Когнитивно-прагматическая роль социокультурно маркированных единиц в медиадискурсе: на материале британской прессы тема диссертации и автореферата по ВАК РФ 10.02.04, кандидат наук Калташкина, Елена Юрьевна

• Калташкина, Елена Юрьевна
• кандидат наук
• 2013

Оглавление диссертации кандидат наук Калташкина, Елена Юрьевна

Содержание

Введение

Глава 1. Когнитивно-дискурсивная парадигма лингвистических исследований

1.1. Когнитивная наука и когнитивный подход к изучению языка

1.2. Дискурс как объект изучения современной лингвистики

1.3. Понятие медиадискурса

1.4. Прагматические аспекты изучения дискурса

Выводы к Главе 1

Глава 2. Социокультурно маркированные единицы в когнитивно-прагматическом освещении

2.1. Понятие социокультурно маркированной единицы

2.2. Когнитивно-прагматический подход к изучению пословиц и поговорок

2.3. Цитаты и аллюзии в когнитивно-прагматическом аспекте

2.4. Теория концептуальной метафоры

Выводы к Главе 2

Глава 3. Когнитивно-прагматическая роль социокультурно маркированных единиц в медиадискурсе

3.1. Особенности политического медиадискурса

3.2. Общая характеристика британских «качественных» изданий

3.3. Когнитивно-прагматическая роль пословиц и поговорок в политическом дискурсе британских «качественных» изданий

3.4. Когнитивно-прагматическая роль цитат и аллюзий в политическом дискурсе британских «качественных» изданий

3.5. Когнитивно-прагматическая роль концептуальных метафор в политическом дискурсе британских «качественных» изданий

3.6. Когнитивно-прагматическая роль реалий в политическом дискурсе британских «качественных» изданий

Выводы к Главе 3

Заключение

Библиография

Приложение 1

Приложение 2

Приложение 3

Приложение 4

Приложение 5

Приложение 6

Приложение 7

Приложение 8

Приложение 9

Приложение 10

SL,

Введение диссертации (часть автореферата) на тему «Когнитивно-прагматическая роль социокультурно маркированных единиц в медиадискурсе: на материале британской прессы»

Введение

Стремительное развитие информационных технологий и устойчивая тенденция к глобализации всех сфер общественной жизни — экономической, политической, научной — во второй половине XX века обусловили новый скачок в развитии средств массовой информации. Благодаря появлению сети Интернет СМИ превратились в одну из основных форм бытования языка. В то же время в области гуманитарных исследований происходит смена научной парадигмы, и интерес ученых смещается в область изучения обработки и репрезентации структур знания в мозгу человека. Новое научное направление, когнитивистика, открыло новые способы и возможности изучения процессов человеческого мышления и предложило рассматривать язык с когнитивной точки зрения. Возникнув на стыке различных наук (психологии, лингвистики, информатики, социологии, философии и др.), когнитивистика обеспечила ученым богатую теоретическую и практическую базу, подготовленную предшествующими фундаментальными исследованиями.

Важное место среди когнитивных исследований занимают работы, посвященные анализу и изучению различных типов дискурса, в том числе и медиадискурса (работы О.В. Александровой, А.Н. Баранова, О.Д. Вишняковой, М.Н. Володиной, Д.Б. Гудкова, В.З. Демьянкова, Т.Г. Добро склонской, М.Р. Желтухиной, И.М. Кобозевой, Т.А. Комовой, М.Э. Конурбаева, O.A. Ксензенко, E.H. Малюги, Е.О. Менджерицкой, Н.Г. Табаловой, А.П. Чудинова, Т.В. Юдиной и др.). На кафедре английского языкознания МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова в последние годы также были выполнены кандидатские диссертации, посвященные изучению различных аспектов дискурса СМИ (Е.В. Темнова 2004, В.В. Хуринов 2009, Ю.И. Клименова 2010, Н.О. Празян 2011, Е.С. Иванова 2012).

В медиадискурсе особого внимания заслуживают тексты политической направленности, которые, во-первых, отличаются своим количественным превосходством над текстами других тематик, а во-вторых, представляют

интерес с точки зрения оказания воздействия на аудиторию. Политические медиатексты направлены не только на информирование аудитории о тех или иных политических событиях, но, прежде всего, на формирование определенной точки зрения на происходящее в мире. Они обладают наибольшим прагматическим потенциалом по сравнению с другими медиатекетами. Воздействие предполагает обращение не к рациональному, а к эмоциональному началу в собеседнике, что требует употребления большого количества экспрессивных средств и образов, в том числе имеющих социокультурно маркированный характер. В этой связи особенно важным представляется комплексное изучение социокультурно маркированных единиц, используемых авторами политических текстов, с целью выявления механизмов воздействия на аудиторию, изучения процессов и результатов человеческого мышления.

Объектом данного диссертационного исследования являются социокультурно маркированные единицы.

Предметом изучения стало выявление когнитивно-прагматических особенностей функционирования социокультурно маркированных единиц в медиадискурсе.

Целью работы является комплексное описание социокультурно маркированных единиц, рассмотрение их бытования и функционирования в политическом медиадискурсе. В соответствии с поставленной целью в диссертации решаются следующие задачи:

- охарактеризовать особенности медиадискурса в целом и политического медиадискурса в частности;

- проанализировать роль социокультурно маркированных единиц в медиадискурсе;

- выявить основные концепты, концептуальные метафоры, прецедентные феномены, реалии, использующиеся в британском медиадискурсе для

репрезентации политической жизни России;

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- охарактеризовать структурные и композиционные особенности использования социокультурно маркированных единиц в медиатекстах;

- определить роль прагматического контекста в процессе создания, актуализации и интерпретации рассматриваемого дискурса.

Решение поставленных в диссертационном исследовании задач обусловило использование следующих методов: сплошной текстовый анализ, когнитивный анализ, концептуальный и фреймовый анализ, дискурсивный анализ, метод обобщения и систематизации, сопоставительный анализ, анализ словарных дефиниций.

Материалом исследования послужили статьи из разделов commentary, features и opinion, посвященные политике России, опубликованные в период с 1999 по 2013 гг. в печатных и электронных версиях таких «качественных» британских изданий, как The Economist, The Financial Times, The Times, The Guardian, The Observer, The Spectator, The Daily Telegraph, The Independent. Обращение к британскому медиадискурсу продиктовано ведущим положением англоязычных текстов масс-медиа и авторитетностью британских «качественных» изданий в мировом информационном пространстве, а выбор медиатекстов, посвященных России, обусловлен многовековой историей сотрудничества и многочисленными политическими контактами между Россией и Великобританией.

Научная новизна диссертации заключается в комплексном когнитивно-прагматическом анализе социокультурно маркированных единиц. Впервые анализируются паремии, цитаты, аллюзии, концептуальные метафоры и реалии с учетом когнитивно-прагматического аспекта их использования и особенностей лингвистического воплощения.

Актуальность предпринятого исследования определяется необходимостью изучения различных аспектов политического медиадискурса, в том числе его социокультурных особенностей, а также выявления основных механизмов воздействия на аудиторию с целью манипулирования,

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формирования стереотипов и переконцептуализации картины мира адресата.

Теоретическая значимость работы состоит в развитии когнитивно-дискурсивной парадигмы в лингвистике. Полученные результаты способствуют дальнейшему изучению особенностей функционирования социокультурно маркированных единиц в различных предметных областях медиадискурса, а также исследованию когнитивных структур политического медиадискурса с учетом их прагматического потенциала.

Практическая ценность диссертации определяется тем, что результаты исследования могут быть использованы для разработки курсов по когнитивной лингвистике, психолингвистике, дискурсивному анализу, медиалингвистике, лингвостилистике, прагматике; при составлении пособий по политологии, ЬБР («языку для специальных целей»), межкультурной коммуникации; при создании культурологических словарей и словарей метафор. Представленные в работе материалы могут быть использованы на практических занятиях по интерпретации и созданию текстов СМИ.

Апробация работы: Теоретические положения и основные результаты диссертационного исследования были представлены на научно-практических конференциях: Международной конференции ЬАТЕ11М, Международной научной конференции студентов, аспирантов и молодых ученых «Ломоносов 2011», Международной научной конференции студентов, аспирантов и молодых ученых «Ломоносов 2012», Межфакультетском круглом столе «Понимание дискурса в разных профессиональных средах». По теме исследования автором подготовлены 9 статей, 8 из которых опубликованы, в том числе три статьи в изданиях, входящих в перечень ведущих рецензируемых научных журналов, включенных Высшей аттестационной комиссией в список изданий, рекомендуемых для опубликования основных научных результатов диссертации на соискание ученой степени кандидата наук.

Цели и задачи исследования определили структуру работы. Диссертация состоит из Введения, трех Глав, Заключения, Библиографии и Приложений.

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Во Введении обосновываются актуальность, новизна работы, выбор объекта и предмета исследования, формулируются цели и задачи диссертации, раскрывается ее теоретическая значимость и практическая ценность, дается характеристика материала, перечисляются методы исследования.

В Главе 1 «Когнитивно-дискурсивная парадигма лингвистических исследований» определяются ключевые понятия диссертации, освещается история когнитивных исследований, анализируются основные подходы к изучению дискурса и текста как его основной единицы, рассматриваются особенности медиадискурса, обосновывается связь когнитивно-дискурсивного и прагматического подходов к изучению лингвистических явлений.

