Проблема реальности самости в современной аналитической философии тема диссертации и автореферата по ВАК РФ 00.00.00, кандидат наук Турко Дмитрий Сергеевич

• Турко Дмитрий Сергеевич
• кандидат наук
• 2023

Оглавление диссертации кандидат наук Турко Дмитрий Сергеевич

Table of Contents

Introduction: Personal ontology between naturalism, phenomenology and

metaphysics

Relevance (Актуальность темы исследования)

Literature review (Степень разработанности темы исследования)

Early modern philosophy. Descartes, Locke, Hume

Contemporary theories of personal ontology

Animalism

Brain views

Realist theories

Soul theories, idealism and Neo-Cartesianism

Phenomenalist or experience-first theories

Parfit's views

Narrative theories

Anti-realist theories

Neurophilosophical and cognitivist anti-realism

Buddhi st anti-reali sm

Conventionalism, relativism and fictionalism

Other anti-realists

Evolutionary-biological and neuroscientific theories of the self

Bibliographies

Limitations

Subject of inquiry (Объект и предмет исследования)

Objectives (Цель и задачи исследования)

Methodology (Методологическая основа исследования)

1. The Method?

2. The three descriptions

3. Modesty

4. On guard against polysemy and ambivalence

5. Strong pluralism and the challenge of conventionalism

6. Essentialism and qualified pluralism

Novelty (Научная новизна исследования)

Positions (Основные положения, выносимые на защиту)

Theoretical significance and practical applications (Теоретическая и практическая значимость исследования)

Thesis structure (Структура диссертации)

Talks and publications by the author (Апробация результатов исследования)

Chapter 1. Experiential process-realism: statement and outline

The task

Person, ego, subject, I and self

Humans vs persons

'We': circularity or indefiniteness

Intuitive definitions

Constraints on intuitive definitions

Running the gauntlet of intuitive definitions

1. You and I and beings like us

2. Self is identical to the human animal or organism

3. The referent of "I"

4. Self must be able to produce first-person thoughts

5. Self is the subject of experience

Substantivalism and non-substantivalism

6. Self is the mental substance

7. Self is the essence

Essentialist and pluralist conceptions

Minimality

8. Self is the essential property

9. Self is the essential property necessary for survival

Limitations of definitions

Selves as reflexive entities

Reflexivity is spontaneous self-ascription

Selfhood is experientiality

Experientiality is sentience

Objection from circularity

Experientiality and intuitive definitions

Substance, property, process? The problem of ontological placement

Objection against selves as properties

We are experiential processes

Objection from neuron replacement

The mongrel self

Chapter summary: The primitive argument

Chapter 2. The question of nature: the evolved self

The task

A true history of our selves

Against pragmatic eliminativism

The naturalistic argument

Damasio on neural evolution of selves

Phenomenal dependence

The naturalistic argument: second approach

Hume and Kant on the self

Objection: Hume's self-criticism and the need for connexion

The naturalistic argument: third approach

Real, natural, artificial, conventional, fictional

Against conventional persons

Objection: consciousness is a conventional property

Chapter summary: what we are under the naturalistic description

Chapter 3. Being someone insubstantial: against neurophilosophical anti-realism

The task

No-self from the neurophilosophical point of view

Neurophilosophical anti-realism: main points

Problems

No self in the brain?

Alternatives

Pre-summary: general objections to neurophilosophical anti-realism

Engaging Metzingerian eliminativism

The Metzingerian argument

1. Naive Cartesians

2. Transparence: why we are naive realists

3. Why PSMs exist

4-5. Metzinger's debunking argument

C1-C2. Anti-realism and pragmatic eliminativism

A Moorean argument?

"We do not exist"

The phenomenal self and PSM

Self-processes: first approach

Pragmatic justification: the self as a natural kind term

Chapter summary

Chapter 4. The question of phenomenology: the self, the subject and its experience

The task

Experience itself

Property cluster for the natural kind "self"

Self-experience: what is it like to be someone?

The elusive subject and modes of self-acquaintance

The transient subject

Weak and strong transientism

The presentist argument for transientism

P1: Phenomenal Presentism

P2: Thin Subjects

The razor-thin subject and alternatives

Monistic and binary ontologies of consciousness

Some objections

Endurantist objection

Continuous subject-time objection

Transientist implications

Chapter summary: what we are under the phenomenological description

Chapter 5. Shifting persons, real persons: Buddhist reductionism and mereological nihilism

The task

Atman & pudgala

Buddha's own views on the self: evidence from the Pali canon

Reductionism simpliciter

BR arguments against the self

Objections to P1.1: the self can be experienced

Objections to P1.2: the existence of the self can be inferred

a. The cogito

b. Self is the inter-personal individuator

c. Self is the intra-personal diachronic and synchronic unifier

d. Self is detached / self is the owner of its experience

Section summary: does Buddhist anti-realism about the self succeed?

Buddhist Reductionism about persons

Self-processes: second approach (bureaucrat identity)

Against mereological nihilism

Why would anyone believe that?

Arguments and objections

Emergent properties

Functionality before composition

Responses to the functionalist objection

Against transience and conventionality

Chapter summary: compositional persons are real persons

Chapter 6. The question of metaphysics: the real self

The task

Formulating realism. Back to the meaning of "real"

1. Strong vs moderate realism

2. Egologism and non-egologism

3. Reductive vs non-reductive theories

4. Self-experience (sense of self) vs ontic self

Self-processes: third approach (fire and fuel)

The bridge problem: every night I die

Waterfall-self

The processual cogito and fission

What are we in the end?

Are we brains (or brain parts)?

Our kind: animals or persons?

Animal-priority vs person-priority

The thinking animal

Back to the terms

The survivability test

Objection from the volitional self

The value argument for experientialism

Chapter summary: what we are under the metaphysical description

Chapter 7. Irreducible persons

The task

The Salience of I*

Persons vs I*

1a. Direct self-acquaintance and being occurrently conscious

2a. Being this subject

Twin-1

The paradox of many I*'s

The knowledge argument for irreducible persons

Responses and objections

Chapter summary: Persons are irreducible perspectival entities

Conclusion

Some implications

1. Death, immortality and transhumanism

2. Artificial persons

3. Moral status of persons

4. Moral status of non-human animals

Consciousness is life

References

Введение диссертации (часть автореферата) на тему «Проблема реальности самости в современной аналитической философии»

Introduction:

Personal ontology between naturalism, phenomenology and metaphysics Relevance (Актуальность темы исследования)

Es ist ursprünglich nichts gesetzt, als das Ich, und dieses nur ist schlechthin gesetzt.

— Fichte (Fichte, 1997, p. 24)

With the first glimpse of consciousness we become aware of the world and its myriad of things. Shortly, we also become aware of ourselves peering into the world. We get to realize that the entity which does the peering is distinct from the world under its gaze. We also notice there are others around us like ourselves. We are aware they are of the same kind as us watchers, but in an important respect distinct because for us they also belong to the world of things. The human mind is a cornucopia of antinomies like this. We act and think as if we were simultaneously believers in other minds and solipsists, realists and subjectivists, embodied and ethereal, engaged and detached. We are naturally immersed in these antinomies and barely ever give thought to them. When as part of these antinomies we learn to consider ourselves not only as the watcher, but also a thing among a myriad of things — a thing to be studied, interacted with, influenced, used, directed, manipulated — we finally achieve full self-awareness. And it is this self-awareness that allows us to pose the question: Are we first and foremost watchers or things? What kinds of things are we? How am I different from the rest of the world, including others like me; and how are we, my kin and I, different from the rest of the world with its rocks, storks, thunderstorms, Mondays and numbers?

When we try to answer the latter question, any answer we might give is going to necessarily delineate things like us from all other things, and in doing so to single out a very special kind of thing. Different answers are the different ways to draw the line. But is there a proper way to do so? When we separate us from

non-us, is it possible to carve nature at its joints? Or will each and every way of carving necessarily bear the mark of the carver?

One of the ways to make the cut is called science. Science tells us we are part of the rest of the things in the world - that is, we are creatures of nature. We get born, feed, live, procreate and die. So we are not unlike other things that do such things. And the things that do those things are called living things, organisms, or sometimes animals. So we obviously share our kind with them. And yet we — very naturally! — feel contraposed not only to the world of nature, but to the world at large we look on as subjects. Natural selection has made it so that in our experience of ourselves, we are entities that stand in opposition to whatever we contemplate. But it does not mean our kind is so different from all other kinds we find around us, science says. Then why does it feel so difficult to cast off the pretence of difference and join the multitude of other living things?

Perhaps we need to trust our feelings instead. What do they tell us when we ask them about what we are? Each of us has a strong inner sense of being a persistent, whole, embodied and detached mental entity. This entity occupies the inside of our skulls. It is the source of our thoughts, volitions, desires and decisions. This entity is the watcher who gazes on the world so intently. It is present in every second of our awareness, so we are always more or less aware of it, or rather it can be more or less aware of itself. It is ever present, but it is also ever elusive as we cannot look back onto ourselves - that would be as impossible as for an eye to see itself. This detached observer is who we are. It is irreducible and its existence sets us infinitely apart from all else in nature. If we want to understand ourselves, we need to tend to this source of ourselves. We need to go back to the source.

This is what our inner mental feeling tells us. But reason teaches us to question our raw feelings and immediate intuitions. What kind of thing are we then, according to the speculative reason? We can see that our existence depends

on the existence of some other things. These other things are more basic and less mysterious than the inscrutable watchers we take ourselves to be. Because we can see how many things that exist arise from - and dissolve back into - some more basic elements, we begin, spurred by abstract reasoning, to question our special and exclusive nature. Can it be so that we - despite all appearances - do not exist, or do not exist in the strong sense of the word, being mere collections of some basic parts? Or can it be that the building blocks we are made of, sticking together and closely interacting with each other, have produced something that is much more than a brute sum of its parts?

So what are we: mere units of nature, elusive and detached watchers, unusual and anomalous sprouts emerging on some more familiar elements, or spectres that do not ultimately exist, being reduced without a trace to some more basic elements of reality? To give an answer, we need first to ask a clear and properly-formed question about what we are. There may or may not be a proper, reality-grounded answer to that question, as the answer might be purely conventional, indeterminate or non-existent. But I believe at least some of the answers are determinate and factual, and in what follows I am going to argue for some of these answers.

This thesis straddles general ontology — ontology proper - and its subfield, personal ontology. Personal ontology, as Eric Olson states in his seminal exploration of the topic, addresses the questions: "What are we? That is, what are we, metaphysically speaking? What are our most general and fundamental features? What is our most basic metaphysical nature?" (E. T. Olson, 2007, p. 3). Apart from that, Olson says, personal ontology deals with the questions like (1) What are we made of? Are we made of matter at all? (2) If so, what kinds of matter are we made of (are we brains, or whole bodies, or something else?) (3) What parts do we have (one, finite number, indeterminate number of part combinations?)1.

1 The principal question of personal ontology (What are we?) is connected to, but distinct from the question How do we persist over time? — the question of diachronic personal identity. It does not

Ontology proper is "the general study of how things are or can be or must be" (G. Strawson, 2009, p. 1). It is also interested in the question "What general kinds of entities exist in the world?".

