Факторы социально-политической дестабилизации в “афразийской” макрозоне нестабильности тема диссертации и автореферата по ВАК РФ 00.00.00, доктор наук Исаев Леонид Маркович

• Исаев Леонид Маркович
• доктор наук
• 2024

Оглавление диссертации доктор наук Исаев Леонид Маркович

Введение

Актуальность

Проблема исследования

Теоретико-методологические основания

Эмпирическая база и методы

Теоретическая значимость

Практическая значимость

Положения, выносимые на защиту

Научная новизна

Апробация

Формирование «афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности

«Арабская весна» как триггер глобальной протестной активности

Центр-периферийный диссонанс как фактор социально-

политической дестабилизации

Внутриэлитный раскол как фактор социально-политической

дестабилизации

Роль региональных акторов в процессах социально-политической

дестабилизации в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности

Глобальный аспект социально-политической дестабилизации в

«афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности

Децентрализация как возможный фатор противодействия

дестабилизационным процессам

Факторы устойчивости дуалистических монархий в странах

«афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности

Заключение

Список литературы

Приложения

Приложение А. Afrasian instability zone and its historical background

Приложение Б. Technological development and protest waves: Arab

spring as a trigger of the global phase transition

Приложение В. Center-periphery dissonance as a possible factor of the

Revolutionary wave of 2023-2024: a cross-cultural analysis

Приложение Г. Egyptian coup of 2013: an «econometric» analysis

Приложение Д. Dynastic sacredness: Islam and the Arab spring in

Morocco

Приложение Е. Russia and the New Middle East

Приложение Ж. Russia and the Middle East: from «honest broker» to

«status keeper»

Приложение З. Арабская весна и Лига арабских государств: между

Багдадом и Каиром

Приложение И. ЛАГ и Ближневосточный кризис

Приложение К. Federalism in the Middle East: state reconstruction projects and the Arab spring

1 Введение

Введение диссертации (часть автореферата) на тему «Факторы социально-политической дестабилизации в “афразийской” макрозоне нестабильности»

1.1 Актуальность

Настоящее диссертационное исследование направлено на выявление факторов социально-политической дестабилизации в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности. В последние десять лет мир-система испытывает мощный процесс реконфигурации, который очень сильно влияет на состояние обществ афразийской макрозоны нестабильности ^пшп, Korotayev 2015). Тем более, что он начался в ядре этой макрозоны с «арабской весны». Вместе с тем, во второй половине 2010-х - начале 2020-х гг. «афразийская» макрозона нестабильности и смежные с ней территории демонстрируют едва ли не большую нестабильность, чем в середине 2010-х гг. Число различных дестабилизационных событий в последнее десятилетие было очень велико и охватило большое количество стран от Марокко до Йемена, от Центральной Азии до Сахеля. При этом риски дестабилизации возрастают даже в тех странах, которые казались устойчивыми во время «арабской весны».

Таким образом, актуальность данной темы обусловлена тем, что определение реальных факторов дестабилизации является основой для последующего прогнозирования социально-политической динамики в изучаемой исключительно важной части современного мира. Данные прогнозы послужат базой для формирования представлений о сущности и динамике стратегических политических рисков и угроз.

В научном плане актуальность связана с необходимостью рассматривать процессы социально-политической дестабилизации в динамике, как постоянно меняющийся процесс. Это, в свою очередь, позволит лучше понять не только логику развития политического процесса в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности, но и внесет существенный вклад в развитие такого направления политической науки, как политическое изменение.

1.2 Проблема исследования

Мир-системная периферия, куда входит «афразийская» макрозона нестабильности, в последние годы развивалась столь быстро, что аналитические системы прогнозирования рисков, разработанные на материалах последних десятилетий прошлого века, не успевали адаптироваться к новой реальности. Ни одна из них не смогла, например, в 2010 г. спрогнозировать дестабилизацию в арабских странах, получившую название «арабская весна», революционную волну 2013-2014 гг. (Issaev, Korotayev, 2ткта 2015) или т.н. вторую революционную волну (получившую также метафорическое название «арабская весна 2.0» (Issaev, Korotayev 2022)) и др.

Более того, имевшиеся в распоряжении политической науки на начало XXI века представления о революционном процессе оказались также неспособными предвидеть столь масштабные дестабилизационные процессы, которые наблюдались в 2010-е гг. Доминирующей позицией среди исследователей того времени оставалась уверенность, что в основе революций лежат структурные особенности государств и системы международных отношений ^косро1 1979). Соответственно, стабильность режимов воспринималась как нормальное и понятное явление. «Арабская весна» и последовавшие за ней события показали несостоятельность подобного рода допущений и актуализировали необходимость разработки новых эффективных систем анализа текущего состояния и прогнозирования социально-политической дестабилизации. Что, в свою очередь, требует отдельного изучения факторов, способствовавших резкому росту социально-политической дестабилизации, начиная с 2010-х гг.

1.3 Теоретико-методологические основания

Как упоминалось выше, долгое время стабильность воспринималось как нормальное состояние, а задача теории сводилась к тому, чтобы выявить «краткий и непротиворечивый список» факторов, подрывающих стабильность

(Голдстоун 2006). Однако впоследствии несостоятельность данного подхода казалась все более очевидной. Одних лишь характеристик режима оказалось недостаточно для предсказания социально-политической дестабилизации. Кроме того, структурные условия также не могли объяснить последствия дестабилизации. Складывалось мение, что «Установление демократии или диктатуры ... характер нового режима, будь он исламский, коммунистические или либеральный, представляются случайными последствиями решений, принятых революционными лидерами, иностранными державами и сторонниками из числа народа, а также взаимодействия между ними» (Aminzade et al 2001). Так, в начале XXI века формировалось «четвертое поколение» теории революций, в рамках которого особое внимание уделялось условиям существования режимов в течение длительного времени, а исходным положением было рассмотрение стабильности как неочевидного явления, учитывающего широкий диапазон факторов и условий, приводящих к подрыву стабильности (Голдстоун 2006).

Таким образом, диссертация во многом основана на теории революций «четвертого поколения», существенный вклад в развитие которой внесли Beck (2011), Nepstad (2011; 2015), Goldstone (2014), Lawson (2019). Ведь изучение процессов социально-политической дестабилизации в странах «афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности происходило именно в рамках теории революций «четвертого поколения».

Для данного направления свойственно: во-первых, рассмотрение гораздо более широкого круга революционных кейсов; во-вторых, попытка объяснить широкий спектр революционных траекторий, включая вооруженные революции, направленные на перераспределение собственности (Goldstone, 2022), «революции по договоренности» (Lawson, 2019) или насильственные революции; в-третьих, акцентирование внимания на факторах, которые приводят как к стабильности, так и к нестабильности; и, наконец, рассмотрение международных влияний и интервенций как фундаментальных

и неотъемлемых, а иногда и определяющих элементов современных революций.

Среди наиболее сильных сторон теории «четвертого поколения» революций можно выделить следующие. 1) Акцентирование особого внимания на внутриэлитных конфликтах, как определяющем революционном факторе (Parsa 2000; Snyder 1998). 2) Выдвижение гипотезы о наибольшей уязвимости именно переходных режимов, нежели последовательно авторитарных или демократических (Albrecht & Koehler 2020; Slinko et al 2017). 3) Выявление роли идеологических, поколенческих и культурных факторов, которые являются движущими силами революции (Foran 2005; Шишкина 2017). 4) Рассмотрение революций не как отдельного явления, а в контексте региональной и глобальной динамики (Гринин 2019; Lawson 2019).

Основная проблема в рамках теории революций «четвертого поколения» заключалась в том, что она оказалась де-факто переходным этапом от «третьего поколения» к «пятому». Колинс Бек в этой связи справедливо отмечает, что исследователи этого поколения революции сосредоточились на критике более ранних работ, но не смогли закрепить новый подход: «Работа над изучением революций была сосредоточена на одном и том же небольшом количестве кейсов, а прогресс в разработке новой теории, похоже, застопорился» (Beck 2018).

Аналогичной точки зрения придерживается и Дж. Голдстоун, который отмечал, что «четвертое поколение» не будет последним словом в теории революции (Goldstone et al 2022). Несмотря на свои очевидные достоинства, относящиеся к этому поколению, теории не брали во внимание столь важные аспекты революций, как, например: роль женщин или гендерных вопросов в целом (Jayawardena 2016); проблемы расовой и этнической борьбы, рост радикального ислама как глобального революционного движения (Grinin et al. 2019), административно территориальный аспект и др.

Более того, отличительной чертой нового, «пятого поколения» теории революций является акцент на ненасильственных революциях. Так, многие ученые сегодня сходятся в мысли о роли ненасильственного протеста в успехе революции. За последнее время появилось немало работ, где говорится о том, что в целом ненасильственные протесты являются наиболее надежным (правда, не единственным и не всегда эффективным) путем смены режима (Bayer et al. 2016; Celestino & Gleditsch 2013; Kadivar, Caren 2016; Kadivar, Ketchley 2018).