В Главе 2 «Социокультурно маркированные единицы в когнитивно-прагматическом освещении» определяется критерий для отнесения языковой единицы к разряду социокультурно маркированных, предлагается классификация социокультурно маркированных единиц, отмечается актуальность их изучения в контексте межкультурной коммуникации, связь рассматриваемых языковых явлений с теорией вертикального контекста. В Главе 2 также рассматриваются различные подходы к изучению пословиц и поговорок, цитат и аллюзий, метафор и реалий, обосновывается важность когнитивно-прагматического подхода.

В Главе 3 «Когнитивно-прагматическая роль социокультурно маркированных единиц в медиадискурсе» представлен анализ пословиц, поговорок и собственно идиом, цитат и аллюзий, концептуальных метафор, реалий в политических статьях британской «качественной» прессы. Выборка материала для анализа проводилась на основании формы употребления (узуальной или деформированной) паремий и идиом, наиболее частотных источников цитат и аллюзий, концептов, социокультурных реалий.

В Заключении подводятся итоги исследования, делаются общие выводы.

Список используемой литературы содержит 316 наименований источников на русском и иностранных языках, включая публикации в

периодических изданиях, статьи из сборников научных трудов, диссертации, монографии, электронные документы.

Приложения включают в себя полнотекстовые версии некоторых статей, примеры из которых были представлены в исследовании.

Глава 1. Когнитивно-дискурсивная парадигма лингвистических

исследований

1.1. Когнитивная наука и когнитивный подход к изучению языка

В 60-е годы XX века большой интерес в науке стали вызывать процессы, связанные с получением, обработкой, хранением, использованием, организацией и накоплением структур знания в мозгу человека. Круг научных дисциплин, занимавшихся этими вопросами, получил название «когнитивистика», или «когнитивная наука».

Как отмечает в своих статьях Е.О. Менджерицкая, одно из первых определений термина «когнитивная наука» появилось в словаре Д. Эйтчисон Introducing Language and Mind, изданного в серии под редакцией Д. Кристала: Cognitive science — a study which covers areas of knowledge relating to the human ability to think and talk, in particular artificial intelligence (AI), linguistics, psychology and philosophy" [Менджерицкая 2009: 219]. Данное определение предлагает широкое понимание термина, поскольку включает в себя все области знания, связанные с мыслительной и речевой деятельностью человека, к которым относятся искусственный интеллект, лингвистика, психология и философия.

Междисциплинарный характер когнитивных исследований обусловил наличие множества подходов и направлений в когнитивистике. Исследователи по-разному понимали цели, задачи и предмет когнитивной науки: кто-то видел в ней науку о принципах, управляющих мыслительными процессами [Shepard 1988: 45]; кто-то ставил во главу угла познание человеческого разума и необходимость создания работающей модели этого разума [Johnson-Laird 1983: 11-12]; Ст. Андерсон полагал, что когнитивистика должна исследовать человеческое поведение, поскольку оно детерминируется некими структурами знания в его мозгу [Anderson 1988: 808]; Я. Ньютс настаивал на необходимости познать когнитивную инфраструктуру мозга со всеми ее способностями и, прежде всего, способностью говорить [Nuyts 1992: 5].

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Сегодня все ученые сходятся в том, что именно когниция является главным предметом когнитивной науки: «Когнитивная наука/науки — наука/науки, занимающиеся человеческим разумом и мышлением (mind) и теми ментальными (психическими, мыслительными) процессами и состояниями, которые с ними связаны; наука/науки, предметом которых является когниция — познание и связанные с ним структуры и процессы; исследование феномена знания во всех аспектах его получения, хранения, переработки и т.п» [Краткий словарь когнитивных терминов 1996: 58].

Термин «когниция» заслуживает особого внимания. В русском языке в связи с трудностью перевода используется транслитирированная форма англоязычного слова cognition, означающего как процесс познавательной деятельности, так и её результат. H.H. Болдырев отмечает, что «когниция — понятие, которое охватывает не только целенаправленное, теоретическое познание, но и простое, обыденное постижение мира в повседневной жизни человека». Кроме того, он подчеркивает, что когниция неразрывно связана с языком, поскольку именно на языке мы в основном передаем накопленные опыт и знания [Болдырев 2004: 23]. Более того, язык может описываться как особый когнитивный процесс [Клике 1983: 10]. Эти замечания позволяют сделать вывод о значительной роли лингвистики в когнитивной науке, но не утверждают, что когнитивная наука есть наука только о языке, а лингвистика — наука о знании.

Сложную связь когнитивной науки с другими областями знаний можно отразить в виде схемы, предложенной Е.С. Кубряковой в статье «Начальные этапы становления когнитивизма: лингвистика-психология-когнитивная наука»:

пол>чение обработка фиксация хранение

теория информации

математическое

моделирование

биология медицина психология

/

организация

>

информации и знаний

человеческим мозгом и/или

машиной

использование

накопление

о мире

рост

компьютеры

в знаковых системах

семиотика

лингвистика

модечирование искусственного интеллекта

Таким образом, когнитивная лингвистика — неотъемлемая часть когнитивной науки, в центре внимания которой находится «язык как общий когнитивный механизм» [Демьянков 1995: 304] и «когниция в ее языковом отражении» [Рудакова 2002: 10,15].

Когнитивная лингвистика сформировалась в США и Западной Европе в 1980-е годы. Формальной датой её появления можно считать 1989 год, когда была создана Международная ассоциация когнитивной лингвистики (International Cognitive Linguistics Association); с 1990 года начал выходить журнал Cognitive Linguistics. Исследованиями в области когнитивной лингвистики занимались Т. Гивон, Р. Джакендофф, Дж. Лакофф, Р. Лэнекер, У. Чейф, Ч. Филлмор и др. В нашей стране она получила распространение благодаря работам А.Н. Баранова, Н.Н. Болдырева, В.З. Демьянкова, В.И. Заботкиной, А.А. Кибрика, И.М. Кобозевой, Е.С. Кубряковой, Л.А. Манерко и др. Зарубежные и отечественные исследователи способствовали разработке единой системы научных взглядов, формированию теоретико-методологической базы исследования, что в определенный исторический период привело к формированию новой парадигмы научного знания [Кун 1977; Болдырев 2004: 20-21]. «Когнитивная революция» изменила математический взгляд на язык как на формальную систему на менее формалистский, при котором язык рассматривается как биологическая система [Ченки 2002: 344].

Когнитивная лингвистика первое время находилась в не очень выгодном положении: многие были убеждены, что она лишь новыми словами повторяет то, что уже давно известно науке [Болдырев 2004: 19]. И действительно, в работах В. фон Гумбольдта, А.А. Потебни, И.А. Бодуэна де Куртенэ, Г. Гийома, К. Бюлера и других классиков теоретического языкознания можно проследить идеи и концепции, близкие когнитивистским. Однако ни одна из теорий предшествующих лет не ставила перед собой целью разработку единой концепции когнитивного подхода к языку в его современном понимании.

Развитие когнитивной лингвистики отчасти стало реакцией на

пренебрежение семантикой в лингвистических теориях XX века, которая, по мнению многих когнитивистов, является ведущей силой в употреблении языка. В отечественном языкознании даже получил распространение термин «когнитивная семантика» (или «сверхглубинная семантика»), в котором содержится указание на основной источник развития когнитивной лингвистики (см. Кобозева 2000, Кубрякова 2004, Маслова 2008). В западной литературе когнитивную лингвистику нередко называют когнитивной грамматикой, что объясняется более широким пониманием термина «грамматика» в американской традиции (см. Дж. Лакофф и Г. Томпсон «Представляем когнитивную грамматику» 1975, Р. Лэнекер «Основания когнитивной грамматики» 1987). Основополагающими для развития когнитивной грамматики стали работы по фреймовой семантике Ч. Филлмора (1983, 1988), когнитивной, или пространственной, грамматике Р. Лэнекера (1987, 1991), теории ментальных пространств Ж. Фоконье (1985), концептуальной семантике Р. Джэкендоффа (1991, 1995, 1997), когнитивным моделям Дж. Лакоффа (1990), прототипической семантике Колмана (1981, 1983) и др.

Критика «объективистских» теорий значения и стремление проникнуть в глубинные области сознания, не ограничиваясь поверхностными явлениями, заставило когнитивистов обратиться к теории генеративной грамматики Н. Хомского. Генеративная грамматика опирается на представления о языке как о внутренней системе человека, внутри которой заложен механизм, отвечающий за порождение и восприятие речи. Таким образом, идеи Хомского изначально были связаны с пониманием языка как главной составляющей когнитивной системы, психики. Как отмечает Е.С. Кубрякова, «генеративизм вызвал целый поток исследований о когнитивных основаниях языка и языковых категориях, постулируя важность выдвижения новых гипотез относительно внутреннего устройства языка взамен господствовавших тогда в американском языкознании индуктивных методов его анализа» [Кубрякова 2004: 49]. В когнитивной лингвистике стандартная генеративная гипотеза о первичной роли глубинной

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синтаксической структуры по отношению к семантической не принимается (об этом в своих работах писали Дж. Лакофф, М. Джонсон, У. Чейф и др.), но при этом исследователи признают, что ключом к изучению когнитивных способностей человека является понятие представления знания, его репрезентации различными структурами сознания, отражающими воспринимаемый мир в голове человека [Кубрякова, 2004: 51]. Данное явление находит отражение в процессах категоризации и концептуализации.