Accordingly, the personal-ontological part of this thesis addresses the question "What are we, metaphysically speaking?". The general-ontological part thereof seeks to answer the question "Do we exist?" or "Are we real?"2. It is obvious that the two are connected: your answer to the first question is probably going to affect your answer to the second one. Therefore, the answer to the former question is expected to precede that to the latter. First we figure out our basic metaphysical nature - or at least what it seems to us. Then we try to answer whether what this idea of ourselves signifies has any place in nature. Do we exist on par with rocks, protons and galaxies? Or do we exist as something parasitic on some other basic things? Or rather something less (something more?) than those basic things? Or is our common idea of what we are, in the way we commonly conceive this idea, something entirely fictitious and illusory? Someone who answers the latter question affirmatively - an anti-realist about our own existence -might instead reformulate the first question in the following way: "What is it that we seem to be?". Their answer should strive to elucidate why this idea is fictional and has no merit in reality: why we are not real at least as the things we suppose ourselves to be. So for both realists and anti-realists it seems the personal-ontological problem takes precedence. First, say what you think we are; then try to figure out if we are real.

matter much if we consider personal ontology part of a wider personal identity philosophy or a distinct topic in its own right. As such, both personal ontology and personal identity straddle metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Although this thesis is concerned with personal ontology, I do not entirely ignore diachronic personal identity either.

2 Everywhere I take terms exists and real to be interchangeable.

The term we in "What are we?" is ambiguous and equivocal3. For now, I will take we to be synonymous with persons or selves. So, the two questions asked about me (as part of us) are identical to those asked about the self which is I. Then the two principal questions of this thesis can be expressed as "What are persons, selves, or subjects?", and "Are those real?". We can call these two the nature question4 and the reality question of personal ontology, respectively. The nature question is related to but distinct from the question of the conditions for selfhood: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions that x must satisfy in order for x to be a self or to possess selfhood?

The nature question of personal ontology can be posed both in the plural and in the singular. So far, following Olson, I have been asking it in the plural: "What are we?", i.e. "Which kind of things do I belong to along with beings similar to me?". The nature question can also be formulated in the singular: "What am I specifically?", or "What differentiates me from beings who I share a kind with?". Put this way, it is clearly a different question. Even if I know the answer to the plural question, and thus know a great deal about my metaphysical nature as a member of a certain kind, I can still be ignorant regarding the answer to the singular question - regarding my nature as a particular as opposed to the nature of my kind. The most of this thesis is meant to be a search for the answer to the plural question. However, ch. 7 also approaches the singular question.

As a matter of fact, the lack of a common conceptual language and methodology dominates personal ontology and philosophy dealing with selfhood and subjectivity in general. The reason for this is not the field's inchoate state, but

3 As I discuss below in more detail, we can take we to mean human beings considered as a whole, human beings considered as living organisms (human animals), and human persons. Different ways to conceive the relation between these entities are investigated in the thesis, especially in ch. 6. But as opposed to animalist philosophers, the question which interests me the most here is What are we as persons? and not What are human animals?K> So throughout this thesis, we means just we as persons, unless specified otherwise.

4 The term nature question is also used by Parfit (Parfit, 1984, p. 202). The nature question is the same as Matti Eklund's semantic question: "what is the nature of the entities that 'person' is true of' (Eklund, 2004, p. 489).

something else. The relevance and novelty of this work comes from its eagerness to recognize there are at least three distinct perspectives, levels of analysis or modes of description associated with the philosophical study of the self. These are the approaches, or groups of approaches, I prefer to call science-first (which, when making claims about the self, prioritize data from neuroscience, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology and evolutionary biology), metaphysics-first (which put an emphasis on traditional arguments and methods of speculative metaphysics) and experience-first (which favour phenomenological5 analysis of our experience and sense of self) modes of description of the self. I do not want to say that these three perspectives are clear-cut, always distinct and always incompatible. In fact, I make the opposite point. Obviously, the results of someone's phenomenological investigations of experience can have huge significance for their metaphysical views (as is the case with Galen Strawson). Any science-oriented philosophical study of the mind can make perfect use of someone's phenomenological reports ("third-person phenomenology", as Daniel Dennett calls it, is of course admissible in data-oriented research of mind and consciousness). Neurophilosophy, a kind of science-first approaches, is also implicitly metaphysical because it seeks to revise folk-beliefs about personal mereology (as is evident in Patricia Churchland's insistence that we should resist "the temptation to think of the self as a singular entity" (P. S. Churchland, 2002b, pp. 308-309)).

But the obvious difficulty stemming from this plurality of descriptions is explanatory incongruity that inevitably arises when we juxtapose the results of science-first, metaphysics-first and experience-first descriptions of the self. As an example, consider the unity of the self, a key element in Strawson's characterization of our own day-to-day experience (G. Strawson, 2009, p. 3). It

5 By phenomenology, I do not strictly mean the historical tradition in mostly European philosophy closely associated with Edmund Husserl, his students and his legacy. Rather, I mean the broad method of philosophical investigation of consciousness which always has to start from investigating conscious experience. As such, it may be rooted in and closely connected to Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenology, but also can be independent of it. By metaphysics about persons, I mean speculative reasoning about their fundamental nature, reality, mereology, supervenience, ontological category, persistence and relations.

seems true that, as he claims, we naturally have a strong sense of ourselves as persistent and unified mental entities or subjects. If we accept the basic presupposition of neuroscience that everything in the mind must first be in the brain, there must be a neural correlate for every mental capacity. So there must be a brain region or a network of neuronal connections that is responsible for cognitive activity associated with the unified self. A review by Gillihan and Farah (Gillihan & Farah, 2005) indicates that such a region or network does not exist; there is no unified self in the brain. The self, in the words of Vogeley and Gallagher (Vogeley & Gallagher, 2011), is "everywhere and nowhere" in the brain. Similarly, Antonio Damasio mentions that "At neither modest nor robust levels do self and consciousness happen in one area or region or center of the brain" (A. Damasio, 2012, p. 23) and compares consciousness to a symphonic orchestra. So our experience tells us we are whole unities, while science tells us we are nothing of the sort. Soul-theory metaphysics can endorse the former view, while the metaphysics of mereological nihilism can rally for the latter one. No matter which you prefer, it will instantly put you at odds with either experience-first ("phenomenological") or science-first description of the self. Similarly, our sense of self has a strong embedded feeling of presence from which we naturally deduce the "fact" that we exist. Both Metzinger's neurophilosophical eliminativism (his phenomenal self-model theory, SMT) and Buddhist Reductionist could not disagree more. I return to these and similar conflicts of descriptions throughout the thesis, especially in ch. 3.

The question whether such warring intuitions, arguments, moves and claims about the self stemming from the three modes of description can be aligned or reconciled, or whether they are fundamentally untranslatable and self-contained, remains unresolved. However, throughout this thesis I will try to correlate descriptions of all the three levels, noting the difficulties that come up along the way. I will show that some problems imminently arise when we try to reduce one mode of description to another. My general thesis here is that while multiple

descriptions are not mutually reducible and not always compatible, they can have points of convergence — or a shared root from which they grow. Recognizing such points has the benefit of facilitating the dialogue between various research programmes and their practitioners6. I argue that in the case of science-first, experience-first and metaphysics-first descriptions we can start looking for points of convergence in the idea of reflexivity, by which I mean the ability of some things - some systems, perhaps exclusively living systems - to represent their own states for themselves in a synthetic and epistemically closed manner. Reflexivity is the for-modality of some internal states, including mental states; and I believe we can make perfect sense of this modality from all of the three perspectives. In biological systems, reflexivity is the necessary condition for sentience: some living organisms which have developed reflexive systems we might as well call just sentient beings. Reflexivity helps us establish the first uncontroversial point from which we can further flesh out the concept of the self as an experiential entity.

Another reason for this thesis' relevance is the significance and urgency of various questions in metaphysics of persons for so many "real-life" practical domains. Personal ontology has a lot to offer to applied problems today, as I hope to show in the conclusion. Bioethics, animal ethics, environmental ethics, AI ethics, legal and moral personhood - a lot in these fields hinges on fundamental ideas and concepts supplied by the philosophical discourse on persons. Many of the listed fields are becoming increasingly prominent nowadays for a variety of reasons. This is why we need more philosophical work on foundational concepts and problems, specifically on the key concept of a person. Only when we figure out the fundamentals can we hope to achieve the conceptual clarity required to solve problems in applied fields. So it is important to get clear on the theory first before we get clear on the issues.

6 Note that apart from these purely pragmatic considerations, there are also independent epistemic considerations for the defended positions.

The final reason for this thesis' relevance is the general opportuneness of personal ontology today, perhaps amplified by the aforementioned demand coming from applied fields. Unlike the problem of diachronic personal identity, the topic of personal ontology was for the most part neglected in Analytic philosophy, until recently. It is not anymore - perhaps because by the late 20th century, Analytic philosophy greatly diversified and expanded thematically (or as some say, died). So it would have been impossible not to re-discover the classical problem of what we are. The views that were non-existent or poorly articulated previously -animalism, narrativism, phenomenalism, neurophilosophical anti-realism and Analytical Buddhism - have sprung up over the past several decades. Now the topic is well-published on (see Literature review for a more detailed discussion of these matters). Concerning the relation between the problems of diachronic personal identity and personal ontology, I share David Wiggins' view he calls sortalism: "the position which insists that, if the question is whether a and b are the same, it has to be asked what are they?" (Wiggins, 2012, p. 1), also endorsed by Igor Gasparov: "Without an adequate answer to the question ' What am I?' it is impossible to answer the question of what constitutes personal identity" (Gasparov, 2021, p. 78). In order to investigate the persistence conditions of persons, we need first to get clear on what persons are. In a word, personal ontology must precede diachronic personal identity - this is why the current resurgence of interest in personal ontology is long overdue.

In this thesis, I am going to defend a distinct account of personal ontology which I call experiential process-realism (ExPR). I define ExPR as a moderate (non-substantivist), naturalistic, egological intraneous, non-reductive, further-fact, emergentist, processual realism about selves (please see the position list at the end of this Introduction for comments). ExPR is a synthetic account as it attempts to solve several issues and answer the Olson's questions cited at the beginning of this Introduction. Furthermore, I hope that ExPR succeeds in conceptualizing the common focal point of all three modes of description and borrows important

insights from all of them without antagonizing any single one. To better situate ExPR in the rich landscape of personal ontology and identity, let us start with a literature review.

Literature review (Степень разработанности темы исследования)

Early modern philosophy. Descartes, Locke, Hume. The core questions of personal ontology - the nature and reality of the self, person and subject - are also among the core metaphysical questions; and as such they have been debated since the dawn of philosophy, albeit not necessarily in these particular terms. It would be impossible to cover here all relevant ideas about the self and person in philosophy, even in Western philosophy. Barresi and Martin's The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity (2006) (Martin & Barresi, 2006) offers an increasingly broad historical account of how our thinking about our metaphysical essence has developed over millennia7. They start with Plato, Aristotle and Classical atomists, discuss medieval and Renaissance ideas, proceed to modern and contemporary philosophy, finally concluding with discussions of Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, Mclntyre and Parfit.