Таким образом, теоретическая рамка диссертации также основывается на идеях, которые в настоящее время используются для разработки теории революций «пятого поколения». Среди таковых следует выделить работы Beissinger (2023), Bayat (2017), Della Porta (2016), Ritter (2015).

Наконец, настоящее исследование основывается на мир-системном подходе в части изучения процессов социально-политической дестабилизации в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности во взаимосвязи с глобальными историческими процессами. Проведенные ранее исследования (Bowlsby et al. 2020; Djuve et al. 2020) показали, что факторы, приводящие к успеху революций, меняются с течением времени, приобретая «форму как циклических паттернов, порождающих революционные волны, так и линейных, при которых определенные революционные процессы затухают, а новые, наоборот, получают свое развитие» (Goldstone, Grinin, Korotayev 2022).

1.4 . Эмпирическая база и методы

Исследование опирается на широкую эмпирическую базу, которую условно можно разделить на три группы. Во-первых, статистические данные, среди которых можно выделить: ключевые индикаторы Всемирного Банка1 (для оценки уровня социально-экономического развития государств «афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности, уровня женской занятости и т.д.);

1 World Bank Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org/

данные Отдела народонаселения ООН2 (для оценки демографического развития стран региона); данные Cross-National Time Series3 (для оценки уровня протестной активности и внутренних конфликтов); этнографическую базу данных Дж. Мердока4 (для оценки распространения ортокузенных браков); данные Freedom House5 (для оценки типа политического режима); индекс восприятия коррупции Transparency International6; данные Египетской фондовой биржи7 (как одного из индикаторов революционных событий).

Во-вторых, интервью с экспертами и непосредственными участниками революционных событий в странах Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки, представителями оппозиционных групп, а также официальных властей, которые были собраны в ходе регулярных полевых исследований в странах «афразийской» макозоны нестабильности с 2011 г. по настоящее время. В-третьих, данные, полученные в ходе включенного наблюдения, так как автор настоящего диссертационного был свидетелем дестабилизационных процессов в Египте (2011 г.), Йемене (2012, 2014-2015 гг.), Сирии (2011-2018 гг.), Ливане (2017-2018 гг.), Ираке (2019 г.), Мали (2021 г.), Нигере (2021 г.), Буркина-Фасо (2021, 2023 гг.), Иране (2017-2018 гг.) и Афганистане (2015, 2019 гг.).

Для работы над диссертационным исследованием использовался целостный комплекс методов с учетом того, что для выполнения различных задач использовались различные научные методы.

Важное место в данном исследовании, как уже отмечалось, отводилось мир-системной теории и, соответственно, мир-системному методу. Сущностной особенностью данного подхода является исследование исторической эволюции систем обществ, а не отдельных социумов. Мир-

2 UN Population Division Data, https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/data-landing-page

3 Cross-National Time Series Database, https://www.cntsdata.com/

4 Murdock G.P. Atlas of World Cultures. Pittsburgh, 1981.

5 Freedom in the World. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world

6 Corruption Perception Index, https://www.transparency.org/en

7 EGX Indices Data, https://www.egx.com.eg/; Trading Economics, https://tradingeconomics.com/

системный метод особенно важен для современного периода, поскольку взаимосвязанность в мировых процессах постоянно растет, что вызывает как быстрые изменения, так и серьезные сложности и конфликты в случае сбоев в мировых связях. Таким образом, мир-системный метод позволяет увидеть, как преломляются глобальные факторы и причины в процессах конкретных обществ или группы обществ. В частности, как многие причины социально-политической дестабилизации тесно связаны с глобальными и мир-системными процессами и аспектами.

Метод включенного наблюдения, экспертных и глубинных интервью применялся для оценки и анализа дестабилизационных процессов в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности. Исследования в области изучения процессов децентрализации проводились в рамках постколониальных исследований, которые являются мейнстримным подходом при изучении федерализма в незападных обществах. Метод статистического анализа, включая множественное порядковое регрессионное моделирование, использовался для выявления центр-периферийного диссонанса. Лонгитюдный анализ динамики биржевых индексов и золотовалютных резервов применялся для исследования политических процессов в кризисных обществах. Лонгитюдный анализ динамики глобального экономико-технологического роста и протестной активности использовался для выявления перехода протестной активности в качественно новое состояние. Метод коррелирования политических и социокультурных характеристик применялся для выявления параметров «афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности. Качественный контент-анализ использовался для выявления роли региональных и глобальных акторов в процессах социально-политической дестабилизации в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности.

1.5. Теоретическая значимость

Теоретическая значимость настоящей диссертации определяется ее вкладом в переосмысление теории революций «четвертого поколения» и

формировании основ «пятого поколения» теории революций. В этих целях предпринята попытка систематизировать накопленный опыт в области оценки и прогнозирования рисков социально-политической дестабилизации. В ходе изучения событий «арабской весны», а затем и событий т.н. второй революционной волны на Ближнем Востоке и Северной Африке конца 2010-х гг. стало ясно, что теория революций «четвертого поколения» не будет последним словом в теории революции. Несмотря на свои очевидные достоинства, относящиеся к этому поколению, теории не брали во внимание столь важные аспекты революций, как роль женщин или гендерных вопросов в целом; проблемы расовой и этнической борьбы, рост радикального ислама как глобального революционного движения и административно-территориальный аспект, который сыграл важнейшую роль в рассматриваемых революционных процессах. Кроме того, в XXI веке изменился сам характер революционных процессов, которые стали приобретать преимущественно невооруженный характер.

Можно утверждать, что теоретическая значимость данной работы заключается в формировании в рамках политической науки направления в области изучения процессов социально-политической дестабилизации в модернизирующихся странах. Диссертация вносит существенный вклад и в развитие методических основ изучения революционных процессов, а также оценки текущего состояния устойчивости социально-политических систем «афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности.

1.6. Практическая значимость

Практическая значимость работы связана с возможностью использования ее результатов и выводов для выявления особенностей революционного процесса в странах «афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности для принятия превентивных мер, препятствующих ухудшению ситуации. Это, в свою очередь, может послужить основой для выработки практических рекомендаций относительно инструментов и методов обеспечения

национальных интересов России в странах Азии и Африки с учетом глобальных вызовов развития «афразийской» зоны нестабильности. Результаты исследования используются в преподавании дисциплин «Современные революции в зарубежных странах», «Исламская политическая культура», «Внешняя политика России и урегулирование конфликтов» и «Россия и Ближний Восток» студентам образовательной программы бакалавриата и магистратуры в Национальном исследовательском университете «Высшая школа экономики». Результаты исследования легли в основу двух учебных пособий для студентов вузов: «Методика моделирования и прогнозирования рисков социально-политической дестабилизации» и «Политические процессы в странах Ближнего и Среднего Востока».

1.7. Положения, выносимые на защиту

1. Есть все основания рассматривать «афразийскую» зону нестабильности, как единое пространство, которое достаточно тесно коррелирует с территорией Омеййадского халифата, традиционного распространения ортокузенных браков, а также с зоной крайне низкой экономической активности женщин. Тем самым в этой зоне созданы условия для формирования более высокого уровня фрустрации среди молодежи, как наиболее склонной к радикальным действиям части общества.

2. На основе анализа революционной волны 2013-2014 гг. в «афразийской» зоне нестабильности было выявлено, что важным фактором социально-политической дестабилизации выступал т.н. центр-периферийный диссонанс. Возникновение этого фактора характерно для развивающихся обществ и обусловлено неоднородностью и асинхронностью модернизационных процессов, когда столицы почти всегда модернизируются быстрее, чем периферия. В 2010-х гг. наличие «центр-периферийного диссонанса» оказалось сильным предиктором не только относительно бескровных процессов невооруженной революционной дестабилизации, но и кровавых гражданский войн в изучаемой зоне.

3. В 2011-2012 гг. мир-система в определенной мере пережила переход к качественно новому состоянию глобальной протестной активности. Переход начала 2010-х гг. был подготовлен новой волной роста глобальной информационной связности, а также совершенствованием средств протестной самоорганизации за счет распространения новых технологий: Интернета, спутникового телевидения, социальных сетей, мобильной связи и т.д.

4. Определяющую роль в процессах социально-политической дестабилизации в странах «афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности сыграло наличие внутриэлитного раскола. На примере революционных событий в Египте в первой половине 2010-х гг. показано, что данный фактор сыграл ключевую роль в революции 2011 г., а также военном перевороте 2013 г. Успех революции 2011 г. был обусловлен расколом внутри египетской политической элиты на «старую» (военную) гвардию и «молодых» политиков, объединившихся вокруг сторонников сына президента Хосни Мубарака Гамаля. В свою очередь, государственный переворот 2013 г. в значительной степени был подготовлен примирением между египетской экономической и военной элитами, объединившихся для свержения власти исламистов.

