. Актуальность темы исследования также определяется и социально-экономической ситуацией, где осуществление бизнеса в условиях пандемии вызовет наступление внешних признаков банкротства у большого ко-

1 Федеральный закон от 26.10.2002 № 127-ФЗ "О несостоятельности (банкротстве)" // СЗ РФ. 2002. №43. Ст.4190 (далее - Закон о банкротстве Российской Федерации).

2 Проект Федерального закона N 239932 «О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон «О несостоятельности (банкротстве) и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части процедуры реструктуризации долгов в делах о банкротстве юридических лиц» дата обращения 10 октября 2019 г. http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi? req=doc&base=PRJ&n=166722#021215881300795636 (далее - Законопроект о реструктуризации долгов).

личества малых и средних предприятий.3 Это означает, что финансовые последствия вызваны внешними экономическими факторами, а не недобросовестностью руководящих должником лиц (они на ситуацию не повлияли и не могли повлиять) . Это дальше означает, что негативные последствия будут распространяться на все хозяйственные субъекты, а закономерность их распространения будет определяться не столько отдельными характеристиками хозяйственного субъекта, сколько видом его деятельности. В такой ситуации интерес кредиторов заключается не только в удовлетворении своих требований, но и в сохранении своего контрагента - должника на рынке, так как шанс появления заинтересованных лиц, которые бы регистрировали новые коммерческие организации в период финансового кризиса невелик. Для этого необходимо предусмотреть новое нормативно-правовое регулирование в законодательстве о банкротстве, в рамках которого, в экономически оправданных ситуациях, кредиторы и должник будут иметь механизмы для совместного восстановления бизнеса должника, получая при этом коллективные гарантии, которые предусматривает традиционное законодательство о банкротстве.

Учитывая срочность и необходимость в разрешении вышеуказанных вопросов, предлагаем обратить внимание на актуальный, вступивший в силу в 2019 году европейский нормативно-правовой акт, посвященный предупреждению банкротства добросовестных должников-юридических лиц - Директива о превентивн

3 «По оценкам Росстата, в России около 20% ВВП создается малыми и средними предприятиями. Таким образом, катастрофичный сценарий сокращения оборота на 50-60% в секторе МСП может привести к сокращению ВВП примерно на 10% во втором квартале 2020 года.» [Электронный ресурс] // [офиц. сайт]. - Режим доступа: https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/

3 993 89-dyra-v-vvp-chem-grozit-ekonomike-gibel-malogo-biznesa-v-rossii? utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=uzhe-seychas-mozhno-priblizitelno-otsenit&fbclid=IwAR3-VTbxB9BWbcgzhnh_xokOb_w3TESJqUlEzom_epa0yc0Ejhc3dgDRlwM. -(дата обращения:01.05.2020); Почти треть российских компаний в конце 2020 года подвержена риску банкротства, сообщил 25 декабря «Коммерсант» со ссылкой на следование Центра стратегических разработок (ЦСР). 10% предприятий намерены завершить деятельность в ближайшее время. [Электронный ресурс] // [офиц. сайт]. - Режим доступа: https://pravo.ru/news/228662/? mob_search&fbclid=IwAR244i7su8se2rYSrHMV8dJ1xnKO3Rqe6N2dTRoNH3YOPks3yErU84lFgFU

реструктуризации должников 1023/20 1 94 (Далее -Директива 1023/2019). Директива 1023/2019 обуславливает предупреждение банкротства отсутствием внешних признаков банкротства у должника, согласием большинства кредиторов и добросовестного должника. Она принята с учетом потребностей и интересов малых и средних предприятий, потому что «экономический кризис в Европе привел к потере более чем 3,5 миллионов рабочих мест в сфере малого и среднего предпринимательства».5 Поэтому социальная направленность европейского законодательства по банкротству основана не только на европейских ценностях, но и на экономических соображениях. Действующее российское законодательство о банкротстве защищает интересы более крупных кредиторов - тех, чьи требования обычно обеспечены залогом, что замедляет развитие малого и среднего бизнеса. Учитывая, что одна из целей России на сегодняшний день - это развитие малого и среднего бизнеса, то адаптированная и продуманная рецепция институтов из упомянутой Директивы 1023/2019 поможет в ее достижении. Кроме того, это позволит снизить потери бюджета, направленные на санацию последствий экономического кризиса. Это справедливо учтено в новом Проекте Правительства Российской Федерации О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон «О несостоятельности (банкротстве)» и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации № 239932-7, где в статье 11 написано, что «целями настоящего Федерального закона являются: 1)справедливое и экономически эффективное урегулирование несостоятельности в интересах всех затрагиваемых ею лиц, разрешение возникших в связи с ней конфликтов; 2) содействие предупреждению банкротства, сохранение в ситуации несостоятельности работоспособных бизнесов, рабочих мест и налогоплательщиков, защита конкуренции; 3)максимально возможное и соразмерное

4Direktiva (EU) 2019/1023 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeca od 20. lipnja 2019. o okvirima za preventivno restrukturiranje, otpustu duga i zabranama te o mjerama za povecanje ucinkovitosti postupaka koji se odnose na restrukturiranje, nesolventnost i otpust duga i o izmjeni Direktive (EU) 2017/1132 (Direktiva o restrukturiranju i nesolventnosti) - [Elektronski resurs] // [sluzbena stranica]. -URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L1023&from=EN (дата обращения: 04.03.2019).

5 Годовой Отчет об европейских Малих и средних коммерческих организациях [Электронный ресурс] // [офиц. сайт]. - Режим доступа: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/ sme/facts-figures- analysis/performance-review/index_en.htm).ue. - (дата обращения: 04.03.2019).

удовлетворение кредиторов несостоятельного должника; 4)предупреждение правонарушений в сфере несостоятельности.Данные цели должны учитываться при применении и толковании положений настоящего Федерального закона».6

Предупреждение банкротства в рамках действующей главы 2 российского закона по банкротству возможно только на стадии неплатежеспособности, в то время как Директива 1023/2019 предусматривает превентивную реструктуризации на стадии платежеспособности и наличия вероятности неплатежеспособности. Преимущество предупреждения банкротства в соответствии с ст. 31 (санация) по российском регулированию - это быстрота и «полнота результата» - моментально погашается вся имеющаяся задолженность по отношению к всем кредиторам, в то время как кредиторам в рамках превентивной реструктуризации в соответствии с Директивой 1023/2019 гарантируется удовлетворение части требований спустя время (через институт защиты «наилучшего интереса кредитора») 7 а в рамках судебных производств по банкротству как по российскому так и по европейскому законодательству не предоставляются никакие гарантии. С другой стороны, процент успешного применения превентивной реструктуризации в соответсвии с Директивой 1023/2019 выше, так как применяется на всех кредиторов и проводится совместными усилиями всех кредиторов и должника в то время как по российскому регулированию в процедуре участвует только должник и одно лицо (которое погашает полную сумму задолженности должника перед всеми кредиторами).

Степень разработанности темы исследования. Выбор темы (сравнительно - правовое исследование предупреждения банкротства по российскому и европейскому законодательству) основывается на том, что автор, закончив юридические факультеты: бакалавр (2008-2012) и магистратуру (2013-2015) в

6 Проект Федерального закона "О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон "О несостоятельности (банкротстве)" и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации" (подготовлен Минэкономразвития России, ID проекта 02/04/03-20/00100272) (не внесен в ГД ФС РФ, текст по состоянию на 16.04.2020). - [Электронный ресурс]. - [Сайт]. - URL: https:// regul ati on.gov.ru/proj ects#npa=100272.

7 им предоставляется гарантия получения тех минимальных сумм, которые бы они получили при возбуждении судебного производства по банкротству, вместо превентивной реструктуризации

Университете в Сараево (Босния и Герцеговина) и магистратуру (2015-2017) и аспирантуру (2017-2020) в Университете в Санкт-Петербурге, получил необходимый фундамент и научный базис для понимания европейского и российского права, без которого отсутствовала бы возможность проведения серьезного научного сравнительно-правового исследования регулирования материи предупреждения банкротства из-за ее межотраслевой и междисциплинарной природе.

Настоящее исследование по времени охватывает период с 2000 года, когда был принят Регламент о процедурах несостоятельности 1346/2000.8 На нормативно-правовом уровне в Европейском Союзе степень разработанности темы отличается в зависимости от государства. В российском Законе о банкротстве «предупреждение банкротства» регулируется всего двумя статьями (ст. 30 и 31) в главе II «Предупреждение банкротства». Для сравнения в Законе о банкротстве Республики Хорватии «предупреждение банкротства» регулируется положениями 53 статей (ст. 21-74).9 Кроме того, в российском законодательстве отсутствует институт внесудебной реструктуризации долгов юридических лиц, как способ предупреждения банкротства на ранней стадии платежеспособности должника. Отсутствие платежеспособности не всегда свидетельствует о том, что речь идет «здоровом» коммерческом лице, поэтому не стоит приравнивать предупреждение банкротства к профилактическому корпоративному управлению. Поэтому далее в тексте обоснуем, что предбанкротные институты характеризуются больше банкротной правовой природой, нежели общегражданской.

Следовательно, отсутствует и практика его применения. Это порождает и низкую публикационную активность по теме. Настоящее исследование может являться необходимым фундаментом для законодательных нововведений - внесение новых институтов предупреждения банкротства и совершенствование существующих. Настоящее исследование в большей степени практико-ориентированно и

8 Uredba Ууеса (Б2) Ьг. 1346/2000 od 29. svibnja 2000. o steCajnom postupku [Электронный ресурс] // [офиц. сайт]. - Режим доступа: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/? uri=CELEX:32000R1346&from=EN . - (дата обращения: 03.08.2019).

9 SteCajni zakon (Narodne novine, Ьг. 44/96., 29/99., 129/00., 123/03., 82/06. i 116/10 (далее -Закон о банкротстве Республики Хорватии)

направлено на создание новых институтов, предложений новых законодательных решений, аргументации к каким последствиям они приведут, чем на изучение эволюции институтов и действующих концепций.

Общие вопросы правового регулирования банкротства, используемые в настоящей работе в качестве отправной базы исследования, рассматриваются в работах таких известных российских ученых, как: Г.Ф. Шершеневич (авторитетный дореволюционный российский исследователь) В.В. Витрянский (заслуженный юрист Российской Федерации), С. А. Карелина, К. Б. Кораев, В.Ф. Попондопуло (заслуженный деятель науки Российской Федерации), М. В. Телюкина, О. Ю. Скворцов, Е.В. Слепченко , и ряда других. Поскольку речь идет о теме, которая традиционно характерна для европейских правовых систем, в данной работе представлены основные выводы и аргументация лучших европейских специалисты в этой области: Х. Эйденмюллер - Германия (на данный момент профессор Оксфордского университета), Н. Толленаар - Нидерланды, В. Чолович - Босния и Герцеговина, Республика Сербия, В. Радович -Республика Сербия, Й. Гарашич -Республика Хорватия, Й. Шонфельд - Чешская Республика, Л. Стагеллини - Республика Италия и ряд других авторов. Анализ работ авторов, принадлежащих и практикующих в различных юрисдикциях, обеспечивает более разносторонний взгляд и придает авторским выводам настоящего исследования более глобальное значение, чем если бы выводы основывались только на работах авторов, принадлежащих меньшему кругу стран. "

Цель и задачи работы. Целью исследования является научный анализ и адаптация европейских процедур превентивной реструктуризации должника, которые применяются по отношению к платежеспособным должникам и последующая имплементация соответствующих институтов в российское законодательство о банкротстве. Целью исследования также является и разработка новых институтов, позволяющих предупреждение банкротства хозяйственных субъектов на любом этапе предпринимательской деятельности, начиная со стадии отсутствия какой-либо задолженности, заканчивая стадией неплатежеспособности должника. Общественная цель исследования проявляется в критическом анализе нынешнего

уровня теоретической и практической разработанности темы и выдвижении перспектив ее развития.

Для достижения цели решаются следующие задачи:

- анализ существующих институтов предупреждения банкротства и формулирование предложений по их совершенствованию или упразднению;

- выявление псевдопроблем, существующих в доктрине, касающихся предупреждения банкротства и постановка реальных проблем;

- обоснование необходимости законодательного закрепления нового авторского института «внесудебного превентивного реабилитационного соглашения» (далее -ВПРС), который будет заключаться при условии фактического согласия всех кредиторов и должника на стадии отсутствия внешних признаков банкротства, в целях предупреждения наступления внешних признаков банкротства;

- аргументация положительных практических последствий внесения ВПРС в российское законодательство и разработка теоретической базы его внедрения;

- имплементация в российское законодательство о банкротстве европейских процедур превентивной реструктуризации, предусмотренных в Директиве 1023/2019, что позволит стимулировать должника на более ранних этапах инициировать процедуры реструктуризации долгов.