Изучение свойств категоризации и концептуализации в языках является ключевым вопросом когнитивной лингвистики. Отвергая формалистский подход к исследованию языка, когнитивистика отказалась от «классического» подхода к категоризации, в котором категории определяются на основе необходимых и достаточных бинарных признаков, имеют четкие границы, а члены категорий имеют одинаковый статус [Ченки 2002: 341]. Классический подход к категоризации основывается на семантических признаках. Например, известен анализ слова «холостяк» по Катцу и Посталу. Значение слова определяется на основании четырех определяющих свойств: [человек], [мужского пола], [взрослый], [до сих пор не женившийся]. Однако данный подход не исключает таких нелепых и неприемлемых предложений, как, например, «Папа римский — холостяк» [Ченки 2002: 341]. По замечанию Дж. Лакоффа, классический подход представляет собой лишь небольшую часть данных о сущности категорий и, к тому же, не учитывает роль когнитивных процессов и культурных моделей в определении значения [Lakoff 1987; Taylor 1989]. К тому же, мир не всегда четко поделен на категории и бинарного противопоставления часто недостаточно. Так, далеко не каждого взрослого неженатого мужчину можно назвать холостяком: кто-то не женится по религиозным убеждениям, кто-то является формально взрослым, но с наступлением совершеннолетия мужчина не превращается одномоментно в холостяка и т.д. [Ченки 2002: 342].

В когнитивистике категоризация может пониматься в узком и широком

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смысле. В узком смысле — это «подведение вещи, явления, процесса и т.п. под определенную рубрику опыта, категорию, и признание ее (этой сущности) членом этой категории» [Кубрякова 2004: 307]. В более широком смысле — это «процесс образования и выделения самих категорий, членения внешнего и внутреннего мира человека сообразно сущностным характеристикам его функционирования и бытия, упорядоченное представление разнообразных явлений через сведение их к меньшему числу разрядов или объединений и т.п., а также — результат классификационной (таксономической) деятельности» [Краткий словарь когнитивных терминов 1996: 42]. Согласно теории Дж. Лакоффа, способность категоризации заложена в самом человеческом разуме [Lakoff 1987]. При отнесении предметов/явлений к той или иной категории мы ориентируемся на некий прототип как на «лучшего», «идеального» представителя своего класса. В прототипе прослеживается наибольшее число характеристик, свойственных данной категории. Прототип с когнитивной точки зрения можно определить, как «концепт, лежащий в основе формирования категории и определяющий ее содержание» [Болдырев, 2004: 32]. В основе «теории прототипов», предложенной Лакоффом (1987), лежит понятие идеализированных когнитивных моделей, посредством которых люди склонны концептуализировать окружающую действительность [Темнова 2004: 40].

Концептуализация — другой важнейший процесс познавательной деятельности человека. Он также представляет собой классификационную деятельность, а потому тесно связан с категоризацией. Концептуализация заключается в «осмыслении поступающей информации и образовании концептов, концептуальных структур и всей концептуальной структуры в мозгу (психике) человека» [Краткий словарь когнитивных терминов 1996: 93]. Концептуализация выступает также как «естественный процесс порождения новых смыслов, трансформирующих и постоянно пополняющих концептуальную систему, и обладает характером непрерывности, как и процесс

14

познания в целом» [Вишнякова 2003: электронный ресурс].

Концепт — базовое понятие когнитивной лингвистики, которое в различных направлениях данной науки может пониматься по-разному. По мнению Р. Джекендоффа, концепты близки семантическим частям речи: можно выделить концепты объекта, его частей, движения, действия, места, времени, признака [Jackendoff 1993]. Семантического подхода придерживается и Н.Д. Арутюнова. Ю.С. Степанов предлагает культурологическое понимание концепта: это основная ячейка культуры в ментальном мире человека, а культура — совокупность концептов и отношений между ними [Маслова 2008: 46]. В.В. Красных также предлагает рассматривать концепт с социокультурной точки зрения: это некая «максимально абстрагированная идея «культурного предмета», не имеющего визуального прототипического образа, хотя и возможны визуально образные ассоциации, с ним связанные, и обладающая определенными коннотациями» [Красных 2003: 272] О. Д. Вишнякова подчеркивает роль лингвокультурного социума в процессе возникновения и развития концептов. Именно в социуме находят различные способы выражения как культуроспецифичные, так и универсальные человеческие концепты [Вишнякова 2003]. Е.С. Кубрякова считает, что концепт является своего рода посредником между словами и действительностью, результатом столкновения семантики слова с личным и коллективным опытом человека. Концепт — это «оперативная содержательная единица памяти, ментального лексикона, концептуальной системы и языка мозга, всей картины мира, отраженной в человеческой психике» [Краткий словарь когнитивных терминов 1996: 90].

По содержанию выделяют разные типы концептов: представления, схемы,

понятия, фреймы, скрипты, сценарии. Их дифференциальным признаком

является способ отражения в сознании языковой личности объектов, процессов

и явлений. Так, представления трактуются как «обобщенный чувственно-

наглядный образ предмета или явления», схемы как «обобщенный

пространственно-географический образ», понятие как результат рационального

15

осмысления предмета или явления, состоящий из наиболее общих, существенных его признаков [Попова, Стернин 2007: 117-118]. Фрейм представляет собой «многокомпонентный концепт, объемное представление» [Попова, Стернин 2007: 118]. Это структурированная единица знания, в которой существует определенный набор компонентов со строго установленными отношениями между ними [Болдырев 2004: 32]. Именно концептуальные фреймы (или «сценарии», т.е. определенные последовательности эпизодов и элементов) организуют поведение человека и позволяют ему правильно интерпретировать поведение других людей, что проявляется, например, в таких формах поведения, как покупки товаров в магазинах, походы в кино или в театр и др. [Дейк 2000: 17].

Анализ концепта и его составляющих возможен с помощью метода концептуального анализа, анализа фреймов и прототипов. Концептуальный анализ направлен на выявление возможных инференций, скрытых, ассоциативных концептуальных характеристик. Инференции могут появляться в процессе мыслительной деятельности, их значения могут отсутствовать в словаре, но актуализироваться в зависимости от ситуации общения. Таким образом, содержание концепта определяется речевыми контекстами и значениями, закрепленными за концептом в том или ином лингвокультурном сообществе. Метод фреймовой семантики также предусматривает анализ значений языковых единиц в когнитивном контексте, что обусловлено зависимостью языкового значения от познавательного опыта человека. Таким образом, различные методы анализа концептов открывают возможность исследования глубинных уровней ментального пространства человека.

Обобщив существующие подходы в когнитивной лингвистике, трудно не

Список литературы диссертационного исследования кандидат наук Калташкина, Елена Юрьевна, 2013 год

Список использованных словарей

301. Англо-русский словарь по лингвистике и семиотике. Под ред. А.Н. Баранова и Д.О. Добровольского. - М., Помовский и партнеры, 1996.

302. Ахманова О.С. Словарь лингвистических терминов. - М.: Сов. Энциклопедия, 1966. - 608 с.

303. Большой толковый словарь русского языка / под ред. С.А. Кузнецова. - Спб.: Норинт, 2000.

304. Жуков В.П. Словарь русских пословиц и поговорок. - М.: Рус. яз., 2000. - 544 с.

305. Ильин И.П. Словарь терминов французского структурализма // Структурализм: «за» и «против». - М., 1975. - С. 450-461.

306. Кубрякова Е.С., Демьянков В.З., Панкрац Ю.Г., Лузина Л.Г. Краткий словарь когнитивных терминов. - М., 1996. - 245 с.

307. Михельсон М. И. Большой толково-фразеологический словарь русского языка Михельсона: в 3 т. - М.: ЭТС, 2005.

308. Ожегов С.И. Толковый словарь русского языка под ред. Шведовой Н.Ю. - 4-е изд., дополненное. - М., 1997.

309. Снегирев И. М. Словарь русских пословиц и поговорок; Русские в своих пословицах. -М. : Терра, 1997. - 352 с.

310. Степанов Ю.С. Константы: словарь русской культуры. Опыт исследования. - М.: Языки русской культуры, 1997. - 824 с.

311. Longman Dictionary of English language and culture. Third edition. 2005.

312. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. Third edition with New Words supplement, Б.м., 2001.

313. Macmillan English Dictionary. - Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 2003.

314. Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary - Oxford University Press, 2000.

315. Simpson J., Speake J. The Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs (5 ed.). -Oxford University Press, 2009 - 388 p.

316. Urban Dictionary. Электронный ресурс. URL: http://www.urbandictionary.com/

Vladimir Putin: return of the king

It is virtually inevitable that Putin will next year become Russia's president again. What will that mean for Russia, the world, and indeed the man who just can't seem to give up power?

Luke Harding, The Guardian, Tuesday 27 September 2011

The year is 2024. The world's economic prospects have perked up a bit since the collapse of the euro. The Germans are happily spending deutchmarks again, the Greeks are back with the drachma. Almost all of the leaders in power a decade earlier have been swept away - Angela Merkel, David Cameron, and Nick Clegg (remember him?). Even Silvio Berlusconi has reluctantly accepted retirement. Italy's former premier now spends his days in his Sardinian villa with a group of showgirls.

Only one leader has defied the iron law that all politicians eventually leave office. His name? Vladimir Putin. Now 71, Putin has served two more terms as Russia's president - bringing the tally of his stints in the Kremlin up to a remarkable four - the final two lasting a total of 12 years. He is fitter and more vigorous than ever: Russian first state TV channel has recently shown him wrestling heroically with a python after it "escaped" from a Moscow zoo.

In theory, this is the moment when Putin should finally step down after a quarter of century at the apex of Russian power. He has already outlasted Leonid Brezhnev (18 years) and is closing in fast on comrade Stalin (a whopping 31).

Ridiculous predictions? Well, no. On Saturday Putin announced that he was standing for a third term as president in "elections" to be held next March. The man who has been keeping the Kremlin seat warm for him, Dmitry Medvedev, is to become Russia's prime minister. It's time to switch! At the Putin-led United Russia party conference, Medvedev endorsed Putin's triumphant return; the two men hugged, Medvedev's grin, admittedly, somewhat strained.