5. Не разрешавшаяся на протяжении десятилетий проблема перераспределения власти между центральной властью и регионами стала одним из важнейших факторов дестабилизации в регионе. Исторически оказавшиеся сложносоставными и разнообразными такие государства региона, как Ирак, Йемен, Ливия, Сирия всегда были предрасположены к децентрализации из-за крайней неоднородности своего политического пространства, лишенного единства культуры, религии, языка, этнического субстрата. Но эта потребность в присущем федерализму сочетании самоуправления и разделенного правления (self-rule и shared-rule) десятилетиями не удовлетворялась, поскольку интенсивное строительство nation-state, сразу же охватившее постколониальные общества, жестко вытесняло федеративные проекты на задний план.

6. На примере протестов в Марокко и Иордании в 2010-е гг. показана стабилизирующая роль монархических институтов, что во много связано с морально-юридическим превосходством престола над любой оппозицией. Также показано, что марокканский (а также иорданский) опыт свидетельствует о наличии в руках монархов дополнительных инструментов стабилизации, а не использовании ими религиозного статуса, среди которых важную роль играет т.н. политика «бюрократизации» ислама -целенаправленное использование религиозных ритуалов и институтов для упрочения собственной власти.

7. На примере изучения военного переворота в Египте 2013 г. показано, что важным дестабилизирующим фактором в регионе стало формирование новых региональных альянсов. В то же самое время, существующие региональные институты (прежде всего, Лига арабских государств) не смогли выступить в качестве стабилизирующего фактора в регионе.

1.8. Научная новизна

Научная новизна диссертации заключается в выявлении особенностей и факторов социально-политической дестабилизации в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности.

1. Впервые введено в научный оборот и концептуализировано понятие «афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности. В частности, личный вклад автора состоял в выработке гипотезы о наличии цивилизационной основы для формирования «афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности и дальнейшем подробном описание каждой из зон.

2. Выявлен феномен центр-периферийного диссонанса и показана его роль в процессах социально-политической дестабилизации в данной макрозоне. В частности, личный вклад автора состоял в усовершенствовании методологического инструментария, предложенного Дж. Голдстоуном и позволяющего более точно описывать дестабилизационные процессы в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности.

3. Выявлена роль событий «арабской весны» как триггера глобальной протестной волны начала 2010-х гг. В частности, личный вклад автора состоял в сборе эмпирических данных, на основе которых удалось выявить ключевую роль глобальной информационной связанности и совершенствования средств протестной самоорганизации в переходе мир-системы в качественно новое состояние протестной активности.

4. Определен потенциал децентрализации как возможного фактора противодействия дестабилизационным процессам в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности. В частности, личный вклад автора заключался в том, что впервые в отечественной и зарубежной литературе была собрана обширная база данных по федеративным и децентрализационным проектам в странах Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки после «арабской весны».

5. Показано, что важным дестабилизирующим фактором в регионе стало формирование новых региональных альянсов.

6. Раскрыта роль внешних акторов и их влияние на процессы социально-политической дестабилизации в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности.

7. Выявлено значение внутриэлитного раскола как важнейшего фактора социально-политической дестабилизации в рассматриваемой макрозоне. В частности, личный вклад автора состоял в разработке на примере событий в Египте в 2011 и 2013 гг. методики выявления внутриэлитного раскола.

8. Подтверждено стабилизирующее влияние монархических институтов в «афразийской» макрозоне нестабильности. В частности, личный вклад автора состоял в осуществлении историографического обзора исламских положений о государстве и власти, по результатам которого был сделан вывод о наличии в исламской политической культуре сдержек и противовесов, которые ограничивали власть правителей.

1.9. Апробация

Основные результаты исследования по теме диссертации были представлены в виде более чем 50 устных докладов на международных

конференциях в России и за рубежом, включая: Annual Meeting of the Society of Cross-Cultural Research, IPSA World Congress, ISA World Congress, Annual Conference of African Econometric Society, Международный конгресс Российского общества социологов, Международная конференция африканистов, Международный конгресс по источниковедению и историографии стран Азии и Африки. Кроме того, итоги исследования были апробированы в рамках выступлений на научных мероприятиях, организованных Qatar University, Georgetown University in Qatar, Geneva Center for Security Policy, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, University of Shahid Beheshti in Tehran, TOBB University in Ankara, The Institute for National Security Studies in Israel.

Исследования по теме диссертации были поддержаны Российским научным фондом (грант 14-18-03615, 2014-2018; 14-11-00634, 2014-2018; 1818-00254, 2018-2022; 19-18-00155, 2019-2023; 21-18-00123, 2021-2023), Российским фондом фундаментальных исследований (грант 17-06-00476, 2017-2019) и Программой фундаментальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ (20142023).

2. Формирование «афразийской» макрозоны нестабильности

Статья, выбранная для защиты: Korotayev A., Issaev L., Shishkina A., Rudenko M. A., Ivanov Y. Afrasian Instability Zone and Its Historical Background // Social Evolution & History. 2016. Vol. 15. No. 2. P. 120-140.

В современной мир-системе можно выделить целый ряд крупных зон нестабильности. В предыдущих исследованиях были выделены пять главных зон нестабильности, которые условно можно обозначить как: центральноазиатскую (включающую, помимо Средней Азии, Афганистан и Пакистан), ближневосточную, североафриканскую, регион Сахеля и тихоокеанскую (см. прежде всего: Труевцев 2014). При этом последняя явно выделяется из общего списка, распространяясь исключительно вдоль границ Китайской Народной Республики и являясь скорее следствием китайских

внешнеполитических приоритетов и амбиций. Что же касается четырех остальных зон, то они в совокупности представляют собой макрозону, которую можно представить как единую непрерывную «афразийскую» макрозону нестабильности. Очевидно, что эта макрозона в настоящее время является основной в мир-системе областью концентрации внутренней социально-политической напряженности. Мир за пределами этой макрозоны выглядит сейчас намного более спокойным (Korotayev, Issaev, Shishkina, Rudenko,Ivanov 2016).

«Афразийская» макрозона нестабильности почти идеально совпадает с зоной распространения ортокузенного брака, Омеййадского халифата, а также с зоной сверхнизкой доли экономически активных женщин (Рис. 1). Чем же объясняется столь тесная корреляция? Почему, например, границы зоны традиционного распространения ортокузенного брака столь близки к границам Омеййадского халифата? С одной стороны, трудно отрицать наличие определенной функциональной связи между исламом и ортокузенным браком. В самом деле, подобная форма брака оказывается высоко адаптивной именно в традиционном исламском контексте (см., например: Rosenfeld 1957).

Рис. 1. Традиционная зона распространенности ортокузенного брака, территория Омеййадского халифата, зона сверхнизкой женской занятости и Афразийская макрозона нестабильности в сопоставлении.

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Приложения

Приложение А. Статья «Afrasian Instability Zone and Its Historical Background»

Korotayev A., Issaev L., Shishkina A., Rudenko M. A., Ivanov Y. Afrasian Instability Zone and Its Historical Background // Social Evolution & History. 2016. Vol. 15. No. 2. P. 120-140.

Abstract. The evolution of the Afroeurasian world-system which in the 'long 16th century' was transformed into the global World System comprised both economic and political components, some of which are discussed in the present article. Earlier research has identified four major zones of instability which can be designated as the Central Asian (including Afghanistan and Pakistan), the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel region. We suggest considering these four zones as a single Afrasian macrozone of instability. We show that this zone correlates rather closely with the zone of traditional prevalence of the parallel cousin marriage, as well as with the zone of very low female labor force participation rate, and the territory of the Umayyad Califate. The article demonstrates that this correlation is not coincidental and also discusses the factors and mechanisms that have produced it.

Разрешение на копирование: Согласно https://www.socionauki.ru/journal/seh/

Afrasian Instability Zone and Its Historical Background*

Andrey Korotayev, Leonid Issaev, Maria Rudenko, Alisa Shishkina, and Evgeny Ivanov

National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow

ABSTRACT

The evolution of the Afroeurasian world-system which in the 'long 16th century' was transformed into the global World System comprised both economic and political components, some of which are discussed in the present article. Earlier research has identified four major zones of instability which can be designated as the Central Asian (including Afghanistan and Pakistan), the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel region. We suggest considering these four zones as a single Afrasian macrozone of instability. We show that this zone correlates rather closely with the zone of traditional prevalence of the parallel cousin marriage, as well as with the zone of very low female labor force participation rate, and the territory of the Umayyad Califate. The article demonstrates that this correlation is not coincidental and also discusses the factors and mechanisms that have produced it.

INTRODUCTION

The evolution of the Afroeurasian world-system that in the 'long 16th century' transformed into the global World System (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2014) had not only economic but also political components some of which will be discussed in the present article.

In his article 'Regional Instability Zones' Konstantin Truev-tsev (2014) has identified five major zones of instability that can be

Social Evolution & History, Vol. 15 No. 2, September 2016 120-140 © 2016 'Uchitel' Publishing House

120

designated as the Central Asian (including Afghanistan and Pakistan), the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel region and the Pacific. The latter stands out from the general list, extending only along the borders of China, and its emergence is the result of the priorities and ambitions of China's foreign policy (Truevtsev 2014). Other regions in the aggregate represent a single continuous Afrasian macro-zone of instability.