Методология исследования. Использовались следующие методы исследования:

- гипотетико-дедуктивный метод при доказывании положений, выносимых на защиту, ввиду того, что их достоверность доказывалась через последствия, которые они порождают на остальные взаимно связанные институты и экономику в целом, а не через непосредственное доказывание самих положений;

- формально-юридический метод не может довести до окончательных и общих выводов, ввиду того, что институт предупреждения банкротства является и междисциплинарным (имеет юридическую и экономическую составляющую) и межотраслевым, однако данный метод необходим как начальная ступенька, которая позволила абстрагироваться от экономической стороны института предупреждения банкротства и реструктуризации задолженностей должника по банкротству и анализировать сам институт, как юридический феномен;

- системно-структурный метод способствовал выявить, на основании причинно-следственных связей института предупреждения банкротства с другими институтами (например, с институтом субсидиарной ответственности управляющих должником лиц), существенные признаки и последствия института предупреждения банкротства. Предупреждение банкротства нельзя до конца понять, без учета таких отраслей, как экономика и политика, а как следствие и без использования данного метода. В рамках данного метода использована методика поликонтекстуального анализа гипотез исследования. Исследование опирается на сравнительные знания о европейских культурных ценностях отдельных государств-членов Европейского Союза, которые предопределяют выбор европейского «законодателя» в пользу тех или иных приоритетов, в зависимости от которых, законодатель в большей степени защищает ту или иную «слабую сторону» (работник, малые и средние кредиторы, малые или средние должники и т.д.);

- метод нормативного критицизма, с помощью которого выявлена коллизия между целями и средствами достижения целей предупреждения банкротства. Также с помощью этого метода выявлена и коллизия в целом между целями государственной политики, в части заявленной поддержки малого и среднего бизнесе, и нормами, регулирующими предупреждение банкротства;

- дескриптивный метод;

- сравнительно-правовой метод помог в сопоставлении различных правовых систем, институтов, норм, с целью уяснения сходства и различия между ними;

- статистический метод.

Научная новизна исследования состоит в том, что по его результатам выявлены особенности европейских процедур реструктуризации долгов, как на стадии судебного реабилитационного производства по банкротству, так и на стадии предупреждения банкротства в контексте главы 2 Закона о банкротстве Российской Федерации. Целью всех упомянутых процедур является предупреждение банкротства, однако цель проявлена в различной степени интенситета и достигает различными правовыми механизмами. Превентивная реструктуризация, предусмотренная Директивой 1023/2019, возможна только для должника на стадии платежеспособности и ее causa finalis является долгосрочное сохранение должника

на рынке. В отличии от нее предупреждение банкротства в контексте главы 2 Закона о банкротстве Российской Федерации возможно только на стадии неплатежеспособности должника (предупреждается банкротство в процессуально-правовом смысле в силу того, что никто из кредиторов не подал заявление, на что каждый из них имел право на стадии неплатежеспособности должника). Легальное условие применения российского института предупреждения банкротства и ее краткосрочная саша finalis одинаковые - неподача заявления кем-либо из кредиторов. В рамках судебных реабилитационных процедур по банкротству предупреждается банкротство в материально-правовом смысле, так как уже подано заявление в арбитражный суд кредитором. Поэтому долгосрочная causa finalis как судебных реабилитационных процедур по банкротству, так и предупреждения банкротства одна и та же - наилучшее удовлетворение требований кредиторов, а не сохранение должника. Превентивная реструктуризация в европейском понимании, также гарантирует кредиторам наилучшее удовлетворение требований, но сама процедура прежде всего возбуждается и меры выбираются с целю сохранения должника на рынке и после удовлетворения требований кредиторов. В соответсвии с ст. 31 российского регулирования, благодаря условию полного погашения задолженностей перед всеми кредиторами, создается абсолютное равенство всех кредиторов, кроме того лица (или кредитора), которое погасило всю задолженность. Равенство всех кредиторов заключается также в том, что каждый из них имеет право стать тем, кто погасит все долги. Такое абсолютное равенство кредиторов невозможно в рамках судебного производства по банкротству, так как еще на нормативно-правовом уровне кредиторы разделены на классы, ради того, чтобы какие-то из них полностью удовлетворили требования вместо других. Равенство кредиторов по регулированию Директивы 1023/2019 относительное и напоминает равенство, предусмотренное судебными производствами по банкротству тем, что кредиторам гарантируется получение минимально той суммы, которая им гарантирована в результате судебного производства по банкротству, при этом не исключена возможность удовлетворения полного требования, но исключена возможность получения суммы, превышающей сумму полного требования, зато даже на стадии платежеспособности должника гарантируются кредиторам банкротные права, которые

еще не возникли, что свидетельствует о банкротов правовой природе, а не общегражданской, как это принято считать в доктрине. Выявлено , что переговоры по предупреждению банкротства по европейскому регулированию имеют общегражданскую правовую природу, а создание правоотношений, его применение и прекращение банкротную. Ст. 31 Закона о банкротстве Российской Федерации гарантирует удовлетворение полной суммы требования изначально. Такая определенность и предсказуемость характеризует институты общегражданского права, а не банкротного. Поскольку без согласия должника предупреждение банкротства невозможно, а кредиторы не менее заинтересованы в нем (особо в рамках ст. 31, где основная цель - полное и моментальное удовлетворение требований всех кредиторов, а не сохранение должника), можем поднять вопрос почему кредиторы ни при каких обстоятельствах не могут самостоятельно инициировать процедуру предупреждения банкротства помимо воли должника? Новизной является и вывод о том, что наличие каких-либо долгов должно перестать быть обязательным условием для применения мер превентивной реструктуризации в рамках пред-банкротного законодательства. Предлагается закрепить в российском законодательстве новые институты по предупреждению банкротства, которые будут доступны на стадии платежеспособности должника. Ввиду отличия финансового положения платежеспособных должников, требуется наличие множества институтов по предупреждению банкротства. Для обеспечения эффективности эти институты должны иметь различные легальные условия для применения: начиная от авторской конструкции института «внесудебного превентивного реабилитационного соглашения», где требуется согласие всех кредиторов и должника, до институтов, которых предлагает Директива 1023/2019, где по общему правилу требуется достижение согласия должника и большинства кредиторов. Проецируя положения Директивы 1023/2019 на российское законодательство, помимо соглашения между большинством кредиторов и должником, необходимо предусмотреть обязательное согласие судебного органа (в силу специфики нынешнего российского регулирования предлагается ввести требование и о обязательном согласии судебного органа). Каждая реабилитационная процедура, в частности предупреждение банкротства может не привести к положительному результату (исходя из природы инсти-

тута, его применение обусловлено как минимум 51% вероятности положительного результата), тем не менее созданные предбанкротные правоотношения между кредитором и должником способствуют более эффективному проведению конкурсного производства.

Научная новизна исследования конкретизируется в следующих положениях, выносимых на защиту:

1. Делается вывод о том, что добросовестная правовая воля платежеспособного должника и всех его кредиторов, проявленная с целью предупреждения банкротства, должна быть достаточной для наступления правовых последствий, которые традиционно возникают в случае возбуждения судебного производства по делу о банкротстве на стадии неплатежеспособности должника, вместо действующего применения норм общегражданского права. Предупреждение банкротства должно быть доступно на любой стадии предпринимательской деятельности должника (как платежеспособности, так и неплатежеспособности должника).На стадии платежеспособности должника, экономические интересы должника чаще согласуются с интересами кредиторов (что отражается и в европейском нормативно-правовом регулировании-требуется согласие только должника, и большинства кредиторов , так как ожидается достижение целей, а в исключительных случаях только должника и судебного органа). Предлагается не реципировать европейское регулирование превентивной реструктуризации в части права должника, в случае достижения согласия большинства кредиторов, инициировать превентивную реструктуризацию без утверждения плана судебным органом. На более поздних стадиях (стадия неплатежеспособности должника), экономические интересы должника и кредиторов не всегда согласуются (что отражается как в российском так в европейском нормативно-правовом регулировании - не требуется согласия должника и меньшинства кредиторов как для возбуждения судебных реабилитационных процедур, так и для выбора мер внутри них). Из этой основной гипотезы вытекает следующее положение;

2.Ввиду отсутствия в российском законодательстве механизмов предотвращения банкротства до появления неплатежеспособности должника, предлагает -ся для начала ввести новый авторский законодательный институт «внесудебное

превентивное реабилитационное соглашение» (ВПРС) условиями заключения которого были бы фактическое согласие всех кредиторов и должника, отсутствие неплатежеспособности должника и цель - предупреждение их возникновения. Кроме того, ВПРС должно быть неоспоримой сделкой, что ВПРС будет отличать от остальных общегражданских сделок.

3. Доказывается, что необходимо закрепить в предбанкротное российское законодательство критерии как добросовестности должника, так и кредиторов, как критерий иницирования и выбора тех или иных мер предупреждения банкротства (кроме ВПРС, поскольку для его заключения необходимо достижение согласия всех кредиторов, чем фактическая добросовестность всех неопровержимо будет предполагаться). Добросовестность должника в рамках общегражданского, предбанкротного и банкротного нормативно-правового регулирования должна пониматься по-разному. Предлагается впервые легальное закрепление градации добросовестности должников и кредиторов. Если кредитор финансово устойчив, но тем не менее требует немедленного удовлетворения своих требований на стадии платежеспособности добросовестного должника или без финансового обоснования не дает согласие на проведение превентивной реструктуризации, то его следует считать недобросовестным (кредитора), а должника наделить правом распространения своей правовой воли на таких кредиторов.

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язык) :

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172. Отчет о работе арбитражных судов субъектов Российской Федерации по рассмотрению дел о банкротстве за 12 месяцев 2018 года от 15.04.2019. Статистический бюллетень ЕФРСБ (31.12.2018 г.)

173. Проект Федерального закона N 239932 «О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон «О несостоятельности (банкротстве) и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части процедуры реструктуризации долгов в делах о банкротстве юридических лиц» дата обращения 10 октября 2019 г.

174. Положение о Федеральной службе по финансовому оздоровлению Правительства РФ от 4 апреля 2000 г. №301 http://base.garant.ru/ 12119218.

175. Постановление Правительства РФ от 25.06.2003 N 367 «Об утверждении Правил проведения арбитражным управляющим финансового анализа»//СЗ РФ . 2003. №26. ст.2664.

176. Проект ФЗ «О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон «о несостоятельности (банкротстве)» и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части регулирования вопросов применения процедур наблюдения и финансового оздоровления».

177. Федеральный закон "О несостоятельности (банкротстве)" от 26.10.2002 N 127-ФЗ дата обращения: 10 октября 2019.;

178. Рекомендация Комиссии 2014/135 / ЕС от 12 марта 2014 г. о новом подходе к банкротству бизнеса и несостоятельности Официальный журнал Европейского Союза, Ь 74/65, 14.03.2014

179. Директива (ЕС) 2019/1023 Европейского парламента и Совета от 20 июня 2019 года о рамках превентивной реструктуризации, о погашении долга и дисквалификации, а также о мерах по повышению эффективности процедур, касающихся реструктуризации, несостоятельности и погашения долга, и поправки к Директиве (ЕС) 2017/1132 (Директива о реструктуризации и несостоятельности) », Официальный журнал Европейского Союза, Ь 172, 26.06.2019.

180. Директива (ЕС) 2019/1023 Европейского парламента и Совета от 20 июня 2019 г. о рамках превентивной реструктуризации, облегчения долгового бремени и запретов, а также о мерах по повышению эффективности процедур, связанных с реструктуризацией, несостоятельностью и облегчением долгового бремени, а также о внесении поправок в Директиву (ЕС) 2017/1132 (Директива о реструктуризации и несостоятельности) [Электронный ресурс] // [офиц. сайт]. - Режим доступа: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/? uri=CELEX:32019L1023&from=EN (дата доступа: 04.03.2019).

181. Предложение для ДИРЕКТИВЫ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО ПАРЛАМЕНТА И СОВЕТА о механизмах превентивной реструктуризации, втором шансе и мерах по повышению эффективности процедур реструктуризации, несостоятельности и освобождения от ответственности, а также о внесении изменений в Директиву 2012/30 / EU COM / 2016/0723 final - 2016/0359 (ХПК). С 3-18. [Электронный ресурс] // PEGI. -[Сайт]. - URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? Uri = CELEX% 3A52016PC0723 (дата обращения: 21.02.2020).

182. Отчет Комиссии в Европейский парламент, Совет и Европейский экономический и социальный комитет о применении Регламента (ЕС) No. 1346/2000 Совета от 29 мая 2000 г. о процедурах банкротства, п. 6,9. [офиц. сайт]. - Режим доступа: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52012DC0743- (дата обращения: 10.04.2019).

183. Руководство для законодательных органов по вопросам законодательства о несостоятельности Часть четвертая. Обязанности директоров в период, предшествующий несостоятельности (в том числе в предпринимательских группах) Второе издание Комиссия Организаций Объединенных наций по праву международной торговли ЮНСИТРАЛ https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/ ru/19-11275_ebook.pdf

184. Сообщение Комиссии Европейскому парламенту, Совету и Европейскому экономическому и социальному комитету Новый европейский подход к банкротству и несостоятельности бизнеса COM / 2012/0742 final, [Электронный ресурс] // PEGI. - [Сайт]. - URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0742. - (дата обращения: 23.11.2019).

185. Постановление Совета (ЕС) № 1346/2000 от 29 мая 2000 г. о производстве по делу о несостоятельности, Официальный журнал Европейских сообществ, L 160,30 / 06/2000.