The news was, somehow, a bombshell and no surprise whatsoever. Over the past four years, poor Medvedev has had to live with the slur that - despite occupying the role of president - he was subservient to Putin, Russia's prime minister but pre-eminent leader. The jibes have been hurtful because they are true. It now appears that back in 2007, before he took the job, Medvedev had agreed to stand aside after one stint - in a sort of un-Granita pact.

Leaked last year, secret US cables offer an amusing portrait of the Putin/Medvedev relationship - an anomalous arrangement for Russia known as the "tandem". Traditionally, of course. Russia has always had one-man (or one-woman) authoritarian rule. Think Peter I. Catherine П. and Alexander Ш; Lenin. Stalin etc. The tandem was an unprecedented break with this historical tradition of conservative autocracy.'

Reading through these dispatches last year, I was struck by the slightly desperate but nevertheless creative way US analysts tried to make sense of impenetrable Kremlin politics. One cable by Eric Rubin, US deputy ambassador, suggested that Medvedev played Robin to Putin's Batman. It was a good analogy; it whizzed round the world, prompting Putin to complain of US "arrogance".

Other comparisons were equally unflattering. US diplomats cabled back to Washington the widely held view that Medvedev was the "junior partner", or Putin's "capable assistant". In the words of one scathing opposition politician he was "the Lilliputian to Putin's commander-in-chief." At a reputed 5ft 2in Medvedev is one of the shortest world leaders ever. It is "Putin who is pulling the strings," I read.

Another delightful comparison likened Putin to Cardinal Richelieu, with Medvedev cast in the role of Louis X1H

At the beginning of Medvedev's presidential term, diplomats, political observers and journalists raked over Medvedev's CV in search of clues. He was famously a fan of the superannuated British rockers Deep Purple. Did this mean that Medvedev would usher in a new, more friendly, era in London-Moscow relations? Or did it merely confirm that Medvedev was a bit of geek?

Despite all the evidence to the contrary, there was a vague optimism that Medvedev might just preside over a partial liberalisation of Russian society, after the rollback under Putin between 2000-2008 of democracy and basic rights. For starters, Mededvev had no background in Russia's sinister security services. He talked of reform and modernisation. Perhaps, then, Russia was finally moving away from its lugubrious KGB track.

By 2010, however, more or less everyone had concluded that Medvedev and his "liberal" agenda were phoney. Most correspondents stopped reporting Medvedev's speeches. They had become boring and lacking in credibility.

In some of the last dispatches released by WikiLeaks, US diplomats correctly predicted that Russia's "bicephalous ruling format" was fizzling out. "His [Putin's] return to the Kremlin is not inevitable. But should things remain stable Putin remains in a position to choose himself, Medvedev or another person to become Russia's next president," diplomat Susan Elliott wrote.

It's no shock, then, that, having carefully weighed up the options, Putin decided to choose

himself to be Russia's next president. His election is a foregone conclusion: in previous polls,

opposition candidates and anti-Kremlin parties fail to make it on to the ballot paper. With Russian

state TV having morphed into a daily Putin/Medvedev blog, Putin can expect blanket positive

coverage ahead of his coronation. No doubt there will be more macho photo-opportunities. Putin

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recently turned up to a convention of bikers, dressed in black and riding a Harley - merely one of a succession of stunts that has seen him ski down a volcano, pose with a polar bear and dive to the bottom of Russia's Lake Baikal in a submersible. He even appears now to have had a bit of face-work done.

So what now? The winds of change may be blowing across the Arab world, rolling from Egypt to Tripoli's Green Square. But Russians are looking at an endless Putin epoch, and a long period of political stagnation.

It's a bleak prospect. Liberals in Moscow and St Petersburg were yesterday posting a photo of Putin mocked up to look like Leonid Brezhnev - complete with military uniform, patriotic Soviet medals and a hammer and sickle. Putin even got Brezhnevian eyebrows.

Actually, the comparisons with the Brezhnev era are spot-on. Brezhnev presided over another era of political and economic stagnation, the 1970s, sustained by a commodities boom and high oil prices. He also had a war - he sent the Red Army to invade Afghanistan. In 2008 Putin did the same thing. He sent Russian tanks into Georgia, promising to hang Georgia's pro-western leader Mikheil Saakashvili "by the balls". It was a brutal lesson in neighbourhood geopolitics.

Brezhnev also presided over an Olympics - Moscow, 1980. Putin has the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi to look forward to, as well as the 2018 World Cup. (The scenario is already tantalising: an ignominious first-round exit by England after an off-form Wayne Rooney falls mysteriously ill with food poisoning. Foul play is discounted since England play so badly anyway. The Russian team sweeps to victory on the back of patriotic fervour and a curious offside decision).

International reaction to the weekend's news has hardly been ecstatic. Putin's world view is reflexively anti-western. He doesn't believe western countries are genuine democracies. He is by temperament suspicious and prone to a belief in conspiracies. The Obama administration put out a bland statement confirming that its "reset" with the Kremlin will go on. Privately, however, the White House will certainly not be delighted at the prospect of dealing with prickly President Putin again. The US administration's attempts to make Medvedev the "primary interlocutor" in negotiations - and to boost the "more progressive" forces he supposedly represented - were, alas, a waste of time.

To be fair, US diplomats always recognised that Putin was in charge, and that he was responsible for the recent modest improvement in relations following a period of mutual acrimony during the last years of the Bush White House. One 2009 dispatch by the US ambassador John Beyrle puts it like this: "We are not advocating circumventing Putin; to the contrary we cannot imagine improved US-Russian relations with his concurrence." Beyrle also talks about "managing Putin and his ego".

Relations with Britain are unlikely to get much better either. Andrei Lugovoi - the man who allegedly slipped radioactive polonium into former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko's tea - enjoys the personal protection of Putin. When the CPS requested his extradition in 2007, Putin responded by lambasting Britain's colonial "no brains" mentality. David Cameron did manage to meet Putin in Moscow this month, the first contact for four years. But it's safe to assume that President Putin won't be visiting London anytime soon.

The main sticking point is the row with Russia's FSB spy agency — the same agency that Putin headed before he became president in 2000.

Britain is convinced that there is an FSB dimension to Litvinenko's murder. It severed contact with it in 2007. The Kremlin sees this as humiliating. It wants cooperation with the FSB to resume. And it has made this a precondition of better relations. The ball is in Cameron's court - or in someone else's court when his Conservative-led coalition shuffles off into history.

Some commentators have persuasively suggested that Putin is tired of being Russia's leader. He would like nothing better, they argue, than to relax in his new palace in Sochi, on Russia's balmy Black Sea coast. The logic, however, of Putin's corrupt vertical state, is that he is forced to carry on. Putin is the only person capable of arbitrating between the Kremlin's rival factions, who are locked in a permanent and exhausting battle for money and influence. Without him, the system would fall apart.

Most crucially, Putin faces the prospect of law enforcement investigations into his alleged secret assets, should he ever decide to step off the throne. According to US diplomats, his main motivation for carrying on is to guarantee the safety of his own assets and those of his inner circle. No one quite knows how much Putin and his friends are worth. (Several of them feature prominently on the Forbes annual list). But the sums involved allegedly total many billions of dollars.

All this, of course, assumes that there is no revolution. With no prospect of removing Putin from power peacefully, and the Kremlin's succession politics as byzantine as ever, could it be a matter of time before Russians take things into their own hands? True, Putin is still Russia's most popular politician. But he is less popular than he was. And while his return to the Kremlin is guaranteed, his nervousness that he may one day be overthrown can only grow.

A One Man Show

Vladimir Putin should respond to protests against his party's fraudulent victory in parliamentary elections with reform

The Times, December 7,2011.

Only dogged optimists would see in the protests crackling across Russia since Sunday's fraudulent parliamentary elections the stirrings of a Slavic Spring. When John McCain, the US Republican Senator, took to Twitter to warn Vladimir Putin that "The Arab Spring is coming to a neighbourhood near you", he was surely driven more by hope than expectation. Even the millions of Russians who are mad as hell, and don't want to take it any more, acknowledge that they are probably going to have to take it for some while yet. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution notwithstanding, Russia has little tradition of major street protests, but a big tradition of crushing dissent.

Even so, Mr Putin can hardly fail to recognise the damage being done to his legitimacy, at home and abroad, by the sight of troops on the streets of Moscow, sent there to silence protesters accusing him of having rigged the Duma ballot. Mr Putin may not yet be vulnerable — there is no expectation that he will fail to resume his role as president next March after a choreographed quadrille with his political puppet. Dmitry Medvedev — but he has lost his air of invulnerability.

Swelling weariness at his domination of Russian politics, combined with fatigue at the flagrancy of official corruption (corruption in Russia has grown so rife, and so rapacious, that even Nigerians might be shocked) has resulted in Mr Putin suffering his worst election setback since he came to power a dozen years ago.

Disillusion is so great that Russians now routinely refer to the ruling party not by its name of United Russia, but by its nickname, "the party of crooks and thieves", coined by Aleksei Navalny, a prominent anti-corruption blogger. The arrest on Monday of Mr Navalny, along with hundreds of activists, is another sign of Mr Putin's faltering political touch. He has turned Mr Navalny from on online blogger into an offline martyr and celebrity rebel. Russia may have much experience of crushing dissent on the streets, but it has little experience of intimidating the internet, the soapbox from which today's dissidents attack Mr Putin's venality and contempt for democracy.