Among pre-20th century sources, I will only discuss the milestones of early modern philosophy relevant to the topic. The most important of those are Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), especially the second meditation; Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) (specifically, Book II, Ch. XXVII Of Identity and Diversity) and Hume's A Treatise on Human Nature (1739) (specifically, Book I Ch. IV, Section 6 Of Personal Identity).

Descartes's second Meditation is a recognized cornerstone of modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, challenged and championed in equal measure since its publication. As such, Meditations are a set of philosophical and

7 Also see their paper-length historical account (Barresi & Martin, 2011). For a thorough and very illuminating Russian-language review of current arguments, scenarios and positions in diachronic personal identity, see (Логинов et al., 2018).

phenomenological exercises Descartes invites the reader to think through and along with him as they read. In an act of the proverbial "Cartesian doubt", Descartes suggests the reader suspends all their existential and factual beliefs. What cannot be suspended, Descartes argues, is the existence of the mind who does the suspension - the thinking thing which is identical to myself, someone who engages in doubting (Descartes, 1984, p. 19). He believes "[t]his exercise [the radical "Evil demon doubt"] is also of the greatest benefit, since it enables the mind to distinguish what belongs to itself, i.e. to an intellectual nature, from what belongs to the body" (Descartes, 1984, p. 9). This clear and distinct difference between the mind and the body - their real distinctness - is the principal tenet of what was later dubbed Cartesian substance dualism. Descartes did not use the terms self and person, but many contemporary philosophers of personal ontology, especially of the realist camp (soul theorists, Neo-Cartesians and phenomenalists, see below) eagerly adopt his intuition that the fundamental nature of persons or selves is thinking, i.e. having consciousness or conscious experience, in modern terms8. But of course, when borrowing the concept of the thinking thing from Descartes, we are not forced to follow him in his substance dualism by making the mind really distinct from the body. Nor do we have to oblige him when he without argument identifies the soul and the mind. So the idea of a Cartesianism without any dualist commitments - or even Cartesian materialism (D. C. Dennett, 1991, p. 70) - is not entirely ludicrous as opposed to what Daniel Dennett wants us to believe.

Descartes' move from the reality of thinking to the reality of the thinker (which first appeared in his earlier Discourse on the Method, 1637) has been shorthanded as cogito ergo sum, or just the cogito. The cogito is a form inference9

8 Descartes meant thinking exactly in this very broad sense of having experience and not in any literal sense (i.e. making a cognitive effort): "But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions" (Descartes, 1984, p. 19).

9 Strictly speaking, there is no consensus among commentators about what kind of expression cogito ergo sum is. Descartes himself denied that cogito is a deduction. "According to Descartes ... by saying cogito, ergo sum he does not logically (syllogistically) deduce sum from cogito but rather

from a thinking that is going on to the existence of the thing that is doing the thinking. It can be employed as an argument to establish the relation between mental contents and the self or the subject, and this is the angle from which I will consider this trope here (in ch. 5 and 6). Descartes' identification of the person with the soul, and the soul with a mental substance, were directly inherited by what Lowe calls substantivalism and what I dub strong realism in ch. 6; but again this is the part of his legacy we are not obliged to accept.

John Locke was the first Western philosopher who explicitly formulated the problem of diachronic personal identity. In the chapter Of Identity and Diversity of his Essay (II.27), Locke asks the question what kind of relation makes anything in the world persist and maintain its sameness over time. The answer depends on the kind of idea we need to establish the identity of: "It being one thing to be the same Substance, another the same Man, and a third the same Person, if Person, Man, and Substance, are three Names standing for three different Ideas..." (Locke, 1975, p. 332) (Essay II.27.7.26-28). For an inanimate object, sameness depends on the sameness of its constitutive parts: "the Mass, consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same Mass, or the same Body, let the parts be never so differently jumbled" (Locke, 1975, p. 330) (Essay II.27.3.16-18) (Boeker calls this position Locke's mereological essentialism (Boeker, 2021, p. 26)).

For living beings like plants and animals, the sameness depends on being the same organism. A plant or animal remains the same "as long as it partakes of the same Life" (Locke, 1975, p. 331) (Essay II.27.4.6). In a crucial move, Locke

perceives intuitively 'by a simple act of mental vision') the self-evidence of sum" (Hintikka, 1962, p. 4). Jaakko Hintikka thinks it is a "performance" rather than an inference (Hintikka, 1962). According to Hintikka, "The expression cogito does not mark a premise from which sum is inferred, but a thought-act which reveals (as long as it goes on) to Descartes the entity that he is" (Hintikka, 1990, p. 133). Feldman rejects Hintikka's interpretation (Feldman, 1973). Reacting to Hintikka, Carney opines "it is both a performance and an inference (though not a syllogism)" (Carney, 1962, p. 492). Without trying to enter the debate, I have to point out that the way Descartes précises his own Second Meditation in Discourse on the Method pt. 4 implies an inference of one fact from another. He says "...from the mere fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed" (Descartes, 1985, p. 127). I suppose the most obvious way to reconstruct it is this: 1. (unstated premise) If something is thinking, it must exist. 2. I am thinking. C. I exist.

distinguishes between the ideas of Man and Person (or Self, as Locke uses these terms interchangeably, sometimes speaking even of personal self (Locke, 1975, p. 336) (Essay II.27.4.10.24). Man is what we would now call just a human being or organism (G. Strawson, 2014, p. 7). The identity of Man, to the extent humans are living things, consist in the sameness of life, i.e. sameness of the living organism (Locke, 1975, p. 331) (Essay II.27.6.35). But humans are are also persons, and the identity of persons consist in a very different criterion — the sameness of consciousness,

For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes everyone to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational Being... (Locke, 1975, p. 335) (Essay II.27.4.9.21-24).

So the criterion of personal identity over time (as well as possible answers to the nature question of personal ontology) depends on the way we consider ourselves: either as human animals or as persons. We can call it Locke's neutral dualism about human nature. This is a crucial idea which I adopt and develop to argue for the metaphysical indeterminacy of human nature in ch. 6 (also see 10 in the list of defended positions below).

Another fundamental insight from Locke I develop is the idea that personal identity is distinct from what I call base identity (also discussed in ch. 6). Because personal identity consists in the sameness of consciousness and not the sameness of body or an immaterial substance (such as the soul), persons are able to replace their associated substances without resetting their numerical identity. As Locke himself puts it, "the Substance, whereof personal self consisted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of personal Identity... " (Locke, 1975, p.

337) (Essay II.27.4.11.6-7).10 We can call it the unimportance of base identity for personhood view.

Locke's statement that "as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person" (Locke, 1975, p. 335) (Essay II.27.4.9.24-26), supported by a tradition of early modern interpreters such as Joseph Butler, Thomas Reid and George Berkeley, gave to rise to psychological "Neo-Lockean" accounts of personal identity championed by Sydney Shoemaker (S. Shoemaker, 2008a, 2008b) and Harold Noonan (H. W. Noonan, 1998; H. Noonan, 2015). Independent merits of such accounts aside, some commentators think this traditional interpretation of Locke is misguided (see (G. Strawson, 2014, Chapter 9, 2015) for an argument).

More to the point, Locke's definition of the person is probably the most cited fragment in personal identity literature and one of Western philosophy's defining moments. Locke thinks a person

is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive (Locke, 1975, p. 335) (Essay II.27.4.9.10-16).

This definition is rather theory heavy as it presupposes many (probably too many) things about the person. Cf. his definition of the self later in the text:

Self is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance, made up of whether Spiritual, or Material, Simple, or Compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of Happiness

10 He also thinks the nature of the substance associated with the self is unimportant (Locke, 1975, p. 341) (Essay II.XXVII.17.14-18).

or Misery, and so is concern'd for it self, as far as that consciousness

extends" (Locke, 1975, p. 341) (Essay II.XXVII.17.14-18).

Here, he ascribes to the self only two fundamental features: thinking (or consciousness) - as we can subsume "Pleasure and Pain ... Happiness or Misery" under types of conscious states - and future-directed self-concern which accompanies consciousness. Elsewhere in the text of Essay II.27, Locke identifies Self with Person, so this discrepancy in definitions is hard to make sense of. I return to both definitions in subsequent chapters.

David Hume's contribution to personal identity and ontology was in line with a general skeptical trend of his philosophy. Similarly to some Indian philosophers before him (see ch. 5), in his Treatise on Human Nature (1739) Hume imposed what I call the constancy constraint on any possible idea of the self, claiming that for the self to persist, its "impression must continue invariably the same". However, according to Hume, there are no constant impressions in the mind, but only a succession of transient "passions and sensations" among other contents. Hume identified persons with this flux of impressions "which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity" (Hume, 1978, p. 252). Importantly, contrary to a popular misconception, he never claimed that selves or persons do not exist; he just established that it is impossible to introspect the self as a presence in our experience, therefore there is nothing to derive the idea of the constant self from. Next, due to the fact that my existence consists in just there being a flux of shifting perceptions, Hume radically claims that periods of unconsciousness, e.g. during the "sound sleep", are indistinguishable from non-existence (Treatise 1.4.6.3-4). Hume's views were called the bundle theory in later literature. Perhaps flux theory or rapids theory would do them better justice. In this work, I engage with Hume often, paying special attention to a possible interpretation of his views in ch. 2, establishing parallels between his thought and Buddhist Reductionism in ch. 5 and tackling the problem of the flux interruption in ch. 6.

Importantly, as the Appendix (1740) to the Treatise indicates, Hume later struggled with the need to account for the connection between individual impressions in the flux. He admitted his failure to solve the problem of what we would now call diachronic unity of consciousness, and saw it as a major challenge for his flux theory, although not necessarily a fatal one. In ch. 2, I discuss Hume's confusion and possible solutions in more detail.

Such a protracted review of early moderns was important because, as Gasparov notes, "The alternatives created by Descartes and Locke provide paradigms for the contemporary debate about personal identity. It is easy to see that Locke's continuity of life and continuity of consciousness crystallized into the physical and psychological theories of personal identity, while the Cartesian identification of oneself with a thinking substance became the prototype of the so-called simple view" (Gasparov, 2021, p. 67). The account I am going to defend, ExPR, also draws a huge deal from early modern philosophy. It is a sort of Neo-Cartesianism because it agrees with Descartes that we are fundamentally thinking things. It is in a sense Neo-Lockeanism because it shares Locke's idea that personal identity over time consists in the sameness of consciousness. It is a kind of Neo-Humeanism because it envisages persons as fundamentally nothing more than rapids of "impressions" - experiential processes. In an important sense -which I hope will become evident as I rally early modern material to my cause further down the road - Descartes, Locke and Hume were phenomenalists; specifically in the sense that they connected our existence and fundamental metaphysical nature with our thinking, consciousness and flux of impressions - or, if I am forgiven such an anachronistic generalization - with our having conscious experience. Having retraced the fundamental early modern ideas related to the topic, let us now discuss more recent developments.