186. Рекомендация Комиссии о новом подходе к банкротству бизнеса и несостоятельности C (2014) 1500 final SWD (2014) 62 final .

187. Руководящие принципы государственной помощи для спасения и реструктуризации нефинансовых предприятий в затруднении, Официальный журнал Европейского Союза, C 249, 31.7.2014 .

188. Закон о споразумном финансовом реструктуризации («Сл. Гласник РС», бр. 89/2015.

189. Закон о согласованной внесудебной финансовой реструктуризации Республики Сербской ("Официальный вестник РС", № 99/20).

190. Закон о финансовых операциях и предбанкротном урегулировании -сводный текст законов Республики Хорватия OG 108/12, 144/12, 81/13, 112/13, 71/15, 78/15.

191. Закон о банкротстве (Официальный вестник, №№ 44/9 6, 29/99, 129/00, 123/03, 82/06 и 116/10 - Республика Хорватия.

192. Регламент (ЕС) 2015/848 Европейского парламента и Совета от 20 мая 2015 г. о производстве по делу о несостоятельности. С.3,17. [офич. сайт]. - Режим доступа: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R0848&from=en (дата доступа: 05.04.2019).

193. Закон о консенсусной финансовой реструктуризации («Официальный вестник РС», № 89/2015)

Судебная практика:

194. Определение Конституционного Суда РФ от 23 апреля 2015 г. N 914-О "Об отказе в принятии к рассмотрению жалобы гражданина Тимофеева Владислава Валентиновича на нарушение его конституционных прав абзацем восьмым статьи 2 и абзацем вторым пункта 2 статьи 4 Федерального закона "О несостоятельности (банкротстве)». Доступ из справ.-правовой системы «КонсультантПлюс»

195. Судебное дело C-212/15 [Электронный ресурс] // [офиц. сайт]. - Режим доступа: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? text=&docid=185222&pageIndex=0&doclang=HR&mode=lst&dir=&occ =first&part=1&cid=2484739 (дата обращения: 05.05.2020)

196. Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Connors, 283 F.3d 896, 899-901 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Juzwiak, 89 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1996); All Trades Temp. Servs., LLC v. Coates (In re Coates), 519 B.R. 842, 847- 48 (Bankr. D. Utah 2014); Hughes v. Wells (In re Wells), 426 B.R. 579, 598 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Spitko (In re Spitko), 357 B.R. 272, 298 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).;

197. Compare Lah, 88 B.R. at 143, and Taylor v. Lineberry (In re Lineberry), 55 B.R. 510, 511 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985), and Fox v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 47 B.R. 871, 874 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985), with Smith v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 399 B.R. 637, 646 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009), and Cadle Co. v. Zofko (In re Zofko), 382 B.R. 45, 48 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. 2008), and Buckeye Ret. Props, v. Tauber (In re Tauber), 349 B.R. 540, 546 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006).

198. Судебное дело C-212/15 [Электронный ресурс] // [офиц. сайт]. - Режим доступа: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? text=&docid=185222&pageIndex=0&doclang=HR&mode=lst&dir=&occ =first&part=1&cid=2484739 . - (дата обращения: 05.05.2020).

199. German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH против Alice van der Schee. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Hoge Raad der Nederlanden -Netherlands. Insolvency - Application of the law of the Member State of the opening of proceedings - Reservation of title - Situation of assets. Case C-292/08. [Электронный ресурс] // [офиц. сайт]. - Режим доступа: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-292/08 . -(дата обращения: 05.03.2020).

200. Stecajni postupak I Zakonodavna rezolucija Europskog parlamenta od 5. veljace 2014. o prijedlogu Uredbe Europskog parlamenta i Vijec o izmjeni Uredbe Vijeca (EZ) br. 1346/2000 o stecajnom postupku C93/366 (C0M(2012)0744 - C7-0413/2012 - 2012/0360(C0D)) Europski parlament ,(2017/C 093/61 COM 2012, 0744 C7 - 0413/2012 - 2012 / 0360P7_TC1_C0D(2012) 0360, P7_TA 2014.[Electronic resource] // Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University Website. -[Site]. - URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/? uri=CELEX:52014AP0093&from=EN (accessed: 26.03.2020).

201. Visoki trgovacki sud RH, Pz-1087/17 od 20.2.2017,

202. Visoki trgovackio sud RH, Pz-3956/17 od 27.7.2017

SAINT PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY

Manuscripts copyright

MASTILOVIC Larisa

DEBT RESTRUCTURING AS A MEASURE FOR PREVENTING

BANKRUPTCY UNDER RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN LAW

Scientific speciality 12.00.03 - civil law; entrepreneurial law; family law; international private law

Dissertation for a degree of candidate of legal sciences

Translation from Russian

Supervisor

Popondopulo Vladimir Fedorivich Doctor of legal sciences, professor

Saint-Petersburg 2021

Table of Contents...............................................................................205

Introduction......................................................................................207

Chapter 1. General characteristics of debt restructuring and preventive restructuring procedures in the context of bankruptcy prevention and their significance..............................................................................................222

1.1.The concept of debt restructuring and bankruptcy prevention under Russian and European law.....................................................................................222

1.2.Legal regulation of preventive restructuring - Directive on preventive restructuring 1023/2019. General characteristics............................................................234

1.3. Bankruptcy prevention: the legal nature of civil or bankruptcy law. Preventive Restructuring Directive 1023/2019........................................................... 241

1.4. Legal regulation of bankruptcy prevention under Russian law.......................250

1.5. The legal nature of bankruptcy prevention under Russian law.......................255

1.6. Risks in assessing the prospects for preventive restructuring in accordance with Directive 1023/2019 and liability for incorrect decisions..................................260

1.7. Economic reasons for the adoption of the Directive on preventive restructuring

1023/2019 and the economic consequences of its introduction...........................267

Chapter 2. Consequences of the introduction of the institution of bankruptcy prevention into Russian and European legislation. Comparative legal analysis of regulation of bankruptcy prevention and bankruptcy proceedings.................277

2.1. Analytical correlation between bankruptcy prevention under Russian law and preventive restructuring under European law................................................277

2.2. Analytical correlation between bankruptcy prevention and traditional court bankruptcy proceedings (liquidation proceedings and rehabilitation procedures) under Russian and European legislation..............................................................281

2.3. The practical aspect of the development of bankruptcy prevention legislation (balance search).................................................................................292

2.4. The evolutionary aspect of the development of bankruptcy prevention legislation. Trans-Interdisciplinary legal regulation of preventive restructuring - Preventive Restructuring Directive 1023/2019........................................................... 297

2.5. Persons entitled to initiate the introduction of bankruptcy prevention and judicial

rehabilitation procedures under Russian and European legislation.......................306

Chapter 3. Consolidation of new institutions. Proposal for new regulation in the field of bankruptcy prevention..............................................................311

3.1. Reasons for the need to introduce the principle of "sociality" in Russian bankruptcy legislation. Comparative view with European legislation..................................311

3.2. The reasons for introducing the principle of "good faith" of the debtor and creditors into the legislation as a criterion for applying bankruptcy prevention in Russian bankruptcy legislation. Comparative view with European regulation....................320

3.3. Reasons for introducing new regulation of legal grounds for initiating bankruptcy proceedings in their relationship with bankruptcy prevention.............................334

3.4. Reasons for the reception of the institution of sale of a debtor in bankruptcy as a whole legal entity................................................................................339

3.5. Reasons for introducing a new institution - an out-of-court preventive rehabilitation

agreement.........................................................................................344

Conclusion.......................................................................................358

REFERENCES

364

"The emphasis will be placed not on liquidation of enterprises, but on rehabilitation." February 10, 2021, Doctor of Economic Sciences, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Andrey Removich Belousov

Introduction

Relevance of the research theme is determined, first of all, by the fact that the Russian bankruptcy legislation does not provide, known to European law, the institution of out-of-court restructuring of debts of legal entities, in order to prevent bankruptcy, at the stage of the absence of external signs of bankruptcy. This applies both to Chapter 2 of the Federal Law of October 26, 2002 No. 127-FZ "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy),293specially devoted to the issues of out-of-court prevention of bankruptcy (Articles 30, 31 of the Bankruptcy Law), and to the rest of the Bankruptcy Law. The only exceptions are the rules governing out-of-court procedures for preventing the bankruptcy of financial institutions (Section 4, Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Law). The restructuring of debts of legal entities is mentioned only in Draft Law No. 239932-7 "On Amendments to the Federal Law" On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) "regarding the procedure for restructuring debts in cases of bankruptcy of legal entities",294 which has not come into force, but only voted for it in the first reading in the State Duma in 2017. The relevance of the research topic is also determined by the socio-economic situation. Doing business during and after a pandemic will lead to a state of insolvency for a large

293 Federal Law No. 127-FZ of 26.10.2002 "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" // SZ RF. 2002. No43. Article 4190 (hereinafter referred to as the Bankruptcy Law of the Russian Federation).

294 Draft Federal Law No. 239932 "On Amendments to the Federal Law" On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) and Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Concerning the Procedure for Debt Restructuring in Bankruptcy of Legal Entities "Date of appeal October 10, 2019 http: //www.consultant. ru / cons / cgi / online.cgi? req = doc & base = PRJ & n = 166722 # 021215881300795636 (hereinafter referred to as the Draft Law on Debt Restructuring).

number of small and medium-sized enterprises.295 This means that the deterioration of the financial position of companies will be caused by external economic factors, and not only by the dishonesty of the persons managing the debtor (they did not influence the situation and could not influence) or their lack of professionalism. This further means that negative consequences will spread to all economic entities, and the level of financial difficulties will be determined not only by individual characteristics of an legale entity, but by the type of its entrepreneurial activity. In such a situation, the interest of creditors lies not only in obtaining satisfaction of their claims, but also in maintaining their counterparty (debtor) in the market, since there is little chance that the same number of new companies (partners) will be registered during the liquidation of existing ones, when the financial the crisis is still ongoing. The author of this paper proposes a new regulatory framework for pre-insolvency, within which creditors and the debtor will have mechanisms for restoring the debtor's business together, while guaranteeing them securing collective interests, as is typical for traditional bankruptcy legislation.

It is proposed that legislators take into account the urgency and need to resolve the above issues. Therefore, the research analyzes the recently entered into force European regulation on the prevention of bankruptcy of bona fide debtor companies. Directive on preventive restructuring of debtors 1023/2019296 (further - Directive

295 "According to Rosstat estimates, in Russia about 20% of GDP is created by small and medium-sized enterprises. Therefore, a 50-60% reduction in market turnover in the SME sector could lead to a decrease in GDP by about 10% in the second quarter of 2020. " [Electronic resource] // [official. website]. - Access mode: https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/399389-dyra-v-vvp-chem-grozit-ekonomike-gibel-malogo-biznesa-v-rossii?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=uzhe-seychas- mozhno-priblizitelno-otsenit & fbclid = IwAR3 VTbxB9BWbcgzhnh_xokOb_w3TESJqUl-Ezom_epa0yc0Ejhc3dgDRlwM. - (date of access: 05/01/2020); Almost a third of Russian companies at the end of 2020 are at risk of bankruptcy, Kommersant reported on December 25, citing the following from the Center for Strategic Research (CSR). 10% of enterprises intend to complete their activities in the near future.

296 Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on frameworks for preventive restructuring, debt relief and prohibitions and on measures to increase the efficiency of proceedings relating to restructuring, insolvency and debt relief and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Restructuring and Insolvency Directive) - [Electronic resource] // [official site]. -URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 32019L1023 & from = EN (accessed: 04.03.2019).

1023/2019). Directive 1023/2019 stipulates the prevention of bankruptcy by the absence of external signs of the debtor's bankruptcy, the consent of the majority of creditors and the presence of a bona fide debtor. It was adopted taking into account the needs and interests of small and medium-sized enterprises, because "the economic crisis in Europe resulted in the loss of more than 3.5 million jobs in the field of small and medium-sized enterprises".297 Therefore, the social orientation of European bankruptcy legislation is based not only on European values, but also on economic considerations. The current Russian bankruptcy law protects the interests of larger creditors - those whose claims are usually secured by collateral. Such regulation slows down the development of small and medium-sized businesses. Given that the goal of small and medium-sized business development has already been proclaimed, a well-adapted implementation of the institutes of Directive 1023/2019 will help to achieve it. In addition, it will reduce budget losses aimed at repairing the effects of the economic crisis. The Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation took these problems into account when writing the new Draft Government of the Russian Federation on Amendments to the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" and other legislative acts of the Russian Federation No. 239932-7. Article 11 of this Draft law states that "the objectives of this Federal Law are: 1) fair and cost-effective settlement of insolvency in the interests of all persons affected by the settlement and the resolution of the confiscated persons; 2) assistance in preventing bankruptcy, preservation of working businesses that are in a state of insolvency, preservation of jobs and taxpayers, protection of competition; 3) the maximum possible and proportionate satisfaction of creditors of the insolvent debtor; 4) prevention of insolvency offenses. These goals must be taken into account when applying and interpreting the provisions of this Federal Law.»298

297 Annual Report on European Small and Medium Commercial Organizations [Electronic resource] // [ofic. site]. - Access mode: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/ sme / facts-figures- analysis / performance-review / index_en.htm) .ue. - (appeal date: 04.03.2019).