Note that in addition to the presence of now traditional hotbeds of instability in the Afrasian macro-zone (due to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, chaos in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Mali, etc.), the situation has deteriorated markedly after the Arab Spring when the vacuum that emerged after the fall of a few political regimes began to be filled by various radical movements, which led to the emergence of new long-running conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, accompanied as well by the emergence of the phenomenon of the 'Islamic State' in Syria and Iraq exacerbated by notable weakness of the key regional players, on which depends the security of the region.

One can easily notice that all the four areas described above form a single continuous macro-zone of instability that can be called 'Afrasian Instability Macrozone' (Fig. 1). It is obvious that this macrozone currently is the major area of concentration of the internal social and political tensions. The world outside Afro-Asian zone looks now much calmer.1

V-

Fig. 1. Afro-Asian macro zone of instability

Compare now the Afrasian instability zone with the zone of parallel cousin marriage. One should note, of course, that in general, cousin marriages (marriages between first cousins) are widespread in the world traditional cultures (Ember 1983: 83; Pasternak et al. 1997: 133). But in most cases we speak about cross-cousin marriages (marriages to one's mother's brother's daughter [MBD] or father's sister's daughter [FSD]). The fact is that cross-cousins (children of a brother and a sister) belong to different lineages, and therefore the marriage between them is not usually considered incestuous, as it does not violate the principle of lineage exogamy (the ban to take a mate from one's own lineage), while the exogamy was a characteristic of the lineage organization of the overwhelming majority of the peoples in the world (see, e.g., Korotayev and Obolonkov 1989, 1990).

The other main type of this form of marriage, parallel cousin marriage, could be observed much more infrequently. Parallel cousin marriage can be divided into two subtypes: matrilateral (with one's mother's sister's daughter [MSD]) and patrilateral (with one's father's brother's daughter - the so called 'FBD marriage'). The first of these subtypes is extremely rare. Strictly speaking, the only such ethnographic case known is the Tuareg of the Sahara who traditionally preferred this form of marriage (Pershits 1998: 543).

The second subtype is much wider spread; however, it is testified to be preferred only in a few dozen (from several thousand) ethnic groups in the world, and at the same time the spatial distribution of these cultures has been rather limited. Fig. 2 shows a map of the traditional spread of parallel cousin marriage. The countries/regions where this form of marriage was traditionally widespread are marked in black, those countries/areas where it traditionally had a significant, but not very broad presence are marked in grey.

If we compare the area of the traditional prevalence of parallel cousin marriage with Afrasian macro-zone of socio-political instability, one can easily note that the spatial boundaries of both zones coincide almost perfectly.

Fig. 2. The traditional zone of parallel cousin marriage

Sources: Murdock 1967; Murdock et al. 1986, 1990, 1999-2000; Andreev 1949; Korotayev and Obolonkov 1989, 1990; Korotayev 2000c, etc.

However, we do not think that there is a causal relationship between these two variables (cross-cousin marriage and sociopolitical instability), although Kurtz (2007) suggests a hypothesis of the presence of this connection, referring to the work of one of the authors of the present article (Korotayev 2000c). We believe that there is some third, deeper, variable, apparently, of a civiliza-tional order underlies them. This observation is confirmed by the fact that Afrasian macro-zone of instability as well as the area of traditional spread of parallel cousin marriage, almost perfectly (with only a few exceptions) coincides with the zone of ultra-low values of female labor participation rate (see Fig. 3; for more details see also Korotayev, Issaev, and Shishkina 2015). In this figure the countries with ultra-low per cent (< 29) of economically active women in the total number of the adult female population (> 15 years) are marked in black, and countries with a very low (2938 per cent) share are marked in grey.

17' ; H IHk' ^ r ■

i I i

V-

Fig. 3. Countries with the lowest female labor force participation rates

Source: World Bank 2015.

As can be seen, the zone of very low female labor force participation rate is extremely close to the area of the traditional prevalence of parallel cousin marriage, as well as to the Afrasian macro-zone of sociopolitical instability. In this case, the functional relationship with the socio-political instability is clearer. For example, in Egypt, a strike of weavers in a textile factory in the town of al-Mahalla al-Kubra (that started on April 6, 2008) was a clear harbinger of the revolutionary events of 2011. During that strike, a group of young activists created on Facebook a group called '6 April Youth Movement' (as a group supporting the strikers [Wolman 2008]), which later became one of the main organizers of the January 25 Revolution in Egypt. Almost in any other countries outside the Afrasian instability zone, these would be predominantly women who would work at textile factories, while in the former case these are mostly men. If women, not men, had worked in the textile factory in al-Mahalla al-Kubra, they would have been unlikely 'to go out into the streets.' However, it is clear that here we speak about significant, but not the only most important factor generating social and political destabilization.

We should note that our earlier study of the phenomenon of parallel cousin marriage (Korotayev 2000c) demonstrate that the most strong correlation is observed when the presence of the parallel cousin marriage in a certain area is correlated with its inclusion in the Umayyad Caliphate. Indeed, in this case we reveal an espe-

cially strong correlation.2 On the whole, a very close match of all areas described above is obvious (see Fig. 4).

Countries with the lowest female labor

Afrasian instability zone

force participation rate

JT

Traditional parallel cousin marriage

The territory of the Umayyad Caliphate (by 750 CE)

Fig. 4. A comparison of traditional parallel cousin marriage zone, territory of the Umayyad Caliphate, area of extremely female labor force participation rate and Afrasian instability macrozone

What can explain such a close correlation? First, we will make an attempt to answer the question of why the traditional boundaries of the parallel cousin marriage zone are so close to the borders of the Umayyad Caliphate.

On the one hand, there seems to be no serious doubt that there is some functional connection between Islam and parallel cousin FBD marriage. Indeed, this marriage type appears to be highly adaptive within the Islamic context. As is well known, an important feature of Islamic Law (al-Sharfah) is that it insists that a daughter should have her share of inheritance, although half as much as a son's. What is more, she must have her firm share of inheritance in all types of property left by her father. '...The Quranic verses of inheritance (4: 7, 11-12, 176)... granted inheritance rights to... daughters... of the deceased in a patriarchal society where all rights were traditionally vested solely in male heirs. Similar legal rights would not occur in the West until the nine-

teenth century' (Esposito 1998: 95; see also, e.g., Schacht 1964; Esposito 1982, etc.). Islamic religious authorities often paid great attention to the observance of this rule, interpreting any attempts to deprive a daughter of her share in any type of property as a clear manifestation of Taghut, 'Satanic Law' (e.g., Dresch 1989).

This norm does not appear to have created any serious problems in nonagricultural mercantile Mecca. However, this norm often created serious problems in an intensive agriculturalist patrilin-eal exogamous patrilocal context.

Imagine, within such a context, an extended family of plow agriculturalists living in a monoclan village and possessing a large consolidated, easily exploitable plot of land. For this family to observe the above mentioned Islamic norm without changing its marriage patterns, would mean the following.

In every generation a significant proportion of the land will be inherited by daughters. However, with exogamous patrilocal marriage the daughters would have to be married to men of other villages. However, the people are plow agriculturalists who, in addition to that are also Muslims who observe (to at least some extent) Islamic woman seclusion. The daughter would be highly unlikely to till the land; it would be rather her husband who would actually plow and control it. Hence, the land would actually fall under the control of a daughter's husband's household.

As a result, within just a few generations what used to be a consolidated tract of land would turn into a patchwork of small plots virtually belonging to different households. The male members of our extended family would also, of course, get control over various small pieces of land through their wives. But a mosaic of small land pieces scattered about the vicinity would be an undesirable compensation for the loss of a large viable mass of land that the family would control.

Within such a context parallel cousin (FBD) marriage could really solve the problem. If your daughter marries your brother's son, the land that she would inherit remains under the control of your family and you have no problems described above (see, e.g., Rosenfeld 1957). Hence, the association of parallel cousin (FBD) marriage and Islam is not at all surprising.

However, one should emphasize several points. Islamic Law does not prohibit patrilateral parallel cousin (FBD) marriage. Nor

does it impose (or even recommend) it (e.g., Schacht 1964; al-Jaziin 1990/1410: 60-61). But most traditional cultures have a clear perception that marriage between a man and his father's brother's daughter (FBD) is incestuous. This is evident in the fact that in most languages a kinship term for FBD (or your mother's sister's daughter [MSD]) would be identical with a kinship term for one's sister. This normally implies that marriage with a FBD (or MSD) would be perceived as equivalent to marriage with a sister (Korotayev 1999). There appears to be something here that Kronenfeld (2000) called a 'cognitive problem.' 3

Within such a context the mere permission to marry a FBD is insufficient to overcome the above mentioned cognitive problem, even if such a marriage brought some clear economic advantages for a groom and his family (as actually occurs, e.g., within most Muslim societies of sub-Saharan Africa). Evidently, there should be something else in addition to Islamization to persuade someone to act in this way. That 'something else' was present in the Arab-Islamic Khalifate of the seventh and eighth centuries (at least up to AD 751). What was it?