Contemporary theories of personal ontology. Perhaps due to the British early modern tradition, or later the Wittgenstein-Ryle influence, the topic of

personal ontology, nature of persons and selfhood was rather shunned in pre-war and mid-century Analytic philosophy. Early on, Wittgenstein proclaimed that the "The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing" (TLP 5.631), and that "The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world" (TLP 5.632) (Wittgenstein, 1922, p. 151). Later, he criticized the tendency to incorrectly reify "I as subject" (Wittgenstein, 1991, pp. 67-69). Ryle's critique of Cartesian dualism (Ryle, 2009) probably contributed to the situation of neglect as well. Consequently, the reality question was discussed to a much lesser extent than diachronic personal identity ("Under what condition is the person pi at time t1 identical to the person p2 at time t2?"). Additionally, Peter Strawson and A.J. Ayer (Ayer, 1963) made important contributions, the latter as a critic of the former. Strawson followed Ryle in rejecting dualism and the pure ego as an impossible concept (P. F. Strawson, 1959, p. 102). There is no distinct subject of consciousness; as the subject to which we attribute mental properties (M-predicates) is identical to the subject to which we attribute physical properties (P-predicates). Strawson also argues for the primitive unanalysability of the concept of person; persons are basic particulars, such that it is possible to ascribe to them both M-predicates and P-predicates.

Broadly, many if not most contemporary theories of both personal identity and ontology can be divided into "brute physical" and mentalistic accounts11. The representatives of brute physical accounts are: the view are that we are living bodies (Thomson, 1997), the view that we are "highly complex, composite

11 These two groups of views are adjacent to what is often called the physical criterion and the psychological criterion of personal identity (Garrett, 2002, pp. 43-55; Sekatskaya, 2020, p. 162). However, I think the word mentalistic fits better because the term psychological in this context is closely associated with psychological contents--based criteria of diachronic identity, first and foremost the memory criterion. But consciousness (as I will argue in ch. 2) should not be seen as content, so the term psychological accounts seems to exclude phenomenalist or consciousness-first views of personal ontology. As such, I use the term mentalistic as a category for both psychological and experience-first accounts. More on this immediately below. Levin also breaks down all accounts of personal ontology into "mentalist, materialist and eliminativist groups" (Levin, 2013, p. 106), mostly understanding mentalist accounts as psychological and mental-substantialist, but mentioning a phenomenalist criterion in relation to Nagel. He categorizes Metzinger, Dennett and, unusually, Hume as representatives of the eliminativist clique. I disagree that Hume was an anti-realist and provide my reasons for viewing him as a realist in the section Hume and Kant on the self of ch. 2.

material objects" (Hudson, 2001, p. 1), animalism - the view that each of us is identical to a human animal, the view that we are brains or brain parts (more on these two below) as well as all naturalistic and neurophilosophical - roughly, science-first - conceptions. All these accounts take both our diachronic continuity and basic metaphysical nature to inhere in some material, non-mental properties and facts. Mentalistic accounts on the other hand (most importantly, Neo-Lockean psychological theories and Neo-Lockean consciousness-first theories or phenomenalism) claim our continuity and nature have to do with - or primarily consist in - our mental properties and contents12. Note that this distinction does not correlate with the physicalism-antiphysicalism divide in the mind-body problem: many proponents of mentalistic accounts are also physicalists in their general metaphysics.

That said, many contemporary theories transcend the brute physical-mentalistic divide because the elements that the nature of persons consists in are, according to these theories, can be both mental and physical (or neither). For instance, Garrett thinks that because neither physical nor psychological identity criteria are satisfactory, we need an "intermediate" (combined) psychophysical criterion. But this criterion implies that I am not identical to either a body or brain, or to a human organism. Hence "although a person is made entirely of matter, he is numerically distinct from his body or brain" (Garrett, 2002, p. 57). According to Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view (and plausibly for other narrative theories) "a person's identity is created by a self-conception that is narrative in form" (Schechtman, 1996, p. 96). But a narrative is a metaphysically neutral entity - neither purely mental nor physical - as it "is composed of a unique sequence of events, mental states, happenings involving human beings as characters of actors ..." (Bruner, 1990, pp. 43-44), as cit. in (Schechtman, 1996, p. 96). Another example of a "neither-nor" theory is Neo-Aristotelianism about personal identity described in David Wiggins' 1967 book Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity.

According to Wiggins, there are "two things, a person and a human body, occupying (or being embodied or realized in) the same matter" (Wiggins, 1967, p. 48). However, the person is spatiotemporally connected to the body and is reidentified by others on the same-body basis13. A more recent advocate of a related view who thinks it can serve as a good alternative to both physical and psychological (mentalistic) theories is Igor Gasparov. Gasparov follows an Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition of personal ontology, according to which "each distinctly perceived substance is described as a unity of matter and form, and in the case of a person, as a unity of soul and body, where the term 'soul' denotes the form, and the term 'body' denotes the matter of a unified substance" (Gasparov, 2021, p. 74), also see (Gasparov, 2007).

As opposed to these and similar "neither-nor" theories, this thesis defends a species of the purely mentalistic class of theories - at the same time operating on the underlying physicalist assumption that mental entities, events and states are also broadly physical.

The term personal ontology in the relevant sense was apparently first consistently used by Olson as a title of his book What are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology (E. T. Olson, 2007). The book is an indispensable source for anyone interested in the problem, and to my knowledge the only monograph-length discussion of the theories thereon. The work is written in a semi-textbook format. It discusses the question What are we? itself, then proceeds to consecutively treat recognizable groups of views: animalism, material constitution, the brain view,

13 "...if A and B are persons and human beings, then A could never be the same person as B and not the same human being as B; or the same human being as B and not the same person. ... So, given the human beinghood of A and B, this furnishes a perfectly good covering concept for the identity 'A is the same as B'. 'Person' and 'human being' differ in sense. They may even differ in their extension. But that is immaterial. What matters is that here, in so far as they assign any, the concepts person and human being assign the same underlying principle of individuation to A and to B, and that that principle, the human being principle, is the one that we have to consult in order to move towards the determination of the truth or falsehood of the judgment that A is B" (Wiggins, 2001, pp. 193-194). However, in a much later publication Wiggins confessed: "...how exactly do we have to conceive of a person in relation to the body that marks their presence? I am not sure". This uncertainty stems from what Wiggins thinks is conceptual incompleteness of our term person (Wiggins, 2012, p. 20)

temporal parts, the bundle view, the soul view and finally nihilism, the idea that we do not exist. Although written in quite a partisan manner (as Olson is a leading proponent of contemporary animalism), the book does justice to each of these views, supplying all relevant arguments and objections. Let us now consider Olson's theory of choice.

Animalism. The one account of personal ontology that has been on the rise in the two recent decades is animalism. In current debates, animalism seems to be at the intellectual forefront of physicalistic accounts as it has mostly superseded other "brute physical" views in personal ontology and identity, such as the old view that each of us is identical to a physical body14. Animalism is the idea that each of us is numerically identical to an animal of the species H.s. There is a certain animal organism of a certain species, and you and that organism are the same. Animalist philosophers15 are generally uninterested (E. T. Olson, 2007, p. 44) in the nature question of selves and persons. At the same time, they insist only that "we are animals, not that people in general are; so it is compatible with the existence of people who are not animals (gods or angels, say), and of animals - even human animals - that are not people" (E. T. Olson, 2007, p. 24). So the extent to which personal ontology is associated with human animal ontology, is unclear, and I will devote some time to discuss animalist-personalist conceptual contradictions in ch. 6.

Olson's 1997 work The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology (1997, rev. ed. 1999) (E. T. Olson, 1999) was historically the first book-length defence of animalism. The brunt of Olson's argument is directed

14 "Though the bodily criterion has few advocates, it is historically an important alternative to psychological-continuity views. It has now largely been superseded by animalism". (E. Olson, 2011)

15 Bailey (A. M. Bailey, 2015, 2016, 2017; A. M. Bailey et al., 2021; A. M. Bailey & Elswyk, 2021); Blatti (Blatti, 2012, 2014); Geddes (Geddes, 2013); Olson (E. T. Olson, 1999, 2003a, 2015); Snowdon (P. Snowdon, 2009; P. F. Snowdon, 1995, 2004, 2014) and Toner (Toner, 2011). Direct critics include Duncan (Duncan, 2021), Hudson (Hudson, 2007), Johnston (M. Johnston, 2007, 2016), Shoemaker (D. Shoemaker, 2016) and Unger (Unger, 2000) among many others. For a collection of papers, see (Blatti & Snowdon, 2016). For an excellent overview of animalist arguments and positions, see (Nekhaev, 2021).

against psychological Neo-Lockeanism. He argues that in both diachronic personal identity and personal ontology (ch. 5, Are People Animals?), the psychological view breeds metaphysical problems abound. The psychological view says that our persistence over time, or our basic nature, consists in some facts like our relation to our own psychological contents. Olson's book argues we are animals, both in our basic nature and persistence conditions. Our being animals is logically independent of psychological facts about us. The book is also notable because it explicitly formulates the now-famous thinking animal argument (see ch. 6 of this thesis for treatment; for other formulations also see ((E. T. Olson, 2003b, 2007, p. 29; Blatti, 2014, sec. 3.1), although the two many thinkers intuition which motivates the argument had been around long before Olson's book.

Brain views. As opposed to whole animals, some "brute physical" and science-first theorists identify the self or simply us with the conscious and thinking brain or its parts. The intuition that we are brains or brain parts is heavily supported by the effects of corpus callosotomy on personal identity. These effects are interpreted by some as the single brain supporting two or more numerically distinct persons (see (Puccetti, 1973) for one of the earliest accounts; see (Rigterink, 1980) for a critique); or they are interpreted in the way that suggests "there is no whole number of individual minds that [split brain] patients can be said to have" (Nagel, 1971, p. 409), and the "simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint some day" (Nagel, 1971, p. 411). The brain view is supported by a family of scenarios: Shoemaker's brain transplant (S. Shoemaker, 1963, pp. 23-24), Parfit's surviving head and surviving cerebrum (Parfit, 2012, p. 11) 16, and Johnston's gruesome guillotining (M. Johnston, 2016, p. 113). All these scenarios are directed against animalism or the bodily view (see (E. T. Olson, 1999, pp. 114119) for an animalist rejoinder) as they are meant to summon the intuition that

16 In this lecture, Parfit defends the view that "we are not human beings, or animals, but are the conscious, thinking, controlling parts of these animals" (Parfit, 2012, p. 24). This result is quite close to the brain view. Note, however, that it is distinct from Parfit's views expounded in a much earlier Reasons and Persons which contains a section (Appendix D) intended specifically to criticize Nagel's view that we are essentially our brains (Parfit, 1984, pp. 468-476).

personal identity is preserved by preserving (living) heads and brains and not the rest of the body or animal which is not essential for the purposes of survival and identity. As Johnston expresses this intuition,

a thinking intelligent thing ... that can consider itself as itself — that is, a person — could survive the transition from being an animal or an organism to being a severed head or extracted brain or cerebrum. So Animal is not a substance kind and animalism is false (M. Johnston, 2016, p. 125).

Some anti-realist philosophers (see below) can also be easily classified with this group of views since they identify the self with the brain (McClelland, 2019) or its representational capacities (P. S. Churchland, 2002b, 2011) while rejecting the need to speak of the self per se as a distinct, real entity.

Realist theories. Note that animalists and brain theorists do not necessarily make a claim about the nature or reality of the self or person (again, animalists are generally uninterested in the nature of persons). Instead, they just defend a view about what we (fundamentally) are. Alternatively, realists about the self17 are theorists who explicitly affirm the existence of the self as some real, concrete, non-conventional and non-constructed entity, albeit their understanding of that entity is extremely varied. Unlike animalists and brain theorists, philosophers with an explicitly realist position usually conceptualize the self as an entity distinct from both animals and brains; as one would expect, their counterparts anti-realists deny the existence of such an entity. Let us now consider some realist and then antirealist schools.