The internet has become the forum of discontent for young Russians who shiver at the prospect of a further 12 years of Putin politics, who dream of futures in foreign countries where they can fulfil their entrepreneurial dreams without needing to pave the path with kickbacks to

Kremlin cronies. When Mr Medvedev sent a message thanking Russians for their support at the ballot box, one internet blogger snapped back: "What support? No one supported you". Jettisoning the hapless Mr Medvedev may soon strike Mr Putin as a politically astute sacrifice. But it is unlikely to be enough to buy the obedience of protesters.

Even those who once felt able to stomach Mr Putin's authoritarianism as a price worth paying for peace and prosperity have become more ready to find fault now that the Russian economy has come off the boil and that Mr Putin's malfeasance is no longer camouflaged by the high prices Russia was long able to command for its oil.

Mr Putin has a choice. He could continue chaperoning Russia back into a Brezhnev-style era of economic and political stagnation, silence free speech still further, stifle human rights and alienate foreign investors. Alternatively, acting with the political maturity that a county as rich, as powerful and as smart as Russia deserves from its leaders, he could loosen his grip on the nation's throat and let it breathe more freely. The world should be offering him every encouragement and incentive to do so, while also making it clear that it is watching and will not stand idly by if he resorts to violently suppressing the protesters.Mr Putin has an opportunity to show the world that he can rule Russia not only with a strong fist, but also democratically, with a strong Opposition.

Russia. Politics begins at home

A new political landscape is emerging: local, energetic and mistrustful

The Economist, April 7,2012. From the print edition.

ONE month after Vladimir Putin was again elected Russian president, Moscow betrays few signs of drama. The protests that erupted in December have become sporadic, and the troops that were hauled in on election night are back in their barracks. The Kremlin has regained its composure without resorting to violence (as some had feared) or giving much political ground (as some had hoped). A month before Mr Putin's inauguration, his policies and the shape of his government remain unclear. But the implied message is that everything will carry on as before, bar a few tweaks here and there.

Yet that impression is deceptive. Although the protests are ebbing, the undercurrents that triggered the discontent are eroding the foundations of the Kremlin's political system. A poll by the Levada Centre found that only 17% of Russians want Mr Putin to be president in six years' time. More than 40% are looking for a fresh face.

Discontent has spread beyond the middle classes and the big cities, according to Mikhail Dmitriev, head of the Centre for Strategic Research, a think-tank, who foresaw the winter protests and is now conducting a study of non-middle-class Russians. His findings are yet to be published, but it is already clear that Mr Putin's supporters are losing motivation as his opponents grow in determination.

The broad unhappiness, says Mr Dmitriev, may not take the form of open protest, but it has already manifested itself in various regional elections. On April 1st an opposition candidate in Yaroslavl, an ancient city north-east of Moscow, won a landslide victory in a mayoral election against a Kremlin nominee. There was a similar result in Togliatti. a town in south-western Russia best known for making Lada cars. Such votes are starting to look like a trend, and as such carry a message to regional elites: being in opposition may now be a better idea than being an ally of the system. Equally important, say Russian analysts, was the involvement of journalists and Moscow-based election observers who ensured a genuinely fair poll in Yaroslavl. Real politics is spreading to the regional and municipal level.

Russians across the country want to elect their own governors. In Moscow protest has become more localised. A recent gathering next to Red Square, which resulted in the arrest of 85 activists, was an attempt to claw back city space taken over by the Kremlin. Protesters vowed to

return and may soon start demanding an early mayoral election in the capital.

The régionalisation of politics in Russia is not just a sign of grass-roots activism, says Mr Dmitriev, but a symptom of people's lack of trust in politicians and parties at the federal level. People are looking not for politicians boasting promises and programmes, but for local administrators capable of solving local problems. Top of the list are health care, education and roads.

One result of this mistrust is that it impedes the creation of national political parties. That is a problem for Russian liberals, who, unlike the Communists, lack organisation or unifying leaders. A new law simplifying the registration of parties will make this weakness only more apparent. It may explain why shrewd opposition politicians, including Alexei Kudrin, a former finance minister, and Alexei Navalny, a popular blogger, have chosen to work through civil-society initiatives rather than to form parties.

Mr Dmitriev says he also detects a deep suspicion of foreign powers, particularly America, that borders on xenophobia. This sentiment is largely the result of Kremlin propaganda, which over the past decade has cultivated the image of Russia as a fortress besieged by foreign enemies, and installed a cynical view that everybody is motivated by greed.

Of television and God

Take "Anatomy of a Protest", a pseudo-documentary screened last month by NTV, a state-controlled television channel. Like Soviet-era propaganda, the film rubbished protest leaders' talk of "dignity" and insinuated that they were in the pay of foreign governments. It seemed to recall the advice of Peter Verkhovensky. the chief provocateur in Dostovevsky's novel "Devils", who explains that "the best way to win over a Russian is by openly advocating a right to be dishonourable."

Aired twice in one week, NTV's film provoked protest from liberal Muscovites, turning them against anyone working for or advertising on the channel. "It was also meant", says one of NTV's more liberal-minded journalists, "as a deliberate humiliation to those of us who sympathised with the protests and tried to report them objectively." No journalist quit the channel, partly because of a lack of other work, and partly because of small new media freedoms granted by the Kremlin. But although state television can still transmit the Kremlin's message, its effectiveness is waning. When pollsters asked Russians about the protesters' motivation, twice as many cited dissatisfaction as money.

Well aware of the mistrust in state institutions, the Kremlin has attempted to draw on the

support of the Orthodox church; the patriarch in effect campaigned for Mr Putin's election. When

Pussy Riot, a group of young feminist punks decked out in balaclavas and fluorescent stockings,

danced and sang "Virgin Mary, Redeem us of Putin!" by the altar of Moscow's Cathedral of Christ

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the Saviour, church and state responded as one. As the head of the church thundered about blasphemy, the state arrested three of the women. They face up to seven years in jail if convicted of the trumped-up charges they face. The harsh approach has led to a split within the church and set liberal Russians against the patriarch. (His moral credentials have been further undermined by news of a lawsuit involving his private flat and photos of a $30,000 watch on his wrist).

Andrei Zorin, a cultural historian, says the NTV film and the treatment of Pussy Riot suggest that the Kremlin is betting on cynicism and hatred. But the tactic is risky: in a crisis, both sentiments could easily be turned against the Kremlin, as well as the church. A slide into left-leaning populism is one danger.

The only way to prevent radicalisation and ensure a transition of Russia's system into something more stable, Mr Dmitriev argues, is through the slow work of rebuilding trust and institutions. Success is far from certain, and time is short. But what other choice is there?

Russia's presidential election. Moscow doesn't believe in tears

Vladimir Putin returns to preside over a country whose people have grown increasingly mistrustful of him

The Economist, March 10,2012. From the print edition.

WITH hundreds of military lorries, menacing police vans, hovering helicopters and thousands of soldiers and riot police around, for much of the past week Moscow felt like an occupied city. The purpose of this mobilisation was to defend the official result of the presidential election on March 4th that gave Vladimir Putin, outgoing prime minister, 64% of the vote.

On election night, the army and police guarded some 100,000 grim-looking people who had been brought to Manezh Square, beneath the Kremlin walls, to celebrate Mr Putin's victory. Many of them were paid or coerced into joining the patriotic celebration. This was a very different lot from the middle-class Muscovites who had mostly voted against Mr Putin. Yet it was the Manezh Square crowd that Mr Putin chose to address.

"We won in an open and honest battle! Thank you friends, thank you!" Mr Putin said. A tear rolled down his face. It was the speech of a conqueror in a hostile capital. There were no kind words for his opponents, no promises to be a president for all Russians, no offers of compromise. Instead he spoke of a fight against "political provocations which have only one aim: to destroy Russian statehood and usurp power." The problem for Mr Putin, wrote Alexander Baunov, a columnist, is that he is not recognised as a legitimate president by a large minority of Russians and by a majority in Moscow.

Mr Putin has little reason for jubilation. The election was neither open nor honest. As Russian observers noted, all plausible opposition candidates were barred in advance, creating the impression that there was no alternative to Mr Putin. The Kremlin monopolises television, which remains the main source of news for much of the country. And by some estimates vote-rigging added at least ten percentage points to Mr Putin's tally. The main victim was Mikhail Prokhorov, a business tycoon and the only fresh face in the election. Officially he got 8%. His real vote was probably nearly twice that, says the League of Voters, a group set up by civil activists after a rigged parliamentary election in December.

Back then the electoral commission simply kicked out observers and blatantly falsified the count, especially in Moscow, leading tens of thousands of Muscovites to take to the streets. This time the Kremlin was cleverer. The counting was more transparent, but the numbers voting for Mr

Putin were artificially increased. Voters were transported to multiple polling stations in special buses. Electoral registers were inflated with people from state organisations both fake and genuine.

Bumping up Mr Putin's numbers was not just a way of ensuring that he won over 50% of the vote and thus did not have to endure a run-off, but a demonstration to his bureaucracy and security services that he is still in charge and able to mobilise whatever resources he needs to stay in power. Yet the fact that the Kremlin was forced to use more elaborate means to rig the election was also testimony to the growing pressure from civil society. Four times as many Russians volunteered to act as election observers as in December.

In Moscow, where Mr Putin got less than 50% of the vote and Mr Prokhorov more than 20%, the official result was notably closer to the figures provided by independent observers than in other parts of the country. This was one explanation for the relative lack of vigour in the protests in the capital. As Alexei Navalny, a popular blogger and protest leader, put it: "People did not feel they were as screwed."