298 Draft Federal Law "On Amendments to the Federal Law" On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) "and Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation" (prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia, project ID 02/04 / 03-20 / 00100272) (not submitted to DG FS , text as of 16.04.2020). -[Electronic resource]. - [Site]. - URL: https://regulation.gov.ru/projects#npa=100272.

Prevention of bankruptcy under the current Chapter 2 of the Russian Bankruptcy Law is possible only at the stage of insolvency, while Directive 1023/2019 provides for preventive restructuring at the stage of solvency and the probability of insolvency. Advantage of bankruptcy prevention in accordance with Art. 31 (rehabilitation) of Russian regulation - this is the speed and "completeness of the result" - all available debt to all creditors is paid immediately. In contrast to such regulation, creditors within the framework of preventive restructuring in accordance with Directive 1023/2019 are guaranteed to receive part of the requirements, but later (through the institution of protection of the "best interests of the creditor»)299. The author notes that neither Russian nor European legislation provides any guarantees within the framework of traditional bankruptcy bankruptcy proceedings. On the other hand, the percentage of successful result of preventive restructuring in accordance with Directive 1023/2019 exceeds the percentage of successful result of rehabilitation procedures under Russian law for the reason that the first is carried out by the joint efforts of all creditors and debtor itself. In contrast to the European concept, according to Russian regulation, only two persons participate in the pre-insolvency procedure: the debtor and one person, which repays the full amount of the debtor's debt to all creditors.

This scientific study covers the period since 2000, when the Insolvency Procedure Regulation 1346/2000 was adopted.300The degree and content of normative regulation in the European Union differs depending on the state. In the Russian Bankruptcy Law, "bankruptcy prevention" is regulated by only two articles (Articles 30 and 31) in Chapter II entitled "Bankruptcy Prevention". For comparison, in the Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Croatia, "bankruptcy prevention" is regulated by the provisions of 53 articles (Articles 21-74).301

299 creditors are guaranteed to receive the minimum amounts they would have received if bankruptcy proceedings had been instituted, instead of preventive restructuring.

300 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on bankruptcy proceedings [Electronic resource] // [ofic. site]. - Access mode: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/? uri=CELEX:32000R1346&from=EN. - (date of entry to the site: 03.08.2019).

301 Bankruptcy Law (Official Gazette, Nos. 44/96, 29/99, 129/00, 123/03, 82/06 and 116/10) (hereinafter - the Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Croatia)

The degree of development of the research topic. The choice of the topic (comparative legal study of bankruptcy prevention under Russian and European legislation) is predetermined by the fact that the author graduated from law faculties both in Europe and in the Russian Federation: bachelor (2008-2012) and master (2013-2015) at the University of Sarajevo ( Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Master (2015-2017) and Doctorate (2017-2020) at the University of St. Petersburg, where the author received the necessary foundation and scientific basis for understanding both European and Russian law. The lack of such education does not make it possible to conduct a serious scientific comparative legal study of regulation of the matter of bankruptcy prevention due to its interdisciplinary and intersectoral nature. In addition, In addition, Russian legislation does not contain legal mechanisms of out-of-court debt restructuring of legal entities, as a way to prevent bankruptcy at the stage of the debtor's solvency, if there is only a probability of occurrence in the future. Such regulation satisfies the principle of legal certainty, but is imperfect from the point of view that lack of solvency does not always indicate that we are talking about a "healthy" commercial person and that bankruptcy is not likely to follow. Therefore, bankruptcy prevention procedures are not the same as preventive corporate governance. Therefore, pre-bankruptcy institutions can be characterized more with a bankrupt legal nature than corporate and civil.

Consequently, there is no practice of its application, and thus the publication inactivity on the topic is justified. This study is the first comparative legal study of Russian and European regulation of bankruptcy prevention, therefore, it may be useful for the legislator to introduce new institutions for bankruptcy prevention and improve existing ones. The present research is more practice-oriented and is aimed at creating new institutions, proposing new legislative solutions, arguing what consequences they will lead to. The questioning of the evolution and development of existing institutions and concepts is secondary.

General issues of legal regulation of bankruptcy, used in this research work as a starting point for the study, are considered in the works of such famous Russian scientists as: G.F. Shershenevich (authoritative pre-revolutionary Russian researcher) V.V. Vitryansky (Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation), S. A. Karelina, K. B. Koraev, V. F. Popondopulo (Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation), M.V. Telyukina, O.

Yu. Skvortsov, E.V. Slepchenko, and a number of others. Since we are talking about a topic that is traditionally characteristic of European legal systems, this paper presents the main conclusions and argumentation of the best European experts in this field: H. Eidenmuller - Germany (currently a professor at Oxford University), N. Tollenaar - the Netherlands, V Cholovic - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Serbia, V. Radovic -Republic of Serbia, J. Garasic - Republic of Croatia, J. Schonfeld - Czech Republic, L. Stagellini - Republic of Italy and a number of other authors. An analysis of the works of authors belonging to and practicing in various jurisdictions presents a more versatile view and gives the authors' conclusions of this study a more global significance and provides «a meeting» between the Russian and European legal systems. If conclusions were based only on research papers by authors from a smaller circle of countries, this might not be the case.

The purpose and the objectives of the dissertation research is to provide a scientific analysis of the new European procedures for preventive restructuring of a debtor, which can be applied to solvent debtors and the subsequent implementation of the relevant institutions into Russian bankruptcy legislation, taking into account the current Russian legislative regulation. The purpose of the study is also the development of new institutions that allow the prevention of bankruptcy of commercial organizations at any stage of entrepreneurial activity, starting from the stage of absence of any debt, ending with the stage of insolvency of the debtor. The public purpose of the study is manifested in a critical analysis of the current level of theoretical and practical elaboration of the topic and in the advancement of prospects for its development. To achieve these goals, it is necessary to solve the following tasks:

— analysis of existing legislative institutions for the prevention of bankruptcy and the formulation of proposals for their improvement or abolition;

— identification of pseudo-problems existing in the current scientific doctrine concerning bankruptcy prevention and posing real problems; — substantiation of the need to introduce into Russian legislation a new author's institute of an "out-of-court preventive rehabilitation agreement" (hereinafter referred to as the VPRS), which will be concluded subject to the agreement of all creditors and the debtor at the stage of the absence of external signs of bankruptcy in order to prevent the onset

of external signs of bankruptcy;

— argumentation of the positive practical consequences of the introduction of VPRS into Russian legislation and the development of a theoretical basis for its implementation;

—Implementation of the European preventive restructuring procedures from Directive 1023/2019 into Russian bankruptcy legislation in the part that will allow and stimulate the debtor to initiate debt restructuring procedures at earlier stages of business activity.

The methodological basis of the research.

The following research methods were used:

—the hypothetical-deductive method in proving the provisions submitted for defense, in view of the fact that their reliability was proved through the consequences that they generate on other interconnected institutions and the economy as a whole, and not through direct proof of the positive consequences of individual provisions; —the formal legal method cannot reach final and general conclusions, due to the fact that the institution of bankruptcy prevention is both interdisciplinary (has a legal and economic component) and intersectoral. However, this method is necessary as an initial step allowing to abstract from the economic side of the institution of bankruptcy prevention and restructuring of debtor's debts and analyze the institution itself as a legal phenomenon;

—the systemic and structural method is used through communicating the cause-effect of the connection between the institution of bankruptcy prevention and other institutions (subsidiary responsibility of the persons managing the debtor) and institutions itself. It helped to identify the essential signs and consequences of the institution of bankruptcy prevention. Besides, bankruptcy prevention cannot be fully understood without considering economics and politics. The author's conclusions of this study are based on legal phenomena, but the author takes into account both the political and economic context, without mentioning it separately.The method of polycontextual analysis of research hypotheses was used within the framework of the system-structural method. The study is based on comparative knowledge about the European cultural values of individual EU member states, which predetermine the choice of the European "legislator" in favor of certain priorities. Priorities are chosen depending on whether the

legislator in a certain European legal order protects to a greater extent one or another "weak side" (employee, small and medium creditors, small or medium debtors, etc.) —the method of normative criticism discovered how a collision between the goals and means of achieving the goals of bankruptcy prevention affects the efficiency of the legal regime. This method showed in which cases we see a conflict between the goals of state policy, in terms of the declared support for small and medium-sized businesses, and the norms of the law regulating the prevention of bankruptcy;

— descriptive method;

— the comparative legal method helped in comparing various legal systems, institutions, norms, in order to understand the similarities and differences between them;

— statistical method.

The scientific novelty of the research lies in the presentation of the features of European debt restructuring procedures, both at the stage of traditional court rehabilitation proceedings and at the stage of pre-insolvency in the context of Chapter 2 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Russian Federation. The purpose of all these procedures is to avoid bankruptcy, but not in the same intensity and is not subject to the same legal mechanisms. Preventive restructuring from Directive 1023/2019 is only possible for the debtor at the stage of solvency and its causa finalis is the long-term retention of the debtor in the market. In contrast to it, the prevention of bankruptcy from Chapter 2 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Russian Federation is possible only at the stage of the debtor's insolvency (the liquidation of the debtor is prevented by avoiding the initiation of this procedure). According to Russian law, we are talking about procedural prevention of bankruptcy due to the fact that none of the creditors filed an application to initiate bankruptcy proceedings when each of them had the right to do so, since the debtor became insolvent. According to Russian regulation, the legal condition for preventing bankruptcy and its short-term causa finalis are the same - ensuring that an application is not filed by any of the creditors. Within the framework of court rehabilitation procedures, bankruptcy is prevented in the substantive sense, since the creditor has already submitted an application to the court.Therefore, the long-term causa finalis of both court rehabilitation procedures and the prevention of bankruptcy is the same - the best satisfaction of the creditors' claims, and not the preservation of the

debtor. According to European regulation, preventive restructuring also guarantees creditors the best satisfaction of their claims, but the initiation of the procedure and the choice of measures are also chosen with the aim of keeping the debtor in the market after the creditors' claims are satisfied. In accordance with Art. 31 of the Russian regulation, debts to all creditors are fully repaid, which creates absolute equality for all creditors, except for the person (or creditor) who paid off the entire debt.Equality of all creditors also lies in the fact that each of them has the right to become the one who will pay off all debts of the debtor to all creditors. Such absolute equality of creditors is impossible in the framework of traditional bankruptcy proceedings, since even at the legislative level creditors are divided into classes. This was done in order to separate the creditors, where some of them fully satisfied the claims instead of others. The equality of creditors under Directive 1023/2019 is relative and similar to the equality of creditors in the framework of classical court bankruptcy proceedings (creditors in the framework of preventive restructuring are guaranteed exactly the receipt of the minimum amount that is guaranteed to them as a result of classical court bankruptcy proceedings, if initiated).Preventive restructuring, according to European law, does not exclude the possibility of satisfying a full claim, but the law does not guarantee it to creditors. The law guarantees the satisfaction of creditor claims only in the amount that would have been received if the bankruptcy proceedings had been initiated. The text of Directive 1023/2019 excluded the possibility of receiving an amount exceeding the amount of the full claim, but the balance was restored by the fact that at the stage of the debtor's solvency (when bankruptcy law does not apply), bankruptcy rights are guaranteed to creditors, despite the fact that they have not yet arisen, which adds bankrupt legal nature into traditional civil legal relations. It was revealed that negotiations on the conclusion of the prevention of bankruptcy according to European regulation have a legal nature of civil law. However, the creation of legal relations, its application and termination have a bankrupt legal nature. It was revealed that negotiations on the conclusion of the prevention of bankruptcy according to European regulation have a legal nature of civil law. However, the subsequent stages have a bankrupt legal nature, namely: the creation of legal relations, its application and termination.In accordance with Art. 31 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Russian Federation, creditors already at the stage of adoption of

the sanation agreement are obligatory guaranteed the satisfaction of their full amount of the claim. This certainty and predictability is characteristic of the legal nature of civil law. Bankruptcy prevention is impossible under Russian law without the consent of the debtor, but creditors are no less interested in it than the debtor (especially within the framework of Article 31, where the main goal is full and instant satisfaction of the claims of all creditors, and not the preservation of the debtor). Why can creditors under no circumstances independently initiate the procedure without the consent of the debtor?Another novelty is the conclusion that the existence of a certain amount of debt should cease to be a prerequisite for the application of preventive restructuring measures within the framework of pre-bankruptcy legislation. It is proposed to establish in Russian legislation new institutions for the prevention of bankruptcy, which will be available at the stage of the debtor's solvency. Due to the difference in the financial position of solvent debtors and creditors, the introduction of new institutions for the prevention of bankruptcy is required. To be effective, these legal mechanisms should have different legal conditions for their application: from the author's construction of an "out-of-court preventive rehabilitation agreement", where the consent of all creditors and the debtor is required, to the institutions proposed by Directive 1023/2019 (as a general rule, the consent of the debtor and most creditors are required).Projecting the provisions of Directive 1023/2019 into Russian legislation, in addition to the agreement between the majority of creditors and the debtor, it is necessary to provide for the requirement to obtain the mandatory consent of the judicial authority (due to the specifics of the current Russian regulation).