Soul theories, idealism and Neo-Cartesianism. There are a few dualist and idealist contemporary philosophers who defend the view that the self, taken to be our essence, is in fact our soul. Others defend Cartesian substance dualism with its thesis that we are minds or mental substances really distinct from our bodies or

17 The specific terms anti-realism and realism about the self (self-realism) are used by Krueger (Krueger, 2010), Albahari (Albahari, 2010), Metzinger (Metzinger, 2011), Tekin (Tekin, 2015) and Jennings (Jennings, 2020).

anything physical whatsoever. We can classify John Foster (Foster, 1991), David Lund (Lund, 1994, 2005, 2009), Colin McGinn (McGinn, 1996, p. 161), J.P. Moreland (Moreland & Rae, 2000; Moreland, 2014) and Richard Swinburne (Swinburne, 1986, 2013, 2019) as belonging to this category. Weir (Weir, 2023), also a soul-theorist, defends the view that property dualism directly implies substance dualism. (S. Shoemaker & Swinburne, 1984) is a classical debate between a dualist (Swinburne) and a physicalist who follows the psychological criterion of personal identity (Shoemaker). See (Corcoran, 2001) for a collection of papers by proponents and detractors of idealism and Neo-Cartesianism; see (Inwagen & Zimmerman, 2007) for a collection of contributions by self-proclaimed idealists, dualists and materialists with a section of personhood in Christianity.

However, in the current landscape idealists and dualists about the self are minorities. As Madden points out, "An idealist view of the self . . . in these days not so much argued against as completely ignored" (Madden, 2015, p. 77). Levin observes that "Few mentalists nowadays are ready to accept the view that our consciousness is a thing constituted by an immaterial substance not subject to physical laws" (Levin, 2013, p. 108). I classify idealist and dualist views as representative of what I call strong realism about the self (at the very beginning of ch. 6). In this thesis, I do not engage with soul-theorists and Neo-Cartesians in much detail, although I draw up or mention several arguments that suggest the self cannot be either the soul or a really distinct mental substance (in ch. 4 when discussing transient selves; in ch. 5 when listing Buddhist anti-realist arguments about the self; most importantly, see the no ontologically independent things but atoms argument in the beginning of ch. 6).

There is also a recognizable group of advocates for the simple view (Sekatskaya, 2020, p. 162) who believe personhood and personal identity is utterly unanalyzable and irreducible to any facts more basic than simple identity

(Swinburne, 1984; Madell, 1991). This view is often associated with soul theories and contemporary dualism (Neo-Cartesianism). for an edited volume on that topic, see (Gasser & Stefan, 2012).

Phenomenalist or experience-first theories. The most recognizable realist camp nowadays are the theorists who can be collectively dubbed experientialists or phenomenalists18 about the self — although that is almost never a self-designation19. Phenomenalists are philosophers who connect the reality of the self with the reality of experience (Dainton & Bayne (Dainton & Bayne, 2005); Dainton (Dainton, 2008, 2012); Gallagher & Zahavi (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2020); Strawson (G. Strawson, 1997, 2009, 2011, 2017)), or with the subjective character (mineness) of experience 20. (For a review of phenomenal accounts and how they relate to metaphysical realist accounts of selfhood, see (Wozniak, 2018)). The fundamental phenomenalist intuition was aptly expressed by Mark Johnston, himself a critic of mentalistic accounts:

If anything deserves the name of a conceptual truth about the relation between persons and minds, it is the claim that a person cannot be outlived by (what once was) his own mind. ... If this is so, then, whenever we have reason to say that a single mind has continued on, we have reason to say that a single person has continued on (M. Johnston, 1987, p. 77).

From this intuition phenomenalistically-minded theorists deduce that not only do we as selves persist as long as our consciousness does - but that we are

18 This phenomenalism about selves is of course distinct and independent from phenomenalism in philosophy of perception such as the one espoused by Berkeley and Mill as well in Hume's early philosophy (Vasilyev, 2020, p. 267).

19 As a self-designation, the term is used, to the best of the author's knowledge, only by Dainton and Bayne (Dainton & Bayne, 2005). Dainton's term for this group of positions is experience-based approach ((Dainton, 2008), xiii). Throughout, I will use experiential and phenomenal as interchangeable attributes, and experientiality or phenomenality as the same as phenomenal consciousness. I will also use consciousness as a shortcut for phenomenal consciousness.

20 Unger's account in Identity, Consciousness and Value (Unger, 1990; Zahavi, 2005) and later publications (Unger, 2000) is also quite close to experientialism. Unger treats persistence as an uninterrupted capacity for experience. However, for Unger there are also material constraints on our persistence conditions, so our persistence does not consist in phenomenal continuity entirely. See (Dainton, 2008, pp. 161-170) for a commentary from the "pure" phenomenalist point of view.

our consciousness. Thus, the phenomenalist desire of to start from consciousness and experience can be seen as a return to both Descartes (with his sum res cogitans) and to Locke who, as we have just pointed out, identified self and Person (which he used interchangeably21) with consciousness22. A quick argument for phenomenalism - we can call it the annihilation argument - is already implicit in the Johnston quote, but long before Johnston it had been made by Descartes and Hume:

...from the mere fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed ; whereas if I had merely ceased thinking, even if everything else I had ever imagined had been true, I should have had no reason to believe that I existed (Descartes, 1985, p. 127).

The annihilation, which some people suppose to follow upon death, and which entirely destroys this self, is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and hatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same with self; since the one cannot survive the other (Hume, 1978, p. 634).

The annihilation argument - that I as a person go out of existence the moment my "thinking", consciousness or flux of perceptions are extinguished -has a great deal of intuitive appeal; and it has been reincarnated in current literature as the vegetable case for the psychological criterion of personal identity23. Indeed, a person who lost their capacity for conscious experience is very plausibly no

21 "Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Where-ever a Man finds, what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the same Person" (Locke, 1975, p. 346) (Essay II.26.24).

22 "Consciousness makes the same Person" (Locke, 1975, p. 340) (Essay II.27.16); "This may shew us wherein personal Identity consists, not in the Identity of Substance, but, as I have said, in the Identity of consciousness..." (Locke, 1975, p. 342) (Essay II.27.19.12-14).

23 This is how Eric Olson sums it up: "Your cerebrum is severely and irreversibly damaged so that all of your higher cognitive functions, including rationality and the capacity for conscious awareness, are irretrievably lost, while your lower brain remains intact and continues to direct your life-sustaining functions without interruption. According to the Psychological Approach, you could not survive such an adventure. The resulting human vegetable is not you, for it has inherited none of your psychological features" (E. T. Olson, 1999, p. 111). Olson goes on to provide an animalist rebuttal of this case.

longer a person - because a permanently non-thinking, or non-conscious, person is inconceivable. If we cannot imagine ourselves without a consciousness, we are identical to our consciousness, the annihilation argument leads us to believe (I return to it for the Cartesian conceivability argument which I try to reconstruct in ch. 6).

In contrast to phenomenalism and classical Lockeanism it builds on, there is also a traditional (and, according to Strawson (G. Strawson, 2014, pp. 1-2, 2014, pp. 72-76), erroneous) interpretation of Locke's views originating mostly from classical interpretations of Locke by Reed and Butler. An approach that has grown out of these traditional interpretations — "psychological" neo-Lockeanism - takes the identity of mental contents (first of all, memory, but also intentions, plans, beliefs, values, dispositions etc) to be the criterion of personality identity over time. Over the last decades of the 20th century, Neo-Lockean psychological theories dominated the mentalistic field: philosophers either defended it, albeit with reservations ((M. Johnston, 1987); (H. W. Noonan, 1998); (S. Shoemaker, 1984, 2008b, 2008a)); or criticized it ((Williams, 1970); (E. T. Olson, 1999); (Van Inwagen, 1997)). In contrast to psychological Neo-Lockeanism, phenomenalist Neo-Lockeanism, as if proclaiming "Back to Locke", interprets personal identity as the sameness of consciousness. But the proponents of this view can also be seen as getting back to Descartes as they connect our basic metaphysical nature with our status as subjects, phenomenal selves, thinking things or experiencers. Below I review the two principal book-length formulations of this approach which I am going to cite liberally throughout the thesis.

It is unsurprising that phenomenal realists about selves are also realists (non-reductionists) about consciousness. It is unsurprising because it may seem the two realisms are locked in a logical entailment. It would not be incorrect to broadly describe phenomenalism about selves as the view which simply identifies the self with an individual instance of phenomenal consciousness, or at least with an entity

endowed with it. So vacillating on the reality of consciousness would be self-defeating for any proponent of the experience-first approach. Characteristically, Dainton avows:

Since I believe attempts to reduce the phenomenal to the non-phenomenal are bound to fail, I adopt a stance of full-blooded realism with regard to the phenomenal. I take conscious states to be just as real, just as much parts of concrete reality, as protons and electrons, or stars and planets.

This view is identical to Strawson's real materialism (G. Strawson, 2008b, 2009, p. 288, 2018a) which combines physicalism or materialism and realism about experience. It was also endorsed by Husserl24. However, again following Locke, Dainton assumes what he calls moderate naturalism:

My working hypothesis is that our consciousness is causally dependent on activity in our brains. Or to put it another way, that our brains have the capacity to produce experience. In adopting this position I do not take a view on the issue of whether phenomenal states are material or immaterial in themselves. Nothing I have to say hangs on this question (Dainton, 2008, p. xiv).

Both realism about consciousness and moderate naturalism are my views, too. However, I believe that negative or "hostile" positions about consciousness such as reductionism, eliminativism and illusionism are not necessarily incompatible with phenomenal realism about selves. If we define selves just as experiential processes, as I do, but at the same time assume that consciousness is a "user-illusion" of some sort, it still makes sense to say that selves are things which internally process that illusion, or illusionary processes themselves. I say more about it in ch. 3 when I discuss Thomas Metzinger's views.

24 "Die volle Welt ist ja nicht bloß physische, sondern psychophysische. Ihr sollen - wer kann es leugnen - alle mit den beseelten Leibern verbundenen Bewußtseinsströme angehören" (Husserl, 1976, pp. 116, §53:16-19). Little did he know there will be so many 20-21st c. philosophers wer es können leugnen.

Barry Dainton's The Phenomenal Self is a towering achievement in the development of a robust and thorough experience-based theory (Dainton, 2008). Dainton defends what he calls C-theory - the view that a subject of experience is just a being that has a capacity for having experiences (Dainton, 2008, p. xxi). As such, C-theory is an account of both diachronic personal identity and personal ontology - a theory of what we are. According to Dainton, we are C-systems: bunches of experiential capacities. Dainton begins his book by showing, using a series of ingenious virtual-reality-centered thought experiments as tests, that the phenomenal Neo-Lockean approach he champions fares much better than its dominant rival, psychological Neo-Lockeanism. What he calls the bridge problem - the question of how the subject or self persists over periods of unconsciousness -is obviously very acute specifically for experience-first accounts. In trying to solve the problem, Dainton proposes to think of the self not as an essentially thinking or conscious thing (as Descartes and Hume - if we take a flux of perceptions to be a thing - thought), but of the potentially conscious self - the thing which has the capacity for having experience (Dainton, 2008, p. 79). I examine the bridge problem and offer my own solution in ch. 6.