Even so, 15,000 Muscovites gathered in Pushkin Square a day after the election. But the euphoria of earlier protests had given way to gloom and desperation. The demonstrators were split between those uncomfortable with the protest's growing radicalisation and those for whom it was not radical enough. Many middle-class Muscovites who had attended earlier rallies voted for Mr Prokhorov, who turned up at the protest. "I greet you, the free citizens of Russia," he said. "I thank those who gave me their votes, despite the fact that the election was dishonest." His speech was well received. Yet the biggest cheers went to Mr Navalny. "We are the real masters here!" he shouted. "We will occupy the streets and squares and we will not leave."

When the sanctioned part of the protest was over Mr Navalny and other opposition politicians, including Sergei Udaltsov, a young radical communist, stayed. An hour later the riot police moved in, arresting Mr Navalny and some 260 others. Most of them, including Mr Navalny, were released unharmed (the police were more brutal in St Petersburg). Mr Putin has so far preferred combative rhetoric and threats to real violence. He may hope that the rallies run out of steam.

Mr Navalny's calculated attempt to escalate the protests could not disguise their fading intensity. The next demonstration, on March 10th, say organisers, should concentrate on electoral fraud rather than general slogans such as "Russia without Putin". But with an election cycle over, it runs the risk of attracting even fewer people. Indeed, this may explain why the Moscow authorities are allowing it to take place.

The ideologists of the protest movement know that its current phase, which began in early

December under the banner of "honest elections", is reaching its limits. They say the movement

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needs not just a new format but a new focus. The next few months may see a shift to the regional and municipal level in Moscow and other big cities. "We must start the movement for bringing back the city in which we live," says a new protest manifesto.

This could mobilise the large number of Muscovites who are unhappy with the running of their city and want the freedom to choose their own mayor, as they cannot do now. Mikhail Dmitriev, head of the Centre for Strategic Research, a think-tank, says that Moscow's protesters are happier to take part in local than federal politics. A demand for a genuine mayoral election could create a platform for Mr Prokhorov, who won more votes in the presidential election than any liberal in the past decade has managed. Mr Putin instead suggested that Mr Prokhorov might join his incoming government, an option the tycoon had earlier ruled out.

Mr Putin is already seen by many as weaker than a decade ago. His popularity rating, pumped up before the election, is likely to deflate as discontent spreads. The Kremlin's tepid agreement to decentralise power and bring back elections of governors, made to mollify the December protesters, means politics is likely to get more regional, allowing some parts of Russia to develop faster than others. This could produce politicians who see more advantage in exploiting discontent with Mr Putin's system than in trying to save it.

Mr Dmitriev says the dip in the protesters' mood was inevitable. He compares it to short spells of depression during Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the 1980s. Such mood swings do not change the trend. "Russia is geographically so vast that any turn of the wheel has an enormous time lag," he says. This does not mean that the changes set in motion in December will dissipate. But the course they follow may be longer and less linear.

Country begins to tire of Putin's reign

Charles Clover, The Financial Times, June 20, 2012

"The movement of nations." Leo Tolstoy wrote, "is caused not by power, nor by intellectual activity, nor even by a combination of the two as historians have supposed."

Instead, he said, in one of the most overquoted passages from War and Peace, history is made by "the activity of all the people who participate in the events".

While perhaps not the most stunning insight into the human condition, it goes some way towards explaining a shift that has taken place in Russian society over the past six months: the people, after a decade-long hiatus, have once again become a factor in running the country.

While most Russian revolutions tend to be "meaningless and merciless", as the saving goes. this one has for the most part been impressive for its peacefulness (with the exception of a May 6 clash between protesters and police where dozens were injured).

It is unlikely to take on the proportions of the Arab spring or sweep the ruling elite from power in the manner of Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution, but it has nonetheless had a profound effect on political life.

For more than a decade since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, three factors have dominated Russia's politics.

First, there is Mr Putin, with his strongman style: second the group of ex-spies and security men he brought with him into the Kremlin in 2000. known as the siloviki ("strong men"): and third, the oil price, which has behaved as a sort of deus ex machina. occasionally intervening from offstage to rain down fabulous wealth or crash the rouble. Mostly the former.

However, that all changed last December, when, following gratuitously rigged parliamentary elections, the largest anti-Kremlin demonstrations since the early 1990s gathered 100,000 protesters.

The size of the marches has shrunk, but the causes of the protests have not - a palpable tiredness with Mr Putin's rule and a new demand for political rights among an emerging middle class.

Marchers seem to feel a new rush of energy following the return to power of Mr Putin on May 7, and on June 12, 50,000 to 70,000 demonstrated in central Moscow for democratic change.

Mr Putin's days as leader, which seemed limited only by his lifespan last September when he announced his return to the presidency, now seem numbered, unless he can reinvent himself as a

leader of the newly emerging elite who have suddenly found their political voice

Tax paying, private sector, internet-sawy workers account for a growing percentage of Russia's population, and it is chiefly from this group that the protest movement is drawn

They are demanding fair treatment from the state, say observers such as Konstantin Remchukov, editor of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the respected Moscow daily newspaper

"They pay taxes, they made it through two economic crises without the state's help and they have decided that they want the state to work for them now They are fed up with being humiliated," he says

Some find it ironic that the so-called middle class, who owe their relative prosperity to the

Putin era - most were impoverished by economic liberalisation in the 1990s, but saw their incomes

nearly triple in the decade of his rule - are leading the mutiny against the Kremlin

Even among pro-Kremlin commentators, there is a growing weariness of Mr Putin's rule

Maksim Shevchenko, a television journalist who is a strong critic of the anti-Putin

opposition, says "I consider Putin to be an effective crisis manager who pulled the country out of a

crisis in which we were threatened by the collapse of the state However, I do not consider him to be

irreplaceable He is not the only leader there is "

Many, including Mr Shevchenko, think it unlikely that Mr Putin will seek a fourth term as

president If he run again in 2018 "I think he would lose"

His current term, says Mr Shevchenko, should be devoted to guaranteeing a democratic

process and transition to real elections

He adds "Putin needs to be the father of the nation, like [John] Adams or [Ben] Franklin In

the next six years, he needs to formulate the principles of a democratic, free development of this

nation He needs to find a balance between managing the country and allowing it to develop "

There are too many examples, he savs. of Russian rulers standing in the way of history "The

Romanov empire collapsed because it was not ready for change"

However, he says anti-Putin opposition leaders such as Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalny,

have not managed to present an attractive alternative

"The only alternative they suggest is a restoration of the Yeltsin era, which is completely

unacceptable to a majority of the population "

Indeed, opinion polls show that, while people care about property rights, criticise election

fraud and corruption, and have ceased to see the Putin Kremlin as sacred repository of the Russian

nation, support for "liberal values" is low

The public distrusts much of the opposition which is too closely associated with the Yeltsin

years, known colloquially as the "era of seven bankers", when oligarchs were massively enriched

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by an insider-driven privatisation process and private property ended up concentrated into a few hands.

Many see only two options: the political system in the hands of a corrupt state bureaucracy, or in the private hands of an oligarchy.

Neither of these inspires confidence in an ability to protect basic rights and property - the hallmark of demands by a newly politicised middle class.

Given the choices, Mr Putin may be the lesser of two evils. He has been working to shore up his popularity with additional government spending (campaign pledges total 1 per cent of Russia's GDP for the next five years, not including a massive defence spending hike), as well as with an assertive foreign policy which has seen Russia play a spoiler role in the midst of the Syria crisis.

While Russia's refusal to endorse UN sanctions against Damascus has been met with international bewilderment and outrage, it has played well in Russia, where voters like to see their leaders standing up to the west.

The president's stance on Syria, defending embattled autocrat Bashar al-Assad from an angry populace, has uncomfortable echos for Mr Putin.

Amid signs of an impending crackdown, the Kremlin has backed down on political liberalisation promised made by former President Dmitry Medvedev last December.

Mr Medvedev's pledges to return elections for provincial governors and fairer registration rules for political parties were watered down by parliament before they were passed.

In one of his first acts as president, Mr Putin then rushed through parliament a law levelling draconian fines on protest violations. Some believe he may have miscalculated and the law will backfire, further aggravating political instability.

The June 12 demonstration, which saw a large uptick in numbers from previous protests, is the first evidence that the regime's hard line attitude may be counterproductive.

Roland Nash, chief strategist for Verno Capital, a hedge fund, says the worst case scenario feared by investors is an overreaction by the Kremlin and a crackdown. "So far, however, they are handling it better than the market feared."

It's Botox v Pathetic as top dogs fall out

Courtney Weaver, The Financial Times, December 24,2012

Putin and Medvedev's relationship has taken a turn for the worse, writes Courtney Weaver Winston Churchill famously described the behind-the-scenes politics of the Kremlin as "bulldogs fighting under a rug". But if the recent snapping and sniping is any indication, the current regime doesn't make carpets the way the Soviets used to. Over the past few weeks, the once chummy relationship between Russia's president and prime minister has taken a drastic turn for the worse -at least in terms of how it is portrayed publicly.

Back as top dog. Vladimir Putin has suddenly started taking jabs at Dmitry Medvedev, his one-time protégé, and hitting him right where it hurts.

Last Tuesday Mr Putin lashed out at the way the prime minister was running his government, blaming the body for "systemic failures" in balancing the budget. The same day, United Russia, the pro-Kremlin party, put forward a motion to undo one of the most visible changes of Mr Medvedev's presidency: the removal of winter time.

The measures are just the latest in a series of humiliating blows for Mr Medvedev, whose standing has fallen so low he is now referred to on Twitter as "#zhalkii" (pathetic).

After Mr Medvedev lowered the retirement age for top civil servants to 60 to create a younger, more dynamic government, the president raised it back up to 70. Mr Putin has also challenged a hallmark of the Medvedev presidency - Russia's 2008 victory in its short war with Georgia - by saying it was he who had advised Mr Medvedev.