We have little doubt that the vast majority of known cases of preferred patrilineal parallel cousin marriage is the result of diffusion from a single source. It is rather possible that the above-described 'cognitive problem' had been solved only once (at least to the extent that led to the formation of preferred patrilineal parallel cousin marriage) and this led eventually to the emergence of dozens of cultures characterized by this marriage practice and occupying large, yet compact enough area of the Old World.

In the era of its origin, the preferred patrilineal parallel cousin marriage had nothing to do with Islam. Cognitive problem was apparently solved somewhere in the Syro-Palestinian region long before the birth of Christ (the oldest mentions of this practice were connected with the Jews in the Old Testament [Fox 2011: 145]). Rodionov (1999) draws researchers' attention to the fact that this marriage pattern is widespread in the non-Islamic cultures of this area (e.g., Maronites or Druze) and that it has a considerable functional value there in this non-Islamic context with facilitating the division of property among brothers after their father's death (Rodionov 1999). Indeed, this marriage pattern could hardly be attributed to Islamic or Arab influence here. It seems, rather, that

this marriage pattern in the Islamic world and the non-Islamic Sy-ro-Palestinian cultures stems from the same source.

However, in the pre-Islamic period the patrilineal parallel cousin marriage was spread in extremely limited territories. The situation changed a bit in the fourth and fifth centuries CE. In the late fourth century the Himyarite rulers of Yemen converted to Judaism and introduced Judaism as the state religion of their empire. In that period, the Kindites, who controlled Central Arabia, were Himyarite vassals. It is not surprising that the Himyarite vassals soon also began to practice Judaism. As is well known, the Jewish tribes (in reality Judaized Arab tribes) were dominant in Yathrib (modern Medina) in the fifth and sixth centuries; in the oases to the north of Yathrib the Jewish tribes were dominant even at the time of the Hijrah. Thus, in the fifth century, a major part of the Arabian Peninsula experienced the Judaization to varying degrees (see, e.g., Crone 1987; Bolshakov 1989; Korotayev 1996a, 2003; Korotayev, Klimenko, and Proussakov 1999, 2007; Gajda 2009; Bowersock 2013).

Against this background, it is not surprising that almost the only area adjacent to the Syro-Palestinian region where this form of marriage became fairly widespread before Islam period had been the Arabian Peninsula where its spread could be associated with significant Jewish influence well detected in this area in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries CE. A special role was played by the Judaization of Kindah, the most notable Arab clan in the fifth century (e.g., Korotayev, Klimenko, and Proussakov 1999, 2007). The Jewish practices which they employed could in principle be borrowed by other Arab clans, even if they did not convert to Judaism, due to the extremely high prestige of the Kindites.

However that may be, by the seventh century the preferred pat-rilineal parallel cousin marriage had become fairly widespread among several influential Arab tribal groups (e.g., Negrya 1981; Kudelin 1994). In the seventh and eighth centuries this pattern explosively diffused when the Arab tribes, supported by Islam, spread throughout the whole of the Omayyid Khalifate. Although preferential parallel cousin marriage diffused (together with Islam and Arabs) later beyond the borders of the Umayyad Khalifate, the extent of this diffusion was very limited. Hence the present distribution of the FBD marriage has been essentially created by the Muslim Arab conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries. Hence

the strong correlation between the degree of the Islamization and the presence of the parallel cousin FBD marriages is to a considerable extent a product of network autocorrelation (e.g., de Munck and Korotayev 2000; Korotayev and de Munck 2003) produced by the Arab-Islamic historical context.

It appears appropriate to note here that Russian and Islamic Studies traditionally designated Islamic civilization as 'Arab-Muslim' (which often met strong objections from the Muslim colleagues from former Soviet Central Asia [e.g., Ahmadjonzoda 1988]). However, this designation is helpful in some respects. The fact is that this civilization (especially within the territory of the first Islamic Empire) seems to contain important Arab non-Islamic elements and cannot be perceived without taking them into account.

It is important to mention that the Arabs were the dominant ethnic within the Islamic Empire at least until the Abbasid revolution in the middle of the eighth century CE (e.g., Shaban 1970), and the Arab culture as a whole (including its non-Islamic components, like preferential parallel cousin [FBD] marriage) acquired a high prestige and proliferated within the borders of the Empire.

With the conquests, the Arabs found themselves in charge of a huge non-Arab population. Given that it was non-Muslim, this population could be awarded a status similar to that of clients in Arabia, retaining its own organization under Arab control in return for the payment of taxes... But converts posed a novel problem in that, on the one hand, they had to be incorporated, not merely accommodated, within Arab society; and on the other hand, they had forgotten their genealogies, suffered defeat and frequently also enslavement, so that they did not make acceptable hatlfs; the only non-Arabs to be affiliated as such were the Hamra' and Asawira, Persian soldiers who deserted to the Arabs during the wars of conquest in return for privileged status... It was in response to this novel problem that Islamic wala' [i.e., the system of integration of non-Arab Muslims into Islamic society as dependent maw all - A. K, L. I., M. R., A. S. and E. I.] was evolved (Crone 1991: 875).

It appears a bit amazing that such a highly-qualified specialist in early Islamic history as Crone managed to overlook another (and much more important!) exception; the Yemenis (most of them hardly belonged to the Arab proto-ethnos by the early seventh century CE). The possible explanation here might be that Yemeni ef-

forts4 aimed at persuading the Arabs that southern Arabians had always been Arabs, were quite as much as Arab as the Arabs themselves, or even more Arab than the Arabs (al-'arab al-'aribah as distinct from al-'arab al-musta'ribah [e.g., Piotrovskiy 1977: 20, 23, 29; 1985: 67; Shahid 1989: 340-341; Robin 1991b: 64; Korota-yev 2006]) turned out to be so successful that they managed to persuade not only themselves and the Arabs, but the Arabists as well.

However, in order to be recognized as Arabs, hence as competent members of early Islamic society, the Yemenis had to adopt many Arab practices, even those that had no direct link to Islam. A good example of this is the borrowing of the Arab genealogical tradition by the Yemenis.

In strong contrast to the North Arabian practice of recording long lists of ancestors (attested also for the pre-Islamic period in the Safaitic inscriptions), E[pigraphic] S[outh] A[rabian] nomenclature consisted simply of given-name plus name of the social grouping (usually the bayt), with optional insertion of the father's given-name, but never any mention of an ancestor in any higher degree. One is irresistibly reminded of the remark attributed to the caliph 'Umar, 'Learn your genealogies, and be not like the Naba-taeans of Mesopotamia who, when asked who they are, say "I am from such-and-such a village" which Ibn Khaldun quotes with the very significant comment that it is true also of the populations of the fertile tracts of Arabia... [The] qabila... [is] fundamentally kinship-based and totally different in nature from the sha'b... In the Qur'an (49:13) ja'alna-kum shu'uban wa-qaba'ila clearly refers to two different types of social organization, and Ibn Khaldun when speaking of the settled populations of Arabia is careful to use the word shu'ub and not qaba'il, reserving the latter for the nomads' (Beeston 1972a: 257-258; see also Ibn al-Kalbi 1966; Beeston 1972b: 543; Ryckmans 1974: 500; Robin 1982a: v. I; 1982b; 1991a; Piotrovskiy 1985: 53, 69; Korotayev 1995, 1996b, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2006; Bondarenko and Koro-tayev 2000c).

In early Islamic times, under the influence of northern Arabian tribal culture which acquired the highest prestige in the Muslim world, many southern Arabian sha'bs, while remaining essentially territorial (Dresch 1989; Serjeant 1989: XI; Korotayev 2006), were transformed into qaba'il, tribes structured formally according to genealogical principles. This transformation was also the result of the

southern Arabians' intense effort aimed at development of their own genealogies, as well as their passionate (and quite successful) struggle for the recognition of their genealogies by the Arab elite. In this way they were able to attain quite high positions in the dominant Arab ethnos within the early Islamic state in the period between the seventh and mid-eighth centuries (Piotrovskiy 1977, 1985).

All this suggests that within the Umayyid Caliphate there was a strong informal pressure on the Islamicized non-Arab groups to adopt Arab norms and practices, even if they had no direct connection with Islam (e.g., genealogies and preferential parallel cousin marriage). On the other hand, after these cultural traits were adopted, particularly FBD marriage, their high functional value in the Islamic context would help to reproduce the Arab cultural patterns for generations. In that historical context when the Arabs were the dominant ethnic group, their norms and practices were borrowed by Islam-isized non-Arab groups striving to achieve a full social status. Thus a systematic transition to FBD marriage took place when Islamization occurred together with Arabization. This was precisely the situation within the Arab Islamic Caliphate in the seventh and eighth centuries. And this might be the major explanation for such a strong correlation between the area of the traditional parallel cousin FBD marriage prevalence and the territory of the Umayyad Caliphate.