Galen Strawson's book Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics (G. Strawson, 2009) is another highly original and profound defence of a theory which is phenomenalist in anything but name. At the center of Strawson's understanding of selves is the concept of the SESMET - a synchronically unified Subject of Experience that is a Single MEntal Thing. Selves are identical to SESMETs, according to Strawson. His path to conceptualizing the SESMET starts from descriptive phenomenology - namely, from studying our ordinary everyday experience of ourselves as subjects, i.e. as embodied mental entities which are distinct from the whole human organism. In terms of phenomenology, being a self is associated with what Strawson calls SELF-experience. This compound sense of self, shared by most of humanity, has some distinct, recognizable properties. "In ordinary human self-experience", Strawson says, "the self is figured as something

that is" (1) a subject of experience (2) a thing of some sort (3) mental (4) synchronically and (5) diachronically single (6) agent (7) character or personality (8) distinct from the organism considered as a whole (G. Strawson, 2009, p. 46) 25. Strawson maintains that any plausible metaphysical account of the self must first proceed from a phenomenological account - i.e., an account of our self-experience. From the "local" phenomenological investigation (how we humans figure for ourselves in our everyday experience) he moves on to general phenomenology (what kind of self-experience is necessary for any kind of self). Because the self, if it exists, is a mental entity whose existence is made sufficient by its phenomenal reality (Strawson also identifies as a "realist physicalist" or materialist - i.e. realist about phenomenal experience), the self's properties revealed in our general phenomenological investigation must also be its metaphysical properties. So we can use the results achieved in the general phenomenological investigation to carve out a metaphysical account of selves.

In this regard, one of Strawson's main results is that in our local phenomenology, some aspects of our local self-experience (diachronically single, agent, character or personality) do not translate into the necessary properties of selves as metaphysical entities. According to Strawson, there are just four of such necessary properties: subject, thing, mental, synchronically unified (1-4 in the list above) and their possible combinations. These properties are necessary and sufficient for any kind of thing to be the self, or SESMET. As evident, these properties lack diachronic unity. Strawson believes that although SESMETs do last, they are extremely short-lived and possibly persist no longer than just a single "chronon" — the ultimate building block of time which physicists say is around 10-43 seconds (G. Strawson, 2009, pp. 257, 388, 393, 402). So in every discernible

25 Cf. his earlier formulation: "What, then, is the ordinary, human sense of the self in so far as we can generalize about it? I propose that it is (at least) the sense that people have of themselves as being, specifically, a mental presence, a mental someone, a single mental thing that is a conscious subject of experience, that has a certain character or personality, and that is in some sense distinct from all its particular experiences, thoughts, and so on, and indeed from all other things. It is crucial that it is thought of as a distinctively mental phenomenon..." (G. Strawson, 1997, p. 407).

moment there might be myriads of synchronically unified selves associated with your organism, coming in and going out of existence. This transience view (G. Strawson, 2009, p. 9) is one Strawson's cornerstone intuitions which he juxtaposes with the traditional persistence view of most people (that we as selves persist for some considerably longer time than a moment, possibly for the whole lifetime of our bodies).

I examine and draw on this striking and extraordinary thesis of Strawson's in ch. 4. Although I reject the transience view about selves, I endorse it about the subject of experience which I understand as an observing and detached mental presence in consciousness distinct from its experiential contents. Because (as I attempt to show in ch. 4) transientism about the subject of experience is indefeasible, identifying ourselves with the subject entails full-blown transientism about persons with all its highly undesirable consequences. This is why I suggest it is much less problematic to identify selves with the experiential process as a whole and not with a supposed detached presence in consciousness.

Parfit's views. When discussing metaphysics of persons, it is utterly impossible to avoid mentioning Derek Parfit and his groundbreaking contributions to the field. In 1971, Parfit published a hugely influential paper titled simply Personal Identity (Parfit, 1971) where he argued that personal identity is unimportant from fission cases - thought experiments where a person is "multiplied" or cloned into some two future persons who possess an important degree of brain- or psychological- continuity relative to the original person. Because it is impossible to be identical to both of them (that would violate the transitivity of identity), Parfit concludes that the answer to the question who the original person is identical to, is indeterminate. But the factual matter of identity over time is itself irrelevant. Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) (Parfit, 1984), specifically its Part Three (chapters 10-15), is the most read and cited 20th century publication on personal identity. Broadly, Parfit makes his case for his

"Reductionism" - the idea that he formulates in several ways, but which ultimately boils down to the idea that facts of a person's identity over time consist in the holding of some more particular facts, and we can describe these facts in an impersonal way, without even presupposing the existence of that person (Parfit, 1984, p. 210). It follows that a complete description of reality might not include persons at all. On diachronic personal identity, Parfit reiterates his earlier view that what matters is not identity, but having a future continuer (be it you or numerically other person) whose psychological and physical facts are in a relation ("R-relation") of having enough connectedness with one's own psychophysical states26.

Parfit mostly engaged with diachronic personal identity and not with personal ontology specifically; this is why I will not discuss his work in great detail, although I offer a brief treatment of Parfitian reductionism and fission from the ExPR point of view in ch. 6. Parfit's ideas are close to Buddhist Reductionism which I consider in ch. 5. On the topic of personal ontology, Parfit also published the lecture We are not Human Beings (Parfit, 2012) intended, among other things, as a polemic against animalism, primarily in its Olsonian iteration. In that lecture, Parfit argues that "we are not human beings, or animals, but are the conscious, thinking, controlling parts of these animals" (Parfit, 2012, p. 24). I look at the brain view in more detail in ch. 6 (section Are we brains (or brain parts)?).

Narrative theories. Another active and distinct group of accounts in personal ontology and identity is narrativism. Narrative theorists characterize selves and persons in terms of their capacity to create and interpret autobiographical narratives ((MacIntyre, 2007, Chapter 15), (Taylor, 1989, Chapter 2), (Carr, 1991), (Ricoeu_r,_1994,_ Chapters. 5-6), _ (S_chechtman,_ _1996,_ _2007av _2014); (Christman, 2004); (Davenport, 2012), (Rudd, 2009, 2012), see also (Volkov, 2018) for a review). It is unclear where narrative theories are situated in the realist-antirealist divide27. Narrativists typically see the self as an acting, speaking, responsible and

26 See (Nekhaev, 2018, p. 51) for a review and analysis of Parfit's view on personal identity.

27 For a case that narrative theories are anti-realist, see (Levin, 2018a).

story-telling entity (Ricoeur, 1994, p. 297) "whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end" (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 205). This characterization implies at least some ontological commitment to the existence of the self. Perhaps the general narrativist stance on the reality question is deftly expressed by Rudd: "The self is not something that just exists, and is then narrated (by itself or by others); it only comes to exist through its being narrated" (Rudd, 2012, p. 1). It follows that while narrativists never attempt to reify the self and think that its existence is predicated on the existence of a narrative, it is rare for them to embrace explicit anti-realism, i.e. claim that the self does not exist, is an illusion, a philosopher's myth, or is fully reducible to some ontologically primal elements. However, some narrativists espouse views quite in line with anti-realism.

Dennett's much cited paper The Self As A Center Of Narrative Gravity (D. Dennett, 1992) is an explicit case of narrative anti-realism, being a curious blend of narrativism and fictionalism about selves. Dennett's main point is that selves are similar to abstract objects in science, such as the center of gravity (see below for a little more detailed discussion). In the naturalistic argument in ch. 2, I rely on Dennett's earlier paper Origins of Selves (D. C. Dennett, 1989) which paints a different, evolutionary-biological picture; so Dennett's views on selves have not been entirely consistent over the years.

Richard Rorty's belief that the human self lacks any intrinsic nature and that it is being "created by the use of a vocabulary rather than being adequately or inadequately expressed in a vocabulary" (Rorty, 1989, p. 7) is a similar case of fictionalist narrativism. A contemporary iteration of this view is Bayne's virtual phenomenalism (Bayne, 2010, p. 289); for Bayne, the self is the centre of phenomenal gravity as opposed to Dennett's narrative centre; but as such the self is a non-real, "intentional" entity which as a "virtual object around which ...

experience is structured" (Bayne, 2010, p. 290) (See (Sekatskaya, 2017) for a critique of Bayne's views)28.

Probably the most seminal narrativist publication, a narrativist manifesto of sorts, is Marya Schechtman's book The Constitution of Selves (1996). Schechtman attacks Deref Parfit's reductionism about persons (see below) on the grounds that it cannot support the four features she says are essential for personhood: survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern and compensation. Instead, she defends the narrative self-constitution view - the idea that persons are self-creating, and they create their lives specifically in the narrative form. "A person creates his identity by forming an autobiographical narrative - a story of his life", Schechtman says. She argues that unlike Neo-Lockean psychological theory of diachronic identity, "this view can explain our intuitions about the relation between personal identity and survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and compensation" (Schechtman, 1996, p. 93).

I will not engage with narrativism in this thesis - in part because it has already been roundly criticized by some phenomenalists (G. Strawson, 2004; Zahavi, 2005, pp. 106-114) and other philosophers (Gasparov, 2018; Sekatskaya, 2018b, 2018a). (See Schechtman's response and refinement in (Schechtman, 2007a)). On the one hand, being a defender of an essentialist and phenomenalist position, I reject Schechtman's thesis that narrative self-constitution is necessary for personhood, especially concerning survival. On the other hand, I follow Zahavi's point that narrativism serves as a complementary description for persons with higher-order capacities, while phenomenalist accounts are primarily accounts of a lower-order "minimal self" (Zahavi, 2005, pp. 128-129). This is also Damasio's view when he arranges the three levels of selfhood into a hierarchy of dependent stages29.

28 Also see Bruce Hood's popular science book Self-Illusion which assumes a broadly neurophilosophical as well as Dennettian fictionialist-narrativistic outlook on the self (Hood, 2012)

29 "The protoself with its primordial feelings, and the core self, constitute a 'material me.' The autobiographical self, whose higher reaches embrace all aspects of one's social persona, constitute a

Anti-realist theories. Despite the fact that narrativists do not seek to hypostasize selves in the way committed realists do, it is safe to say they are at least sympathetic to the idea of selves as valid subjects of philosophical inquiry; as narrativists do not claim there is something fallacious or ignorant about applying the concept self the way philosophers do.

As opposed to this, let us now consider "negativists" about persons. We can call the idea that the self does not exist, is an illusion, a residue of Cartesian dualism, a conceptual muddle, a piece of "philosopher's nonsense" (Anthony Kenny (Kenny, 1988)), or really is some other thing or bunch or things, anti-realism about the self. Anti-realism is also called the no-self view or no-self theory ((Siderits et al., 2010, pp. 4-5); (McClelland, 2019, p. 22)) or non-entity theory (Lowe, 1991, p. 84). In today's literature, anti-realists come in many shapes and colours and are motivated by a variety of reasons in their hostility towards the concept. A distinctive mark of contemporary anti-realism, however, is that it almost always denies the self as it is traditionally conceived - as a unified, simple, single and persistent entity, i.e. as a substantial entity; but at the same time anti-realist theorists rarely consider other conceptions of the self, such as proposed by the phenomenalists just discussed (more on that in ch. 3 and 6).