Each rehabilitation procedure, in particular the prevention of bankruptcy, may not lead to a positive result (based on the nature of the institution, its use is due to at least 51% of the probability of a positive result). Nevertheless, the created pre-bankruptcy legal relationship between creditors and the debtor contributes to a more efficient conduct of liquidation proceedings for bankruptcy, even if the pre-bankruptcy fails.

The scientific novelty of the research is concretized in the following provisions. The main provisions to be defended:

1.It is concluded that the good faith legal will of a solvent debtor and all his creditors, manifested in order to prevent bankruptcy, should be sufficient for the onset

of legal consequences that traditionally arise in case of initiation of bankruptcy proceedings at the stage of insolvency of the debtor, instead of the current application norms of general civil law. Pre-insolvency procedure should be available at any stage of the debtor's entrepreneurial activity (both the solvency and insolvency of the debtor). At the stage of the debtor's solvency, the economic interests of the debtor more often coincide with the interests of the creditors (which is reflected in the European regulatory legal regulation - only the consent of the debtor and the majority of creditors is required for preventive restructuring. The reason for this lies in the fact that a positive result is expected to be achieved. Exceptions to the general rule, Directive 1023/2019 allows for the approval of preventive restructuring even without the consent of the majority of creditors, if the consent of the judicial authority and the debtor is obtained. It is proposed not to follow the European regulation of preventive restructuring in terms of the debtor's rights, if the majority of creditors agree, initiate preventive restructuring without the approval of the plan by the judicial authority. At later stages (the stage of insolvency of the debtor), the economic interests of the debtor and creditors do not always coincide (which is reflected both in Russian and in European legal regulation -the consent of the debtor and the minority of creditors is not required both to initiate court rehabilitation proceedings on insolvency, and to select measures within them). This basic hypothesis gives rise to the following proposition;

2.Since there is no possibility in Russian legislation to prevent bankruptcy through legal mechanisms of bankruptcy legislation before the debtor becomes insolvent, it is proposed to consider the timeliness of the proposal for the introduction of the author's construction "out-of-court preventive rehabilitation agreement" (OPRA). The condition for the conclusion of a OPRA would be the consent of all creditors and the debtor, the absence of the debtor's insolvency and the goal -to prevent the occurrence of insolvency. In addition, the OPRA agreement will not be subject to challenge, which will distinguish OPRA from other civil law contracts.

3.It is proved that it is necessary to introduce into the pre-bankruptcy Russian legislation the criterion of the good faith of the debtor and creditors, as a criterion for initiating and choosing certain measures to prevent bankruptcy (except for the OPRA, since for its conclusion it is necessary to reach the consent of all creditors, and thus the

actual good faith of all creditors and the debtor will be assumed).The good faith of the debtor (bona fide debtor) within the framework of civil. law, pre-bankruptcy and bankruptcy law should be understood in different ways. It is proposed for the first time to legalize the gradation of conscientiousness of debtors and creditors. If a creditor is financially stable, but nevertheless requires immediate satisfaction of his claims at the stage of solvency of a bona fide debtor or, without financial justification,does not give the necessary consent to initiate preventive restructuring, then such a creditor should be considerednon bona fide. In relation to non bona fide creditors, the debtor must be empowered to extend his legal will to such creditors.

4.It is proposed to introduce and develop criteria for market assessments of the future prospects of a bona fide debtor who is voluntarily interested in preventing bankruptcy. These criteria will predetermine the choice of bankruptcy prevention measures in conjunction with other criteria such as: the presence of consent of a largeror smaller number of creditors, the amount of debt in the context of the "size" of the debtor, the amount of claims taking into account the "size" of the respective creditor, types of creditors and debtor (large or small).The current legal regulation of bankruptcy prevention is too simplified and does not reflect the complex economic reality, since it is only able to fix the current financial and legal position of the debtor without taking into account unconditional dynamic economic changes, which makes it ineffective;

5.Preventing bankruptcy should become a priority goal of pre-bankruptcy legislation, which can be ensured, among other things, by increasing the subsidiary liability of the debtor's dishonest management. More measures should be aimed at preventing the onset of insolvency than measures to prevent bankruptcy at the stage of the debtor's insolvency. It is necessary to introduce into the legislation new mechanisms for preventing bankruptcy, which will be available at any stage of entrepreneurial activity, depending on the consent, solvency and good faith of creditors and the debtor. If bankruptcy proceedings at the stage of insolvency of the debtor give an advantage to the debtor, the debtor has no interest inpreventing bankruptcy as part of preventive restructuring. If it gives advantages to. creditors, then this stimulates the debtor to be dishonest and withdraw assets "on time". Proper legal regulation implies balanced regulation;

6. It is necessary to introduce into the legislation new mechanisms for preventing bankruptcy, which will be available at any stage of entrepreneurial activity, depending on the consent,solvency and good faith of creditors and the debtor. If bankruptcy proceedings at the stage of insolvency of the debtor give an advantage to the debtor,the debtor has no interest in preventing bankruptcy as part of preventive restructuring. If it gives creditors an advantage over the debtor, thenthis encourages the debtor to be dishonest and withdraw assets "on time"(the pre-insolvency period).Proper legal regulation implies balanced regulation;

7.Sanitation, in accordance with Art. 31 of the Law on (insolvency) bankruptcy of the Russian Federation, provides instant and full repayment of all debts of the debtor to all creditors, which fully and instantly ensures the interests of all creditors and the debtor at once. Preventive restructuring in accordance with Directive 1023/2019 also provides protection to creditors, but does not immediately satisfy their claims and does not guarantee their satisfaction in full, but in accordance with the principle of "creditors best interest test." Therefore, the circle of persons whose interests are protected within the framework of bankruptcy prevention exceeds the circle of persons protected within the framework of European preventive procedures. However, the chance for initiating and bringing such procedures to a positive result is higher within the framework of European regulation, since all persons, solitary forces, carry out the debtor's recovery. Preemptive restructuring can only harm the financial interests of the creditors, not the debtor, but has the potential to help both.

Theoretical and practical significance of the study. The formulated conclusions and proposals in the study are of moral and practical importance for the science of business law and bankruptcy law. The study made it possible to develop conditions for adapting European preventive restructuring procedures for Russian bankruptcy legislation. Research findings can help improve bankruptcy prevention issues. The formulated conclusions represent new scientific ideas about ways to prevent bankruptcy. The practical significance of the study is that it can be used to improve the current pre-bankruptcy legislation. It can also improve the practice of applying pre-bankruptcy legislation and become part of bibliographic list for the courses in framework of the Department of Commercial Law of the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg State

University.

Approbation of research results. The main provisions of the research are reflected in eight articles, one of them is included in the international citation databases Web of Science Core Collection. Four of them were published in foreign journals (one of them was published in Serbia in Russian, the second in Serbian, the third was published in Italy in Italian, the fourth was published in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Bosnian).302 Some of the conclusions of the dissertation research were presented at three conferences: 1) "The impact of the formation of oil prices on the solvency of foreign consumers and the profit of oil companies" at the international Russian-Italian conference "Energy and Environmental Law. New challenges to corporate social responsibility "(St. Petersburg, February 11, 2019); 2) "Investment agreement as a way to restore the debtor's solvency" at the international Russian-Italian conference "Problems of foreign investment law in Russia and in the European union" (St. Petersburg, February 10, 2020); 3) "Applicable Law in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings" at the Insol Europe Joint International Conference (Zagreb, September 1819, 2020).

302 See:

1) Sale of a debtor in bankruptcy as a legal entity as the most optimal way of restructuring // Lawyer. 2019. No. 4. P.41-49;

2) Consequences of non-recognition by the state of foreign bankruptcy proceedings for the debtor's property located on their territory // Lawyer. 2019. No. 4. P. 50-56;

3) Legislative introduction of the debtor's right to initiate the pre-bankruptcy rehabilitation procedure. Comparative view: Russia and Europe // Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu. 2020. № / 2019. S. 1333-1346;

4) Out-of-court preventive rehabilitation agreement as a way to prevent signs of bankruptcy //Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. 2020. No. 1. P. 140-154;

5) Debtor restructuring as a mechanism for preventing bankruptcy under European law //Courier of Kutafin Moscow State Law University (MSAL). 2020. No. 3. Pp. 179-187;

6) Preventive restructuring as a bankruptcy prevention mechanism - a new tendency of European Union legislation / European legislation. 2020. №1. pp.52-70;

7) The European protection of workers' rights in preventive restructuring procedures in bankruptcy matters and the comparison with the insolvency regulations in Croatia, Serbia and Russia // Labor Market Law 2020. №2. P. 425-443;

8) The influence of conscientiousness and the degree of discretionary will of debtors and creditors on the influence on the prevention of bankruptcy reasons // Godisnjak Pravnog fakulteta u Sarajevu. 2021.№1.С. 431-459.

The dissertation was discussed and approved at the Department of Commercial Law of St. Petersburg State University (discussion took place on October 25, 2020). The main provisions of the dissertation research were supported within the framework of the scientific project No. 19-311-90063 "Debt restructuring as a measure of preventing bankruptcy under European law."

The structure of the dissertation research consists of an introduction, 3 chapters, 17 paragraphs, a conclusion, a list of normative legal acts, materials of judicial practice and a bibliography. The first chapter presents the general characteristics of the regulatory framework for bankruptcy prevention procedures in accordance with Russian and European legislation. The doctrinal part (legal nature) has also been developed, as well as specific legal institutions and conditions for their application (at the communitarian European level and in specific jurisdictions: Republic of Serbia, Republika Srpska303,Russ-ian Federation, Republic of Croatia, Italian Republic, Republic of Greece. The author analyzes the economic foundations and emerging risks in the process of making procedural decisions by the creditor and the debtor. The second chapter is devoted to a comparative legal analysis of Russian and European bankruptcy prevention procedures, as well as a comparison of bankruptcy prevention procedures with traditional court proceedings of these two legal orders.The emphasis is placed on the evolutionary aspect of legislative regulation and the comparative aspect of the balance of interests between creditors and the debtor in these two legal orders. The third chapter is devoted to the introduction of new institutions into the legislation: two new ones ("good faith of the debtor and creditors" as a criterion for applying bankruptcy prevention, and "out-of-court rehabilitative preventive agreement") and borrowing a number of institutions already existing in foreign countries (such as, the sale of the debtor in bankruptcy as a legal entity ", which provides for the sale of not only the debtor's property, but also all its components, including contracts and shares). The bibliography is presented at the very end and consists of sources that are presented in the following languages: English, Bosnian, Italian, German, Russian Serbian, and Croatian.

303 The Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are administrative parts of the same state - Bosnia and Herzegovina. Each of the administrative parts has its own separate legislation, including bankruptcy legislation.

Chapter 1. General characteristics of debt restructuring and preventive

restructuring procedures in the context of bankruptcy prevention and

their significance

1.1. The concept of debt restructuring and bankruptcy prevention under Russian and European law

There are three approaches to debt restructuring, and they are determined by the level of government interventionism: 1) the market option (creditors and debtors themselves regulate debt restructuring). The role of the state is to provide eventual support (for example, through additional capitalization of banks); 2) the interventionist approach implies direct intervention of the state, for example, through tax and other regulation, the state protects more the interests of creditors, or, conversely, of debtors; 3) an approach where the state acts as a mediator.304 A.A. Kravchenko believes that "a single and general principle of legal regulation of insolvency is the principle of state regulation of insolvency relations. The institution of insolvency is an institution of business law regulated by a specific imperative-dispositive method inherent in this particular area of legal regulation».305 In addition, Karelina S.A. believes that the principle of state regulation in Russian insolvency legislation is harmoniously combined with the principles of self-regulation.306 The interventionist approach also implies the creation of specialized societies that acquire, manage and sell capital and property of economic entities in financial difficulties. An interventionist approach is applied during systemic financial crises.307 This approach is reflected in the Instructional Letter dated September 16, 1993 No. A III-598 / 6-210 "on the development of a procedure for the

304 См.: Laryea В. T. Approaches to Corporate Debt Restructuring in the Wake of Financial Crises // IMF Staff Position Note. — 2010. —№ 2.— 7 p.

305 Kravchenko A. A. To the question of the system of principles of legal regulation of insolvency (bankruptcy) relations // Problems in Russian legislation International legal journal. - 2019. - No. 1. -38 p.

306 See: Karelina S.A. Principles of legal regulation of relations arising in connection with the insolvency (bankruptcy) of the debtor // Entrepreneurial Law. - 2008. - No. 2. - 2.5, 9 p.