Thus, the parallel cousin marriage serves, in fact, quite a good marker of belonging to the Arab-Islamic civilization. There are reasons to believe that some characteristics of this civilization in modern conditions contributed to the growth of sociopolitical de-stabilization in condition of accelerating modernization of respective societies. In this paper we will focus only on some of them.

Apparently, one of these characteristics could be the combination of strict prohibitions on extramarital sexual relations together with a number of marriage and family customs, which in conditions of modernization have led to a sharp increase in the age of marriage, especially for men (see, e.g., Rashad, Osman, and Roudi-Fahimi 2005: 6; Marks 2011a: 5, 25; 2011b; Puschmann and Matthijs 2012: 15, 19).

One should note that in the Arab countries the practice of early marriage, in particular for women, was traditionally very widespread (which, incidentally, was typical of the vast majority of traditional societies [Schlegel and Barry 1991]). Often the bride's family hid a girl's true age to give her in marriage as soon as possi-

ble. At his time, Kamel Nahas (1954) singled out the following reasons of early marriage in the Arab countries. Firstly, from a religious point of view, marriage is a sacred duty, the Qur'an encourages the creation of family and marriage. Second, the early appearance of sexual desire necessitates the marriage to avoid sin. Third, in the Arab countries a strict gender division is adopted. Fourth, the spread of the desire to have children, both among men and women, is important. Fifth, a girl should have no sexual relations with a man before marriage, because otherwise it would jeopardize the honor of her family (so the girl's family seeks early marriage to save their honor) (Nahas 1954).

However, due to the inclusion of all the Arab countries in the modernization processes we can observe a distinct change in all spheres of society, including the sphere of marriage and family relations. In recent decades modernization has led to the widespread increase in the marriageable age, but in the Arab world such a phenomenon is especially pronounced among males (see Fig. 5).

34

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Fig. 5. Dynamics of the average age of first marriage (in years) for men in some Arab countries in recent decades

Source: UN Population Division 2015.

One of the main reasons for the widespread increase in the average age of the first marriage is that young people are with increasing frequency unable to make the engagement due to financial difficulties. Over recent decades, the wedding in Islamic countries has become particularly expensive for both groom and bride, as well as for their families. The groom must pay the mahr5 and to accept

obligations of the full financial support of his wife and children (note that this correlates rather closely with the very low female labor force participation rates that are so typical for the Afrasian Instability Zone); at the same time the size of the official mahr and informal bride price (fee paid by the groom for the bride to her parents) in recent decades has grown enormously.6

Thus, a wedding needs an immense amount of money, and a male, who is responsible for the payment of the major part of this amount, has to work hard to earn it. Many young people after the agreement of engagement leave for a few years to work in one of the oil-producing Arab countries in order to save money. On average, up to 30 years an ordinary Arab Muslim can hardly afford to get married, because first he has to find a job with a salary sufficient to purchase a car, to build a house or buy an apartment, furniture, and finally, have to pay mahr for the bride and buy an expensive wedding gift for her (e.g., Shmeleva 2003: 67-71).

The joyous traditions surrounding an Arab marriage have combined with the region's increasing modernization and consumerism to make marriage ceremonies and related requirements in Arab countries extremely expensive. Arab young men in their 20s commonly say that they are saving now in order to be able to marry some years in the future [Rashad, Osman, and Roudi-Fahimi 2005: 6].

The rising costs of marriage are the important reason for its postponement. By the end of the 1990s, an average marriage in Egypt cost approximately US$ 6,000, while the annual national income per capita was only US$ 1,490. This explains why young men and their families for years had to save money in order to finally get married (Puschmann and Matthijs 2012: 19).

In this regard, in 2005, Mensch, Singh, and Casterline noted:

It seems reasonable that postponement of marriage, beyond certain point, may not be considered universally positive, even if the delay is caused by heightened expectations rather than declining economic circumstances. Indeed, late age at marriage, if it arises from limited resources, may not be viewed as desirable by young men - it may be a source of frustration, particularly where premarital sex is not condoned (Mensch, Singh, and Casterline 2005: 26).7

In this regard, it seems relevant that unmarried men are much more prone to radicalism and extremist political actions (including direct terrorism) than married men of the same age, that has been shown with the use of direct empirical data on Egypt (Marks 2011a: 9-17). Thus, a significant increase in the average age of marriage among men observed in the last decades in most Arab countries can be considered as a significant factor of socio-political instability in this part of the globe. This appears to be a rather significant channel (but, of course, in no way the only one) through which certain peculiarities of the Arab-Islamic civilization contributed to the formation of the Afrasian instability zone.

NOTES

* The study was implemented within the framework of the HSE's Basic Research Program in 2016 with the support of the Russian Science Foundation (project № 14-18-03615).

1 Yet, the processes of socio-political destabilization are also observed outside this area. For example, in the period between 2013 and 2014 quite strong socio-political upheavals were observed in Thailand, the Ukraine, Venezuela and Bosnia.

2 That has been shown via formal statistical procedures as well (Korotayev 2000c).

3 The comment was made by D. Kronenfeld during the 29th Annual Meeting of the Society for Cross-Cultural Research in New Orleans, LA, on February 24, 2000 during the discussion of Andrey Korotayev's paper on the parallel cousin marriage correlates.

4 And these efforts were by no means senseless, as some Arabs for some time refused to recognize the Arab identity of the Yemenis (e.g., Piotrovskiy 1985: 67).

5 The term mahr in the Muslim family law is used to designate the property allocated by the husband to his wife at the conclusion of equal marriage (zawaj). The payment of mahr is the main condition of the marriage and is regarded as a fee for the marriage to one's wife. In this context, the mahr can be absolutely anything that has any value and to that the right of property can be extended (see Spies 1913-1936; Bogolyubov 1991: 164).

6 Thus, for example, in Libya in the first half of the 1970s (during the oil boom), the average size of payments for the bride jumped from US$ 3,500 to US$ 35,000 just in a few years (Toros 1975: 3).

7 This could be applied to the countries of the Arab-Muslim civilization in the highest degree. Here, the honour of a young girl is the highest virtue, a source of pride of her family and a prerequisite for the marriage (confirmation of a bride's virginity is the confirmation of family honour) [Dialmy and Uhlmann 2005: 19]. The ritual of the confirmation of bride's chastity is particularly important for the groom since it determines his male viability and status in the society.

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Приложение Б. Статья «Technological development and protest waves: Arab spring as a trigger of the global phase transition?»

Akaev A., Korotayev A., Issaev L., Zinkina J. V. Technological development and protest waves: Arab spring as a trigger of the global phase transition? // Technological Forecasting and Social Change. 2017. Vol. 116. P. 316321. DOI: 10.1016/j .techfore.2016.08.009

Abstract. There are grounds to conclude that in 2011-2012 the World System experienced to some extent a phase transition to a qualitatively new state of global protest activity. This phase transition is shown to bear some resemblance to the one which the World System experienced in the early 1960s. The first (after 1919) phase transition of this sort occurred in the early 1960s and was related to the growth of global informational connectivity after World War II, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of television, portable radio receivers, portable electric loud-speakers and other technologies of the Fourth Kondratieff Cycle. The phase transition of the early 2010s was prepared by a new wave of growth of global informational connectivity, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of various technologies of the Fifth Kondratieff cycle (the Internet, satellite television, Twitter and other social networks, mobile telephony etc.). Similarly to what was observed during the Fourth Kondratieff Wave, during the Fifth Cyclewhile the spread of these technologies was going on for many years before 2011, their internal colossal potential for generating and spreading protest activity was realized in one leap, as a phase transition.

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Technological Forecasting & Social Change

From my perspective

Technological development and protest waves: Arab spring as a trigger of the global phase transition?

CrossMark

Askar Akaev, Andrey Korotayev *, Leonid Issaev, Julia Zinkina

National Research University Higher School of Economics, Laboratory of Monitoring of Risks of Sociopolitical Destabilization, 20 Myasnitskaya, 101000 Moscow, Russian Federation

ARTICLE INFO

Article history: Received 9 July 2016 Accepted 8 August 2016 Available online 4 October 2016

Keywords: Kondratieff cycles hype-cycles Internet Arab Spring

Sociopolitical destabilization Protest activity

ABSTRACT

There are grounds to conclude that in 2011-2012 the World System experienced to some extent a phase transition to a qualitatively new state of global protest activity. This phase transition is shown to bear some resemblance to the one which the World System experienced in the early 1960s. The first (after 1919) phase transition of this sort occurred in the early 1960s and was related to the growth of global informational connectivity after World War II, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of television, portable radio receivers, portable electric loud-speakers and other technologies of the Fourth Kondratieff Cycle. The phase transition of the early 2010s was prepared by a new wave of growth of global informational connectivity, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of various technologies of the Fifth Kondratieff cycle (the Internet, satellite television, Twitter and other social networks, mobile telephony etc.). Similarly to what was observed during the Fourth Kondratieff Wave, during the Fifth Cycle while the spread of these technologies was going on for many years before 2011, their internal colossal potential for generating and spreading protest activity was realized in one leap, as a phase transition.

© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

In this article we will demonstrate that Kondratieff waves can be traced not only within various economic and technological indicators, but also within the global pattern of protests. What is more, Kondratieff waves in technologies appear to be tightly connected with the K-waves in global protests that in their turn are tied - through the mechanism of expectations - with the hype cycle. On the other hand, we will demonstrate that the colossal potential of relevant technologies of a particular K-cycle to generate and spread protest activities tends to be realized in one leap, as a phase transition.

In particular, we will show that the recent upsurge in the global protest activities is connected with the diffusion of the communication technologies of the fifth Kondratieff cycle. We fully agree with the importance ascribed to communication technologies - and would like to emphasize their role in shaping major manifestations of protest activity. It has already been noted that numerous events of revolutionary unrest, from the July revolution in France under King Louis-Philippe to Chinese revolts of 1989 were to a considerable extent facilitated by technological developments - everyday newspaper technology in case of the 1848 Spring of Peoples, cassette recorders in case of the Iranian Revolution, fax machines in case of 1989 China revolts and so on (for a review see Toska, 2015: 137). The technologies assumed to have played the greatest role in the Arab Spring events and their global echo include

* Corresponding author. E-mail address: [e-mail] (A. Korotayev).

Internet-based communication technologies (Internet sites, Twitter, Facebook groups, blogging etc.), satellite television channels (first and foremost, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya), and mobile telephony (Khosrokhavar, 2012: 152, Brynen et al., 2012: 233; Lynch, 2014: 93-110). Note that we are dealing here precisely with the 5th KondratieffWave technologies. Khosrovakhar offers a typology of social movements as regards communication technologies they employ: premodern movements, "based on the transfer of information by word of mouth"; modern movements, based on print, radio, and TV; and post-electronic age1 Net movements "based on new communication systems, with the Internet - especially Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube - playing a major role. They are gender mixed and youth oriented, as well as religiously open and politically inclusive ... They are not based on charismatic leadership or monitored by professional revolutionaries or intellectuals" (Khosrokhavar, 2012: 150-151).

The world in general and the Arab world in particular were experiencing an unusually intensive surge of protests in 2011-2012. The Middle East (especially the Arab countries) contributed the major part of this surge in 2011. Although the protests in Algeria began earlier, it has already become a traditional practice to start the description of the

Arab Spring events from December 17th, 2010, when the young unem-

p-_

l 1 Though it appears more correct to denote this age as "digital electronic" (correspondo- ing to the 5th K-wave) rather than "post-electronic", while the previous age can be called the "age of analog electronics" (corresponding to the 4th K-wave).

http ://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.08.009 0040-1625/© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

1920 1935 1950 1965 1980 1995 2010

Fig. 1. Dynamics of the total number of major antigovernment demonstrations registered in the world annually as recorded in the CNTS database (1920-2012). Cross-National Time Series Database. This figure has been made by Elena Slinko. Data source: (CNTS, 2015).

yed Mohamed Bouazizi committed self-immolation in the provincial Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid. The rising wave of protests resulted in an unexpectedly rapid fall of the Ben Ali regime primarily due to the revealed intra-elite conflict between the non-privileged army and the privileged security forces who were under the special care of the President (see, e.g., Nepstad, 2011). As a result, the army sided with the protesters, which determined the fall of the authoritarian regime in Tunisia. This surprisingly quick (and rather bloodless) fall of the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali pushed the secular leaders of youth movements in Egypt to attempt to organize (with the widespread use of social networks) large-scale protests in their country. Due to considerable internal stress in Egypt (see, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina, 2011; Grinin et al., 2015; Korotayev et al., 2016), this attempt caused an avalanche that led to the fall of Mubarak's regime. All of the above raised a wave of de-stabilization throughout the Arab world (the signs of which, however, were already visible immediately after the quick victory of the Tunisian revolution). The scale of destabilization in specific countries depended primarily on the extent to which there were present the appropriate conditions, such as internal elite conflict, intermediate regime type (half-democratic/half-authoritarian), the presence of disadvantaged groups (except guest workers), a high proportion of unemployed young people (especially with higher education) and so on (see, e.g., Goldstone, 2011, 2014; Beck, 2014; Lang and De Sterck, 2014; Korotayev et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2013, 2014; Grinin and Korotayev, 2011, 2012; Moore, 2012; Weyland, 2012; Wilson, 2013).2 In some cases (especially in Libya and Syria), an important role was played by external destabilizing actions.

However, the rest of the world also experienced - under the influence of the Arab Spring - a very non-trivial upsurge of protest activity

2 Note that by now the synchronizing factors of the Arab Spring events have been identified as follows: (1) a high level of synchronization of processes of modernization in most Arab countries, including the simultaneous sharp drop in infant and child mortality in the 1970s-1980, against the background of the massive expansion of higher education. This has resulted in the 2000s in most of the Arab countries in the simultaneous explosion of the number of young people in general, and the number of highly educated young people in particular; (2) the synchronizing effect of the second wave of agflation (skyrocketing food prices), which peaked just in January-February 2011; (3) the synchronizing role of pan-Arab satellite channels; (4) the synchronizing role of the pan-Arab Internet (Tsirel, 2012; Khodunov and Korotayev, 2012; Korotayev et al., 2012b; Korotayev et al., 2012a; Korotayev and Malkov, 2014; Korotayev, Issaev, Rudenko, 2015; Grinin, Issaev, Korotayev; Grinin, 2013; Korotayev and Zinkina, 2011; Korotayev et al., 2011a, 2011b). We would note immediately at this point that the last two factors are directly connected with the technologies of the 5th Kondratieff cycle.

as well; one can remember here the numerous "Occupy..." movements, from Occupy Wall Street to Occupy Abay.3 To sketch a brief picture of the "Occupy" protest activity in 2011-2012 and to emphasize its truly global nature, let us remember that this wave manifested itself in the USA (New York City, Detroit, Harvard University and so on), UK (London, Edinburgh, Glasgow etc.), Germany (Berlin and some other major cities), Norway (Oslo), numerous cities of Canada, Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), Australia (Melbourne and Sydney), New Zealand (Auckland and other cities), Nepal (Baluwatar), Cyprus, Ghana (Accra), Nigeria (Kano, Lagos, Abudja), Iceland (Reykjavik), South Africa (Johannesburg and Cape Town), Japan, Russia etc. One should also remember the 15 October 2011 global protests, which were endorsed by people from dozens of countries. In addition to the abovementioned Occupy protests, one could recollect major protests in 2011 in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Burkina Faso, Malawi, China, India, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Iran and so on (see, e.g. Breau, 2014; Charnock et al., 2012; Danjibo, 2013; Erde, 2014; Erdogan, 2013; Fadaee and Schindler, 2014; Greene and Kuswa, 2012; Gunter, 2013; Hoesterey, 2013; Iranzo and Farne, 2013; Jensen and Bang, 2013; Kerton, 2012; Musthaq, 2014; Pickerill and Krinsky, 2012).

However, the truly outstanding nature of these events is visible only with quantitative empirical data. In order to better understand the true scale of the Arab Spring and its global echo consider Figs. 1 and 2:

As we see, in 2011 the level of protest activity in the Middle East experienced a staggering leap by two orders of magnitude.4 However, in the rest of the world the increase in the level of protest activity in 2011-2012, though not as colossal as in the Middle East, was also very impressive - it grew almost by an order of magnitude.5

There are grounds to assume that in 2011-2012 the World System experienced to some extent a phase transition to a qualitatively new state (let us denote it as Phase Transition B). This phase transition bears some resemblance to the one which the World System experienced in the early 1960s (let us denote it as Phase Transition A).

In Fig. 1 the scale of Phase Transition A is somewhat diminished by the tremendous scale of Phase Transition B. So, in order to get a better understanding, it is reasonable to consider the same graph in logarithmic scale (see Fig. 3):

The dynamics featured in Fig. 3 bears some resemblance to the dynamics of Kondratieff waves. Let us take a deeper look into this resemblance.

A Russian economist writing in the 1920s, Nikolai Kondratieff observed that the historical record of some economic indicators then available to him appeared to indicate a cyclic regularity of phases of gradual increases in values of respective indicators followed by phases of decline (Kondratieff, 1922: ch. 5; 1925,1926,1935); the period of these apparent oscillations seemed to him to be around 50 years. This pattern was found by him with respect to such indicators as prices, interest rates, foreign trade, coal and pig iron production for some major Western economies (first of all England, France, and the United States), whereas the long waves in pig iron and coal production were claimed to be detected since the 1870s for the world level as well (note that as regards the production indices during decline/downswing phases we are dealing with the slowdown of production growth rather than with actual production declines that rarely last longer than 1-2 years, whereas during the upswing phase we are dealing with a general acceleration of the production growth rates in comparison with the preceding downswing/slowdown period

3 "Occupy Abay" is the appellation of the Russian 2012 Occupy movement named this way because its members chose as their main meeting point a square around the monument of Abay Kunanbayev (a famous Kazakh poet) in one of the central parts of Moscow.