In this thesis, reductionism and eliminativism about persons are both treated as species of anti-realism. Metaphysical eliminativism about x is the view that x, contrary to some beliefs and appearances, does not exist (Van Riel, 2014, p. 13). Reductionism about x is the view that x is really just y, or "that x is nothing more than y or nothing over and above y" (van Riel & Van Gulick, 2019). Accordingly, a reductionist about persons believes persons are better understood as something non-personlike; she could say if we want to understand persons, we really need to study that other thing that persons really are (say, brain capacities). As van Riel points out,

'social me' and a 'spiritual me.'" (A. Damasio, 2012, p. 23).

If water reduces to H2O then there is just one thing rather than two - thus we get unity. Unity does not come at the price of elimination - claiming that water reduces to H2O, we do not thereby claim that there is no water (Van Riel, 2014, p. 1)

Reduction does not imply elimination, but it implies what van Riel calls directionality: "if water reduces to H2O, then H2O is prior to, or more basic than water" (Van Riel, 2014, p. 1). This is why although reductionism about persons does not deny that persons exist tout court, I am still inclined to classify it as an anti-realist position. Reductionism evidently denies that persons have ontological robustness on par with brains or other things they are supposed to be reduced to. In other words, it treats persons as something parasitic on some other "more real" thing. While I certainly do not think persons are ontologically fundamental in the sense they are basic constituent blocks of reality on par with elementary particles and fields, as a realist I believe persons exist in a robust sense - no less than the things they are supposedly reduced to; this is the reason I subsume reductionism under the anti-realist group of views.

A connected view which is nevertheless distinct from anti-realism about persons is what variously called non-egological theory (described in Zahavi (Zahavi, 2005, p. 127); proponents: (Sartre, 1966), (Gurwitsch, 2010), (Krueger, 2010), (Slors & Jongepier, 2014), no-ownership view (P. F. Strawson, 1959, p. 95) and impersonality thesis (Zahavi, 2005, p. 127). These views do not deny the full-blooded reality of consciousness and conscious experience, but deny that there is a subject of experience in our consciousness which owns, holds, looks on or enjoys phenomenal states. In other words, according to the no-ownership view, those states are anonymous.

Contemporary anti-realist philosophers who deny that our representations of ourselves as subjects have a referent do so on various grounds. Generally, it is safe to say there are two major flags under which contemporary proponents of this

position rally: the neurophilosophical and the Buddhist one. Predictably, these philosophers argue for non-existence of the self on extremely different grounds. Neurophilosophical anti-realism is a sort of naturalistic, science-oriented eliminativism or reductionism about selves and consciousness, while Buddhist anti-realism is purely speculative and metaphysical. A good part of this thesis is directed against anti-realism, mostly in these two recognizable forms. Let us look closer at different strands of contemporary anti-realism.

Neurophilosophical and cognitivist anti-realism. The first camp of anti-realists draw their arguments and inspiration from cognitive science and neuroscience. It is represented by Patricia Churchland (P. Churchland, 2013; P. S. Churchland, 2002b, 2002a, 2011); to a lesser extent Daniel Dennett (D. Dennett, 1992; D. C. Dennett, 1989, 1991); Bruce Hood (Hood, 2012); Tom McClelland (McClelland, 2019); and especially Thomas Metzinger (Metzinger, 2003, 2007, 2010b, 2010a, 2011) 30. The general stance on the self here is reductionist or eliminativist. It is argued the self is nothing like what we suppose it to be, and our natural intuitions as well as any insights from the so-called "self-experience" should be abandoned. Thus, Patricia Churchland interprets the self as a bunch of the brain's representational capacities. She suggests recasting multiple and diverse meanings of the term self — multiple selves — as multiple brain functions. (P. S. Churchland, 2002b, pp. 308-309).

But even if we are conceptual fictions, there exists something like the phenomenal self. It exists in the sense that we either naively or on reflection experience ourselves as inner mental entities. So, this experience, even if it is illusory, requires an appropriate scientific or at least naturalistic explanation. In his tour-de-force monograph Being No-One (Metzinger, 2003), Thomas Metzinger argues that we should stop speaking of "the self" and start speaking of a conscious organism's phenomenal self-models (PSM). These models are virtual because they

30 See also Hofstadter's I am a Strange Loop (Hofstadter, 2008) - an attempt to treat the self, "I" and consciousness as a "strange loop" of self-referencing recurring cycles of representation.

are not veridical (or "epistemic" as Metzinger says), being mere representations spun by the brain as an adaptive means to process perceptual data and interact with the environment. They are also transparent because they are not recognized as virtual models by those whose brains create them: we take these brain-produced adaptive models to be identical to ourselves31. McClelland (McClelland, 2019) objects to Metzinger's "virtual selves" view and argues instead that the self is our misrepresentation of the brain. Therefore, according to McClelland, we are literally our brains.

Approaching the matter from a different perspective, Daniel Dennett (D. C. Dennett, 1991, Chapter 13; D. Dennett, 1992) takes the self to be a constructed concept, a useful fiction akin to the center of gravity in physics. The self, according to Dennett, is the center of narrative gravity. It is the logical point around which events and actions connected to or produced by a particular individual revolve32. So persons in Dennett's view are not unlike literary characters.

Despite the variety, all cited models seek to eliminate the traditional concept of the self and to redefine it in terms of narrative, virtual and representational capacities of the brain. As Malabou points out,

For most neurobiologists today, the brain is not a simple 'organ' but the very possibility of linking, the fundamental organic coherence of our personality, our 'we,' a consideration that tends to blur the line between the nervous system and the psyche (Malabou, 2009, p. 57).

This sentiment is shared by neurophilosophical anti-realists as well. Though not a neurophilosopher himself, Graham Priest, echoing and referencing Dennett,

31 In Metzinger's own words: "Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. . . . subjective experience of being someone emerges if a conscious information-processing system operates under a transparent self-model" (Metzinger, 2003, p. 1)

32 "What is a self?," Dennett asks. "I will try to answer this question by developing an analogy with something much simpler, something which is nowhere near as puzzling as a self, but has some properties in common with selves. What I have in mind is the center of gravity of an object. ... A center of gravity is just an abstractum. It's just a fictional object" (D. Dennett, 1992).

Hume and Buddhist philosophy, sums up the general stance prevalent in current Analytic philosophy towards the self:

[T]he illusory self is a purely fictional object. It is just a character in a fiction that the brain weaves, part of a fictional narrative that the brain fashions ... And of course, this means that the self does not have the properties one may take it to have, such as existence, constancy, unifying power, and so on (Priest, 2019, p. 148).

Accordingly, ch. 3 of this thesis is an extensive argument against neurophilosophical anti-realism, especially in its Metzingerian iteration.

Buddhist anti-realism. The second large anti-realist camp actualizes arguments from Buddhism and other Indian philosophies ((Albahari, 2006, 2010, 2014); (Chadha, 2017, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021; Chadha & Nichols, 2022); (Dreyfus, 2010); (Deikman, 1996); (Krueger, 2010); (Bihan, 2019); (M. MacKenzie, 2010, 2022; M. D. MacKenzie, 2007); (Siderits, 2010, 2011, 2017, 2019)).

The book I will focus on in my critique of Buddhist anti-realism - or Buddhist Reductionism (the distinction to be established later) is Mark Siderits' Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons (Siderits, 2017). Unlike the cited early modern philosophers, Buddhists distinguished between the self (atman) and the person (pudgala). Indian tradition understood the self not unlike how Descartes understood the thinking thing - something eternal, simple, persistent and immaterial, but also (unlike Descartes) something detachable from and non-identical to its mental contents. As opposed to the allegedly transcendent and eternal self, the person, on the other hand, was understood as a psychological and mundane entity. One of the fundamental features of reality, according to the Buddha, is that the self does not exist (anatta), although as we shall see the Buddha is ambiguous on that matter, e.g. sometimes he refuses to affirm or deny the self's existence. Anyway, it is the nature of persons where Buddhist

philosophical traditions are split. Siderits reconstructs Buddhist Reductionism of the Abhidharma tradition as the Middle Way between eliminativism (outright denial there are persons) and personalism of the Pudgalavada school (realism about persons). According to Buddhist Reductionists, persons are conventional, transient entities which do not exist as far as the ultimate reality is concerned. I engage with Buddhist Reductionism in ch. 5 of this thesis. As I demonstrate, core Buddhist Reductionist arguments hang on mereological nihilism, a view that composite things do not exist. So ch. 5 also formulates, analyzes and attacks mereological nihilism about persons.

Conventionalism, relativism and fictionalism. Finally, some philosophers claim that the person or self is a fictional construct, akin to a literary character as Dennett (D. Dennett, 1992) argues, or a conventional entity similar to a nation. It would be fair to classify these theorists as proponents of anti-realism as well. David Braddon-Mitchell and Kristie Miller are the most prominent contemporary conventionalists about persons (Braddon-Mitchell & Miller, 2004, 2020b, 2020a; Miller, 2013), see (Merricks, 2001b) for a critique and (E. T. Olson, 1997) for a useful general discussion without endorsement). Braddon-Mitchell and Miller also embrace relativism about personal identity on the grounds that whether someone survives or not is dependent on conative attitudes which of course differ from community to community and person to person. The conventionalist-realist debate is one of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of persons. I react to conventionalism in the next chapter (Against conventional persons).

Other anti-realists. There are also philosophers who do not join any of these camps and deny we exist on independent conceptual, pragmatic or metaphysical grounds. Thus, Jiri Benovsky (Benovsky, 2018) uses a mereological nihilist argument against the existence of persons. Alternatively, in his early two papers Peter Unger (Unger, 1979a, 1979b) uses sorites-style arguments to show that he does not exist and neither does any of us. Anthony Kenny thinks the self is a

philosophical myth which grows out of two historical "roots": Cartesianism and British empiricist employment of introspection and inner sense (Kenny, 1988, 1992). Matti Eklund argues that the person is an indeterminate concept; ultimately the answer to the "semantic question", or the nature question as I call the same problem here ("what is the nature of the entities that 'person' is true of" (Eklund, 2004, p. 489)), is irrelevant even it is factual. Finally, there are philosophers who claim the concept self is too fuzzy and indeterminate to be useful (E. T. Olson, 1998), or that it is superfluous, residual and ultimately meaningless (Metzinger, 2011, p. 285). I engage with the latter position in ch. 2 (Against pragmatic eliminativism)33.

Evolutionary-biological and neuroscientific theories of the self. As opposed to neurophilosophical anti-realists, some authors offer evolutionary-biological and neuroscientific theories of the self which, although not necessarily outspokenly realist, do not explicitly endorse anti-realism either. However, by speaking about selves as evolved, enactive, natural or emergent entities, they ontologically commit to their existence in one shape or another, albeit certainly not in the "Cartesian" one. The self is not eliminated, but has its ontological category recast. An example of such a recasting is Jeremy Sherman's 2017 book Neither Ghost nor Machine. The Emergence and Nature of Selves (Sherman, 2017). The book is an exciting attempt to reconcile evolutionary neuroscience with moral and agential notions like free will and means-to-an-end behaviour. Sherman draws from the work of the biologist Terrence Deacon. Proceeding from naturalistic, emergentist and anti-dualistic standpoints, he treats selves as living, goal-setting agents.