As Kremlin photos can faithfully attest, the two men used to do everything together. They played badminton and billiards. They clinked glasses over football matches. They even traversed the slopes of Sochi in matching snowmobiles.

The prime minister has come out with guns blazing (or at least blazing by his standards).

Responding to Mr Putin's complaint about the budget's failures last week, he coyly suggested a solution: raid the coffers of Rosnefitegaz, the state energy holding that is controlled by Igor Sechin, one of Mr Putin's closest allies, and put the money towards the ballooning pension deficit.

The next day he suggested that the president had been responsible, in 2008, for causing New York-listed steel producer Mechel to lose half of its value during a single day of trading.

On Twitter, where the president has earned a nickname for his unnaturally smooth face, it is

now #Botox vs #Pathetic.

Sun sets on nobody

The jury is still out on Mr Medvedev's ultimate fate, but one battle he appears already to have lost is the fight against time itself.

Last year Mr Medvedev boldly announced that Russia would not turn back the clocks in 2011 and would stay on summer time. The reasoning for this was simple, he said. The time change would "upset the human biorhythm" and distress "cows and other animals that don't understand the clocks changing".

While the cows may have been happier, cosmopolitan Muscovites have been in uproar. Their favourite gadget, the iPhone, went ahead and turned the clocks back, causing many residents' October 30 to start an hour later. Watching the European Championships became impossible for those with a day job with kick-off pushed back from 11pm to midnight. A weekend trip to London now meant crossing four time zones in a four-hour flight.

By February, when most were at their wits' end, Mr Putin floated the idea of restoring winter time and last week United Russia put the motion to the Duma.

Andrei Vorobyov, a United Russia MP, said the summer-time experiment had been a disaster, adding that the number of instances of cardiovascular disease and depression had increased dramatically.

The new plan is for Russia to stay permanently on winter time, an even bigger affront to Moscow's young elite who will no longer be able to enjoy 10pm summer suppers in broad daylight - "the worst, most retrograde option of all those possible", as commentator Mikhail Fishman put it. "They are not just cancelling summer time in winter - they are bringing back winter time in summer. So it is not that it's going to grow light an hour later in winter, but that it's going to get dark an hour earlier in summer," Mr Fishman wrote on his Facebook page. "And all for the sake of giving Medvedev a daily reminder of the fact that with the onset of early dusk each day, he is a nobody."

There are many wavs to shear a pig, Mr Putin

The Russian president shares his proverbial lore with an Old Master and Eric Cantona 'Dutch Proverbs' by Pieter Brueghel: I'm not saying that President Putin borrowed his pig proverb from the painter, but Brueghel does show a peasant shearing a sheep sitting next to one shearing a Pig

Christopher Howse, The Daily Telegraph, June 26,2013

_ Vladimir Putin said: "It's like frying a whole herring for the sake of the roe." Well, he didn't actually use those words, but his remark yesterday about chasing Edward Snowden, the leaky fugitive from US justice, amounted to the same thing. "It's like shearing a pig - plenty of squealing but not much wool." he said.

The Russian words that he uttered were translated by broadcasters in a variety of ways. Some said, "there's a lot of screaming", which seemed to fit in with Mr Putin's KGB background. Such off-beam translations help to make proverbial lore sound mysteriously Russian.

It's quite easy to generate Russian proverbs just by translating English ones badly. Remember to insert the letter Y before each vowel when reading them out: "Sew now or darn later, as we say in Novosibirsk" (A stitch in time); "We have a saving in Oktvabrskv: watch out where you're jumping" (Look before your leap).

Pig proverbs clearly appeal to Mr Putin, who himself has an inexpressive, slightly inflated appearance, like a new leather sofa from DFS. I'd recommend: "The pig is stabbed in the belly." This is a variant of the rather blander: "What's done can't be undone." Or (perhaps as a rebuke to lax American security) there's: "When the gate is open the pigs will run into the com." I'm not sure there's an English equivalent, but it overlaps with: "When the cat's awav..."

Those piggy sayings all feature in Dutch Proverbs, a picture painted, in a style alarmingly like that of Hieronymus Bosch, by Pieter Brueghel in the 1550s. Many of the Dutch proverbs seem to concern poo, as we now like to call it, but never mind.

I'm not saying that Mr Putin borrowed his pig proverb from the painter thanks to evening classes in art history, but Brueghel does show a peasant shearing a sheep sitting next to one shearing a pig. Another peasant in the picture scatters roses before swine (pearls, perhaps, being unavailable in peasantish parts of the Low Countries). A sow is seen knocking the bung from a barrel so that the ale runs to waste. The Russian equivalent is no doubt: "Like a pig in a vodka shop ".

Very surprisingly, Brueghel shows, next to the pig department, a man banging his head

against a brick wall. It is surprising because it is precisely our proverb. Indeed, it is more an English idiom than a proverb, being fully active as a metaphor. You don't need to say it is like banging your head against a brick wall, you say that you are banging your head against a brick wall.

It hardly seems fair of Brueghel to steal our idiom four centuries avant la lettre. But the sensation of being robbed is only the reverse of hearing a professional Yorkshireman say, as if no one else had ever said it: "It's an ill wind, as us folk say in Pontefract."

It is also a cheat when foreigners make up proverbs. "When the seagulls follow the trawler, it is because they think sardines will be thrown into the sea." said Eric Cantona in 1995. There the problem was not in understanding the proverb, but in seeing what_possible application_it bore, Cantona had just been sentenced to 100 hours' community service for launching a drop-kick against a spectator after being sent off in a game against Crystal Palace.

Cantona's utterance, though, was simply a version of: "Wheresoever the carcase is. there will the eagles be gathered together." That was a proverb used by Jesus, as the "wheresoever" hints. But there are plenty of other proverbs from the Gospels that are now used quite unconsciously of their source. "The blind leading the blind" is one, which is also depicted in Brueghel's Where's Wallv?-style painting. That and the mote and beam are freely deployed by politicians with no sense of biblical trespass. In fact, the Russians have a mote-and-beam proverb that might be up Mr Putin's street, as it involves a pig: "A pig went up to a horse and said. 'Your feet are crooked and your hair isn't up to much.'"

Somehow we might have expected Mr Putin to come up with rather coarser proverbs, as if he had spent his youth in a pool hall in Sunderland. "All that jelly and no toast": "You don't look at the chimney-piece while you're poking the fire" - that sort of thing.

But if international relations are to be conducted via proverbs, I'd recommend two approaches. One is to use proverbs that appear quite devoid of sense. There are barns full of them, all certified genuine home-grown maxims - "When fern grows red, then milk is good with bread": "Old maids lead apes in hell": "Simpering like a furmitv kettle": "This bites the mare by the thumb." What can it all mean?

The deeper policy is to stock up with gnomic statements. These, by necessity true in themselves, may leave rival world leaders scratching their heads about the target at which they are aimed. The fire is never without heat. A quiet conscience sleeps in thunder. There's no sun without shadow. Acorns were good till they found bread. Ah, yes, how true.

Russia. Putin's retribution

The Guardian, March 1,2004, Leader

Vladimir Putin's decision to sack his entire cabinet just two weeks before a presidential election came out of the blue. He had been expected to jettison his prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, a man regarded as the last link to the discredited Yeltsin era, but not until after the election. Overturning conventional political logic, Putin made the sacking of a prime minister he appointed an electoral asset. But Russia is not a country where normal rules apply. Yeltsin got through five prime ministers in 17 months. Politics have been so stable - or so moribund - since those heady days, that Putin may have been injecting a welcome frisson of excitement into a campaign that has become embarrassingly one-sided. No one will know what direction Mr Putin intends to take until he nominates Mr Kasyanov's replacement. The markets speculate that the new prime minister will be pro-business. Most Russians are pro-business. The perennial question of Russian politics is: who profits from it?

Those who still cling to the belief that the chaos and misery of the Yeltsin era were just the painful birthpangs of democracy, are in the process of making the same mistake now. They agonise about Mr Putin as a man who wavers between market reform and political repression, between pragmatism and authoritarianism. But they are barking up the wrong birch tree. In the four years he has been in power, he has neither pursued nor rejected the path of democracy. It would be naive to believe that Mr Putin, himself the product of The Family, had undergone some Damascene conversion. His first act as president was to grant Yeltsin immunity from prosecution. He did not have Mikhail Khodorkovsky arrested because he was a Yeltsin-era oligarch. Roman Abramovich, owner of Chelsea, whose companies have been the subject of tax fraud investigations by the Russian Accounting Chamber, operates freely in Russia as an oligarch and a regional governor.

Mr Putin's mission has been to re-establish order after the wild chaos of the Yeltsin years. It may not be what the west's doctors ordered, but if you had lost your savings twice in a decade, if your heavy industry had been decimated and your traditional markets lost, if the Americans were running around Georgia installing presidents as once you had done, a strong Kremlin leader becomes attractive. Mr Putin is a provider to his loyalists and a nemesis to those who dare to oppose. The political legacy of Russia's free-market reforms is that democracy is a devalued coinage now that the rouble is able to float freely.

Russia's presidency. Guess who!

The news that Vladimir Putin will return to the Kremlin ends a four-year charade. The real question is how he can stay in power

The Economist, Octover 1,2011. From the print edition

NIKOLAI GOGOL'S play "The Government Inspector" ends with a scene in which the bureaucrats who mistook a flimsy impostor for a high official from St Petersburg are dumbstruck when a messenger announces the arrival of the real inspector-general. This week Russia enacted a postmodern version of this scene: the arrival of the genuine official was announced by the pretender, and the pair hugged in front of duped bureaucrats who rewarded them with a standing ovation for their clever performance.