4 While in 2010 CNTS registered only 5 major antigovernment demonstrations in the Middle East, in 2011 this number rocketed up to 307.

5 While in 2010 CNTS registered only 37 major antigovernment demonstrations in the rest of the world, in 2011 this number increased to 208.

»

•V 41 J h> /rwi Vf

350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Fig. 2. Dynamics of the total number of major antigovernment demonstrations registered in the Middle East and the rest of the world annually as recorded in the CNTS database (2002-2012). Data source: (CNTS, 2015).

Middle East

-World without the Middle East

Fig. 3. Dynamics of the total number of major antigovernment demonstrations registered in the world annually as recorded in the CNTS database (1920-2012), logarithmic scale.

[see, e.g., Modelski, 2001, 2006 who prefers quite logically to designate 'decline/downswing' phases as 'phases of take-off, whereas the upswing phases are denoted by him as 'high growth phases']).

Kondratieff himself identified the following long waves and their phases (see Table 1).

Kondratieff himself noticed that 'during the recession of the long waves an especially large number of important discoveries and inventions in the technique of production and communication are made, which, however, are usually applied on a large scale only at the beginning of the next long upswing' (Kondratieff, 1935: 111).

One of the ways K-waves influence the social processes and shape social macro-events is through the emergence of principally new communication technologies corresponding to respective technological systems, each of which corresponds to a particular Kondratieff wave.

From our perspective, the first (after 1919) phase transition occurred in the early 1960s and was related to the growth of global informational connectivity after the World War II, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of television, portable radio receivers, portable electric loud-speakers and other technologies of the Fourth Kondratieff Cycle (see, e.g., Transistor Radios, 1999; Arceneaux, 2014).

Even though global informational connectivity was on the increase throughout the whole of the 1950s, the growth in protest activity occurred not in a smooth, but in a sharp way in the very beginning of the 1960s. Prior to Phase Transition A CNTS records about 20 to 30 major antigovernment demonstrations annually, while in the early 1960s this rate jumps up to 100.

After that in 1964-1966 (but especially after the peak of the late 1960s, in 1971-1973) there follows a notable decline. However, by the 1980s the level of global protest activity which seemed anomalous in the early 1960s becomes quite regular.

The two decades preceding the Arab Spring were marked by a perceptible decreasing trend in the level of global protest activity; in 2010 it reached the lowest values since the mid-1970s. However, even in 2010 it was notably higher than any value recorded in CNTS before 1960.

Phase Transition B was prepared by a new wave of growth of global information connectivity, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of various technologies of the Fifth Kondratieff cycle (the Internet, satellite television, Twitter and other social networks, mobile telephony etc.). Once again, while the spread of these technologies was going on for many years before 2011, their internal colossal potential for generating and spreading protest activity was realized in one leap.

Table 1

Long waves and their phases identified by Kondratieff.

Long wave number Long wave phase Dates of the beginning Dates of the end

One A: Upswing 'The end of the 1780s or beginning of the 1790s' 1810-1817

B: Downswing 1810-1817 1844-1851

Two A: Upswing 1844-1851 1870-1875

B: Downswing 1870-1875 1890-1896

Three A: Upswing 1890-1896 1914-1920

B: Downswing 1914-1920

The subsequent students of Kondratieff cycles identified additionally the following long-waves in the post-World War 1 period (see Table 2).

Let us note that the spread of these technologies and the surge of revolutionary moods seem to share common pattern, which is stipulated by the dynamics of expectations:

In recent years a growing number of social science studies have pointed out the significance of expectations in science and technology innovation.... Novel technologies and fundamental changes in scientific principle do not substantively pre-exist themselves, except and only in terms of the imaginings, expectations and visions that have shaped their potential. As such, future-oriented abstractions are among the most important objects of enquiry for scholars and analysts of innovation. Such expectations can be seen to be fundamentally 'generative', they guide activities, provide structure and legitimation, attract interest and foster investment. They give definition to roles, clarify duties, offer some shared shape of what to expect and how to prepare for opportunities and risks. Visions drive technical and scientific activity, warranting the production of measurements, calculations, material tests, pilot projects and models (Borup et al., 2006: 285-286).

These words can without almost any change be applied to the expectations of the revolutionaries - the regime they want to create does not pre-exist except in imagination, so future-oriented abstractions are crucially important in guiding their activities.

This makes us turn our attention to the Gartner's hype-cycle, which describes the dynamics of expectations of a certain innovation during the early stages of the innovation's life cycle (see, e.g., Linden and Fenn, 2003; O'Leary, 2008, 2009; Jun, 2012; van Lente et al., 2013; Adamuthe et al., 2015; Sasaki, 2015, for more detail on Gartner's hype-cycles). Let us note that, according to Artemy Malkov's observation, the technologically stipulated dynamics of the protest activity during the previous phase transition somewhat resembles the dynamics of the new technologies expansion in the course of Gartner's Hype Cycle (see Fig. 4).

If this hypothesis is true, we are now in the second phase of this cycle, characterized by a notable decline in the level of protest activity. However, it will be very probably followed by a new (not such a dramatic one) phase of increase in the level of protest activity, after which its intensity will likely stabilize at the values lower than the 2011 peak, but still remarkably higher than the level of the first decade of this century.

Conclusion

There are grounds to conclude that in 2011 -2012 the World System experienced to some extent a phase transition to a qualitatively new state of global protest activity (phase transition B). This phase transition appears to bear some resemblance to the one which the World System experienced in the early 1960s (phase transition A).

Table 2

'Post-Kondratieff long waves and their phases.

Longwave number Long wave phase Dates of the beginning Dates of the end

Three A: Upswing 1890-1896 1914-1920

B: Downswing From 1914 to 1928/29 1939-1950

Four A: Upswing 1939-1950 1968-1977

B: Downswing 1968-1974 1984-1991

Five A: Upswing 1984-1991 2008-2010?

B: Downswing 2008-2010? ?

Sources: (Mandel, 1980; Dickson, 1983; Van Duijn, 1983:155; Wallerstein, 1984; Goldstein, 1988: 67; Modelski and Thompson, 1996; Pantin and Lapkin, 2006: 283-285,315; Ayres, 2006; Linstone, 2006: Fig. 1; Tausch, 2006: 101-104; Thompson, 2007: Table 5; Jourdon, 2008: 1040-1043; Korotayev and Grinin, 2012; Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010; Korotayev et al., 2011a). The last date is suggested by the authors of the present paper. It was also suggested earlier by Lynch (2004), Pantin and Lapkin (2006): 315, see also Akaev (2009), Akaev et al. (2011,2012).

Fig. 4. Stylized graphic representation of the dynamics of the new technologies expansion in the course of Gartner's Hype Cycle. Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ commons/9/94/Gartner_Hype_Cycle.svg

The first (after 1919) phase transition occurred in the early 1960s and was related to the growth of global informational connectivity after the World War II, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of television, portable radio receivers, portable electric loud-speakers and other technologies of the Fourth Kondratieff Cycle.

And although the global information connectivity was growing all the 1950s, the protest activity growth took place not gradually but abruptly at the beginning of the 1960s. If CNTS registers 20-30 large anti-government demonstrations per year before the phase transition A, at the beginning of the 1960s this level jumps up to a hundred.

Then, in 1964-1966 (but especially after the peak of the late 1960s -in 1971-1973) a noticeable decline could be noticed. However, by the 1980's the level of global protest activity that seemed anomalous in the early 1960, is becoming quite normal.

In the last 20 years before the Arab Spring there was a tendency to decline in the global protest activity, and in 2010 it was the lowest since the mid-1970s. But even in 2010 it was higher than whatever recorded in CNTS before 1960.

The phase transition of the early 2010s was prepared by a new wave of growth of global informational connectivity, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of various technologies of the Fifth Kondratieff cycle (the Internet, satellite television, Twitter and other social networks, mobile telephony etc.). Similarly to what was observed during the Fourth Kondratieff Wave, during the Fifth Cycle while the spread of these technologies was going on for many years before 2011, their internal colossal potential for generating and spreading protest activity was realized in one leap, as a phase transition.6

Acknowledgment

This article is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2016 with support of the Russian Science Foundation (Project# 14-11-00634).

6 Incidentally, as has been mentioned by Fred Phillips in his correspondence with us, he "anticipates massive protests as the robots and AIs take over almost all blue collar, white collar, and administrative jobs" during the forthcoming Sixth Kondratieff Wave (Phillips, 2016). We agree that this is a rather likely way how the technologies of the Sixth Kondratieff might produce Phase Transition C. Phillips is also correct to note that "the regularity of historical cycles, as you present them, implies that it is immaterial whether a protest results in regime change (Algeria) or not (USA), or whether it achieves its stated goal (ending the USA's Vietnam war or apartheid in South Africa) or not (Occupy Wall Street; Occupy Abay in Russia). It also implies that regimes can better plan when to prepare for internal vs. external threats, but offers no help to dissidents about how to make protests more effective" (Phillips, 2016).

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