307 See: Colovic V. Debtor restructuring // Godisnjak fakulteta pravnih nauka. - 2018. - №8. - 6. s.

rehabilitation, reorganization and termination of activities of insolvent enterprises" of the Russian Federation308,where Annex 1 lists a huge number of financial profitability criteria, where their application is subject to strict government standards. However, this kind of "care" about business entities is unnecessary at the current stage of development of market relations. As KB Koraev writes: "The right is incapable of liquidating the state of insufficient capital of the insolvent debtor. It can only create legal conditions for the elimination of this state, if there are necessary real economic resources for this. If the debtor does not have the specified economic resources, then the law is not capable of ensuring the restoration of his solvency.»309

The vitality of the company is key to a successful reorganization. The company is influenced by internal and external factors, although the process itself is regulated by law. Government preferential regulation of bankruptcy prevention leads to the fact that sometimes not the most viable company finds support.310For example, in accordance with Article 106y par. 3 of the Greek Bankruptcy Code, the debtor automatically receives a "certificate of tax exemption". It is issued by the competent tax authority after reaching the ratification of the agreement on preventive restructuring and its approval by the court.311

"There are 3 types of procedures within which it is possible to restructure the debtor's debts when the debtor is in financial difficulties: 1) out-of-court procedures; 2) judicial procedures; 3) hybrid procedures that combine the benefits of court control,

308 Instruction letter dated September 16, 1993 No. A III-598 / 6-210 "on the development of a procedure for the rehabilitation, reorganization and termination of the activities of insolvent enterprises" of the Russian Federation [Electronic resource] // [official. website]. - Access mode: http:// docs.cntd.ru/document/9005278. - (date of access: 10.10.2019).

309 Koraev K.B. Insolvency: New institution of legal regulation of financial recovery and insolvency (bankruptcy): dis. doct ... jurid. Sciences: 12.00.03. SPB., 2019.S. 172.

310 See: Schonfeld J. Financial situation of pre-packed insolvencies // Journal of Business Economics and Management. - 2020. - No. 21/4. - p. 1113.1114.

311 See.: Stergios F. Pushing Towards Efficiency: New Changes in Greek Restructuring and Insolvency Law // Chase Cambria Company (Publishing) Ltd. —2017.— p. 282.

accessibility, informality and the low cost characteristic of out-of-court procedures .312 There are hybrid institutions that perform both the function of preventive out-of-court restructuring and judicial rehabilitation, for example, in Serbian legislation there is an institution in Article 158 of the Bankruptcy Law of Serbia313,the so-called "pre-prepared restructuring plan" institution. Only the debtor is authorized to initiate this procedure if the debtor has previously, at an out-of-court stage, signed an agreement on financial restructuring of debts with creditors. The debtor further submits this agreement to the court together with a petition for the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings (if the debtor proves the existence of conditions for the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings from Article 11).The court does not assess the existence of economic justification and feasibility of the plan. Moreover, "foreseeing the restoration of the financial stability of a business is based on data from financial documents as of the date of filing an application with the court and for the period preceding this date. This data may not be useful for predicting future financial condition."314 Such an institute also exists in the Czech Republic. This institute begins with the conclusion of an out-of-court agreement, but then the agreement is submitted to the court together with the application for the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. This helps to speed up bankruptcy proceedings, ensure financial recovery and support the principle of business continuity of the debtor. Such procedural regulation ensures faster decision-making and promotes the development of preliminary agreement and cooperation between creditors. The agreement must be approved by half of both secured and unsecured creditors before filing for bankruptcy (paragraph 148 of the Bankruptcy Act of the Czech Republic № 182/2006).This half is obtained by mathematical calculation: based on the sum of creditors' claims. Within the framework of the already prepared agreement, the debtor

312 Economic Impact of Rescue and Recovery within the EU, 2015, European Commission: Mihaela Carpus Carcea, Daria Ciriaci, Carlos Cuerpo, Dimitri Lorenzaniand Peter Pontuch, [Electronic resource] // [official. website]. - Access mode: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/dp004_en.pdf. -(date of access: 10.04.2020).

313 Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Serbia ("Official Gazette of the RS", No. 104 / 2009.99 / 2011-other Law, 71/2012-Decision of the US, 83 / 2014,113 / 2017,44)

314 Hamzic M. Financial analysis as a tool for predicting company bankruptcy: Dis. ... Ph.D.: Sarajevo, 2018.S.108.

may propose to the court the appointment of a trustee (paragraph 25 of the Bankruptcy Act of the Czech Republic № 182/2006 Coll.).315"A pre-packed restructuring plan has been introduced into Serbian law and has been in force since June 2010. From 2010 to February 2015, 250 successful agreements were prepared where debtors' liabilities exceeded three billion euros."316A similar institute of bankruptcy prevention is provided in paragraph 1 of Art. 143 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In accordance with Article 109 of the Draft Law on Debt Restructuring to the Russian Federation, it is stated that "the debtor may propose this procedure before one of the creditors has initiated bankruptcy proceedings and after the initiation, but if the debtor has agreed to procedure of restructuring. The plan must be agreed no earlier than 6 months before the bankruptcy proceedings are initiated."The difference between the current legislative version in the Republic of Serbia and the Draft Law of the Russian Federation is that the Bankruptcy Law of Serbia does not provide for a time frame for reaching an agreement between creditors and a debtor and does not stipulate a date for reaching an agreement with the date when an application is filed to initiate bankruptcy proceedings in court ( Article 155 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Serbia).

The current Russian Bankruptcy Law (as of December 2021) does not mention debt restructuring of legal entities either in the framework of insolvency proceedings (only debt restructuring of individuals is regulated and mentioned in the law). Including, it is not mentioned in the text of the law within the framework of Chapter 6. In accordance with Chapter 6, the goal of rehabilitation (one of the court rehabilitation insolvency procedure) is to "restore the debtor's solvency", and not to avoid business failure of the debtor. Despite the fact that "restoring solvency" is also not defined, Article 2 contains a definition of "insolvency", therefore, it can be concluded that "restoring solvency" is the elimination of the state of "insolvency" or in other words -reduction of debt to the amount and term which remove the legal opportunity to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. In contrast to the restoring solvency, the debt restructuring

315 See.: Schonfeld J. Financial situation of pre-packed insolvencies. 1111,1114.1124.p.

316 Radulovic B. Pre-packed reorganization plans and the problem of negative selection // Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. - 2015. - № 1. —152. s.

should not be conditioned by the achievement of only this one mentioned goal, since the legal means of achieving it are determined only by the trustee. At the same time, trustee does not take into account the disagreement of the persons managing the debtor. The trustee's legal powers and possibilities to achieve the mentioned goal are strickly limited by law, due to his exclusive position and the fact that the goal is limited only to "restoring solvency" activity). Therefore, "restoring solvency" has a less ambitious goal than "debt restructuring". Therefore, they should not be considered as legal synonyms. This defect is corrected in Art. 2 of the Draft Law on Debt Restructuring of the Russian Federation, where the institution of "debt restructuring" is mentioned for the first time, defining: "debt restructuring is a procedure within the framework of court insolvency proceedings in relation to a debtor - a legal entity, in order to restore its solvency and satisfy creditors' claims." From this definition, we see not one but two goals.317 Legal analysis of Art. 2 of the aforementioned Draft Law on Debt Restructuring brings us to two conclusions: 1) the restoring solvency implies the presence of debtor's insolvency even at the moment of the opening of the debt restructuring procedure, respectively, at the stage of the absence of external signs of bankruptcy (debtor's solvency), the procedure is not available ; 2) debt restructuring is possible only within the framework of court proceedings (after its initiation),, respectively, it is not available withing an at the out-of -court platform. This means that if the Draft Debt Restructuring Law of Russian Federation enters into force in 2021, the opening of the debt restructuring procedure will be possible only if one of the creditors has already initiated bankruptcy proceedings (withn court bankruptcy proceedings). Accordingly, we conclude that this is the opposite legal condition in comparison with the condition for initiation of prevention of bankruptcy in the current version of Chapter 2 of the Bankruptcy (Insolvency) Law of the Russian Federation. Within the framework of the mentioned Chapter 2 the debtor has to be already insolvent, but none of the creditors applied for initiation bankruptcy proceedings despite all them being entitled to do so. In accordance with Art. 2 of Directive 1023/2019, debt restructuring "means measures aimed at

317 in the newer version of the mentioned draft "debt restructuring" is defined not only "in order to restore its solvency and satisfy the claims of creditors" but also in order to "preserve the efficiency of an economic entity (business)"

restructuring the business of the debtor, including changing the composition, conditions, structure of assets and liabilities of the debtor or any other part of the capital structure of the debtor, such as the sale of assets or parts of the business, and, if provided by the national legislation and any necessary organizational changes or a combination of these elements».

The purpose, significance and complexity of bankruptcy prevention is not inferior to the goals of standard bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, the number of legal norms regulating the prevention of bankruptcy should increase from two (prevention of bankruptcy in the Russian Federation is regulated in two articles: Art. 30 "Measures to prevent bankruptcy of organizations" and Art. 31 "Reorganization") to the number of norms that regulate liquidation bankruptcy procedures.Bankruptcy liquidation protects only the "best interest of the creditors" and efficiency is equated only to the speed of sale and distribution of the debtor's assets. In addition, liquidation of the debtor is the only outcome of such a procedure, therefore it is easier to regulate. The issue of the effectiveness of regulation can be assessed only in relation to procedures whose purpose is to avoid liquidation of the debtor. Legal analysis paragraph 3 of Art. 30 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Russian Federation 318leads to the conclusion that bankruptcy prevention can be done by the debtor either jointly with creditors or independently (without the participation of creditors or other persons), which is typical for corporate law. Considering that the aforementioned norm does not prohibit the participation of creditors or other persons (if the debtor agrees), then in the norm, which is localized in the Bankruptcy Law, we notice contractual legal regulation instead of bankruptcy.Elements of contractual regulation are also recognized in the fact that decisions are made outside the court, the absence of a council of creditors, the absence of the need to obtain the consent of a certain percentage of creditors on the choice of legal measures, the absence of collective legal consequences for all creditors, which is all characteristic of bankruptcy legislation. It appears that this provision should not be

318 Paragraph 3 of Art. 30 "In order to prevent the bankruptcy of organizations, the founders (participants) of the debtor, the owner of the property of the debtor - a unitary enterprise have the right to take measures to restore the debtor's solvencyuntil the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy petition. Measures aimed at restoring the debtor's solvency may be taken by creditors or other persons on the basis of an agreement with the debtor. "

found in the Bankruptcy Law. On the other hand, at the same time, in paragraph 1 of Art. 30 Bankruptcy Law319 where we can see also an element of compulsory obligation, which is tipical for bankruptcy regulation, where it is provided not voluntary, but obligatory prevention of the debtor's bankruptcy by the debtor himself (although this is not the essence of bankruptcy regulation, but rather a characteristic that, as a priori, does not occur within the framework of contractual and corporate law).A question for reflection: if the debtor was in good faith and is able to restore his solvency on his own or with the voluntary participation of other persons, then the debtor would have prevented bankruptcy voluntarily without prescribing the compulsion of such commitments. Therefore, the requirements of paragraph 1 of Art. 30 that the debtor is obliged to provide such a result seems to be a norm that cannot be applied in practice, but simply reminds of how it should be. This legislative norm does not create legal consequences for creditors; therefore, this norm has a corporate or contractual nature, despite the fact that it is placed in the Bankruptcy Law.In other words, this legislative norm has created unnecessary competition between corporate, contract and bankruptcy law (whose principles in many respects contradict each other) in the same norm: it is corporate in terms of the rights and obligations of creditors, but bankrupt in terms of the obligations of the debtor. This makes her ambivalent. In addition, it is controversial to achieve the principle of efficiency, given that it is difficult to imagine the prevention of bankruptcy of the debtor against the consent of the debtor himself.In European legislation, there is no norm that obliges the debtor to file an application for bankruptcy prevention, but, on the contrary, the consent of the debtor and, as a general rule, the consent of the majority of creditors is required. This is justified, since the prevention of bankruptcy in the European Union is possible at the stage of the debtor's solvency. The consent of the majority of creditors is required because it is legally too "slippery" to provide for legislative mechanisms for coercing the debtor to initiate preventive restructuring and extending the legal will of the consenting majority to the dissenting

319 In accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 30 of the Bankruptcy (Insolvency) Law of the Russian Federation "If there are signs of bankruptcy established by paragraph 2 of Article 3 of this Federal Law, or the circumstances provided for in Articles 8 or 9 of this Federal Law, the director of the debtor is obliged, within a reasonable time, to take all reasonable necessary measures depending on him aimed at preventing the debtor's bankruptcy ".

minority of creditors, at the stage of the debtor's solvency.Member States of the European Union, prior to the adoption of Directive 1023/2019, were not required to provide for bankruptcy prevention mechanisms at the stage of the debtor's solvency. In the period "before Directive 1023/2019", creditors were entitled to initiate bankruptcy proceedings, despite the measures taken to prevent bankruptcy, if the debtor became insolvent.After the entry into force of Directive 1023/2019, if preventive restructuring has begun, it is prohibited to initiate enforcement proceedings within the timeframe specified in the preventive restructuring plan, even if during the procedure the debtor becomes insolvent. In other words, the debtor has the right to choose: initiate the preventive restructuring procedure or not. If the debtor initiates it, he chooses on the basis of the corporate right to renounce the range of corporate rights in favor of bankrupt ones. If the debtor decides not to initiate the preventive restructuring procedure, then, within the framework of corporate or contractual law, he can engage in restructuring on his own. On the other hand, preventive restructuring, in accordance with Directive 1023/2019, enforces the legal will of the consenting majority of creditors to the dissenting minority, which is a bankrupt element and not a corporate or contractual one. Therefore, it is possible to understand the Russian legislator (in the context of clause 1 of Article 30), however, it is proposed that the application of bankruptcy prevention be no longer conditioned by the state of insolvency.