This is roughly what happened on September 24th when Dmitry Medvedev, Russia's president, told a congress of the ruling United Russia party that Vladimir Putin would return to the Kremlin after a presidential election in March 2012, and Mr Putin informed them that Mr Medvedev would stay on as prime minister and leader of United Russia. The applause from bureaucrats whose only concern is to stay close to the rent-distributing centre grew louder when Mr Putin and Mr Medvedev told them that they had agreed this arrangement several years ago.

Mr Putin's return to the office he vacated in 2008 was largely expected. The shameless admission of the stitch-up, however, should have been a humiliating slap in the face for any self-respecting audience. It makes a mockery of any notion of open politics, democratic elections and independent institutions. It exposes Mr Medvedev's presidency as little more than a ploy used by Mr Putin to stay in power after his constitutionally mandated two-term presidential limit expired. It has made fools out of many of the 50m people who voted for Mr Medvedev in 2008, and those both in Russia and abroad who have cultivated him as some sort of liberal reformer since. Yet unlike the small number of high-minded citizens who protested, neither Mr Putin nor his bureaucrats saw anything shameful in the revelation that the job swap was pre-planned. In fact it was designed to explain why Mr Medvedev, a young politician in good health with apparent ambitions to stay on in the Kremlin, had stepped aside.

In Mr Putin's Russia it is informal arrangements, rather than such formalities as elections, that carry weight. As in a mafia, the word is bond, and loyalty matters more than competence. When Alexei Kudrin, Russia's long-serving and highly respected finance minister, objected to the choice of Mr Medvedev as prime minister, he was promptly dismissed (see article). According to a

rumour that spread through Moscow's chattering classes this week, to thank Mr Medvedev for sticking to the deal Mr Putin offered him any job he liked (bar one). Mr Medvedev plumped for the premiership. Whether or not this is true, it shows how cynically the political process is seen in Russia.

The news of Mr Putin's return does at least put an end to the embarrassing spectacle in which Mr Medvedev was cast as a president with a supporting cast of liberal-sounding cheerleaders. After next March Mr Putin's status as Russia's most powerful man will chime with his title as president.

That Mr Putin, who enjoys approval ratings of nearly 50%, wants to stay in power is not surprising. (If he runs for two terms he could stay in office until 2024). But it is the fatalistic acceptance of his decision by most of the country that makes it possible. Some Russians held their noses and turned the other way, others shrugged their shoulders, but few protested. In fact, the Kremlin often defends its actions, particularly to foreigners, by pointing to the "mindlessness" of Russians and the lack of a strong civil society. It is this, they say, rather than rulers who treat citizens like cattle and institutions with scorn, that lies at the heart of Russia's problems. In the meantime, as a former Kremlin official puts it, Russia has to rely on the restraint of its leaders.

Confident in its right to rule, the Kremlin has banned opponents from television studios and electoral registers, put election commissions under its control and created political clowns and clones to create an appearance of democratic choice. Such machinations, although they can get electoral results, are losing legitimacy. Under Mr Medvedev United Russia, already widely thought of as a party of "thieves and crooks", will lose more support. Even if the party finds a way to achieve 50% of the vote in parliamentary elections on December 4th, public irritation will grow.

Similarly, Mr Putin can make Mr Medvedev prime minister but he cannot make him respected by his colleagues, as the fallout from his row with Mr Kudrin shows. In the past month, the Kremlin has also alienated Mikhail Prokhorov, one of Russia's richest tycoons, who threw in the towel after making an attempt to participate in public politics.

The legitimacy question will also be central for Mr Putin. When he first became president in 2000, his popularity was guaranteed by a growing economy, spurred by rising oil prices, a devalued currency, macroeconomic stability, spare capacity left after the end of the Soviet Union and, above all, entrepreneurial activity. These sources of growth are all now exhausted. Higher oil prices seem to lead only to expectations of more public spending.

Before the weekend's announcement some observers argued that, once reinstalled in the

Kremlin, Mr Putin would reinvent himself as an economic liberal with a repressive streak (a

Russian Pinochet, in effect), and that he would appoint a prime minister who would bring public

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spending under control and find new sources of growth. Mr Medvedev's looming premiership makes this less likely. Mr Putin has little faith in market forces. The Kremlin's belief that the answer to Russia's economic problems is more spending on the military-industrial complex will only exacerbate the country's difficulties. Corruption is so deep, and the degradation of skills and education so acute, that most of the money will evaporate without trace.

The only way to promote growth is to foster competition, both economic and political, and the rule of law. But this is just what neither Mr Putin nor Mr Medvedev can deliver, as their job swap demonstrates. It is clear that Mr Putin wants to stay in power for the next 12 years. What is unclear is whether he can. His return is not a continuation of the past. It opens a new chapter in Russian history—one that may well end in crisis.

Russian politics. Why Russia needs me

The prime minister defends his record

The Economist, September 9, 2010. From the print edition

VLADIMIR PUTIN looked smooth, tanned and rested. He had a fun summer, most of it televised by state channels. He took a spin on a Harley with a bunch of bikers, had a go at flying a firefighting jet and dropping water on the wild forest-fires in central Russia, fired darts at a grey whale, and most recently drove thousands of miles across Russia's tundra in a canary-yellow Lada accompanied by dozens of foreign-made security cars and two spare Ladas—just in case.

Out of these antics emerged the image of a hands-on, no-nonsense and down-to-earth ruler who feels at ease with rough-speaking truck drivers. In any democratic country such public-relations stunts could have been mistaken for part of an election campaign. In Russia, where political competition is long gone, they are part of Mr Putin's political housekeeping, helping to keep up his image as a good tsar who is the flesh and blood of his people. When the Valdai club, a group of mostly foreign experts on Russia, asked him over dinner on September 6th about his plans for the next presidential election in 2012, Mr Putin positively glowed with pleasure.

He cited the example of Franklin Roosevelt who was elected American president four times to Mr Putin's twice (in 2000 and 2004). This answer was interpreted by most as a clear sign that the prime minister wants to come back as Russia's president for two more six-year terms. In fact, the question of Mr Putin's return is artificial, for he has never really left power in Russia, but simply switched job title.

More than two years into his presidency, Dmitry Medvedev seems no more powerful than when he was, in effect, appointed to the job by Mr Putin. There are signs, however, that the Kremlin wants to draw a stylistic distinction between the two men. This may explain Mr Medvedev's decision not to meet the Valdai club, as he did last year. On September 9th and 10th he was due to stage his own show in the Russian city of Yaroslavl, on his favourite theme of modernisation, which he advertised a year ago in an online article: "Go, Russia!"

Despite the commanding words, there has been precious little progress. After a few days of anguished discussion about Russia's direction, the Valdai club gloomily concluded that the country was stagnating—an opinion shared even by most Russian participants. The club said in a report that "there is practically no real modernisation, restructuring or diversification, oil and gas remain the main sources of revenue, corruption continues unchecked and there is almost zero innovation."

When these conclusions were put to Mr Putin, however, he largely rejected them as empty chatter that ignored his government's concrete deeds He cited the abolition of import duties on high-technology equipment and spoke of Russia's successful diversification into different industries He talked up the amount of foreign investment, even though he admitted that most of it was in the energy sector

But what his answers demonstrated was a firm belief in the virtues of today's political system The overriding purpose of modernisation is not to change the political set-up or overhaul state institutions, but to refine and preserve the system and justify the central role of the state (and the unchecked power of its security services)

Only the state and its guardians are capable of taking a country of Russia's size and history forward, the argument goes As Vladimir Yakumn, the head of Russia's railways and a former KGB officer who is close to Mr Putin, argued in a letter to The Economist last week, state capitalism of the Chinese kind "simply works better" Russia's past attempts to "reject all history and tradition, combined with the blind imitation of foreign experience, impeded the country's political and economic development for 20 years "

Yet the real problem is not that the state in Russia is too powerful or ambitious, but that it fails in its basic functions of providing adequate health care, security, justice and infrastructure At the same time, corruption has become institutionalised Earlier this year, at a forum in Krasnoyarsk that gathered the country's business and political elite, most participants were stuck to name one state institution that works

Paradoxically, the statist rhetoric is combined, in the minds of many officials, with extremely low expectations of what the state is supposed to accomplish This was starkly revealed in another Valdai interview, with a top official Responding to accusations of government ineffectiveness in tackling the summer's forest fires, he said it was never any use relying on the fire brigade, which always came too late People had to look after themselves The official argued that this was true everywhere, even in central London, where he owns a flat The idea of an accountable state providing public services was clearly absurd (unlike the idea of Russian bureaucrats owning expensive flats abroad)

The mam role of the state, to Mr Putin and his entourage, is to keep political order, or, to put

it differently, to protect the state and the vested interests of its bureaucracy Public protests

organised by opposition leaders are provocations Those who join them deserve what they get As

Mr Putin put it (thrice) in a recent interview with Kommersant, a daily newspaper, "Go out [to

demonstrate] without a permit—you get a whack on the head That's all there is to it" (The message

is frequently and dutifully put into practice by Moscow's not police—most recently during a

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demonstration on August 31st). Gesture politics

A leitmotif of the Valdai discussions was how Russia should deal with its troubled history. Should the authorities move Lenin from his Red Square mausoleum or repent for Stalin's crimes to draw a line under the violent 20th century? Kirill Rogov, a political analyst and participant at Valdai, says that such a symbolic gesture could add historical flavour to Mr Putin's return to the Kremlin, but what Russia needs is to redefine the limits of state violence. Moving the Bolshevik revolutionary or condemning Stalin's terror will not by itself shake the legacy of the Soviet past: the supremacy of the state over the people.