33 Note that the so-called Continental philosophy also supplies an abundance of its own, often quite exotic variants of anti-realism. Generally, it is safe to say that Continental philosophy has been hostile to the idea of the self - at least of a substantial "Cartesian" variety. The gist of the Continental critique is that the self along with subjectivity at large is created only as an intersection of external societal relations, practices and interests. As a paradigmatic example, Foucault in his classic Discipline and Punish argues that the "soul" is an "element where the effects of a certain kind of power are articulated" (Foucault, 2003, p. 34). The subjectivity thus is molded by disciplinary practices and power relations. See (Cadava et al., 1991) for a look-back with contribution by leading French theorists.

Principal monographs in this category include Antonio Damasio's Descartes' Error (1994), The Feeling of What Happens (1999) and Self Comes to Mind (2010) (A. Damasio, 2000, 2012; A. R. Damasio, 2006), Joseph LeDoux' The Synaptic Self (2002) (LeDoux, 2002), Georg Northoff's Minding the Brain (2014) (Northoff, 2014) and Jenann Ismael's The Situated Self (2007) (Ismael, 2007). In ch. 2, I use Damasio's work to argue for the thesis that selves are units of nature.

Bibliographies. Unfortunately, there are few bibliographies on the topic. Olson's annotated bibliography of personal identity contains a section on personal ontology (E. Olson, 2011) apart from lots of other related literature. One can also use Olson's bibliography at the end of his What Are We? (E. T. Olson, 2007) as well the works he cites in relevant chapters.

After this concise review, it is possible to sort realist and anti-realist positions and trends into three broad groups, each of which has two respective pulls (pro or contra):

Chart 1. Realistic and anti-realistic positions according to the three modes of description.

realism anti-realism

science-first neurophilosophical realism (Damasio, Northoff, Sherman, Ismael) neurophilosophical anti-realism (Dennett, Metzinger, Churchland)

experience-first traditional phenomenologists (Zahavi, Gallagher), phenomenalism (Dainton, Strawson) non-egological theory / no-ownership view / impersonality thesis (early Sartre, Gurwitsch, Krueger)

me taphysics-frst phenomenalism; contemporary dualism and soul theories Buddhist Reductionism and anti-realism (Siderits, Albahari); Analytic mereological nihilism

What such an alignment indicates is that there seem to be three broad positions from which we can talk about the self - and defend either realism or anti-realism. Of course, this is just one way to arrange and think of the current field; however, this proposed way is not arbitrary because each approach or mode of

description has its own characteristic set of problems. To illustrate, here are some of their respective problems among those covered in this thesis:

Chart 2. The three modes of the personal-ontological description: problems

science-first the person's relation to its organismic and neural bases; neural correlates of the self; evolutionary history of persons; the person's status as a unit of nature or as a conventional concept (ch. 2); reducibility of persons to the neural (ch. 3)

experience-first sense of self; what persons seem to themselves in their self-experience; the mineness of experience; pre-reflective self-awareness; the existence of the subject of experience, its relation to consciousness, its role and ontological robustness (ch. 4)

me taphysics-first mereology of persons, their parthood, unity and simplicity; reality of the self (ch. 5); the person's substantiality and general ontological category; its status as an emergent, ontologically independent or reducible entity; its relation to its base or the elements it ontologically depends on; diachronic personal identity (ch. 6); primitiveness of the personal identity-relation; reducibility of persons to some basic facts (ch. 5, 6, 7)

In this review, I hope to have succeeded in showing that distinguishing all

aforementioned schools and approaches is not arbitrary, nor is the central tripartite thematic division.

Limitations

Now a couple of words must be said about this thesis' limitations:

1. Both core problems this thesis is concerned with - the nature and reality questions - are of course instantly recognizable and perennial. The terms such as the subject, person, ego and self, or rather their conceptual predecessors and counterparts, were previously explored in Ancient philosophy, in the scholastic tradition, by British empiricists, very thoroughly by German idealists and of course in the phenomenological-existential tradition. Much work has been done on this subject in Indian philosophy; there are important works in Russian thought as

well34.

34 For instance, Gustav Shpet's "Consciousness and Its Proprietor" («Сознание и его собственник»), Alexei Losev's treatise "The Self Itself' («Самое само») and Vladimir Bibikhin's lectures "Property. A Philosophy of One's Own" («Собственность. Философия своего»).

However, in this thesis I am forced to sacrifice the historical breadth for the sake of detailed development. Even a cursory review of all positions and arguments on this topic is the task for a voluminous, probably multi-volume monograph, so this text will be limited to the context of contemporary discussions about the self in Analytic philosophy and its outgrowths - the so called neurophilosophy and "Analytical Buddhism". This is not a work on history of philosophy, so whatever historical references it has will mostly have to do with Analytic philosophy, phenomenology and relevant ideas in early modern philosophy — mostly in Descartes, Locke and Hume35.

2. Another limitation concerns an adjacent but ultimately distinct problem: the mind-body problem. This thesis operates on a non-reductive physicalist or emergentist assumption that supports realism about consciousness, and in ch. 3 I will make a stand against neurophilosophical positions about the self connected with tougher versions of physicalism, e.g. reductionism and eliminativism about consciousness. However, this work does not concern itself with the mind-body problem specifically, and I hope that almost all its claims (except those of ch. 7 which cannot be reconciled with tougher versions of physicalism) are compatible with virtually any position in the mind-body debate.

I believe that ExPR's three main theses (reality, experientiality and processuality of selves) are collectively open for people with all kinds of views on the mind-body problem, although a follower of Frankish's illusionism would probably find it much harder to accept than a follower of McGinn's mysterianism. ExPR fundamentally identifies selves with individual consciousnesses, so your

35 If the reader gets puzzled why the thesis with "contemporary Analytic philosophy" in its title dedicates so much time to discuss early moderns, the reason is that those who wish to understand the foundations of current thinking about selfhood must look no further than the work done by early modern philosophers, especially Descartes, Locke and Hume. As a testament to this legacy, among today's most prominent theorists Galen Strawson declares himself a Cartesian (G. Strawson, 2009, p. 159), Barry Dainton calls his account of the self neo-Lockean (Dainton, 2008, p. xii) and Patricia Churchland proclaims Hume with his rejection of the unified, persistent self a precursor to the scientific, brain-oriented understanding of the subject matter (P. S. Churchland, 2011, p. 44).

position on the mind-body problem will likely, but not necessarily, correlate with your position on the reality question of the self. For instance, if someone is an illusionist, it should follow that if consciousness is an illusion, the self must be an illusion. But it is still possible to be an illusionist about consciousness without being an anti-realist about selves - e.g. by claiming that any entity which naturally entertains the illusion of consciousness is a self; so some entities are real in the robust sense because they possess a non-conventional property of being in a constant fuddle about consciousness. Conversely, it is possible to be a realist about consciousness and anti-realist about the self (an example is Ned Block with his "deflationism about the self" (Block, 1997, p. 162)). Colin McGinn thinks "the time has come to admit candidly that we cannot resolve the mystery" of consciousness (McGinn, 1989, p. 349). As species, "we are simply not equipped to know" the answer to the mind-body problem (McGinn, 1989, p. 365). Whether this is true or not has no real bearing on the truth or falsity of the views defended in this thesis.

3. The final limitation is that I will be mostly talking about persons and selves only in the broadly metaphysical and phenomenological sense. Except for a brief discussion in the Conclusion, I will not explore social and ethical construals of persons, including narrative and agential ones. But the reason for that is that, as I see it, the metaphysical-phenomenological level is fundamental: ethical and social persons are represented by higher-order properties compared to minimal, metaphysical selves in which the former are ontologically based.

Заключение диссертации по теме «Другие cпециальности», Турко Дмитрий Сергеевич

Consciousness is life

In this final section, let me indulge in some fancifulness and deliver a eulogy for the essence of selfhood as I see it — consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness which in our world is instantiated as distinct living entities - selves - is both a condition for contemplating any value, and a thing of value by itself. Now I will provide reasons why.

First, selves - individual conscious entities, are valuable not only in virtue of their kind, but as unique tokens. This is probably part of the reason why we intuitively perceive destruction to be meaningful for selves (like animals, including humans) and not really eventful for non-selved organisms and entities (plants, non-conscious robots or bacteria). When a person dies, their consciousness perishes; and when it happens we intuitively feel something is irretrievably lost. This is the tragedy of perspectivality: no matter how neuroanatomically primitive and insignificant, every person's demise is the demise of a unique, one of a kind thing - the collapse of a phenomenal sub-universe. If persons are really irreducible (as I argued in ch. 7), there is something forever lost when a person disappears. Apart from their moral worth, consciousness and selfhood have this sort of intrinsic epistemic value furnished by the loss of epistemically closed information once a conscious being ceases to exist.

Apart from that, there is something, for a lack of a better word, negatively aesthetic in the demise of even a "primitive" selved organism (like a worm, if worms are indeed sentient). When a self, even a minimal self, dies, some value is lost forever - so it is similar to losing a work of art. If you disagree, you must concede that even if token-uniqueness is not necessarily valuable (a uniquely-shaped apple is not), kind-uniqueness is more likely to be valuable. Selfhood as it exists on Earth apparently comes in many forms, but it is unique as a property of a kind of thing in the larger universe, even if now we have no evidence that other species of this kind exist anywhere but here.

Second, selves are aesthetic in some other respects. There are primitive innervated organisms who very well might be minimal experiential selves (again, worms or ticks); but for many selved animals, their high neural complexity makes them fragile, similar to works of art (we know that human brains - and human selves - are especially fragile). In nature, high complexity apparently comes with high fragility. So similarly to how I feel works of art are precious in some part because they are fragile - because the value they represent can be easily lost due to their delicacy - I feel consciousness and conscious beings are precious because of their frailty as selves.

Third, relatedly, consciousness is beautiful by itself: it has intrinsic aesthetic value; there is something unique, special or sublime about it, or at the very least one gets sentimental when thinking about it. It is really hard for me to rationalize this intuition. Perhaps this intuition is entirely irrational and cannot be rationalized philosophically, but I am definitely not the only person to have it.

Fourth, consciousness is also epistemically valuable derivatively: as a tantalizing mystery of nature. It is ubiquitous, but precisely because we cannot understand it and physicalistically explain it, consciousness fascinates us as it should.

And in the end, to repeat the value argument from ch. 6, phenomenality is valuable for us because we are phenomenal beings. When individual consciousness comes into the world, a person comes into the world. When it goes, they go. Anything that matters to us is given to us phenomenally. Friendship, love, sorrow, delight, suffering, longing, shame, awareness of one's fulfilled duty or one's bad conscience and all other moral emotions - all these things would not be of the slightest significance to us unless they were phenomenally realized. We have to be conscious of all important things in our lives - meaning we have to phenomenally experience them. As we are persons, phenomenality is the domain wherein our life goes. The only way to go by is to cherish it.

Happiness comes from the self and can be found in the self only.

— Nisargadatta (Maharaj, 1999, p. 19)

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