"Without a sincere, conscientious and voluntary interest of the debtor in disclosing the true reasons that caused the insolvency, creditors will not be able to understand the true reasons that caused the insolvency and the prospects for recovery of the debtor, respectively, they will not be interested in supporting the financial recovery of the debtor, both within the framework of judicial and out-of-court rehabilitation bankruptcy procedures».320 In the Czech Republic, researchers found that, 3 years before the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, 48 debtors voluntarily published their financial indicators, in 2 years the number of reporting decreased to 42 companies and in the last year only 30. The decrease in the number of companies shows that the closer bankruptcy proceedings, the less likely the debtor will voluntarily publish his financial

320 Mastilovich L. Out-of-court preventive rehabilitation agreement as a way to prevent the occurrence of signs of bankruptcy //Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University.. - 2020. - No. 1. - 141. p.

documents. However, the analyzed sample is determined by the size of the company and the type of its activity. The closer the bankruptcy proceedings are, the more sales decrease.321 For example, the legislation of Serbia and Croatia provides that the debtor voluntarily decides whether to prevent bankruptcy or not. The Italian Republic in 2005 introduced "an agreement on debt restructuring, where the debtor remains debtor in poessessio and his assets are protected by the" umbrella"effect from the creditors' enforcement procedures for a specified period.322Preambles 1, 2, 30, 38, and 53 of Directive 1023/2019 provide for the prohibition to initiate enforcement proceedings against the debtor for a certain period (the so-called "stagnation" institution) in the event that negotiations on preventive restructuring have begun. When the preventive restructuring of the debtor has already begun, the debtor is provided with protection in the form of a ban on the initiation of enforcement proceedings by anyone. In addition, it is prohibited to terminate the contract with the debtor. In addition, the debtor's governing body continues to operate the business. Paragraph 33 of the Preamble to Directive 1023/2019 provides that EU member states have the right to regulate the grounds for establishing exceptions in the application of the institution of stagnation (for example, stagnation may only apply to certain categories of creditors, in exceptional cases).In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 4 of Art. 68 of the Croatian Bankruptcy Law, from the date of initiation of bankruptcy prevention, all enforcement procedures have to become terminated and it is forbidden to initiate newprocedure, during the period specified in the agreement(if such procedures affect the pre-bankruptcy procedure). In accordance with Art. 15 of the Law on Bankruptcy of the Republic of Croatia, before the end of the preventive restructuring procedure, bankruptcy proceedings cannot be initiated. At the same time, if a court insolvency proceeding has been already started, it is impossible to initiate bankruptcy prevention until such a procedure is closed. In accordance with Articles 30 and 31 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Croatia, from the date of the commencement of negotiations on the initiation of preventive restructuring until its eventual approval (the

321 See.: Schonfeld J. Financial situation of pre-packed insolvencies. p.1115.

322 See: Nocera I.L. The "new" restructuring agreements, role of the professional and treatment of foreign creditors // The bankruptcy. - 2012. —1. p.

court must decide within 8 days), there is no prohibition on the initiation of executive procedures.

The Republic of Serbia introduced an out-of-court debt restructuring procedure in 2011323,and Republika Srpska in 2020.324The Republic of Croatia introduced a modern version of this procedure (in accordance with Directive 1023/2019) in 2015, immediately after the adoption of the Recommendation to the European Commission on 12 March 20 1 4).325Law on Financial Activities and Pre-bankruptcy Agreement of the Croatian Republic326it aims to prevent bankruptcy, but unlike Serbia, this is within the framework of the judicial procedure. Article 29 of the Croatian Bankruptcy Law and Art. 17 of the Law on Financial Governement and Pre-bankruptcy Agreement establish that "from the date of submission of the proposal to open the bankruptcy prevention procedure until the decision to open the procedure is made, the debtor is obliged to make only those payments that are necessary for current business activities, including payments arising from labor law".327If the debtor will conduct business activities outside the current business and what is listed in Art. 17 of the Croatian Financial Law and Pre-bankruptcy Agreement, the bankruptcy prevention procedure will be terminated. It follows from this that the legal capacity of the debtor is partially limited, which is not indicated either by Directive 1023/2019 or by Chapter 2 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Russian Federation. It is interesting to think: What is the interest of the debtor to voluntarily restrict his rights at the stage when no one other than the debtor himself can restrict these rights ?! In accordance with Art. 3 of the Law on Financial Restructuring of a Debtor in Serbia,

323 Law on Consensual Financial Restructuring of the Law in Serbia ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 89/2015)

324 Law on Agreed Out-of-Court Financial Restructuring of the Republika Srpska ("Official Gazette of the RS", No. 99/20)

325 Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency {C (2014) 1500 final} {SWD (2014) 62 final [Electronic resource] // [ofic. site]. - Access mode: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014H0135. - (access date: 10.04.2020).

326 Financial Operations and Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement Act in the Republic of Croatia (consolidated text OG 108/12, 144/12, 81/13, 112/13, 71/15, 78/15)

327 Commentary on the Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Croatia, Cuveljak J. Zagreb. 2018. Official Gazette. S. 94

financial restructuring is defined as "the re-establishment of a debtor-creditor relationship when a debtor is in financial difficulties." Financial difficulties are defined as "inability to pay (not liquidity), threatened inability to liquidity (threatening non-liquidity), or large indebtedness. In accordance with Art. 5 the procedure is voluntary (the consent of the debtor and creditors is required) and the participation of an institutional professional intermediary, which is also mentioned in Directive 1023/2019. Directive 1023/2019 was adopted 8 years after the entry into force of the Law on Financial Restructuring in Serbia.Nevertheless, the primary goal of preventive restructuring, as regulated by Directive 1023/2019, is the preservation of the debtor and this is the specificity of this regulatory legal act. Therefore, the European legislator justly requires the consent of creditors, if they are in good faith.

The preventive restructuring from Directive 1023/2019 is designed for bona fide debtors, as unscrupulous debtors will intentionally worsen their financial situation. Therefore, against the will of such debtors, it is impossible to recover them (the exception is cases when in this interval the debtor decided to stop the dishonest behavior and became conscientious, which practically does not occur in practice).In accordance with Art. 13 of the Law on Financial Restructuring in Serbia, a deferral (so-called "debt stagnation") can be introduced in the course of financial restructuring, but this is not mandatory, in contrast to the provisions stipulated in Directive 1023/2019. If it starts, a special agreement is concluded, which is called the "agreement on stagnation of debts." Serbian legislation regulates the conditions for financial restructuring for legal entities: no bankruptcy proceedings have been initiated, including procedures for a "pre-prepared restructuring plan", which is a hybrid procedure (both judicial and nonjudicial)^ accordance with Art. 3 of the Law on Financial Restructuring of a Debtor in Serbia, the conditions for preventing bankruptcy are different from those provided for by the Russian legal order (signs of bankruptcy): illiquidity, not threatening liquidity and over-indebtedness.Therefore, this research dissertation provides a comparative analysis of the legal conditions for conducting bankruptcy prevention and their impact on the effectiveness of their implementation.

In most legal systems of the world, it is allowed to provide for the so-called ipso facto clauses, which allow automatic termination of the contract in case of initiation of

any type of insolvency procedure. However, European regulation is aimed at protecting the debtor.In accordance with Art. 31 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Greek Bankruptcy Code, the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings can no longer be considered as a legal basis for the termination of an existing contract. This prohibition on the use of ipso facto clauses does not apply only to legal relations arising from financial, banking, investment and insurance contracts.328In accordance with Art. 7 paragraph 4 Directive 1023/2019, from the moment of the commencement of negotiations on preventive restructuring, creditors cannot "terminate, accelerate or in any other way modify the main provisions of their existing agreements". Number 40 of the Preamble puts out of force the eventual ipso facto clauses of the contract, which provide the opportunity to terminate the contract only on the basis of the commencement of negotiations in connection with the prevention of insolvency. If the legislation allowed the termination of contracts at the discretion of each of the creditors, then such termination would harm not only the debtor, but also the creditors who, without terminating their contracts, help in the recovery of the debtor. Therefore, this limitation of the range of discretionary behavior of creditors is the protection of the "best interest of the creditor" (in the sense of obtaining the minimum required by Directive 1023/2019 - "test of the best interest of creditors").329

Considering all this, it is proposed to introduce into the legislation two types of bankruptcy prevention measures: the first are aimed at long-term bankruptcy prevention - measures that are aimed not only at avoiding the filing of an application by any of the creditors to the court on declaring the debtor bankrupt, but also at ensuring long-term activity of the debtor;2) "short-term bankruptcy prevention" - a one-time debt repayment or financial injection by someone, without taking into account what brought the debtor into such a situation and whether the debtor will be able to continue to successfully continue the business (after restructuring) or again deteriorate its financial performance. The concept of "short-term bankruptcy prevention" is provided for in the current

328 See.: Stergios F. Recent Reform of Greek Restructuring and Insolvency Law. Chase Cambria Company (Publishing) Ltd . 2016 . p.124.

329 they are provided with a guarantee of receiving the minimum amounts that they would have received upon initiating bankruptcy proceedings, instead of preventive restructuring

Chapter 2 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Russian Federation therefore, it is proposed to introduce preventive debt restructuring into Chapter 2 and abolish the legal requirement for the presence of a state of insolvency as a condition for the application of bankruptcy prevention.

1.2. Legal regulation of preventive restructuring - Directive on preventive restructuring 1023/2019. General characteristics

As a general rule, preventive restructuring requires the consent of the debtor and the majority of creditors (the "majority of creditors" principle). However, in accordance with Art. 11 and 14 of Directive 1023/2019, the judicial authority has the right to approve a plan for preventive restructuring without the consent of the majority of creditors (as well as not approve the plan even if the necessary consent of the majority of creditors is obtained). In accordance with paragraph 50 of the Preamble, the judicial authority checks whether creditors are guaranteed the minimum amount that they would receive in the event of traditional court bankruptcy proceedings.Thus, the court is empowered to make decisions instead of creditors (the principle of "cross-class cram-down"). The judicial authority bases its decision on the arguments of the creditors, in contrast to bankruptcy proceedings, where the court is formally guided by the principle of "majority of creditors". This decision is more stable, as it was made on the basis of the analysis of the judicial authority, and not creditors, therefore it is not challenged by others. It should be noted, however, that the "cross-class cram-down" principle prevails over the "majority of creditors" principle only in cases where it is necessary to prevent adverse behavior of specific creditors or their class in order to protect the common interests of all creditors.330Interference with creditors' rights is permitted insofar as it benefits creditors as a group.331 Directive 1023/2019 recommends the least possible judicial

330 See: De Weijs, R., Baltjes, M. Opening the door for the opportunistic use of interim financing: A critical assessment of the eu draft directive on preventive restructuring frameworks // International Insolvency Review. 2018 . № 27(2). P. 232,235,236.

331 See: Nicolaes W.A. Tollenaar. The European Commission's Proposal for a Directive on Preventive Restructuring Proceedings // Insolvency Intelligence. 2017. № 5 (30). p. 71 .

intervention and involvement.332 This regulation is due to the fact that if the consent of all creditors were required instead of the consent of majority of creditors, the negotiation procedure would take a long time and would create high costs or in the worst case would not be initiated at all. Such a waste of time and money can also accelerate the onset of insolvency.On the contrary, it is necessary to stimulate the participants to come to an agreement at the earliest stages of negotiations. This economic moment is important because "a debtor who does not have signs of bankruptcy is not always able to repay all existing debts. Veiled insolvency is just as dangerous as legally occurring, because it creates even more harm for potential counterparties and creates state financial crises".333 In the European Union, "bankruptcy laws are the main obstacle to the integration of the capital market in the European space".334There are states where bankruptcy prevention is not possible before the onset of insolvency, which is usually confirmed by the court. There are legal orders where, in addition to the judicial authority, administrative authorities can also give confirmation. There are situations where national legislation does not provide for bankruptcy prevention procedures at all or they are rarely applied.335In some legal systems, deferral of payments is possible during negotiations, in others it is possible after its approval by the authorized body. All these differences are further complicated when it comes to cross-border bankruptcy prevention, or the duration of restructuring is usually long (in half of the EU member states, restructuring lasts from 2 to 4 years).336 In addition, the negative consequences of the lack of harmonization of national laws in practice arose in connection with the

332 See: Eidenmüller, H. What is an Insolvency proceeding // American Bankruptcy Law Journal. 2018. №92 (1). 59,67, 69,70.

333 Mastilovich L. Out-of-court preventive rehabilitation agreement as a way to prevent the emergence of signs of bankruptcy. Pp. 142,150.

334 European Council on 12 February 2015, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker presented an Analytical Note on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), prepared in close cooperation with the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the President of the Eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, and the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi.

335 See: Radovic V. The principle of pure universality in international bankruptcy // Pravni fakultet u Beogradu. - 2013.— № 2. —266. p.

336 See: Galen van R., Madaus S., Corporate rescue. 2012. 52 p.

problems of legal qualification of debt restructuring measures (the same measures in one order are considered as measures of corporate law, and in another as part of the law). Usually, the reduction of fixed capital, the issuance of securities, the conversion of claims into capital were qualified as strictly corporate measures, however, others considered them bankrupt as well as measures of deferred payment, change of debt repayment dates, waiver of debt claims. The legal qualification of the measures is important, as the applicable law depends on it. In addition, EU member states have different legal conditions for initiating bankruptcy proceedings, which further creates inequality. This is due to the fact that in states where bankruptcy proceedings are not initiated, only corporate measures will be able to be applied, and bankruptcy measures remain inaccessible. This creates inequality between debtors, as the same debtor in one state will be able to benefit from both corporate and bankruptcy measures, and in another can only apply corporate measures.337 Paragraph 24 of the Preamble to Directive 1023/2019 guarantees debtors the right to initiate preventive restructuring, when "it appears likely that their insolvency can be prevented and the viability of the business can be ensure» , they are bona fide, "before a debtor becomes insolvent under national law». In other word, when the sum of the debt does not have potential to convert the solvent debtor into an insolvent. However, it is not mentioned whether a commercial organization can initiate preventive restructuring if there are no debts at all. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the absence of debt or the presence of debt in an amount that does not reach the signs of bankruptcy, does not deprive the opportunity to open a preventive restructuring.338 Which legal entities are protected by not being allowed to initiate preventive restructuring at the stage of insolvency of the debtor? The goal of preventive restructuring is to preserve the debtor (obligatory consent of the debtor indicates that this is the primary goal). Why, then, at the stage of the debtor's insolvency, not allow preventive restructuring if the consent of the majority of creditors is reached. Creditors at the stage of insolvency of the debtor always have the right to

337 See: Garcimartin M. V. The European Inoslvency Regulation :Law and Practice.2004.-85 p.

338 See: Mastilovich L. Restructuring of the debtor as a means of preventing bankruptcy under European legislation //Courier of Kutafin Moscow State Law University (MSAL). - 2020. - No. 3. —184 p.

initiate traditional bankruptcy liquidation proceedings. Why, then, were they not given the right to waive the right to initiate a standard bankruptcy procedure in favor of the debtor's recovery?Why does the legislator condition the preventive restructuring by the absence of signs of bankruptcy, if the bankruptcy proceedings are not automatically initiated upon the appearance of signs of bankruptcy,until none of the creditors files an application for bankruptcy? Considering that the goal is not to initiate judicial or preventive procedures, but to rehabilitate the debtor and fully satisfy the interests of creditors, it seems not logical to condition the prevention of the debtor's bankruptcy by the state of debtor's solvency.The legal will of creditors to participate in preventive restructuring and interest in retaining the debtor as their counterparty is expressed if the majority of creditors agree to initiate preventive restructuring. Insolvency as a criterion was introduced for the protection of the debtor from premature statements of creditors to initiate liquidation, and not as a criterion, the absence of which should predetermine the possibility of preventing bankruptcy. Moreover, creditors are more interested in preventive restructuring, instead of judicial restructuring, because it is more likely to lead to success and, therefore, to the satisfaction of their claims. The fact that, at the stage of the debtor's insolvency, none of the creditors filed an application to initiate bankruptcy proceedings indicates the interest of the creditors themselves (all of them) in keeping the debtor within the framework of preventive restructuring. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to provide them with such a right at the legislative level.»339 If, at the stage of the debtor's insolvency, creditors voluntarily refrain from filing an application to the court (passive support of the debtor), then all the more their active behavior - consent to preventive restructuring should have been allowed. Such restrictions lie in the complex interaction of the legal requirement to obtain the consent of the majority of creditors and the fact that the debtor must be solvent at the time of filing the application, as two inseparable conditions, which together are required to protect dissenting bona fide creditors from eventual actions of the unfair majority of creditors. Therefore, it can be proposed to allow preventive restructuring at the stage of insolvency of the debtor, if all creditors agree.This should not be equated with the

339 Ibid. - P. 183.

debtor's right to conclude an agreement with all creditors within the framework of contractual law, since the provisions of an ordinary agreement, within the framework of civil law, cannot be in conflict with the norms of bankruptcy law and cannot rise in force above the norms of bankruptcy law.

In accordance with Directive 1023/2019, the condition for the adoption of the plan for preventive restructuring of the debtor will be approval by the majority of creditors and the debtor.340Tollenaar explains that votes are cast by classes, which are created and grouped according to similar requirements and interests. Class members are viewed as a homogeneous group with a common interest. The preventive restructuring plan is considered approved if each class voted in favor (if the majority of the members of the class agree, art. 9). If the plan is approved by a judicial authority, the consent of the creditor classes is not required. This judicial intervention is not beneficial to the parties to the agreement, as it always implies additional costs, delays and legal uncertainties. In order to validate a plan without agreement by all classes of creditors, Directive 1023/2019 requires at least the agreement of a majority of creditors within each class. However, as indicated above, the judicial authority can reject the refusal of majority creditors if at least one of the interested classes has agreed on the plan (the interest of the creditor class means that the provisions of the plan do not worsen the situation in comparison with their rights guaranteed in bankruptcy proceedings).Member States of the European Union are obliged to guarantee those creditors whose interests are affected by the plan, the right to vote on the preventive restructuring plan. This right can also be granted to interested shareholders, but this is not strictly required. Despite the fact that in most cases the actions of shareholders have led to a deterioration in the financial situation of the debtor, the granting of special protection to the rights of shareholders is explained by the fact that some member states of the European Union must extend the legal consequences of preventive restructuring to shareholders. This is justified only when there is a "probability of insolvency", but unjustified when the debtor is solvent or will

340 In accordance with Art. 59 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Croatia on the Preventive Restructuring Plan, each group of creditors votes separately. The consent of the majority of creditors in each class of creditors must be obtained, and the amount of claims of the agreeing creditors in each class must exceed twice the amount of the claims of non-consenting creditors. Creditors who have a common claim are counted as one creditor when voting.

inevitably become insolvent. If, in the event of the failure of the preventive restructuring plan, the creditor's rights are withdrawn or reduced in relation to the one guaranteed by the bankruptcy right, then such a creditor should not be given the right to vote, since his disagreement is initially expected. This is necessary because in the case of only "the probability of insolvency", the amount intended for satisfying the claims of creditors of the priority line of creditors will not slip away to subsequent lines of creditors. Consequently, the existence of a mechanism for the forced distribution of the consequences of the preventive restructuring plan to dissenting creditors is justified. The rule of absolute priority and the enforced extension of the consequences of the preventive restructuring plan to all creditors is necessary so that lower classes of creditors cannot sabotage asset distribution.341This position is controversial in that a successful result of the preventive restructuring could lead to the satisfaction of the claims of all creditors in the full amount of claims, including those creditors who at the time of the start of the preventive restructuring did not have the right to satisfy their claims, i.e. creditors of later classes. Since preventive restructuring is always instituted if there is "faith" in a successful outcome, it seems fair to grant lower-ranking creditors the right to influence the procedure if they are in good faith (bona fide creditors).

If the disagreement of the majority of creditors is not economically justified, then the procedure can be approved by an authorized body (judicial or administrative). Creditors are guaranteed protection of the "best interest of each creditor" (creditors are

341 See: Nicolaes W. A. Tollenaar. The European Commission's Proposal for a Directive on Preventive Restructuring Proceedings. Insolvency Intelligence. № 5/30. 2017. UK Limited and Contributors. p. 67-72.

guaranteed the minimum amount they would receive in a bankruptcy proceeding).342The protection of "each creditor's best interest" is regulated in a manner similar to United States law. The judicial authority has been specially granted the right to issue mandatory rulings even before the creditors vote on the formation of creditors' classes. This creates some legal uncertainty. The imposition of additional obligations on dissenting creditors and the restriction of their free legal will at the stage of the debtor's solvency are compensated by the fact that they are provided with a guarantee of receiving the minimum amounts that they would have received upon initiating bankruptcy proceedings, instead of preventive restructuring.343The creditor's best interest test is governed by Section 1129 (a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Code and means that no creditor who voted against the plan can satisfy their claims less than they would have received if bankruptcy proceedings were initiated , pursuant to Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.344 In addition, if a successful outcome of the preventive restructuring is achieved, dissenting creditors will receive full satisfaction of their claims, which they would not have received in the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. However, here the question arises: "How can one predict and determine the amount of satisfaction of claims at the time of the debtor's solvency if the prospect of the debtor's non-solvency is unknown"?The financial position of the debtor at the time of the provision of such a

342 In accordance with Art. 61 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Croatia "if the creditor makes it probable that the preventive restructuring plan infringes upon his rights and makes them less than what he could reasonably expect if the preventive restructuring plan was not adopted or it follows from the plan that the debtor cannot within 2 years to pay back their debts, the plan will not be approved. " Nevertheless, a guarantee to dissenting creditors is provided for in many legal orders, for example, in clause 2.1 of Art. 175 of the Law on Bankruptcy Procedures of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (if the creditor proves in his application to the court about the deterioration of his situation, the court will prohibit the approval of the plan for court restructuring of debts). Such additional guarantees are not provided to creditors who agree with the preventive restructuring plan, which puts them in an unequal position with dissenting creditors, but based on their free discretionary will. This guarantee is the result of a search for a balance of interests between limiting the aforementioned potential rights of dissenting creditors to immediately satisfy their claims and the fact that if they "endure", their rights will subsequently be satisfied to the same extent or even more.

343 Page 48 of the 2020 Legislative Guide to Insolvency Law also provides that "creditors can be protected by requiring them to be in a better position as a result of measures than such measures would not be taken. [Electronic resource] // [official. website]. - Access mode: https://uncitral.un.org/sites/ uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/ru/19-11275_ebook.pdf (date accessed: 02.12.2020).

344 Nicolaes W.A. Tollenaar. p.67-69.

guarantee will differ from what it would be at the time of the eventual liquidation of the debtor (in case of failure of the preventive restructuring). In addition, the effectiveness of preventive restructuring is proportional to the speed of its opening, which is inversely proportional to an accurate assessment and forecast of the debtor's financial situation.345 Preventive restructuring in accordance with Directive 1023/2019 does not occur automatically upon the occurrence of any external financial circumstances, but arises on the basis of the will of the debtor and the majority of creditors, if their will is economically reasonable and fair (legal will is not absolute, as is typical for the regulation of civil the rights).Creditors in the framework of preventive restructuring do not act as one party in relation to the debtor, but each defends his individual rights and obligations, and not only in relation to the debtor, but also in relation to all other creditors. However, in the absence of complaints from any of the creditors, the procedure is carried out exclusively in a collective manner. Therefore, the prevention of bankruptcy, as a general rule, should be regulated in a manner of self-regulation and only in borderline situations the judicial authority should be given the right to intervene.

1.3. Bankruptcy prevention: the legal nature of civil or bankruptcy law. Preventive Restructuring Directive 1023/2019

The definition of legal regulation of preventive restructuring is necessary, first of all, to give a general description of the legal regulation of insolvency. "The law of insolvency is closely interrelated and interdependent with the law of securities, personal rights, corporate law, criminal law and public law".346 "Bankruptcy law equally belongs to both private and public law, as it is complex. In other words, bankruptcy law consists of civil law rules that regulate legal financial relations between a debtor unable to fulfill monetary obligations and creditors, but also consists of public law rules, including

345 Mastilovic L., Debtor restructuring as a means of preventing bankruptcy under European law, p. 181.

346 Omar P. J. International Insolvency Law.- Sussex: Themes and Perspectives.- 2016. P.32.

procedural law (rules governing the consideration of bankruptcy cases by a court)".347 "No one from researchers in science denies that insolvency is governed by the norms of both public and private law. However, most of the norms of bankruptcy law are still civil law norms "348but "science and practice understand the role and significance of this legislation differently."349Tollenar provides a theoretical explanation for the need to regulate preventive restructuring in accordance with Directive 1023/2019. He says the "creditor's bargain theory" is based on the inability to fulfill obligations and coordinate individual actions of creditors to collect their claims. Therefore, insolvency proceedings restrict creditors from individually initiating executive proceedings.Instead, participants are given the right to collective enforcement, which usually results in better satisfaction of creditors' claims and therefore better results for creditors as a group. Collective debt collection contributes to debt restructuring only if it does not impair the debtor's business continuity and ability to keep the business. Improving creditors' debt collection mechanisms and promoting the preservation of the debtor's business are not contradictory goals, but they must be "balanced" with each other, and led to their complementarity.They can and should be done in parallel. This is achieved if the rights of the creditors are "balanced" to preserve the debtor's business. Interference with individual rights leads to the promotion of the interests of one particular group to the detriment of another, which is justified by the protection of the interests of creditors as one whole group. However, interference with the rights of creditors is permitted to the extent that it benefits the creditors as a whole (all creditors are already in financial loss). All creditors must share the risk as a group.350 In the Russian Federation, all types of bankruptcy proceedings include judicial participation, except for the prevention of bankruptcy. On the contrary, Italian legislation includes "minimal court involvement